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ABSTRACT 
There has been much criticism of international diplomacy in former Yugoslavia 
from 1991-95, with official investigations carried out into the role of key 
international players including France, the Netherlands and the United Nations. 
A number of states and institutions have been cited as responsible for aspects 
of the international failure, such as Germany for its 'premature' recognition of 
Croatia, the United States for failing to commit ground troops in the Bosnian 
war, the United Nations for failing to protect UN declared 'safe areas', and the 
European Community/Union for its lack of resolve. There has, on the other 
hand, been only limited scrutiny into the British role in the war, and none at 
institutional or governmental level. The only full-length study so far published 
is by Brendan Simms, entitled Unfinest Hour. The Destruction of Bosnia (2001). 
This thesis comprises an empirical study of the British role in Yugoslavia and 
its successor states between 1991 and 1995, and demonstrates that the British 
government led the international 'consensus' during that time, through what 
may be considered a doctrine of assertive appeasement while, at the same time, 
misleading parliament on issues crucial to an understanding of the situation. It 
also demonstrates that British policy was consistent, unlike that of its western 
allies, in obstructing initiatives aimed at effective international military 
intervention, which resulted in a prolongation of the war, and advanced the 
agenda of the Belgrade regime. 
The motives which may have guided British policy in this instance are 
discussed briefly in the introductory chapter which offers an outline of the 
global framework within which British policy was formulated in the wake of the 
Cold War, with particular reference to Britain's place in the new European 
order, following the downing of the Berlin Wall, and in the lead-up to the 
Maastricht Treaty. A chronological approach has been adopted as the most 
appropriate in demonstrating some of the intricate manoeuvres which 
characterised British diplomacy in the region at crucial junctures of the war. 
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PREFACE/ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Although the turmoil in Yugoslavia and its successor states during the 
1990s spawned a vast volume of literature, including three detailed 
reports into the Srebrenica crisis, there has been little analysis of the 
British role in the region during the war, and only one full-length study, 
Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia, by Brendan Simms. 
Other studies include Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy 
and the Yugoslav War, published in 1997 by James Gow with a section on 
British policy, Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion? British Policy in Former 
Yugoslavia, a short study by Jane Sharp, published in 1997, and The Serb 
Lobby in the United Kingdom, published in 1999 by this au thor who also 
co-authored a report for the European Commission, A Test for Europe. 
Report: Confidence Building in Former Yugoslavia (1996), with a brief 
review of the British role in the conflict. 
This thesis reaches similar conclusions to Simms' study, namely that 
Britain assumed a leading role in the conflict and, in the process, 
alienated some of its closest allies. On the other hand, Simms confines his 
study to the Bosnian war, and attributes the failure of British policy to a 
form of 'negative Conservative pessimism' leading to a lack of political will, 
which is the main theme of James Gow's analysis. Gow, unlike Simms, is 
a regional specialist but was constricted by his official advisory capacity 
which, as Simms suggested, may have impelled him to 'calibrate his advice 
according to the circumstances and the prevailing policy'.1 Gow contends 
that, while British policy in Bosnia failed, its failure was shared 
internationally, and resulted from a lack of sufficient will on the part of 
leading powers and institutions to take the action necessary to end the 
war sooner. 
I SIMMS, Brendan. Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia. Penguin, 200 l, p.25l. 
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This study draws from material published in the languages of former 
Yugoslavia, and French and Italian, and benefits from recent publications, 
including memoirs by some of the leading players, the extensive French 
and Dutch reports, and evidence offered at the trial of Slobodan Milosevic 
and other indictees at the International Tribunal at the Hague. It also 
draws extensively on parliamentary proceedings and Select Committee 
evidence. 
International policy on Yugoslavia and its successor states was partly 
shaped by a number of myths surrounding the war and its genesis, many 
of which emanated from Belgrade. These included the characterisation of 
the war as of a civil or religious nature, the belief that it was rooted in 
centuries of ethnic hatred, that the Serbs were militarily invincible, that 
Serbia was the best guarantor of the continuance of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, and that the international recognition of Croatia 
was premature, and thereafter circumscribed international policy in the 
area, leading to full-scale war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In order to examine 
some of these myths and their interaction with international, and 
particularly British, policy, a chronological approach has been adopted. 
This has also facilitated analysis of the international debate in relation to 
developments on the ground, to demonstrate the way in which Britain 
endeavoured to maintain control of the political process throughout the 
wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, foiling attempts by other 
international players to introduce measures which may have contributed 
to restoring the balance between the different communities to end the war, 
including, amongst other measures, the threat and use of military force, 
removal of the inequitable embargo on armaments, a more stringent 
implementation of UN sanctions and other Security Council resolutions, 
and early enforcement of an air exclusion zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Since international policy in former Yugoslavia was decided primarily 
within the UN Security Council, the positions of the other Permanent 
Members of the Council, in particular the United States and France, are 
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assessed in relation to developments on the ground. Chapter 1 (1991) 
focuses on the prelude to hostilities, and the six-month war in Croatia, 
during which time most of the main elements of international policy in the 
area were formulated, including the introduction of the UN arms embargo, 
the establishment of a peace conference, chaired by a former British 
foreign secretary, Peter Lord Carrington, and the eschewal of military 
intervention to stem the conflict. In Chapter 2 (1992), the build-up to war 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina is examined, as well as the role of UN Under 
Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Marrack Goulding, and of 
Lord Carrington in launching the Cutileiro Plan for the ethnic partition of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also assesses the influence of Britain during its 
tenure of the EC Presidency, in particular through the London Conference 
and the despatch of 1,800 British UN troops to Bosnia with a mandate to 
escort humanitarian aid. 1993 was dominated by a series of international 
peace plans, most of them under the aegis of another former British 
foreign secretary, David Lord Owen, appointed European negotiator and 
co-chair of the steering committee of the International Conference on 
former Yugoslavia, working firstly with former US Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance, and with former lIt Secretary at the Norwegian embassy in 
Belgrade, Thorvald Stoltenberg. In Chapter 3, the influence of the Vance-
Owen Plan in particular is analysed, both in relation to events on the 
ground in Bosnia and to the evolution of international policy and the 
establishment of UN 'safe areas'. While David Owen's influence on 
international policy continued till his retirement in 1995, much of the 
spotlight in 1994 transferred to the new British UN Commander in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Lt. General Sir Michael Rose, at a time when international 
policy was tested by the Bosnian Serb army in assaults on three UN 'safe 
areas'. Chapter 4 examines the role of General Rose who acted in a 
political, as well as military, capacity in the 'safe areas' crises, with 
consequences both for international policy and the situation on the 
ground. In 1995, the single greatest atrocity in Europe since World War II 
took place, as over 7,000 men and boys were massacred following the fall 
of the UN 'safe area' of Srebrenica to Serb forces, challenging the main 
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precepts on which the British-led policy had been based. In Chapter 5, the 
British government role in the prelude to, and aftermath of, the massacre 
is assessed and contrasted with that of the new British UN Commander, 
Lt. General Rupert Smith as he, in coordination with the Commander of 
NATO's Southern Command, finally acted to bring the war to an end. 
The research for this thesis is also based on a study of the languages, 
literature and history of Yugoslavia over a period of more than thirty years, 
with extended stays in the country and region on a working, study and 
personal basis, including from July 1990 to April 1991, directly preceding 
the outbreak of war. Frequent visits were made to the area during the war 
and afterwards, in the course of implementing two European Commission 
projects, as well as on humanitarian grounds. Participation in academic 
conferences at the Universities of London, Keele, Bristol, Aberdeen and 
Wales, as well as Tuzla, Skopje and Montenegro, have provided an 
invaluable opportunity for an exchange of views and information. 
Knowledge of the languages has often enabled the direct contact essential 
to an understanding of some of the subtler undercurrents affecting 
relations, both within and amongst the different communities, and 
towards outside protagonists. I am grateful to the Social Science Research 
Council for an initial grant towards this dissertation, allowing the time and 
opportunity to research more fully into the background of the region, 
which later proved invaluable to an understanding of the rapid 
developments of the early 1990s. I would like to acknowledge the support 
of my former supervisor, the late Professor Alec Nove, for encouragement 
and discussion on some of the wider aspects of the issue, and to Professor 
Hillel Ticktin, for his assistance in the final presentation. 
Acknowledgement is also due to the University of Glasgow Library, the 
Mitchell Library, and the libraries of London University (SSEES) and the 
House of Commons. My thanks go to Professor Nenad Bicanic for the loan 
of his comprehensive tapes recording British television coverage of the 
war, to Marjan Koharic for taping Serbian and Croatian TV coverage, to 
llario Salucci for generously sharing his flies of the Italian media coverage 
ix 
of the war, and to the UNHCR for providing maps contemporaneous with 
the situation on the ground in Bosnia. Extended correspondence with over 
a hundred Members of Parliament on the Bosnian war, as well as with the 
East Adriatic Office and the Ministry of Defence, has also been helpful. 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the benefit of frank and useful 
exchanges of information with numerous other people, including the late 
Sir Fitzroy Maclean, Vladimir Velebit, Henri Wynaendts, Sir Russell 
Johnstone, Professor Ervin Staub, Professor Thomas Cushman, Professor 
Wohlstetter, Sir Kenneth Scott, Sir Martin Garrod, officials from the 
Cabinet of former EC Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Hans Van den 
Broek, former ambassadors to the UK, Ante Cicin-Sain, Muhamed 
Filipovic and Osman Topcagic, former Bosnian government ministers Ejup 
Ganic and Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, the Croatian foreign minister Tonino 
Picula, founder member of the Belgrade Circle, Professor Obrad Savic, 
officers at the Hague Tribunal, including David Talbot, John James and 
Jonathan Cina, Peter Kessler at the UN High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR), Pentagon officials at the office of the late Joe Kreuzel, staff at the 
International Crisis Group and, not least, the late US Senator Frank 
McCloskey. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the Cold War international order, Britain enjoyed a pivotal role 
amongst western powers, and was an essential partner to the United 
States in guaranteeing West European security. Its privileged status as a 
nuclear power, and as a leading European military power with a 
disproportionate share in NATO military commands, marked Britain out 
amongst other European states. 1 Britain also differed from its European 
partners in its trade and investment patterns, its continued military and 
political commitments in the dependent territories and Commonwealth, 
and its entrenched position in the Security Council and other global 
institutions. Yet the erosion of international arrangements and national 
institutions largely predicated on the Cold War, coupled with Britain's 
indigenous industrial decline and economic under-performance, 
suggested it was likely to have a diminished role in the post Cold War 
order. The City of London's world leadership in various markets had 
been assisted by deregulation and a 'light' administration of rules. The 
new global order confronted Britain with the choice between settling for 
the status of a middle-rating European power commensurate with its 
economic performance, and attempting to retain its long-enjoyed world 
power status.2 
The end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany also led to a 
reassessment on the part of European leaders attempting to come to 
terms with the new order, and particularly Britain as it found itself on 
the periphery of a European order dominated by Germany and France 
which were locked into an interdependent relationship, substantially 
determined by the Cold War. German reunification, transforming it 
easily into the largest European power, threatened Britain's primus inter 
1 WALLACE, William. British Foreign Policy after the Cold War. International Affairs 68, 
3,1992, p.427. 
2 See HUnON, Will. Britain in a Cold Climate: the economic aims of foreign policy in the 1990s. 
International Affairs 68, 3,1992, p.619-632. 
1 
pares status in Europe. Yet Britain was not prepared for a diminished 
status, or a reduced scope for autonomous action which the terms of the 
Maastricht Treaty seemed to presage. 
The Yugoslav crisis erupted in the interval between the Gulf War and the 
final disintegration of the Soviet Union, and in the midst of the 
Maastricht negotiations. The United States, emerging from a qualified 
victory in the Gulf, looked to the European Community to address what 
was generally viewed as a limited regional war. The (in)famous remark of 
the Luxemburg Foreign Minister and EC Troika member, Jacques Poos, 
as war broke out in Yugoslavia, that 'This is the hour of Europe' , 
reflected at that time the overall sentiment of European leaders some of 
whom, France in particular, attempted to promote the role of European 
institutions such as the Western European Union in resolving the crisis, 
as part of a general attempt to establish a viable European Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, independent of the United States. 
British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd's unqualified rejection of the use 
of military force in Croatia at the WEU and Council of Ministers' 
meetings in September 1991 was generally viewed at the time as British 
reluctance to become involved militarily in what might tum out to be a 
lengthy, open-ended battle in the Balkans. The imposition of a blanket 
arms embargo in the same month by the United Nations, on Britain's 
initiative, reinforced the impression that Britain had opted for a 
containment policy. Although the use of force remained the main issue 
of contention between Britain and many of its European partners, the 
UK position appeared plausible at the time, not least in light of Britain's 
experience in Northern Ireland where, despite the considerable military 
commitment, hostilities had continued for over two decades. 3 The 
European Community's eschewal of military intervention prevailed, with 
a few exceptions, till 1995, earning it the reputation of a lack of political 
3 This was the argument offered to the author by former Defence Secretary, John Nott, in October 
1995. 
2 
will, a label which was subsequently extended to the United States 
which was disinclined to commit ground troops to Bosnia, and reluctant 
to intervene with air power, in the absence of the approval of its main 
European ally, Britain. 
Britain was perhaps less pusillanimous on the Yugoslav issue than was 
generally supposed, however. As argued above, with the erosion of Soviet 
power, and the concomitant diminution in Britain's strategic value to the 
United States, the UK position within the European Community, as it 
moved towards closer political cooperation, assumed greater relevance in 
Britain's endeavours to sustain its world power status. This was 
reflected not least in lengthy debates in the House of Commons during 
1991 and 1992 to resolve contentious party political issues, but also to 
ensure the necessary degree of flexibility within the EC to enable Britain 
to prevail as a leading European power. In this, the UK's military 
strength in European terms played a vital role in challenging the 
effectiveness of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). This was 
reflected inter alia in the French press in late 1991, where British 
intransigence was viewed as the main obstacle to European political 
integration.4 In this, the Yugoslav crisis may have offered Britain an 
opportunity to lead, as it were, from the rear. In quelling calls for 
European intervention, Britain nipped in the bud any European 
pretensions towards creating a viable CFSP in practice, while at the 
same time with the aid of the arms embargo ensuring the supremacy of 
Belgrade against the secessionist republics. 
4 See, for instance, 'Un geste des Britanniques', Le Monde November 14, 1991, p.1, 'La 
Communaute au pied du mur britannique', Le Monde, October 11, p.2, L'adhesion de la Grande-
Bretagne ala CEE', Le Monde, October 27-28, 1991, p.2, and Les desaccords sur la politique 
etrangere et de security, Le Monde, December 5,1991, p.6. Britain's focus was mainly on EC 
enlargement. In a New Year interview on BBC Radio 4, in early January 1992, the Prime 
Minister, John Major spoke of the EC extending 'to include Russia at least as far as the Urals'. 
The Labour Party, despite differences with the Conservatives on a number ofEC issues, 
appeared to concur with this. Its manifesto for the 1992 election declared 'we will make the 
widening of the EC apriority'. 
3 
The EC's practice, during the summer of 1991, of perceiving Serbian 
President Milosevic in Belgrade as the main Yugoslav interlocutor was 
less surprising than may appear in retrospect. The Presidency, with 
four of its eight republican delegates under Serbian control, was based 
in the Yugoslav capital, as were the diplomatic links. Britain, on the 
other hand, may have considered the cultivation of a relatively powerful 
ally on Europe's south-east flank a useful attribute, in military and 
political terms, not only as a bulwark against German hegemony within 
Europe (and possibly a cordon sanitaire against Islam), but as a foil to 
EC political and military integration. 
British/Serb sympathies are not of recent origin. Support for the small 
Balkan nations rebelling against the Ottoman Empire emerged during 
the rule of Gladstone in the 1870s, and more specifically for Serbia 
during World War I, as evidenced in parliamentary debates. s Much of the 
literature of the time also reflected a pro-Serb bias, from Robert George 
Dalrymple Laffan's The Serbs: The Guardians o/the Gate6 to Dame 
Rebecca West's interwar travelogue, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, a 
best-seller and, for many, the first introduction to Yugoslavia.7 The 
divisions within Yugoslavia during World War II produced two main pro-
Serb traditions in Britain, the monarchist, Cetnik movement led by 
Draza Mihailovic which until 1943 received limited support from the 
British government, and the Titoist partisan movement, led by Josip 
5 See, for instance, vote of Credit. Serbia. Hansard. November 11, 1915, Sup.ply-Cornmittee, Land 
~s. Hansard. December 21.1915, c.429-430, and Motion for Adjournment. 'no country in the 
whole of Europe has supported Serbia during this War as we have .. .it was the British munitions, 
sent lavishly when we were short ... that enabled the Serbians, when they were in the very direst 
extremity, to succeed in thrusting the invader from their land'. Christmas Recess. Hansard. 
December 23, 1915, c.733. 
6 Laffan refers to the Serbs as 'never ... content to submit to slavery, [they] have unceasingly 
struggled towards the light', and 'Bosnia and Hertzegovina are Serbian lands'. LAFFAN, R.G.D. The 
Guardians of the Gate: Historical Lectures on the Serbs. Clarendon Press, 1918, republished as 
The Serbs: The Guardians of the Gate. Dorset Press, 1989. 
7 WEST, Rebecca. Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: The Record of a Journey Through Yugoslavia in 
/937.2 vols. (London 1943) and New York, Viking Press, 1968. 
4 
Broz, to which Churchill switched allegiance in September 1943.8 
Approximately 8,000 Cetniks were resettled in Britain after 1947 and 
joined the substantial Serb emigre population in Britain. A number 
became politically active in the 1990s, working through parliament, the 
media and other sectors of the British establishment.9 
The assumption that Britain, or the Major government, in the final 
decade of the twentieth century was overcome by a 'profoundly 
conservative philosophical realism'lO was not evident in statements made 
by British ministers at the time, however. Foreign Secretary Douglas 
Hurd was at pains to clarify the British position in the post Cold War era 
in the House of Commons and elsewhere. 
Sometimes ... those in charge of British foreign policy have felt, perhaps, 
that they were working against the grain of history, against the way in 
which the world was going. Sometimes the pressures on us to 
dismantle the British empire were felt to be forcing us to move more 
quickly than seemed at the time to be safe or sensible ... There is no 
such feeling now. Those of us who try to work for British interests in 
these areas feel that we are going now with the grain of history. We are 
at the centre of events. No other country belongs to NATO, the 
Community, the Commonwealth, the Group of Seven and the 
United Nations Security Council. We are uniquely central to 
developments and discussions that I have been talking about. It means 
8 This led to divisions in Britain between Fitzroy Maclean, Bill Deakin and others who had 
championed Tito's partisans and Cetnik supporters, which sharpened during the early 1990s. 
Works by BELOFF, Nora, Tito's Flawed Legacy and LEES, Michael, The Rape of Serbia, 
published by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich in 1985 and 1990, respectively, promoted the Cetnik 
legacy in Britain. For Churchill's own account of the switch in policy, see CHURCHILL, 
Winston S. The Second World War. Volume Five. Closing the Ring. London, 1952. pp.360-372. 
9 For further details of this, and Serb lobbying activities in Britain in the 1990s, see HODGE, 
Carole. The Serb Lobby in the United Kingdom. The Donald W Treadgold Papers. The Henry M 
Jackson School ofIntemational Studies, University of Washington, 2003, pp.7-8. For specific 
lobbying activities within the Conservative Party, see also VULLIAMY, Ed and LEIGH, David. 
Sleaze: The corruption of parliament. London, 1997. 
10 This position was taken by Brendan Simms in the only full-length published appraisal of the 
British role at the time of writing (January 2004). See SIMMS, Brendan. Unfinest Hour. Britain 
and the Destruction of Bosnia. Allen Lane, 2001, p.6. 
5 
that the merry-go-round of meetings is pretty formidable. It means also 
that our foreign policy has to be strenuous and energetic ... we are well 
placed to persevere and to succeed. 11 
In recent years, Britain has punched above her weight in the world. 
We intend to keep it that way ... Britain plays a central role in world 
affairs. We owe this in part to our history, but we continue to earn it 
through active diplomacy and a willingness to shoulder our share of 
international responsibilities. 12 
Britain has traditionally been a 'warrior nation', 13 and was usually not 
hesitant in using force. Its special sense of responsibility has been 
explained as a legacy of imperial times, 14 but it also reflected a priority to 
retain the UK's privileged Permanent Five position on Security Council, 
as well as its leading European role in NATO and other international 
institutions. In light of this, in leading the international consensus not 
to intervene militarily in Croatia (and later Bosnia), it is improbable that 
Britain was motivated by what another analyst termed its 'pusillanimous 
realism'.lS Neither is it likely to have been guided by 'an acute sense of 
the limitations of British power', as Simms concluded. 16 A more 
convincing explanation for Britain's determined stand against other 
major European powers in 1991, and its unwavering rejection of 
11 Douglas Hurd, Debate on the Address. Hansard. Vo1.198, November I, 1991, c.130. 
12 'Making the world a safer place: our priorities'. Douglas Hurd, Daily Telegraph, January 1, 
1992. 
\3 SHARP, Jane. Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion? Institute for Public Policy Research, 1997, 
p.4. This was also reflected in UK defence spending. In 1990, Britain spent 4% of its GDP on 
defence, against a NATO average of3.1-3.2% Statement on the Defence Estimates: Britain's 
defence for the 1990s. HMSO, London, 1991. p.54, quoted in BELLAMY, Christopher. Soldier 
of Fortune: Britain's new military role. International Affairs, 68, 3, 1992, p.54. Bellamy notes 
that the Labour Party had a similar policy on defence spending levels. 
14 SHARP, Ibid. 
15 GOW, James. International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict. MacMillan, 1996, p.97. 
Gow argues in this and later works that, while British policy in Bosnia failed, its failure was shared 
internationally, and resulted from a lack of sufficient will on the part of leading powers and 
institutions to take the action necessary to end the war. 
16 SIMMS, B. Unfinest Hour, op.cit. p. 7. 
6 
effective military intervention during the Bosnian war, was offered by 
Jane Sharp, senior research fellow at the Centre of Defence Studies, 
King's College London: 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the main reason Britain did 
not halt Serb aggression against Bosnia is that policy makers in 
Whitehall wanted Serbia and its proxies in Bosnia to prevail. l7 
According to one British journalist, 
the advice from successive British envoys in Belgrade is that without 
a strong Serbia there will be no stability in the Balkans. In the eyes of 
the Foreign Office that remains as true today as it did in 1913 and in 
1939. Unpopular, unpalatable but undeniable. ls 
The motivations of British policy makers are not addressed in any detail 
here, since to assess the broader objectives of British policy would 
require study over a longer timescale, and probably over a wider area. 
This study demonstrates, however, that Britain, for the most part, led an 
international 'consensus' which, between the summer of 1991 and 1995, 
benefited the Serb regimes in Belgrade and Pale, respectively, at the 
expense of the interests of the Bosnian government and other 
proponents of a multi-cultural society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Croatia, and in doing so may have prolonged the war. 
17 SHARP, 1997. op.cit. p.8. Sharp somewhat dilutes her conclusion, however, by arguing that 
Britain had 'no stomach to act unilaterally' in the absence of an American lead. Ibid. Indeed, the 
efforts by British leaders to prevent US military intervention in Bosnia (vide US Secretary of State 
Warren Christoper's visit to London in May 1993) challenge that theory. 
18 SHERIDAN, Michael. Independent, June 3, 1995, quoted in SHARP,lbid. p.8. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CROATIA 1991: ESTABLISHING THE PARAMETERS 
Introduction 
Decisions taken in 1991 established the main framework for 
international policy in Yugoslavia and its successor states till NATO took 
action in Bosnia in late 1995. Most scholars now concur that the 
international Yugoslav policy failed in 1991.1 Contrary, however, to 
those who attribute the failure to the international community as a 
whole, or to Germany in particular, it is argued here that it was Britain 
which dominated the international decision-making process, resulting in 
the reinforcement of the Milosevic regime in Belgrade, and facilitating 
the maintenance of territorial gains by the Yugoslav People's Army 
(JNA)2 and Serbian paramilitaries in Croatia in the latter half of 1991. 
The first part of this chapter examines developments in the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRJ] at political, constitutional and 
economic level, leading up to the war in Croatia, when most 
international agencies and states, including Britain, supported the 
survival of the SFRJ as a unitary state. The background to the 
disintegration of the SFRJ, and the efforts by individual republic leaders 
to break the impasse created by unitary forces, on the one hand, and 
would-be secessionists on the other, have particular relevance in 
I This is supported by a number of official enquiries which have acknowledged varying degrees of 
international responsibility in failing to exert a credible threat of force in the early stages of the war 
to bring an end to hostilities, including the Report of the International Commission on 
the Balkans (1996), the United Nations Srebrenica Report (1999), the French National Assembly 
Report (2001), and the report by the Netherlands Institute of War Documentation (2002). The EC-
brokered Brioni agreement of July 7, 1991, signalled the end of hostilities in Slovenia, but also 
served to hasten the onset of full-scale war in Croatia. 
2 Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija. 
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relation to later assumptions which contributed to shaping the policies 
of leading world powers in attempting to bring hostilities to an end. 
The second part of the chapter comprises a chronological analysis of the 
international response to developments on the ground after the onset of 
war, and demonstrates how the divergent positions within Europe 
during the early part of the war in Croatia gradually coalesced under 
British guidance, through a series of closely inter-linked policies 
introduced in the late summer of 1991. These both facilitated and 
encouraged the control of the war by Serbian elites, headed by President 
Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade, and backed by the JNA on the ground. 
Reference is made to parliamentary records, and to the positions of 
other major powers, including the United States, France, Russia, 
Germany, and the Netherlands as holder of the EC Presidency. Evidence 
given at House of Commons Select Committee meetings and other fora is 
also examined, particularly with regard to the commonly-held view that 
the JNA was acting autonomously, thereby implicitly absolving the 
Serbian regime of central responsibility for most of the atrocities. 
The lack of success of the Hague Peace Conference, chaired by former 
British foreign secretary Lord Carrington, has often been attributed, not 
least by Carrington himself, to Germany's 'hasty' recognition of Croatia 
and Slovenia.3 By contrast, the Vance Plan, involving the despatch of 
UN troops to Serb-held territory in Croatia, was frequently perceived as 
the main, and even only, redeeming feature of international policy that 
year, crucial in bringing the six-month war in Croatia to an end. These 
positions are critically examined with reference to British ministerial 
statements, the situation on the ground, and relevant developments in 
the Soviet Union and elsewhere. The genesis, timing and impact of the 
Vance Plan are also assessed, both with regard to the situation in 
Bosnia and the Belgrade regime, with close reference to the memoirs of 
3 Interview in NIN, Belgrade, 20 October 1995. 
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the outgoing SFRJ president, Borisav Jovic, and reports by senior 
members of the EC Monitoring Mission [ECMM], and Western and 
Yugoslav media coverage. 
Prelude to war 
The international response to the rising tensions in Yugoslavia in the 
late 1980s was muted until January 1991, at which time a number of 
countries, including Britain, issued a warning to the JNA that military 
action against individual republics would not be tolerated.4 
The growing unrest in Yugoslavia in early 1991 posed a dilemma for the 
international community. Slovenia and Croatia were planning to declare 
their independence, while the JNA resolved to undertake military 
measures in defence of the unitary state. In either case, it was 
recognised that serious consequences would ensue, not only in 
Yugoslavia but also the Soviet Union where the Baltic republics were 
threatening to secede, and where a direct confrontation with the JNA 
might draw in the Soviet army. 
In early 1991, international policy was united in attempting to hold 
Yugoslavia together as a unitary state. But the 'sticks and carrots' 
approach adopted by the European Community, the United States and 
Western fmancial institutions to address the problem failed to take full 
account of two main factors. Firstly, the Yugoslav Federation was by 
4 The CIA, in November 1990, had warned of Yugoslavia's probable disintegration, while 
Conservative MP Peter Fry, leading a parliamentary group to Yugoslavia in late 1990, took a 
more sanguine view, judging that complete separation was not inevitable, urging work towards a 
largely self-governing loose confederation, with certain specified powers on a federal basis: "As 
an encouragement to them, my fellow officers and members of the parliamentary group called on 
our Government to help admit Yugoslavia to several institutions to give greater credibility to the 
federal Government ... Unfortunately that opportunity was lost. The Western powers misread the 
situation .... " Croatia. November 13, 1991, Hansard, V01.l98, c.l202. See also 'Break-up nearer 
after Milosevic win'. The Times, December 12, 1990. 
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that time already at an advanced state of disintegration and, secondly, 
the main force behind the disintegration process, Slobodan Milosevic, 
was not prepared to consider anything less than a Serb-dominated 
state. Predictably, this was rejected out of hand by the other republics 
(apart from Montenegro), creating a 'Catch 22' situation which precluded 
peaceful resolution while the Serbian President remained at the helm. 
For a number of other reasons, peace was not an attractive option for 
Milosevic, since the mounting tensions in Serbia in early 1991, arising 
from deep-seated political and economic problems, clearly indicated that 
Milosevic's longer-term political survival now depended on a major 
diversion, such as a limited war, controlled by Belgrade. 
Close analysis of the situation in Yugoslavia in the lead-up to hostilities 
in 1991 is essential in understanding Milosevic's increasingly tenuous 
position, even within Serbia itself, as the country plunged deeper into 
economic, political and social chaos, while Milosevic, within weeks of his 
election victory in 1990, lost the support of the majority of the Serbian 
population.s By the end of 1991, however, he was firmly re-entrenched 
in power. It was in no small measure the response of the European 
Community, and Britain in particular, to the war in Croatia which was 
instrumental in shoring up Milosevic's hold over the army and the main 
political and economic power structures, so that by early 1992 he was in 
a position to extend the field of military combat to Bosnia. 
As a federation, Yugoslavia had already collapsed in political, economic, 
and constitutional terms well before the outbreak of war in Slovenia. 
The country was already suffering the loss of revenue in the form of soft 
loans and aid secured by Tito till his death in 1980, which had helped to 
S This era is analysed in some detail from differing perspectives in MAGAS, Branka, The 
Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the break-up 1980-1992. Verso, 1993, SILBER, Laura, and 
LITILE, Alan, The Death of Yugoslavia, Penguin, 1995, WOODWARD, Susan, Balkan 
Tragedy, Brookings, 1995, and GOLDSTEIN, Ivo, Croatia. A History. Hurst, 1999. 
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keep Yugoslavia afloat during the Cold War years. By the end of the 
decade, the rigorous economic reform programme introduced by 
Yugoslav Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, backed by international 
[mandal institutions, was considered the only hope for economic 
recovery6. This programme collapsed virtually within days of Milosevic 
becoming Serbian president.7 The Serbian National Assembly in which 
his party had acquired 194 of the 250 seats voted secretly to authorise 
the printing of$1,4 billion in unauthorised loans to the Republic of 
Serbia, without federal approval. s Apart from bringing about an instant 
devaluation of the dinar, it challenged the entire economic reform 
programme crafted by Markovic.9 In the process, federal structures 
were weakened, and the more prosperous western republics began 
opting out of [mandal payments to the federal authorities. Since 
Slovenia produced a significant percentage of Yugoslavia's export 
revenue at this time, this dealt a further blow to the economy. 10 
6 Yugoslavia's total foreign debt was reduced from $22 billion in 1988 to $16.5 billion in 1990, 
with an increase in exports of 9.1 % compared with the same period in 1989, and over 2,000 
contracts for joint ventures signed with foreign capital by September 1990, estimated at DM 1.5 
billion. See 'The End of an Era, New Beginnings?' ANDREJEVICH, Milan. RFEIRLReport on 
Eastern Europe, December 20, 1990, p.44. 
7 For the role of the Serbian media in assisting Milosevic's SPS party to power, see HAYDEN, 
Robert M 'Politics and the Media', in RFEIRL Report on Eastern Europe, December 6, 1991, and 
Vreme, June 10, 1991. 
8 The move hit the headlines of Yugoslav dailies, Borba pointing out that it breached the Serbian 
constitution and damaged Yugoslavia's monetary policy. See 'Udar na monetami sistem', Borba, 
January 9, 1991. For an account of this episode by the Yugoslav Prime Minister at the time, see 
transcripts of testimony by Ante Markovic at the Milosevic trial [Milosevic: "Kosovo, Croatia 
and Bosnia Herzegovina" IT-02-54.] International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia 
[leTY], October 23, 2003, pp.28012-3. 
9 Some of this revenue is rumoured to have been invested abroad; the rest swelled the coffers of 
Belgrade's banks in preparation for war. According to Borka Vucic, director of the Beogradska 
Banka's branch in Nicosia, Cyprus: 'When it was clear to President Milosevic that war in SFRJ 
was inevitable, and that Serbia too had to introduce a multi-party system, he ... took the decision 
that we should move most of our gold and currency reserves abroad, thus preventing the 
opposition from keeping a check on our business ... With that money we bought arms and food for 
Serbia, we paid the expenses of our embassies and diplomatic representatives, and through my 
bank we traded with the world. That money saved Serbia and its leadership .. .' Nasa Ree, 
Belgrade, August 12, 1996. 
10 Markovic transcripts, ICTY. op.cit. 
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Markovic's reforms worked towards a strengthening of federal 
structures, with a corresponding reduction of power in the republics. 
The collapse of the economic reform programme had the reverse effect 
and, in the economic chaos which ensued, Milosevic was able to 
expropriate funds from the federal reserves in preparation for war .11 
These developments had serious consequences for the working 
population throughout Yugoslavia, and especially in Serbia. By 
December 1990, a considerable number of Serbia's industrial workers 
had been unpaid for months and feared redundancy. Many who voted 
for Milosevic, the 'socialist' candidate, in the December 1990 elections 
had done so in the hope that he would guarantee their jobs and social 
benefits at a time of domestic upheaval and international uncertainty. 
They soon found this not to be the case, as thousands of firms in Serbia 
faced bankruptcy by the end of the first quarter of 1991. On 28 January 
1991, over 2,000 metal workers went on strike under the slogan: We 
voted/or you and you deceived us'. 12 The following month, a further 
13,000 workers struck in the district of Rakovica, in protest not just 
about wages but against Serbian government policies, declaring that 
Milosevic had lost the confidence of the unions that had supported him 
in the election. 13 In mid April, some 750,000 workers from the metal, 
textile and leather industries took to the streets, demanding higher 
wages and compensation for unpaid work. The Serbian National 
Assembly agreed to their demands, but the strikers threatened further 
action would ensue, possibly including the miners, if their requirements 
11 Yugoslavia's foreign currency reserves, amounting to over $9 billion in September 1990, 40% 
more than in 1989, had dropped to $8.2 billion immediately following Milosevic's victory in 
December 1990, due to the loss of confidence in banks, resulting in the large-scale withdrawal of 
hard currency. RFEIRLReport, op.cit. December 20, 1990, p.44. 
12 Borba, January 29, 1991. 
13 RFEIRL, op.cit. 18 February 1991. The workers' fears were not unfounded. According to the 
Yugoslav Accounting Service figures, published on 25 February, 6,500 firms, employing nearly 2 
million workers were insolvent at the end of January, with 823 firms in Serbia facing bankruptcy, 
with over $1.7 billion unsettled debts overall. Borba, February 13, 1991; Vjesnik, February 19, 
1991, and RFEIRL Report on Eastern Europe, February 26, 1991, p.52. 
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were not met promptly. 14 Strikes were not a new phenomenon in 
Yugoslavia, but in the new pluralist state just weeks after the election 
they could not be ignored, and even threatened the survival of the 
Serbian government. 
By early 1991, Serbia was effectively in control of four out of the eight 
republics and provinces represented in the Yugoslav Presidency. The 
Serbian leadership had stripped the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina 
of their autonomy granted by Tito under the Yugoslav Constitution of 
1974 and installed, by means of rent-a-crowds, rigged elections and 
other political manoeuvres, a Milosevic placeman, Momir Bulatovic, as 
President of Montenegro. IS This Serb bloc, with 50% control of the 
Presidency, was crucial in many respects but especially in relation to the 
JNA of which the Yugoslav President was also titular Commander-in-
Chief. In the space of a couple of years, the intricate devices evolved by 
Tito since the 1940s to prevent the political domination of Yugoslavia by 
one ethnic group or republic had been shattered. 
During the mass anti-government demonstrations by students and staff 
of Belgrade and other Serbian universities, and the media and 
intelligentsia in March 1991, the 8-member Yugoslav Presidency was 
heavily pressurised by Serbian representatives to sanction the use of 
the JNA to quell the civilian unrest in Belgrade. 16 In mid-March, 
Borisav Jovic, the Serbian President of Yugoslavia, resigned due to 
tensions arising from the refusal by Croatia and Slovenia to disband 
14 Borba, April 16, 1991. 
IS See SILBER/UTILE, op.cit. pp. 60-73, for a full account of this. 
16 The divisions within the JNA were apparent at this time. In an interview in Borba, Stevan 
Mirkovic, a former JNA Chief of Staff had warned that the army would be mobilised if 
necessary, to which the Slovene Commander, Colonel General Konrad Kolsek, retorted that the 
use offorce to arrive at a political settlement to the crisis could result in anarchy, adding that the 
army was between 'two fires', with some trying to involve it in their political games. Borba, 
March 18, 1991. 
14 
their territorial armed forces. 17 On the same day, Milosevic declared on 
Belgrade television that "under the present circumstances, Serbia will 
not recognise a single decision by the federal presidency", a move which 
some Serbian opposition leaders regarded as tantamount to Serbia's 
secession from the Yugoslav Federation,18 The outgoing President Jovic 
then sought, with the full support of Milosevic, to prevent Stipe Mesic, 
the Croatian incumbent to the rotating presidency leadership, from 
taking up his seat in May 1991, by creating a deadlock within the 
Yugoslav presidency. 19 This disrupted the rotational process which had 
ensured the smooth running of that institution, and left Yugoslavia 
without either a constitutional or military head.20 The following week 
Croatia went to the polls, with 94% voting for Croatian sovereignty 
within a confederal Yugoslavia, President Tudjman having ruled out 
Croatian secession.21 
The constitutional deadlock was compounded by a growing political 
crisis in Croatia. In late August 1990, Croatian Serbs held a 
referendum in Serb majority areas on Serb "sovereignty and autonomy" 
in Croatia. Croatians living in these areas were barred from 
participation, and the vote predictably went overwhelmingly in the 
Serbs' favour. Attempts by the moderate Serbian Democratic Party of 
17 On January 18, it was agreed that Croatia should surrender 20,000 arms. Jovic records a 
conversation with Milosevic later that day where he gained the impression that Milosevic would 
have preferred disarmament by force. JOVIC, Borisav. Poslednji dani SFRJ. Politika, Belgrade, 
1995, p.254. For a full account of the disarming and rearming of the Slovenian and Croatian 
Territorial Defence forces, see SILBERJLITTLE, op.cit, pp.113-128. 
18 SILBERJLITTLE, op.cit. p.139. 
19 Mesic obtained four votes within the Presidency but was not elected. Interestingly, JNA 
generals Veljko Kadijevic and Blagoje Adzic supported Mesic, as did most Serbian opposition 
leaders. See JOVIC, op.cit. May 15, 1991, pp.325, 340 and 346. 
20 As Borisav Jovic, then President of the Yugoslav collective Presidency, noted in his diary: 'We 
have crossed the "Rubicon". We no longer seek decisions from anyone. We act according to 
need in defence of the Serbian nation. We inform the Presidency about events. Whoever doesn't 
like it can go home'. JOVIC, op.cit. p.317. [Author'S translation] 
21 RFEIRL, op.cit. May 20,1991. 
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Croatia to urge peaceful settlement of the crisis were rejected by the 
Krajina leaders and, on 21 December 1990, the Serb-dominated Krajina 
declared itself an autonomous district. On March 16, 1991, Milosevic 
declared 'Yugoslavia is fInished', and that Serbia would no longer be 
bound by federal presidency decisions. 22 On the same day, Krajina 
declared its separation from Croatia, and Serb forces attempted to 
consolidate power over predominantly Serb-populated areas. In Pakrac, 
Serb police took control of a police station, while in Plitvice a busload of 
Croatian policemen came under attack. The following week, Serbian 
activists organised a protest meeting in Plitvice National Park and 
declared it part of the 'Autonomous Province' of Krajina. Local 
disturbances ensued in Krajina, Slavonia and Baranja, wherever there 
was either a Serb majority. or large minority. Meanwhile, during the 
same week, the Serbian National Assembly relieved the Kosovo 
representative on the Presidency, Riza Sapundxija, of his duties.23 On 6 
May, the JNA generals presented the collective Presidency with an 
ultimatum. Either the army be permitted to impose martial law, or it 
would sort out Croatia on its own. 24 
In an attempt to avert war, a series ofYU-summits took place amongst 
the various republic leaders during the first half of 1991.25 To bridge 
the growing gap and establish common ground between the confederal 
model proposed by Slovenia and Croatia and the federal one backed by 
22 SILBER/LITILE, op.cit. p.139. 
23 Despite objections by international observers and other Yugoslav politicians, the Assembly 
elected Sejdo Bajramovic in Sapundxija's place. During May 1991, the crisis in Kosovo 
deepened, as weapons were distributed to local Serbs in ten Kosovo municipalities. According to 
a report by the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights in Kosovo that month, in the two 
previous years since 1989,90 Albanians had been killed and 300 wounded by Serb police, with 
some 2,500 sentenced by Serbian courts for political reasons. Nearly 60,000 Albanians lost their 
jobs during this time. See also 'The Kosovo Boomerang' in MAGAS, op.cit. pp. 290-296. 
24 Economist, May II, 1991, p.51. 
25 For Croatian Serb opposition to Serbia's policy in Croatia at this time, see 'State Presidency 
Agrees on Measures to Prevent Further Ethnic Violence', ANDREJEVICH, Milan. RFEIRL 
Report, op.cit. May IS, 1991, pp.18-20, Vjesnik, May 13, 1991, and Borba, May 10-11, 1991. 
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Serbia and Montenegro, the remaining republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Macedonia, proposed a so-called asymmetric solution.26 The 
ensuing meetings which took place in the respective republic capitals in 
early 1991 were characterised by verbal duels and open quarrels. The 
'asymmetric solution' was a compromise, involving the transformation of 
Yugoslavia into a union of sovereign states with central authority 
confined to a national army, common currency, an EC-type common 
market, a joint parliament and a collective head of state. The proposal 
was launched on 3 June 1991, following which a four-point accord was 
reached as the basis for future discussion. The Serbian leadership 
decided to go along with the proposal verbally in order to avoid isolation, 
while pursuing its own policies.27 These policies, involving the breakup 
of Yugoslavia as defined by the 1974 Constitution, had been planned by 
the Serbian elites well in advance of the Slovene and Croatian 
declarations of independence in June 1991. Already, on February 25, 
1991, Borisav Jovic noted in his diary that 
the Serb parties in Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia [should] in a 
combined political and military action overthrow the government 
first in Croatia and then Slovenia ... in the hesitant republics 
(Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) it is necessary to overthrow 
the leaderships and/or redirect them [in] activities ... combined 
with military operations.28 
According to Jovic, Milosevic agreed but considered Slovenia should be 
left out of the equation. Milosevic also spoke out about the necessity to 
change state borders which, he opined, were 'always decided by the 
strong, not by the weak', and declared that he had ordered the formation 
of new police forces. 'If we have to fight we are more than prepared'. 29 
26 This in some respects echoed the proposals of Yugoslav Prime Minister, Ante Markovic the 
previous December, in his II-point programme, and those of Lord Carrington in October 1991. 
27 Jovic noted in his diary: "We decided to shock them: to accept the proposal as a basis for 
talks ... and then slowly evolve our own concept". JOVIC, op.cit. June 5, 1991, p.33S. 
28 JOVIC, Ibid. pp.276-7. [Author'S translation] 
29 NIN, April 12, 1991 and Monitor, October 11, 2002. 
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Not all Serbian politicians agreed, however. Slobodan Unkovic, president 
of Serbia's first postwar mUlti-party National Assembly, resigned in 
protest. Opposition politicians, meanwhile, in a reportedly stormy 
Assembly session criticed Milosevic for having led Serbia into isolation. 30 
Without a president, its economy in virtual free fall, and suffering 
increasing social unrest, Yugoslavia was becoming a fertile breeding 
ground for the nationalist polarisation which would stifle the voices of 
reason in the middle-ground. The situation called for urgent external 
mediation to act as a catalyst and introduce a new dimension on which 
all republics could hinge and focus their future programme, to include 
access to the main European institutions and acceptance in the fullest 
sense as a European nation. 
Despite the demands of the Gulf War, the international community was 
not blinded to developments in Yugoslavia in the early part of 1991. On 
the contrary, the US State Department, NATO, the European 
Community and others became involved at various levels in attempting 
to stem the drift towards all-out war, forecast in November 1990 by the 
CIA. In January 1991 war was averted, following an unequivocal 
warning to the Yugoslav government by the United States, backed by 
Britain, after the JNA had threatened the Croatian government which 
had failed to respond to the call to disarm its territorial forces. 31 By the 
end of June, however, few outsiders had much understanding of the 
underlying forces at play in Yugoslavia. The war which lasted ten days 
in Slovenia, but was to rage for months throughout Croatia, was 
30 RFEIRL Report, June 4, 1991. In another rally in Belgrade, 20,000 people gathered to demand 
the resignation of the government. RFEIRL Report, June 9,1991. 
31 Apart from any logistic considerations (the threat coming as it did at the height of the Gulf 
War), Western governments would have wished to avoid an army coup within what was still 
perceived as one of the most westernised of the East European states, at a time of general 
uncertainty in the region. 
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largely seen by outsiders as a clash between the Western republics 
which sought to secede and those which still strove to hold Yugoslavia 
together, led by Serbia and the Yugoslav Army. So, while there was 
general condemnation of the methods used by the JNA to bring the 
breakaway republics to heel, there was also some sympathy for the 
apparent defenders of what was perceived as the only East European 
country to have developed 'socialism with a human face'. 
Outbreak of war: Slovenia 
Just prior to the onset of hostilities in Slovenia, and US Secretary of 
State James Baker's (un)timely warning to the breakaway republics, 
America took a back seat, monitoring events from a safe distance. 32 EC 
leaders, on the other hand, welcomed the opportunity for Europe to take 
a leading role. Initially, the major powers were in general agreement in 
adopting a so-called 'even-handed' policy. By the time the war had 
spread through Croatia, however, this policy was recognised as 
ineffective at best, and divergences began to emerge as to how to 
address the escalating situation, increasingly seen as a serious potential 
threat to European security. Options discussed ranged from recognition 
of the seceding republics (supported by Germany, Austria and Denmark) 
to wholesale or selective economic sanctions, an arms embargo, and the 
use of military force to restore peace. The military option began by this 
time to be favoured by most European powers, albeit with reservations 
and differing motivations. Although still assuming a relatively low 
profile at this stage Britain, by the end of July, began to emerge clearly 
32 In a letter to incumbent Yugoslav President Stipe Mesic on 3 July, however, US President 
George Bush partly retracted Baker's comments, indicating that the United States no longer 
insisted on Yugoslav unity, emphasizing instead the need for re-establishing civilian control over 
the military. Le Monde, July 5, 1991, p.4. On September 25, 1991, at the UN Security Council, 
Baker sought to distance himself from his earlier remarks. 
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as a leading opponent of any solution which included the use or threat 
of external military force. 33 
European policy in Yugoslavia during the war in Croatia, however, 
cannot be divorced from its member states' conflicting national 
interests, played out in the margins of the Maastricht Summit 
preparations.34 At this time, most EC members, France and Germany in 
particular, supported the establishment of a European army, backed by 
a viable common foreign and security policy, while Britain attempted to 
block these and other measures designed to bring about a more 
integrated European security system. The French proposal, first mooted 
in late July 1991, to despatch a European inter-positionary force to 
Yugoslavia, and supported by most major European states as hostilities 
escalated, was consistently opposed by Britain until proposed more than 
three months later, by the Serb-dominated Presidency, by which time 
Serb forces were in virtual control of nearly a third of Croatia. The 
tendency to defer to Belgrade became a hallmark of British policy in the 
region, and shaped international policy in the Balkans for much of the 
1990s. 
In order to respond to any proposed use of external military force, the 
Foreign Office embraced new terminology in parliament, at news 
conferences and elsewhere, to imply that this was either unworkable, or 
amounted to interference in the internal affairs of another state. 35 One 
British foreign minister even suggested that the JNA might be called to 
33 Britain's position was understandable at this stage, on pragmatic grounds. Northern Ireland was 
an experience Britain would have been unwilling to repeat in an area not defined as a specific 
British interest, especially in a leading role (as a major European military power) and without US 
support on the ground. [Author's discussion with former Defence Secretary, John Nott] 
34 See Le Monde, July 2,1991, p.8. 
3S Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg asserted 'you've got to have a peace to keep', opposing 'peace 
by armed force'. Channel 4 News, September 16,1991. Lord Carrington declared that 'you can't 
impose a solution from outside'. Statement at Igalo Summit, Montenegro, September 18, 1991, 
and Douglas Hurd conftrmed that 'when they are ready for peace we can help monitor it'. Channel 
4 News, September 19, 1991. 
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restore order at the onset of hostilities, demonstrating a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the traditional role of the army in Yugoslavia, but 
playing into Milosevic's hands.36 Notable also was a sense of lack of 
urgency amongst ministers in addressing the mounting tensions in the 
area, as proposals put forward by MPs across the political spectrum met 
with brief, dismissive comments from foreign ministers.37 
In Serbia, meanwhile, Milosevic was becoming increasingly isolated. 
Jovic, on July 5, recorded the growing tensions as Serbs called for his 
and Milosevic's resignation. The JNA opposed Milosevic's readiness to 
agree to Slovenia's independence, and was described as 'disoriented' and 
'demoralised', while the Soviet Union was unprepared to offer support. 38 
Yet Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd refused to be drawn on the 
culpability of the Serbian leadership in Belgrade. 39 He also supported 
Milosevic's preference to deal with the European Community, once the 
36 " ... the Yugoslav federal army might have, under the constitution, a role in restoring order if 
there were widespread civil unrest". Mark Lennox Boyd, MP, Yu~oslayia. June 27,1991, 
Hansard, Vo1.193, c.1138. Multi-ethnic in make-up, albeit with a strong preponderance of Serbs 
in the officer corps, the JNA had been built up in the postwar anti-fascist movement, and trained 
for the defence of Yugoslavia's external borders. In civil disputes it was traditionally the police 
who were called in to restore order. By 1990, however, a new trend had been initiated whereby 
recruits were trained to guard against the 'internal enemy', namely, those tending not to adhere to 
the centralist ideals shared by the upper echelons of the JNA. The JNA's traditional role was 
challenged in the street riots in Belgrade in March 1991, when Milosevic called on the army to 
quell the demonstrations without the constitutional power to do so, an early indication that the 
JNA could not necessarily be trusted to act constitutionally in the interests of the SFRJ. 
37 Just a month before hostilities broke out, Liberal Democrat MP, Sir Russell Johnston, 
suggested EC mediation and even the provision of a peace-keeping force. Douglas Hogg replied 
'I do not think that the European Community should play such a role. Oral Answers, May 22, 
1991, Hansard, Vo1.191, c 919. In response to Yugoslav army action in Slovenia, Labour MP 
Ken livingstone's proposal for 'firm and total economic sanctions' was dismissed by Douglas 
Hurd. Yu~oslayia, July 3, 1991, Hansard, Vo1.l94, c332. Hurd also rejected consideration of 
Slovenian and Croatian independence. 'It is not for the European Community to ... devise a 
political structure for Yugoslavia ... There must be - some effective working relationship -
between those peoples but only they can work it out'. Ibid. 
38 JOVIC, op.cit., pp.364-6. With Slovenian independence, the Serb bloc would be assured of 
domination of the Federal Presidency. For the same reason, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia 
opposed Slovenia's secession. Ibid., pp.344-S. 
39 Asked whether 'much of the problem in Yugoslavia relates to the intransigence of Belgrade', 
the Foreign Secretary did not reply. YUI:0slayia, Hansard, op.cit. c.332. 
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CSCE had been dismissed early on as an appropriate forum from which 
to address the crisis.40 When, later that summer, the EC Presidency 
pressed harder for military intervention in Croatia, the debate 
transferred to the Hague, at a peace conference chaired by former 
British foreign secretary Lord Carrington. 
The sitting of 3 July 1991 at the House of Commons, confmed to just 
over thirty minutes, was the last opportunity for parliamentary 
discussion of the escalating crisis in Yugoslavia until the Autumn. 
Hurd's fmal comment of note that day confrrmed the impression of 
playing for time conveyed by the Foreign Secretary throughout the 
debate, and set the tone for the EC's response to the conflict over the 
crucial months which followed: 
It may well be that, after having looked into the abyss the people will 
want to work together on a new relationship. We cannot be sure of 
that or impose it but perhaps we can help to create the pause in which 
such thinking and discussion can take place.41 
Following the EC foreign ministers' meeting just two days later, EC 
President Hans van den Broek announced officially that recognition of 
the two Western republics would be suspended for three months. 
War in Croatia: July/August 1991 
Speaking in the House of Commons just before the Summer 
parliamentary recess three weeks later, Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg 
reiterated Britain's non-interventionist stance: 
40 'I do not know what further can be achieved under the CSCE machinery, which is why we are 
not relying exclusively on it'. Douglas Hurd, YUl;loslayja. Hansard, op.cit. c.333. The CSCE 
meeting had condemned the JNA action, by 34 votes to 1 (Yugoslavia), prompting the Yugoslav 
delegates to leave the Chamber. 
41 Douglas Hurd, Ibid. 
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We and our EC partners have restated our readiness if asked to assist 
in negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. 
However, it is for all Yugoslav parties to decide on the future military 
arrangements for their country.42 
To observers in Belgrade, these statements by one of Europe's strongest 
military powers, and a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, 
mindful of the imbalance of weaponry, could have been interpreted as 
giving the green light to the JNA to continue with its offensive. 
In August, a number of EC initiatives took place. A visit by the EC 
Troika to Belgrade attempted to extend the EC Monitoring Mission 
(ECMM), already in Slovenia, to Croatia.43 The closely-worded text 
defining the ECMM in Croatia reflected the compromise amongst the 
Twelve, resulting from British 'caution'.44 But even so, it was rejected by 
Milosevic.45 Dutch EC President Van den Broek was amongst the first to 
identify the main responsibility for failure. 46 France, too, recognised 
Milosevic as the main stumbling block in the peace talks. The 
contrasting views of the French and British governments at the time 
42 Douglas Hogg, Hansard. Vo1.l95, July 24, 1991, c.638. 
43 The French group leader of the ECMM, George-Marie Chenu, later described it as 'une mission 
borgne et sourde d'une oreille' ['a blind mission, and deaf in one ear']. CHENU, George-Marie 
Chenu, from Derniere Guerre Balkanique? ed. COT, Jean, L'Harmartan, 1996, p.93. 'The morale 
of our group of observers could not sink much lower. It didn't seem like we were fulfilling any 
useful function. The British who controlled the working group were always counseling caution.' 
Ibid. p.95. [Author's translation] 
44 COT, ed. op.cit. p.95, and WYNAENDTS, Henry. L'Engrenage. Denoel, France, 1993, pp. 61 
& 79, Wynaendts notes that Britain insisted on 'an effective ceasefire' before the deployment of 
EC monitors in Croatia. 
4S Milosevic, fearing Serbian isolation, eventually agreed to the EC monitoring mission in Croatia 
on September 1, following a visit to Belgrade by Van den Broek. WYNAENDTS, H, Ibid. 
pp.74-77. 
46 'Yugoslavia faces tragedy and catastrophe ... talks have foundered because on a number of vital 
elements the agreement of one party is lacking .. .it is not difficult for those who followed our 
work here to recognise who stonewalled our mission'. Le Monde, August 6, 1991, p.3. 
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were reflected in the respective press reports of the Troika failure in 
Belgrade.47 
France, now supported by Germany, renewed its call for a peace-keeping 
force to be sent to Croatia and, with Belgium (then a non-Permanent 
Member of the Security Council), suggested that the issue be placed 
before the UN Security Council. 48 During the same week, at a meeting 
of EC foreign ministers, Britain, the only other EC country with 
Permanent Membership on the Security Council, vetoed the use of force. 
Following a warning from Russia that military intervention would mean 
a 'European war', other EC ministers also temporarily retreated, 
reverting to non-military options.49 On August 8, at a CSCE meeting in 
Prague, it was proposed to apply pressure on the Serbs through the 
selective supply of aid, which had been frozen the previous month. 
Germany, meanwhile, was pressing for international recognition of 
Croatia and Slovenia, which was later to prove one of the most 
contentious issues of the war. At the time, however, Germany had little 
support within the Ee, other than from Denmark. By late August, 
matters had once again come to a head. The Soviet coup of August 20 
had failed, and pressure from Russia, itself in political turmoil, 
diminished. 50 Even so, at an EC foreign ministers' meeting days later, 
47 While, in Le Monde, a front page headline declared: 'Serbia made the EC mission fail', the 
Financial Times referred to the failure of the peace mission as 'showing up the flaws', thereby 
minimising the growing consensus within the EC for a firmer approach, including military force. 
The FT editorial also argued that there was "no clear demarcation line" for deployment. 
Financial Times, August 5 & 6, 1991, and Le Monde, August 6, 1991. 
48 See 'Europaje nemocna', Borba, August 9,1991, p.6; CHENU, J, in Cot, ed. op.cit. p.94, Le 
Monde, August 3, 1991, p.4, and Borba, August 3-4, 1991, p.lO. France held the presidency of 
the UN Security Council at this time. 
49 Financial Times, August 7,1991, p.l. The French foreign minister persisted, suggesting that 
the grounds should be laid for a WEU force, while an unnamed British official stated that 'while 
there is no peace to keep, what we would have would be an opposed landing by troops from EC 
member states'. Financial Times, August 8,1991, p.7. 
so At the outset of the Yugoslav crisis, Soviet President Gorbachev and US President George Bush 
shared the EC wish for Yugoslavia to remain a unitary state, not least to present Soviet republics 
using developments in Yugoslavia as a precedent. Following the coup in Moscow, Soviet leaders 
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Douglas Hurd countered dissatisfaction voiced at the EC's 
ineffectiveness, stressing that the West could not sort out Yugoslavia's 
problems.51 
Meanwhile, the Serb lobby in Britain had been activated. At the end of 
August, the Duke of Somerset, Henry Bellingham MP,52 and prospective 
Conservative parliamentary candidate John Kennedy, visited Serbia and 
Montenegro.53 The two-hour meeting with Milosevic, although covering 
a wide range of issues, did not refer to the position of Kosovo's 
Albanians.54 Neither, reportedly, did the delegates visit any other 
Yugoslav republics.55 John Kennedy was subsequently to playa major 
role in organising Serb-funded trips to Serbia and Serb-controlled areas 
of Bosnia for British members of parliament. 56 
September: the establishment of policy parameters 
September 1991 marked a turning point in the involvement of the 
European Community in the Balkans, when Britain moved to flx the 
policy parameters. In that month, crucial decisions were reached, with 
Britain at the forefront, which determined the course of the war in 
former Yugoslavia and shaped the basis for international policy till the 
US-led NATO air strikes of September 1995. 
had no clear Balkans policy and, hopeful of western investment, tended to support positions held 
within other major European capitals. 
51 Borba, August 28,1991, p.15, & August 29,1991, p.14. 
52 Henry Bellingham was Parliamentary Private Secretary to Malcolm Rifkind, Secretary of State 
for Defence, 1992-97. 
53 Borba, August 27,1991, p.l. 
54 Borba, August 29,1991, p.8. 
55 Borba, August 30, 1991, p.7. 
56 For John Kennedy's role in promoting the Serb cause see HODGE. The Serb Lobby, op.cit., and 
Vreme International, February 6, 1995, pp.36-38. 
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On September 13, the Chair of the Hague Conference, Lord Carrington, 
in conversation with EC President Hans Van den Broek, opined that the 
Croatian and Slovenian leaders should be dissuaded from the belief that 
the EC would intervene militarily.57 Carrington persuaded Van den 
Broek to exert pressure on Croatia, which he considered the more 
aggressive side at that point. Van den Broek reportedly did so, but was 
not dissuaded from his intention to propose the introduction of a 
peacekeeping force into Croatia. 58 
On September 18, at a crucial meeting of EC foreign ministers, however, 
Britain vetoed the use of military force to end the conflict. The EC 
President's initiative, to despatch a European inter-positionary force of 
up to 30,000 troops to Croatia to establish the conditions for peace, was 
quashed following a reportedly stormy exchange of views. 59 A single-line 
communique followed: 'No military intervention contemplated'. 60 The 
Dutch initiative had been supported by all major EC member states 
apart from Britain, which had nevertheless managed to swing the 
'consensus'.61 At a WEU meeting the following day, the British Minister 
for the Armed Forces, Archie Hamilton, argued that, with the 
~7 Referring to the Slovene and Croatian requests, Carrington reportedly commented 'You're living 
in another planet'. Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NJOD), Part 1, Chapter 1. 
~8 The Netherlands was also prepared to contribute personnel and equipment to the operation. 
See NJOD, Ibid. 
~9 Later interviewed by the NJOD, the former Dutch Premier Wim Kok referred to Van den Broek's 
frustration with EC reluctance to move to a more active position on Yugoslavia. NJOD, op.cit. Part 
1, Chapter 2. 'The War in Croatia and the Westem Reaction'. 
60 ZAMETICA, ]ohn.JnternationaIJnstituteforStrategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper, No.71, 1992. 
See also BENNETT, Christoper. Yugoslavia's Bloody Col/apse, Hurst, 1995, p.176, and SHARP, 
Jane M O. 'Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion', op.cit. pp.ll-12. 
61 Confrrming this at the first House of Commons sitting on Yugoslavia after the Summer recess, 
Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg stated: 'The views of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary 
have been of immense influence within the council of Foreign Ministers. I suspect that on every 
substantial matter he has been leading the consensus'. Douglas Hogg, YUioslayia, October 14, 
1991, Hansard, V01.196. c.47. See also Douglas Hurd's view on reaching decisions within the 
Council of Ministers in Debate on the Address, November 1, 1991. Hansard, V01.198, c.124. 
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deployment of a peacekeeping force, the EC would be 'sucked into a 
quagmire' .62 The rejection of the military option by the EC prompted 
three other countries, Canada, Australia and Austria to request that the 
UN intervene.63 Such an appeal to the UN had earlier been made by the 
Yugoslav President, Stipe Mesic, and was now also endorsed by France, 
Germany and Italy.64 
The highly publicised meeting called by Lord Carrington the previous 
day with the Serbian and Croatian presidents and federal defence 
minister Veljko Kadijevic at Igalo, Montenegro, may have been influential 
in the EC rejection of force. Mter four hours of negotiations, a ceasefire 
was agreed, but was violated days later, as the JNA called up reserves 
and territorial defence units in Vojvodina.65 It was a weak agreement, 
and lacked specificity.66 The timing of the ceasefire agreement, however, 
reached just a day before high level EC and WEU summits in Brussels, 
62 NIOD, op.cit. The Dutch report records strong pressure from other countries to shift the British 
position. France wanted to send 20-30,000 troops, of which France would provide a quarter, but 
Douglas Hurd was recorded as opining that Yugoslavia was not worth the life of a single British 
soldier. The UK offered a possible contribution of 100 medical staff. 
63 Time International, September 30,1991, p.l2. 
64 Borba, 20 September 1991, p.lS, and RFEIRL Report, Weekly Record of Events. September 23, 
1991. The following month, Germany and France also unveiled a new European defence 
initiative, whereby French and German forces would become the nucleus of a WEU force, a 
proposal opposed by Britain, but reportedly welcomed by Spain, Italy, Belgium and Greece, and 
by the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors. Le Monde, October 17 & 18, 
1991. For Mesic's request, see 'Zagabria chiede l'intervento dell'Onu'. II Sole 24 Ore, September 
14, 1991. 
6S RFEIRL Report, Ibid. September 27,1991. A Foreign Office memorandum described the 
events somewhat differently. 'On September 17, Lord Carrington brokered a further ceasefrre 
agreement at Igalo. This collapsed by 1 October, but a further ceasefrre agreed in The Hague on 9 
October seemed to have a better chance of holding.' Recent developments in Eastern Europe with 
special reference to Yuaoslayia. Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (CE 17), dated October 11, 1991, published by The Foreign Affairs Committee, November 
6, 1991, p.lS [14]. This, from an official British source, totally misrepresented the situation, and 
exaggerated the degree of success of the Hague Conference. 
66 GOW, James. Triumph of the Lack of Will, op.cit. p.S4. Also see GOW, James and SMITH, D.O. 
Peacekeeping, Peacemaking: European Security and the Yugoslav Wars. Brassey'sfor the Centre 
for Defence Studies, London, 1992, pp.164-172. 
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along with the wide pUblicity it generated, may have sufficed to deter 
foreign ministers, many of whom may have felt less well-placed to make 
such critical decisions than the current and former British foreign 
secretaries, one of them also a former NATO Secretary General. 
It has often since been argued that Europe was not in a position at that 
time to raise a European force of any size. Yet, an endorsement by 
Britain of the EC initiative threatening military action would have sent 
an unequivocal signal to Milosevic that Europe was united in giving 
serious consideration to all options to end the war, at a time when, in 
the absence of general mobilisation, the JNA was losing confidence in its 
ability to hold the frontlines. Instead, through the declared policy of the 
EC to reject the use of force, Milosevic evidently took his cue. 67 During 
the week following the EC communique, hundreds of tanks, armoured 
personnel carriers, trucks and heavy weapons set off on a 20-mile 
military convoy from Belgrade towards the Croatian border, and the 
Serb-led JNA launched a three-pronged offensive. Seven Adriatic ports 
had previously been blockaded, cutting off most of Dalmatia and the 
islands from the capital. Dubrovnik came under siege by Serbian and 
Montenegrin forces for the first time in its history, with heavy shelling of 
several Croatian towns, including Vukovar. On 28 September, after a 
mortar attack on one of its convoys, the International Red Cross 
temporarily suspended its work in Croatia. The scene was now set in 
Croatia for the takeover of nearly one third of its territory, while in 
neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina tensions between Serbs and non-
Serbs were mounting, with the formation of four 'Serbian Autonomous 
Regions' (SAOs), along with a Belgrade-orchestrated operation to arm 
Serbs in areas where they formed a majority, or a sizeable minority. 68 
67 For a French view on Britain's torpedoing of the proposal for an intervention force in September 
1991, see Daniel Vemet: 'Franco-British disagreements', in Le Monde, June 6, 1995, p.2. 
68 The operation known as RAM, was organised from Belgrade by SPS member, Mihalj Kertes, 
to distribute arms to Serb communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in secret lorry convoys. See 
GLENNY, Misha. The Fall of Yugoslavia, (3rd edition) pp.150-151, Penguin, 1996. See also 
Prime Minister Markovic's accusation of Milosevic for complicity with the JNA in the RAM 
operation, towards the creation ofa Greater Serbia. Le Monde, October 2, 1991, p.4. 
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The crucial EC decision, not to intervene militarily, was one of four 
inter-linked policies adopted during that month which shaped the role of 
Europe in the Balkans till late August 1995. In the second, an arms 
embargo imposed on all republics of Yugoslavia, Britain was again a 
leading player. During the week following the Council of Ministers' 
meeting, the UN Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo 
on all weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia. UNSCR 713, the 
first of hundreds of Security Council resolutions on former Yugoslavia, 
was adopted on 25 September 1991. It is unlikely, however, that this 
resolution would have passed without a veto, at least from China, had 
not the then Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Budimir Loncar, personally 
requested it. Loncar's statement, together with a letter from the 
Yugoslav Representative to the UN, was specifically noted in the 
resolution, as well as statements made by some Security Council 
members.69 It was from Britain, however, that the suggestion to Loncar 
to request the arms embargo emanated. 70 Britain also, amongst the 
western powers, was to argue most consistently for its maintenance 
throughout the war. The imbalance of weaponry as a result of that 
resolution, later gave rise to sharp divergences internationally, and 
amongst UN Security Council Members. The JNA, its considerable 
arsenal built up since World War II was, by the Summer of 1991, mostly 
composed of Serb and Montenegrin officers and conscripts. Croatia, on 
the other hand, with its territorial army largely disarmed by the JNA the 
previous year, was unequipped to mount a credible defence against the 
fourth largest army in Europe.71 The arms embargo became one of the 
main linchpins of international policy. Fiercely defended by Britain and 
69 UN Doc. S/23069. 
70 See GOW, James. 'British Perspectives', in International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict, 
ed. Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson. Macmillan Press, 1996, pp.92-3. 
71 See Le Monde. October 5, 1991, p.3. for Slovenian President Kucan's argument that the 
embargo discriminated in favour of Serbia in what he termed a war of conquest, not a civil or 
interethnic conflict. 
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many other European states, it impeded any meaningful attempt by 
Croatia (and later Bosnia) at self-defence. And yet, ironically, it was only 
after the imposition of the arms embargo that the heavy bombardment 
of much of Croatia got into full swing,72 From then onwards, Croatian 
policy went officially on the offensive. The 'National Croatian Guard' 
became the 'Croatian Army', and JNA barracks across Croatia were 
blockaded, with Croatian President Tudjman insisting on the Army's full 
withdrawal from Croatia. 
A third component of international policy instituted in September 1991 
was the Hague Peace Conference. In a BBC interview before its launch 
Conference Chairman Lord Carrington gave a clear indication of his 
approach to the conflict: 
If we're going to get a solution to this, first of all we've got to have a 
ceasefire. Then we've got to get around the table and listen to the 
points of view of each of the republics to get an accommodation 
that is acceptable to everybody. 73 
Carrington's recommendation that an 'evenhanded' approach be adopted 
allowed the Serb forces the time to acquire further territory to use as 
bargaining chips with the same international leaders who had created 
(wittingly or unwittingly) the manoeuvring space in the first place. 74 For 
so long as one side rejected a settlement, none would be implemented, 
and in the absence of a settlement the capture of territory could 
continue with impunity. This approach allowed for interminable 
72 The head of the EC Monitoring Mission, Henry Wynaendts, records the impotence of the EC 
Mission in the last week of September 1991, as they witnessed the bombardment of Osijek, 
Vinkovci, Vukovar, Novska, Sisak, Gospic, Zadar, Split and the environs of Dubrovnik. 
WYNAENDTS, H. op.cit. p.l02. 
73 Lord Carrington, BBC TV. Nine O'Clock News. September 4, 1991. 
74 The 'evenhanded approach' was further legitimized by academics. London University Balkans 
specialist Mark Wheeler, for instance, painted a picture of chaos: "What's going on in Yugoslavia 
now is warlordism, lords of the valley ... carving out little empires for themselves. These people 
are not going to be subordinated to anybody's command." BBC News, September 4, 1991. 
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prevarication, as well as providing a pretext for rejecting international 
military intervention. Also, if one side of the conflict had an 
overwhelming military preponderance, the results were predictable. 75 
Britain's role in all this, however, contrary to the claims of some 
analysts, was not wholly ingenuous.76 Britain appointed the two main 
EC negotiators, Lords Carrington and Owen, who between them fronted 
EC policy from 1991-95, and included a small secretariat from the 
Foreign Office. The so-called EC negotiating team was allegedly run from 
Britain, a practice which continued when David Owen took over 
chairmanship of the Conference from Lord Carrington, deferring more 
often to London than Brussels. In late May 1995 Owen, overcome by 
European and especially American opposition, finally retired from the 
scene to make way for Carl Bildt, a former Swedish Prime Minister, and 
close friend of the then Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev who 
could be relied on to continue the diplomatic line established by Britain 
in 1991.77 
The role of Lord Carrington's Conference in facilitating Serb territorial 
gains should not be under-estimated. It may have appeared benignly 
bungling most of the time, as one ceasefire after another collapsed. But 
it also conveyed the impression that Europe was working collectively in 
seeking to resolve the crisis and, crucially, it preempted alternative 
initiatives. It also lay the grounds for ethnic partition, ratified in the 
Dayton Peace Agreement. Also, Slobodan Milosevic, despite his track 
record as the prime mover behind all the wars in former Yugoslavia, had 
7S See DEBIE, Franck, in COT [ed.] op.cit. pp.47-82, on the peace negotiations, and for an 
incisive analysis of international diplomacy during this time. 
76 James Gow, for instance, concludes that British policy, 'although less than glorious and, in the 
end, a failure' shared these qualities with other major international players, attributing Britain's 
opposition to combat troops to a 'lack of will'. GOW, James. Triumph of the Lack of Will, op.cit. 
Brendan Simms, while fiercely critical of Britain's role in Bosnia, nonetheless argues that it was 
largely an error based on 'profoundly conservative philosophical realism' or 'a particularly 
disabling form of conservative pessimism'. SIMMS, op.cit. p. 6 & xi. 
77 See Chapter 5 for Bildt's briefmg at the Foreign Office, prior to his appointment. 
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been rehabilitated and become tacitly regarded as the Western 
community's principal 'peace-broker' in the region. 
A fourth component of British policy underpinned the other three policy 
strands. Despite being a major European diplomatic and military power 
and a 'PS' Member of the UN Security Council, Britain could not be 
certain of maintaining its dominant role in Europe's Balkans policy 
without the backing of another major European power, especially as the 
majority of EC states favoured the military option. France, with its 
powerful army, its traditionally ambivalent foreign policy approach, and 
a historical affmity to the Serbs, was the obvious partner.78 Surprisingly, 
however, French President Mitterand did not seem to be acting 
predictably on the Yugoslav crisis.79 Slobodan Milosevic in July 1991 
had viewed with dismay the bid by French Foreign Minister, Roland 
Dumas, to send a European peacekeeping force to Yugoslavia.Bo Indeed, 
France's determination to activate the mechanism of the Western 
European Union through a military operation in Croatia, was still 
evident after the defeat of the Dutch initiative in mid-September, as 
France, together with Germany appealed to the United Nations towards 
the end of that month for help in sending a force into Yugoslavia, with 
similar initiatives from Canada, Australia and Austria. 81 The Foreign 
Office evidently saw a possible way around this problem, however. 
Fitzroy Maclean, respected World War II veteran and friend of 
78 See interview with former French foreign minister, Herve de Charette. May 10, 200 1. 
Assemblee Nationale. Rapport d'in!ormation depose en application de l'article 145 du reglement 
par la mission d'Injormation commune sur les evenements de Srebrenica. November 22.2001. 
79 Mitterand was otherwise known to have Serb sympathies. See, for instance. L 'Annee des 
adieux, Paris, Flamrnarion, 1995, p.84. 
80 See CANIVEZ, P. in COT, ed., op.cit. p.189. 
81 See Le Monde, September 21,1991, and Time magazine, 'Flash of War', September 30, 1991, 
p.11-12. The Netherlands, too, raised the issue again, offering four options to a meeting of WEU 
ministers, ranging from logistical support for the EC monitors to a force of up to 30,000 troops. 
WEU member states continued with contingency plans for a peacekeeping force. Douglas Hurd, 
however, announced he could not foresee any conditions under which Britain or other EC powers 
would intervene militarily in Yugoslavia. See SHARP, Jane M 0, op.cit. p.11. 
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Yugoslavia, travelled to Belgrade in late August 1991 to meet JNA 
generals Kadijevic and Brovet. He advised them that France was the key 
to resolving the Yugoslav crisis and that, although currently vacillating, 
it should be encouraged to support Britain in curbing Germany which 
was viewed as supporting Croatia, in order to achieve conditions for a 
ceasefire and political solution.82 According to former Yugoslav 
President Borisav Jovic, Kadijevic informed Maclean that the best 
outcome would be a united Yugoslavia or, alternatively, a smaller state 
comprising Serbia, Montenegro and whoever else wished to join, in order 
to arrest German domination of the Balkans.83 Shortly afterwards, 
Milosevic went to visit President Mitterand at the Elysee who explained 
that France's reluctance to support Serbia fully had been out of 
domestic considerations.84 Mitterand advised Milosevic to accept the 
European arbitration process.8S Weeks later, France and Britain were 
working in tandem on all major Balkans policy issues, an alliance which 
endured until May 1995, and one which Douglas Hurd in partiCUlar 
valued. When Jacques Chirac took over the French Presidency, he put 
his own stamp on France's Balkans policy, leading to an Anglo-French 
clash on Balkans policy, such as had not arisen in four years. Within 
weeks of Chirac's arrival at the Elysee, Douglas Hurd resigned. 
82 Author's conversation with Sir Fitzroy Maclean, Glasgow, January 1996. Borisav Jovic records 
that Fitzroy Maclean went to Yugoslavia at Lord Carrington's request, where he met generals 
Kadijevic and Brovet in the presence of the British Ambassador, and told them that a ceasefire 
would be difficult to secure if the Gennans, who supported Croatia, were not stopped. According 
to Jovic "Maclean's message is: To resolve the Yugoslav question, France which is currently 
vacillating, is important. It is necessary to try to get France to support Britain, in order that they 
can together stop the Germans, who would in tum stop the Croats, creating the conditions for a 
ceasefrre and political solution." JOVIC, op.cit. p.384. [Author's translation] 
83 Maclean's visit may have lent Jovic the confidence he needed for his later attack on German 
policy. On October 21 Jovic, and other Serbian politicians and writers, accused Germany of 
trying to achieve today in the Balkans what it was not able to accomplish in two world wars. 
Veljko Kadijevic's memoirs indicate an almost pathological fear of a Fourth Reich in the Balkans. 
KADIJEVIC, Veljko. Moje Vidjenje Raspada, Politika, Beograd, 1993, p.24. 
84 Borba, August 30,1991, p.1& 2. 'Stavovi vrlo podudami' [Very similar viewpoints] 
85 JOVIC, op.cit. pp.384-5. 
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The Carrington Peace Plan 
The Carrington Plan was a last-ditch attempt to hold Yugoslavia 
together, albeit within a loose confederation. It depended, however, on 
acceptance by the Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, whose approval 
Lord Carrington was at pains to secure before it was presented for 
acceptance by the six republics. At a meeting with Lord Carrington on 
October 4, also attended by Yugoslav Defence Minister, Veljko Kadijevic 
and Croatian President Tudjman, Milosevic agreed in principle to all 
three main points of Carrington's proposals which were to be presented 
to the six republics on October 18, namely, (i) a loose association of 
sovereign or independent states; (ii) the protection of minorities, human 
rights with possible special status for some areas,86 and (iii) no 
unilateral border changes. The irony was that the proposal, based on 
confederallines, was very similar to that proposed by the Bosnian and 
Macedonian leaders in the months preceding the conflict. 87 If Milosevic 
had rejected a confederal arrangement earlier, however, he was unlikely 
to accept one with nearly a third of Croatian territory under the control 
of Belgrade. In the meantime, Dubrovnik came under total siege, 
Vukovar was heavily bombarded, and the presidential palace in Zagreb 
shelled by the JNA whilst parliament was in session. By the time 
Carrington's plan was placed before the republic leaders, Serb forces 
were in control of large swathes of Croatia. 
The tide was beginning to turn against the Serbian leader, however. He 
could not accept the peace proposals because the provisions, albeit 
generous to Serbs in Croatia, applied throughout Yugoslavia, and 
86 The 'special status' agreement for certain areas was proposed by Milosevic, and taken up by 
Carrington. WYNAENDTS, op.cit, p.120. Inspired by the Alto Adige agreement reached 
between Italy and Austria, the special status terms went far further, ensuring demilitarisation of 
those areas under international supervision., Ibid. p.124. 
87 Milosevic's closest adviser at the time, the former President of Yugoslavia, Borisav Jovic, 
records in his diary that the proposal offered by Izetbegovic and Gligorov was 'stupid and 
unworkable'. JOVIC, op.cit, p.338. 
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Milosevic could not accept reciprocity. Kosovo was particularly 
problematic since Milosevic had built his power base there. With the 
restoration of Kosovo's autonomy, Milosevic's earlier pledges to Kosovo's 
Serbs would be rendered meaningless. Having publicly proclaimed 
Kosovo as the 'heartland' of the Serbs, if the myth were to be abandoned 
out of political expediency, Milosevic risked putting himself out of office. 
Also the 3-month moratorium on the issue of independence for the 
western republics had expired and Germany, in light of the Conference 
collapse, was pressing harder for international recognition for Croatia 
and Slovenia. Incorporated into the Peace Conference, moreover, was the 
Franco-German sponsored Badinter Arbitration Commission88 which, 
after Serbia's rejection of the EC peace plan, was instructed to draw up 
recommendations on independence for all republics who wished it. 
Montenegro was the most serious problem, however. In breaking ranks 
with Serbia, and accepting the Carrington Plan, Montenegrin President 
Momir Bulatovic, Milosevic's placeman in Montenegro, had presented 
Serbia with a serious problem. Montenegro's departure from the 
Yugoslav federation would render Serbia landlocked. Equally, Serbia's 
bid to retain the name of Yugoslavia together with its assets, including 
the army and its arsenal, and other hitherto commonly owned 
investments, was only possible if a minimum of two republics remained 
in the Federation.89 Referenda in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia 
had already indicated a majority vote for independence if Croatia and 
Slovenia seceded. Montenegro was therefore vital to the equation. 
Then there was the international dimension. US Deputy Secretary of 
State Lawrence Eagleburger, who had previous business connections 
with Belgrade,90 had advised the Serbian leadership that America was 
88 STARK, Hans, 'Histoire immediate de la guerre yougoslave', in COT, [ed.] op.cit. p.39. 
89 See JOVIC, op.cit. p.405. 
90 For Eagleburger's background, see GL YNNE, Patrick in The New Republic, February 1992, 
and GUTMAN, Roy. Witness to Genocide. Sbaftesbury: Element Books, 1993, pp.24-S. 
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taking a back seat on the conflict. But the United States was concerned 
that the conflict should not escalate, and had made clear its intention to 
impose full economic sanctions on Serbia, should it attempt to create a 
Greater Serbia on the principle of "all Serbs in one state". 91 It was also 
clear to Milosevic that the patience of the European Community could 
not hold out for much longer. While Lord Carrington continued to insist 
that any proposed settlement had to have the full agreement of all 
parties involved, the EC President Hans van den Broek set a 2-month 
deadline to reach a peace settlement, after which recognition for 
Slovenia and Croatia would be considered.92 The Soviet Union, hitherto 
Serbia's closest ally on the UN Security Council, was itself in the process 
of disintegration, with the Baltic States and Ukraine seeking 
independence. Like the US, Russia did not wish to become directly 
involved in the crisis.93 President Gorbachev was also unable to reassure 
Serbia that the Soviet Union would veto a UN economic blockade, or 
even military measures. 94 
On the domestic front, Milosevic was under considerable pressure from 
the army which had been humiliated over Tudjman's blockade of JNA 
barracks in Croatia, and was struggling to hold onto Western Slavonia, 
from which most Serbs had already fled. 95 On 25 October, a week after 
Serbia's rejection of the peace plan, General Veljko Kadijevic, caught in 
91 JOVIC, op.cit. p.395-8. Following the JNA shelling of Zagreb and the takeover of federal 
organs by the rump Serb presidency, the United States recognised the Serbs as the main 
aggressors, US Secretary of State James Baker condemning the Serbs for a 'bloodbath', in a shift 
from his earlier position in June. Le Monde, October 9, 1991, p.3. 
92 RFEIRL Report, op.cit., October 17 & 25, 1991. This is confirmed by the Dutch Srebrenica 
Report which, however, comments that the phone call from Van den Broek to Carrington to steer 
towards a comprehensive peace agreement in two months was 'absolutely ridiculous'. NIOD, 
op.cit. p.18. 
93 Gorbachev did, however, intervene to reprimand the JNA following the bombing of Zagreb, in a 
departure from Russia's traditional pro-Serb sympathies. RFEIRL,lbid. October 7 & 18, 1991. 
94 JOVIC, op.cit., p.401. 
95 See Le Monde, October I, 1991, p.3, for JNA desertions. 
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the crossfire between the Serbian army officers and the conscripts, on 
the one hand, and Serbia's political leaders on the other, again pleaded 
with Jovic for the full mobilisation of Serbia (250,000 troopS).96 Kadijevic 
had hoped to raise five brigades for the Western Slavonia campaign, but 
only managed one and a half,97 and warned Jovic that, if the army 
continued to be left short of infantry, his troops in Western Slavonia 
would march fully armed on Belgrade to settle accounts with the 
political leaders responsible for their predicament. 98 Kadijevic made it 
clear, moreover, that his own sympathies lay with the soldiers.99 
Meanwhile, further funds had to be secured to pay for the war. The 
Yugoslav Treasury was accordingly given instructions to transfer $100 
million from the National Bank of America to the National Bank of 
China, in the case of an economic blockade. This move was rejected 
after US Ambassador Warren Zimmerman referred the matter to Prime 
Minister Ante Markovic who ordered the instructions to be cancelled. 100 
This was perhaps the last effective measure of Markovic's premiership. 
World opinion was by now becoming increasingly focused on the plight 
of Dubrovnik, and in late 1991 a number of petitions were sent to 
international institutions, from Nobel Laureates, French writers, 
philosophers, orthodox theologians, and other prominent 
personalities. 101 Meanwhile, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
96 Kadijevic attributed the JNA failure to hold the front in Western Slavonia to the Serb 
reluctance to fight in Croatia. See KADIJEVIC, Veljko. op.cit. pp.138 & 143. 
97 Ibid. p.138. 
98 See JOVIC, op.cit. pp.403-6. For the Bosnian and Macedonian decision not to send conscripts 
outside their own republics, see Le Monde, August 23, p.10, and October 2,1991, p.4, for deep 
divisions within the Serb ranks, due to poor working conditions, low morale and lack of training. 
99 The response amongst Serbian reservists to mobilisation at the time was around 30%, while in 
Belgrade and Novi Sad, 80% of reservists resisted the call up. HARTMAN, Florence. Milosevic, 
fa diagonafe dufou. Denoel, 1999, p.179. 
100 See JOVIC, op.cit. p.403. 
101 Le Monde, November 22,1991, p.4, November 27, 1991, p.2, and December 61991, p.2. 
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of Europe passed a resolution calling upon member states 'to consider 
recognising those republics which have declared independence', and 
considering that 'the continued massive use of violence in Yugoslavia, 
which could easily spill over into neighbouring countries, must be 
considered as a threat to international peace and security within the 
meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter' .102 The Council also appealed to 
member states 'to ask the UN Security Council, under the appropriate 
articles, to consider sending an effective military force to Yugoslavia in 
order to secure a cease-fire and a sensible solution to the future of 
Yugoslavia and its republics'.103 
In the first House of Commons sitting on Yugoslavia in Britain since 
July, however, Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg did not refer to the 
position taken by international institutions, groups and individuals 
across Europe for international action to stop the war, that the conflict 
was considered a potential threat to European security, or that Britain 
was alone amongst major European powers in opposing any form of 
military action. 104 Instead, he drew a picture of a state in the throes of 
near anarchy, its authority being flouted by irregulars on both sides 
fighting for their own narrow interests. The House was also not informed 
about the military misbalance on the ground. lOS Hogg acknowledged that 
the crisis had deepened, and that the Yugoslav army were bombarding 
civilian targets, but he did not condemn this. Instead, he concluded that 
102 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 969. 13th Session, September 21, 
1991,6 & 8. 
IOJlbid,9. 
104 See Le Monde, October 2, 1991, p.4, for Britain's obstruction of modest proposals to enable 
the EC monitors to be more effective. 
lOS A question one week later by Liberal backbencher David Alton, enquiring about military 
weapons and equipment available to the respective sides, met with the response that a 
comprehensive answer would involve disproportionate expense and the use of confidential 
information Written Answers. October 21, 1991, Hansard, Vo1.196, c.350. 
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the only solution that can last is a political one, freely reached 
among the Yugoslavs themselves. There is no military solution to 
this problem, let alone one imposed from outside ... we cannot use 
our forces to separate the combatants. 106 
He also stated military intervention would not be used by Britain's 
'European partners', an indication of the British government's 
confidence in its ability to overrule, or dissuade, other European 
powers. Coming from a 'PS' Member of the Security Council, moreover, 
it could be construed as encouragement to Serbia to continue its 
military campaign. 
One of the measures increasingly feared in Belgrade was an oil embargo. 
In November 1991, Borisav Jovic made a special trip to China to secure 
Beijing's backing at the UN Security Council against an oil embargo. 107 
When the matter was raised in the Commons, however, Hogg stated: 
we do not think it would have an early effect because the JNA has 
substantial reserves of oiL.the main source of supply is Greece, which 
has made it plain that she would have considerable difficulties with 
interfering with that oil supply, certainly without the authority of the 
United Nations. IOB 
It was only the following year, after the conflict had spread to Bosnia, 
that Serbia's access to oil imports was acknowledged as having fuelled 
the conflict. 109 The Labour Foreign Affairs spokesman, Gerald Kaufman, 
generally endorsed the government's policy in Yugoslavia, setting the 
106 Douglas Hogg, Yul:oslavja. October 14, 1991, Hansard, Vol. 196, c.40. 
107 JOVIC, op.cit. p.4ll. 
108 Douglas Hogg, YUioslavja. op.cit. c.4S-6. 
109 Serbia had reportedly negotiated with officials in Montenegro, Greece, Russia and other 
countries, in order to avoid dependence on deliveries via Croatia. RFEIRL Report, September 27, 
1991. 
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pattern for what was to become the standard Labour front bench 
position on the Balkans throughout the war. 110 
On October 18, when the Carrington Plan was presented at the Hague, 
Carrington invited Milosevic to speak first, contrary to the usual 
alphabetical procedure, evidently under the illusion that the Serbian 
president would accept the plan and set the tone for the Conference. III 
Milosevic's reassurance to Carrington on October 4 that he would accept 
the plan had almost certainly been to buy time, bearing in mind that the 
expiry date of the 3-month moratorium on Slovenian and Croatian 
independence fell on October 7. 112 Unsurprisingly, the Plan failed for 
the same reason as the proposal by the Bosnian and Macedonian 
presidents, Izetbegovic and Grigorov, had failed in June. Milosevic, as 
before, had feigned broad support for a confederal solution to avoid 
isolation (and to gain time), but rejected it when it came to formal 
endorsement. By October 30, he had persuaded Momir Bulatovic, the 
Montenegrin President, to withdraw his initial acceptance of the Plan. 113 
Milosevic also managed temporarily to subdue the growing international 
censure of the JNA bombardment of Dubrovnik. As UNESCO called for 
all arms to be withdrawn from the area, the Yugoslav attache in London, 
Svetozar Rikanovic, was called to account by the Foreign Office, after 
which the bombing abruptly ceased. 114 Two days later, British 
110 An exception to this was when the late Labour leader John Smith called for military action in 
Bosnia in April 1993. 
III Nikola Samardzic, testifying at the Milosevic trial, commented that Lord Carrington was 
concerned that Croatian would reject the plan, but was confident of Serbia's acceptance. 
Milosevic trial, op.cit.ICTY. October 8, 2002, p.11223. 
112 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe had already recognised Slovenian and 
Croatian independence. II Sole 24 Ore, September 22, 1991. 
\13 JOVIC, op.cit. pp.399-406. Montenegro, Serbia's main ally in Yugoslavia, was essential to 
Serbia's claim to be the sole legitimate successor state, through the formation of a 'rump' 
federation. 
\14 Borba, October 26-27, 1991, p.2, & October 28 & 29,1991, p.5. 
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Ambassador to Belgrade Peter Hall was invited, along with two other 
foreign diplomats, to Dubrovnik to witness the lack of damage to the 
city. On his return to Belgrade, the ambassador reported to the Foreign 
Office that he had seen only two damaged buildings and no ruins in the 
old town, although he admitted to witnessing evidence of destruction in 
the surrounding area. Dubrovnik came under renewed attack the day 
after he left.llS 
Slovenian and Croatian recognition was now seriously under 
consideration by several European states, which would render the JNA 
onslaught a violation of international law. Serbia also now faced an 
ultimatum .. A meeting of EC foreign ministers on October 28 gave 
Serbia till November 5 to accept the EC Plan, under threat of 
international sanctions. It has been suggested by some analysts that the 
Carrington Plan did not attain the recognition it deserved, not least as 
testimony to the extent to which the parties were prepared to go, to meet 
Serb aspirations.l 16 As first presented on October 18, and in its 
subsequent revisions of October 23 and November 1, it may be said 
that, on balance, the plan represented a reasonably impartial approach 
towards the republics, in its accommodation of the Serb and other 
minorities, including provision for the restoration of autonomy in Kosovo 
and Vojvodina. 117 But Kosovo was the main sticking point. Milosevic 
could not deny Kosovo's Albanians the rights he insisted on for Croatia's 
Serbs. And to agree would be to backtrack on guarantees given to 
Kosovo's Serbs in 1987, weakening further his position in Serbia. On 
November 4, however, the provisions for the former autonomous 
provinces were deleted from the final draft of the Plan, a distinct 
11~ Borba, 'Borbe se nastavljaju', November 1, 1991, p.l. On November 8, the medieval centre of 
Dubrovnik was heavily shelled for the first time by JNA forces. RFEIRL. op.cit. November 9-10, 
1991. 
116 See, for instance, SILBERILITTLE. op.cit. p.212. 
117 Hungarians constituted about 20 % of the population ofVojvodina, and had benefited from the 
autonomy conferred by the 1974 Constitution. 
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concession to the Serbs by Lord Carrington. This, too, was rejected by 
Milosevic, however, who was now in the process of producing a proposal 
of his own to the international community. 
The Vance Plan 
In the impasse arising from the Serbian rejection of Lord Carrington's 
plan, Milosevic and Jovic worked on a new proposal for the deployment 
of UN peacekeeping troops in the Serb-held enclaves of Croatia. The 
intention was to freeze Serb territorial gains, while releasing JNA troops 
for the planned Serb takeover of parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the 
same time, it would reinforce Milosevic in power. This proposal was 
assisted through the UN Security Council by Britain, France and 
Romania (then holding the presidency), and supported by the new UN 
envoy, Cyrus Vance, and by Lord Carrington at the EC Peace 
Conference. Soon afterwards referred to as the Vance Plan, it was mostly 
forgotten, or overlooked, that the proposal had originated in Belgrade. 
Meanwhile, at the opening of the new parliament, the Foreign Secretary 
sought to define British policy in the post Cold War era. 
In the run up to the Maastricht summit, Britain had once again become 
isolated in EC circles as its European partners came to realise that, 
despite a change of leader, the Thatcherite EC policies were still very 
much in place. lIS Douglas Hurd, however, at the Queen's Speech on 
November 1, sought to place Britain in the forefront of Europe, and of 
international policy in Yugoslavia: 
118 In Le Mande, 11 October 1991, p.2, Britain was referred to as a Trojan horse, and the EC as 
being at the foot of a British wall. 'La Communaute au pied du mur Britannique'. 
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It is increasingly clear that the United States is not willing, and the 
Soviet Union is not able, to act as policemen or magistrates of the 
world ... increasingly the US will look to regional or international 
organisations to settle regional disputes. That has a great bearing 
on what is happening and what might happen in Yugoslavia. It has 
meant clearly and specifically that the European Community has been 
expected to take the lead in international efforts to help find an answer 
to the problems in Yugoslavia. That is right ... We cannot impose peace 
on the peoples and republics of Yugoslavia - nobody can ... 
Few ... Members would argue that we should launch British soldiers 
into operations to which it would be hard to see a limit or an end ... we 
would encourage hopes which we would not be willing or able to 
realise. It would not be sensible to go down that path ... We are at the 
centre of events. No other country belongs to NATO, the Community, 
the Commonwealth, the Group of Seven and the United Nations 
Security Council. We are uniquely central in the developments and 
discussions that I have been talking about... 119 
In affirming Britain's 'uniquely' central role in the management of the 
Yugoslav crisis, the Foreign Secretary went on to reject the proposal for 
an air exclusion zone over Croatia to stop the bombing of Vukovar, 
Dubrovnik and other towns, commenting that it would probably not be 
meaningful (he did not elaborate on this) or viable. 120 He confirmed 
continued support for the blanket arms embargo, and for Lord 
Carrington's peace conference. 121 He did not reprove Milosevic for 
reneging on his initial acceptance of the peace plan, but simply 
described the Serbian president as 'obdurate'. Nor he condemn the 
Serbian leadership for orchestrating the onslaught on Vukovar. Instead, 
he lay all blame on the JNA, which he alleged was 'struggling for its own 
existence as an army, regardless of any constituted authority'. 122 In 
119 Douglas Hurd. Debate on the Address, November 1, 1991, Hansard, Vo1.198, c.130. For 
further discussion of the Foreign Secretary's views on arriving at agreement within EC structures, 
see Orders of the Day. December 19,1991. Hansard, Vo1.201, c.482-S. 
120 The foreign secretary confirmed this position the following month. 'I do not think that an air 
shield is feasible or would be effective'. Douglas Hurd, Oral Answers, December 18, 1991. 
Hansard, Vo1.201, c.266. 
121 Five days after this speech the Hague Conference adjourned in 'an atmosphere of failure', with 
Carrington's scepticism described as 'contagious'. Le Monde, November 7, 1991, p.4. 
122 Douglas Hurd, Debate on the Address, op.cit. c.121. 
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short, at a time when Serbian government policies in Croatia were 
coming under growing pressure both within Serbia and internationally, 
with the multi-ethnic city ofVukovar about to fall to the JNA and Serb 
paramilitaries, Milosevic had been implicitly acquitted by at least one 
major power. 
In rejecting the concept of majority voting, Douglas Hurd also elaborated 
on his methods of achieving 'unanimity' within the EC by 'sitting around 
a table and thrashing out a problem, and then reaching agreement on 
what needs to be done'. 123 The Foreign Secretary stressed that Britain's 
foreign policy 'has to be strenuous and energetic' and that it would 
succeed.124 On November 4, Lord Carrington presented the final draft of 
the EC Plan to the republics. 125 Within days of its rejection by Milosevic, 
on November 9, the 'rump' Yugoslav presidency's proposal for a UN force 
was on its way to the Security Council. 
The new proposal was distinctly more advantageous for the Milosevic 
regime. The circumstances under which foreign troops would now enter 
Croatia were substantively different from three months earlier, when the 
French had first mooted the idea. Most of the Serb majority areas were 
now under Serb control, and much else besides. On the other hand, due 
to desertion, lack of discipline and low morale amongst recruits, the JNA 
could not hold out for much longer without the full mobilisation of 
Serbia. Additionally, Serbs were fleeing en masse in Central Slavonia 
before a Croatian offensive. With a stalemate developing, this was the 
time from the Serb viewpoint to set in motion the process for engaging 
123 Douglas Hurd, Ibid. c.124. 
124 Douglas Hurd, Ibid. c.130. 
125 See BURG, Steven L and SHOUP, Paul S in The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict 
and International Intervention. M.E. Sharpe, 2000, p.89, for a discussion of the provisions of the 
respective drafts of the EC Plan. 
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UN troops to protect the territory acquired by force. 126 On the other 
hand, it made international recognition of Croatia virtually inevitable, 
since without the promise of independence, Tudjman would have been 
unlikely to agree to deployment in the enclaves. 127 Acceptance in full of 
the Belgrade proposal would imply defacto endorsement by the UN of 
Croatia's loss of territorial integrity. Croatia was by now virtually severed 
in two, with no access to the Danube. Several hundred thousand 
Croatians were consigned to long-term refugee status, while the Krajina 
Serbs controlled nearly a third of the new state. The UN envoy, Cyrus 
Vance was considerably out of his depth in the Balkans, and mostly 
guided by the UN in New York 128 
On November 13, Britain asked the UN Security Council to discuss the 
despatch of UN peacekeepers to Yugoslavia,129 On the same day, the 
proposal was conditionally endorsed by the British foreign minister in 
the House of Commons. 130 There was no international debate about the 
terms of UN deployment. The conditions laid down in the letter from the 
rump presidency in Belgrade, namely, that the troops be placed along 
the lines of confrontation, consolidating Serb territorial gains, rather 
than along the republic boundary lines, were automatically accepted. 
The proposal was put to the UN Security Council via the Romanian 
President who was considered more amenable to a Serb-inspired 
126 One Balkans military expert considered that the war in Croatia ended precisely because the 
momentum was moving from the JNA to the Croatian side. CIGAR, Norman. 'Croatia's War of 
Independence: The Parameters of War Termination', in The Journal o/Slavic Military Studies, 
Vol.l0, No.2, June 1997, pp.34-70. 
127 On the UNPROFOR role in Croatia, the British UN Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping 
Operations, Marrack Goulding, notes that 'Milosevic and Kadijevic were on the whole reasonable 
and supportive of our proposals. Tudjman, by contrast, was strained and emotional, very much 
the underdog.' See GOULDING, Marrack. Peacemonger, John Murray, 2002, p.300. 
128 Cyrus Vance was often flanked at press conferences by Marrack Goulding, who accompanied 
Vance to Yugoslavia to negotiate a ceasefrre the day after Vukovar fell. See Chapter 2 for a more 
detailed assessment of Goulding's role. 
129 RFEIRL, Report on Eastern Europe. November 22,1991. 
130 Douglas Hogg, Croatia. November 13, 1991. Hansard, V01.198, c.1208. 
45 
initiative than Yugoslavia's official UN Representative, Darko Silovic, a 
Croat. 131 Secrecy in the early stages, according to Jovic, was such that 
even Jugoslav Kostic and Sejdo Bajramovic, two of the four Serb bloc 
Presidency members, were not brought into discussions. 132 Deputy 
Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Milovoj Maksic, when first 
consulted, believed that the proposal would not be accepted since the 
West did not recognise the four-member rump presidency. He was 
wrong, however. Britain and France waived the fact that the proposal 
was not signed by the SFRJ President, Stipe Mesic, or by the Slovenian, 
Bosnian and Macedonian Presidency members (none of whom were even 
consulted), but pressed for its prompt acceptance within the UN 
Security Council. 133 Considerable diplomatic activity ensued. Carrington 
flew to meet Milosevic in Belgrade, for the first time expressing 
optimism, and stressing that the UN deployment depended on 
Milosevic's agreement. He did not seem bothered that, as Yugoslav UN 
Ambassador Silovic was to point out, the proposal was illegal since it 
had not passed through the SFRY constitutional process. 134 
The Belgrade regime now had a double-edged advantage. Carrington and 
Vance had endorsed the proposal, but stressed that a cease-fire had to 
131 'We found a 'Solomon's' solution: to send it personally to the President of the Security Council, 
the Romanian Ambassador to the UN, and to inform the Romanian government so that they can 
influence matters, to bring the request onto the agenda ... ' JOVIC, op.cit. pA09. [Author's 
translation] 
132 JOVIC, Ibid. pA08. 
133 Jovic comments in his memoirs that the Security Council had begun debating the idea of 
sending 'blue berets' into Krajina, but that they avoided mentioning that Serbia had requested it! 
"They ... found a 'Solomon's' solution. Great Britain and France 'sought' it formally ... they didn't 
want to mention our 'rump' Presidency'. JOVIC, Ibid. pAll. On 17 October, the rump Presidency 
had already informed the EC that it had competency in respect to Yugoslavia's defence, security 
and foreign affairs. At the same time, it ordered the red star to be removed from JNA berets, and 
banned all communist and 'Titoist' insignia. Le Monde, October 18, 1991, p.3. 
134 Borba, November 11,1991, p.14. See also Le Monde, November 12,1991, p.7, for Croatia's 
reaction, and Le Monde, November 10, 1991, pJ, for Croatia's and Slovenia's upbraiding of the 
international community for its 'evenhanded' attitude. 
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be in place before a peacekeeping force could be sent,135 a signal that 
peace enforcement was not on the agenda. But, if no UN force was to be 
despatched while fighting continued, there was little inducement to halt 
the offensive. Since all Serb-held territory was to be under UN military 
protection there was, on the contrary, an incentive to conquer as much 
as possible. Accordingly, the JNA onslaught on Vukovar intensified with 
no international response beyond a further abortive EC-brokered 
ceasefire.136 On November 18, Vukovar fell to the JNA and Serb 
paramilitaries, and the EC and the International Red Cross agreed to 
oversee the evacuation of some 14,000 civilians and wounded. 137 
Serbia's proposal to the Security Council was raised in an Adjournment 
Debate in the House of Commons on 13 November. Called at the request 
of Conservative backbencher, Peter Fry, the debate started at 11.45pm. 
It was Labour MP Robert Wareing, a frequent visitor to Yugoslavia with 
pro-Serb sympathies, who raised the issue of deploying "a peacekeeping 
force within the Serbian enclaves in Croatia and along the Croatian 
border with Serbia."138 The Foreign Minister clarified the British 
position. 
The proposition ... is not unattractive. I understand the intellectual 
force of it ... that we should protect the enclaves by some form of 
135 RFEIRL, op.cit. 
136 RFEIRL, Ibid. November 29, 1991. 
137 Goulding notes in his memoir that Van den Broek was keeping Carrington 'on a tight rein and 
was insisting that any agreement should include condemnation of the JNA attack on Osijek'. 
GOULDING, op.cit. pAO. Osijek at this time was, as Goulding confirmed, under JNA siege, and 
undergoing heavy shelling so, in view of the Vukovar experience, Goulding'S reasoning was 
difficult to understand. See BLASKOVICH, Jerry. Anatomy of Deceit. Dunhill, 1997, for an 
American physician's first-hand account of atrocities in Eastern Slavonia in late 1991. 
138 Robert Wareing, Q:milia, Hansard, op.cit. This was the first of numerous interventions by 
Robert Wareing to the House, where he argued the Serb cause, often inaccurately and without 
evidence for his claims. See HODGE, Carole. The Serb Lobby, op.cit. pp.13-14. 
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peacekeeping force ... although both President Tudjman and President 
Milosevic have invited the Security Council and, indeed, the 
international community to deploy a peacekeeping force, it is clear 
from the small print that there are substantial differences between the 
two positions. The Serbs say that such a force should be along 
existing fighting lines, whereas the Croats say that it should be along 
historic frontiers. Those views are incompatible ... There may come a 
time when we would be willing to deploy a peacekeeping force ... First, 
there must be an effective ceasefrre. Secondly, those who request it 
must genuinely be prepared to accept it on their territory. Thirdly, the 
deployment of the force must be seen to be positively productive in 
terms of contributing to a settlement .. .It may be that ... the hon. 
Gentleman's proposal that there shall be some deployment into the 
enclaves becomes an option that we shall seriously consider ... "139 
Croatia's preference, that troops be deployed along the republic borders, 
was not explored by the Foreign Minister. His statement clarified the 
British position, which concurred with that of the Milosevic regime. 
The Croatian president reluctantly went along with the proposal because 
it also tacitly encompassed the prospect of Croatian recognition. 140 
Milosevic had realised that he would have to concede Croatian 
independence, and had indicated such to a party of visiting British 
parliamentarians at the beginning of November. 141 Germany was alone 
in arguing for Croatian recognition at this juncture, but other countries 
139 Douglas Hogg, Cmatia. Hansard, op.cit. Milosevic had already stated clearly to British MPs 
on a parliamentary visit to Belgrade on 11 November that he hoped for the UN to be in "these 
enclaves ... for a period of X years". The Foreign Affairs Committee, November 27,1991,125. 
See also Croatia. David Howell, March 5,1992, Hansard, Vo1.205, c.463. The extended UN 
occupation in Cyprus was probably enough to convince the Serbian leader that the conquered 
territory stood a chance of remaining frozen in UN hands long enough to bring about an eventual 
fait accompli. 
140 For the Croatian decision at this time, see CIGAR, Norman. 'Croatia's War of Independence: The 
Parameters of War Termination'. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 1 0, No.2, June 1997. 
pp.43-6. 
141 Milosevic had earlier also indicated to British MPs travelling to Yugoslavia on a fact-finding 
mission on behalf of the Foreign Affairs Committee, that Croatia's independence was acceptable 
to him, 'as long as within the state of Croatia there was a UN presence in these enclaves to defend 
for a period of X years and to safeguard the interests of the Serbian population'. See Foreian 
Affairs Committee. Examination of Witnesses. November 27,1991,125. Comment by Ted 
Rowlands, who had met Milosevic on November 11. 
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had intimated that they would readily follow once conditions were in 
place. 142 In view of world-wide sympathy for the plight of Croatian 
civilians at this time, due to extensive media coverage of Dubrovnik and 
the destruction ofVukovar, and the fact that Tudjman had agreed to 
accord Croatia's Serbs full minority rights,143 Croatia's request stood a 
strong chance of being granted. Milosevic was a pragmatist, moreover. 
International recognition of Croatia, provided this did not embrace any 
guarantee of territorial integrity, would not damage Serbia's interests in 
practical terms. With Southern Dalmatia and Eastern Slavonia severed 
from the capital, a major railway junction (Knin) under Serb control, and 
its tourist industry devastated, Croatia was unlikely to derive much 
tangible benefit from international recognition, at least in the short 
term. Meanwhile, Serbia would be free to focus on the more difficult task 
of taking over much of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The debate on November 13 served to further endorse the Foreign 
Secretary's speech of November 1. Questioned on the use of air power or 
a naval force to lift the siege of Dubrovnik, Foreign Minister Hogg opined 
I do not believe that we can [deploy an interdiction naval forcel because 
there is no authority to do so. Let us be clear about this: if we were to 
deploy naval units, they could be effective only if they were authorised 
to fire. That is an act of war. We cannot commit an act of war unless 
it is lawful. I do not believe that it would be lawful unless it were 
underpinned by some appropriate resolution of the Security Council 
for the United Nations. It is unlikely that we would get such authority 
at the moment ... The same applies to air interdiction. That will not be 
successful unless it is backed by the readiness to fire. That, too, is an 
act of war. That being so, in the absence of the Security Council 
resolution it would not be justified or, indeed, possible. Therefore for 
the moment I could not commend either proposition to the House ... In 
142 On October 31, the Italian foreign minister, Gianni De Michelis, stated that the EC would 
recognise the independence of all the republics that requested it. Sir Russell Johnston Debate on 
the Address, op.cit. c.146. Slovenian and Croatian passports were already being recognised by 
Austria, Italy and Germany. Le Monde, October 12,1991, p.3. 
143 The Croatian government passed a law which went some way to guaranteeing rights to 
minorities on December 4,1991, although it still fell short of the Badinter Commission 
requirements. Le Monde, December 6, 1991, p.6. 
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any event, I would be cautious, because once taking the path of force it 
is difficult to stop going the whole way. It is difficult to draw any 
intellectual distinction between, on the one hand, the deployment of 
naval and air forces and, on the other, the deployment of land forces. 
If we do the one, we are driven to the other. I must be honest about 
this. I fear greatly the prospect of committing land forces to that part 
of the world. I shrink from it .. ,144 
On the military option in general, Mr Hogg commented 
I do not believe that at present the Security Council would authorise 
the use of force. There is no prospect of its doing so in the foreseeable 
future. Therefore, we are focusing on what is obtainable within the 
Security Council, most notably the UN underpinning of sanctions and 
of the oil embargo. We may be able to achieve that. We shall have to 
see. But I do not believe that the authority would extend to military 
action of the kind suggested ... 145 
The foreign minister did not indicate where Security Council opposition 
to military intervention might have arisen. According to Borisav Jovic, 
the Russians at that time were not prepared to veto the use of force. 146 
China, judging from its previous record, was likely to abstain, and the 
United States deferred to Europe on the Balkans. Of the remaining 
permanent members on the Security Council, Britain and France, 
France had already requested a UN force in the September. As Douglas 
Hurd had pointed out earlier, however, Britain was 'at the centre of 
events'.147 It may, therefore, be concluded that the foreign minister's 
certainty about Security Council opposition to military force rested in 
his confidence that the British position would prevail. 
144 Douglas Hogg, Croatia. op.cit., c.1207. Fonner UK Ambassador to the United Nations 
Anthony Parsons viewed the situation differently. 'I wondered at the time whether the whole 
imbroglio could be ended if the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean spent half an hour, all that 
would have been required, destroying the puny Yugoslav navy bombarding Dubrovnik, and if 
NATO knocked out with air attacks the Serbian artillery which was smashing up Vukovar'. 
PARSONS, op.cit. p.226. 
14SDougias Hogg, Ibid. c.l208. 
146 JOVIC, op.cit. p.401. 
147 Douglas Hurd, Debate on the Address, op.cit. c.130. 
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On the issue of sanctions, the foreign secretary was more specific about 
Britain's position, and that of other Security Council members. 
Responding to a question on whether agreement would be sought "for a 
Security Council resolution imposing comprehensive sanctions, 
including an international oil ban, on the whole area, as a way of 
exerting pressure to bring the fighting to an end", Douglas Hurd stated 
The three EC members of the Security Council - Britain, France 
and Belgium - have reached agreement on what we want the 
Security Council to do. Our representatives are now canvassing 
support for that. I am not sure whether we shall get the support, but 
the plan includes the elements mentioned ... 148 
These two significantly contrasting positions of the British government 
relating to Security Council authority are just one incident which 
challenges the argument that the international diplomatic failure in the 
Balkans was due to a lack of political will. 149 On its part, Britain 
manifested the clear will to work actively for a peacekeeping force on the 
lines proposed by Milosevic, but not for the interdiction force proposed 
earlier by other EC states and rejected by the Serbian president. 
The situation in Croatia was debated in the Commons during December 
but, despite the centrality of the issue to UK foreign policy, 
parliamentary debating time was confmed to the margins of other 
government business. In a Christmas adjournment debate on December 
12, Liberal Democrat David Alton pointed to the lack of parliamentary 
debate and, at the same time, the degree of support amongst MPs for a 
review of government policy on Yugoslavia,150 A further adjournment 
148 Oral Answers, November 20, 1991, Hansard, Vo1.199, c.255 
149 James Gow has adopted this viewpoint in Triumph o/the lack o/will, op.cit. 
ISO 'There has been no debate in the House on the war in Croatia, but hon. Members have tabled 
early-day motions with which I have been associated. An all-party Friends of Croatia group has 
been established. The hon. Member for Homsey and Wood Green (Sir H. Rossi) tabled early-day 
motion 138. My hon. Friend the Member for Inverness, Nairn and Lochaber (Sir R Johnston) 
tabled early-day motion 219. About 70 signatures have been added to those motions. The hon. 
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debate on the same day, called by Conservative MP Patrick Cormack 
began at 3.21 a.m. and, not surprisingly, was poorly attended. 
Cormack, a lone Conservative voice at this time, appealed to the 
government to 'stop acting as an honest broker between victim and 
aggressor. The evidence of responsibility for the carnage and destruction 
is too overwhelming to be ignored'. 151 
The Labour spokesperson for Europe, George Robertson, endorsed all 
the main facets of government policy. On the blanket arms embargo, he 
declared 'nobody who is sensible or sane would say that we should 
export more arms to a country that is already awash with them' .152 On 
Croatian and Slovenian independence, he opined 'the problem cannot be 
solved by the recognition of any number of states' and on military 
intervention declared 'there are those who even dare to say that we 
should intervene militarily and hope that some form of peace will come 
about as a result'. Robertson also referred to 'the culpability of the 
federal army, which is no longer responsive to any of the organs of the 
previous state'. He was evidently unaware that the JNA generals 
reported on an almost daily basis to Milosevic and the Serb-dominated 
rump presidency. 'We are watching human beings killing each other for 
no other reason than the fact that they live next door to each other'. 
Robertson's evident confusion about the political situation was matched 
by his ignorance of the regional geography, as he reflected on 
'Dubrovnik. ... that beautiful city in the Aegean'. 153 
Members for Hyndburn (Mr Hargreaves), Ynys Mon (Mr Jones) Sheffield, Attercliffe (Sir P 
Duffy) and Torfaen (Mr Mwphy) are among the sponsors of those motions, that demonstrates the 
breadth of concern in the House ... ' David Alton, A<1joumment (Christmas), December 12, 1991. 
Hansard. Vo1.200, c.1017. 
lSI Patrick Cormack, Cr.wlWl, December 12, 1991, Hansard. Vo1.200, c.1160. 
IS2 George Robertson, Ibid. c.1164. 
IS3 George Robertson, Ibid. c.l163. 
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The confusion evident amongst a number of Members less directly 
concerned with foreign policy is perhaps not surprising. Many of the 
experts, including British academics, were also confused. One Balkans 
military specialist stated that 'the army has its own agenda which is not 
the same as the Serbian regime in Belgrade nowadays', a comment 
repeated by Foreign Office officials and others which suggested that the 
JNA offensive outside Milosevic's control. 154 Other expert witnesses, 
giving evidence at the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, 
contributed to the myth that the army was out of political control, one 
opining that it would be 'extremely difficult to identify useful 
interlocutors and workable structures through which to work' .155 The 
interlocutors existed: Federal President Stipe Mesic, Prime Minister Ante 
Markovic, Foreign Minister Budimir Loncar, and others. 156 But they had 
been forsaken in the frantic international scramble to reach an 
accommodation with Milosevicl One witness concluded that 'only 
mutual exhaustion - not reason or foreign intervention - seems likely to 
stop [the war] 157 a view supported by another witness who opined that 
'military intervention is not a realistic option', instead advocating 
'unobstructive' mediation, and also informed the Committee that whilst 
Croatia was "defending a cause", the other side had no war aims I 158 He 
154 See evidence submitted by expert witnesses to the Foreign Affairs Committee on November 
27, 1991. Nos. 147, 149 & 153, and December 4, 1991, No. 234, where Jonathan Eyal, Director 
of the Royal United Services Institute, and a frequent contributor to the Balkans debate in the 
British media, described the Yugoslav army as 'an independent institution'. 
ISS Mark Wheeler, from the School of Slavonic Studies, London University, referred to 'tribalism', 
and a 'madness' and psychosis' amongst Serbs and Croats. Report to Foreian Affairs Committee, 
November 27, 1991, pp.76-79. 
156 The Federal Assembly passed a vote of no confidence in Ante Markovic and Budimir Loncar 
on November 15, but Markovic refused to resign, calling the vote 'an illegal and illegitimate act'. 
But he did resign a month later because, according to Yugoslav reports, 81 % of the 1992 budget 
had been earmarked for the federal armed forces which, Markovic believed, would lead to a 
continuation of war. RFEIRL, January 10, 1992. 
1S7 Mark Wheeler. "The Death of Yugoslavia [CE 72]'. Report to ForeiiD Affairs Committee, 
November 27,1991, p.79. 
158 Dr Stevan Pavlovitch, University of Southampton. Evidence before ForeillD Affairs 
Committee, November 27, 1991, No.108. See also Recent developments in Eastern Europe with 
special reference to Yulloslavia, a memorandum submitted by the Foreign & Commonwealth 
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referred to the situation in Dubrovnik as "stabilized", moreover, at a time 
when it was being bombarded by land, sea and air. On the question of 
the role of the JNA, on which witnesses were closely questioned, two of 
them apparently were of the belief that the JNA was engaged in an 
ideological war against fascism. 159 The day before the Foreign Mfairs 
Committee meeting, a confidential EC Monitor's report was leaked to the 
media. The report also constituted an appeal to European leaders. It 
stated that 
the path of negotiation and persuasion chosen by Europe has failed 
and its pursuance will damage Europe's image and credibility. The 
Mission has exhausted all means of action. The moment has come for 
ministers to make a choice: either to pursue (the same path), but with 
certain failure; or to leave, which would be dishonourable; or to give 
the Mission the military means of protection and persuasion to give 
the process a chance of succeeding. 160 
The international response to the deepening crisis was a UN 
peacekeeping force which British officials insisted should not enter 
Croatia before a lasting ceasefire was in place. This was reinforced in 
the House of Commons by Douglas Hurd, in response to the argument 
from a Conservative backbencher that either Croatia should have the 
means of self-defence, or it should be defended by UN troops with a 
peace enforcement role, as opposed to merely a peacekeeping one. 
Office (CE 17), dated 11 October 1991, published by The Foreign Affairs Committee, 6 
November 1991, p.1S [12], which concluded that the 'origins of the crisis lie in the division 
between Rome and Byzantium'. The memorandum also dermed the limits of NATO intervention 
to exclude Yugoslavia [24], minimized the differences between Britain and other EC member 
states on a potential WEU contribution [26], and advised that as Yugoslavia is 'sui generis ... there 
is no necessary reason why the crisis in Yugoslavia should generate widespread regional 
instability'. [29] 
159 Dr. Pavlovitch and Dr Wheeler,lhid. Nos. 147 & 149. For further comment on the British 
intellectual and media response to the war, see SIMMS, op.cit. pp.306-313. 
160 Quoted by Chenu J. in COT, ed. op.cit. p.lOl. Anthony Parsons agreed. 'I do not believe in 
the effectiveness of unarmed observers, or lightly armed peacekeepers in such roles [a state 
verging on civil war or disintegration] ... three or four battalion groups with supporting weapons, 
if deployed ... on the Croatian side of the Serbia/Croatia border in 1991, might well have 
prevented hostilities from breaking out'. PARSONS, op.cit. p.256 & 262. See also Le Monde, 
December 4,1991, p.4. 
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Mr Hurd replied: 
I do not think that there has ever been any prospect of any member of 
the European Community or of the United Nations believing that a 
United Nations or a Western European Union peace-keeping force 
could force its way into Yugoslavia against the opposition either or the 
Yugoslav national army - the JNA - or of any armed force. 161 
It was an argument, and a mode of argument, that Douglas Hurd was to 
adopt on many occasions in the House of Commons, the media and 
elsewhere. But it did not quite correspond with the facts. Following the 
fall of Vukovar, for instance, the French foreign minister. Roland 
Dumas, had proposed that the UN enter Croatia regardless of any 
ceasefrre,162 the essential difference being that the French government at 
that point was still prepared to defy Milosevic and the JNA, while the 
British were not. 
Conclusion 
The response by the European Community to the war in Croatia in 1991 
laid down the parameters for international Balkans policy over the 
following four years, facilitating the takeover by the JNA and Serb 
paramilitaries of one third of Croatia, while freeing the JNA to launch an 
offensive in Bosnia and Herzegovina the following year. 
The inefficacy of EC involvement in the early stages of the war can partly 
be attributed to its lack of understanding of recent developments in 
Yugoslavia, and the degree to which the country had already 
disintegrated, in terms of the Titoist structures set up in the wake of 
World War II. By early 1991, Yugoslavia had all but collapsed in 
constitutional, political and economic terms, due mainly to measures 
161 Douglas Hurd, Oral Answers. December 18, 1991, op.cit. c.266. 
162 Le Monde, November 20, 1991, p.S. 
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taken by the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, to gain control over 
much of the Yugoslav Federation, while the legitimate concerns of 
Croatian Serbs for the preservation of their rights within an independent 
Croatia were fuelled out of all proportion by propaganda from Serbia. 
Milosevic, well before the onset of hostilities in June 1991, infiltrated 
insurgents into Serb majority towns and villages in Croatia, and those 
with a large Serb minority, initiating low-key disturbances and military 
manoeuvres, laying the ground for support in the planned offensive. 
On the other hand, the attempts by Slovenia and Croatia to secede from 
the Federation were not altogether dissimilar to national(ist) 
manifestations throughout eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, but were probably in greater measure a reaction to the 'Greater 
Serbia' policy orchestrated from Belgrade. The failure of efforts by the 
Macedonian and Bosnian leaders in the first half of 1991 to secure a 
confederal arrangement acceptable to all sides reflected the impasse 
which only external (political) intervention might have alleviated. 
Initially, whilst hostilities were confined to Slovenia, the European 
Community took the international initiative, giving priority to political 
means for resolving the conflict. Once the war spread to Croatia, and 
alternative measures were considered at various international fora, 
Britain emerged as the European power most opposed to an 
international military presence in Croatia, either in the form of 
European monitors or an interpositionary force. In this, it was 
supported by the Soviet Union. 
Following the Soviet coup on August 20, and Russia's subsequent 
temporary retreat from the Balkan policy arena, the EC was afforded 
more leeway in which to produce a policy more responsive to the 
escalating situation on the ground. Calls for military intervention in late 
August, less muted than the French-inspired attempt a month earlier to 
despatch a WEU force to Croatia, were met with the British proposal for 
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a peace conference in the Hague, to be chaired by a former NATO 
secretary-general and British foreign secretary, Lord Carrington. 
The Hague Conference was founded on the premise that the only 
approach to what Britain characterised as an intractable conflict was 
through a negotiated solution, acceptable to all sides. This 'evenhanded' 
approach to what most independent observers regarded as a war of 
aggression was bolstered by an arms embargo on all Yugoslav republics, 
proposed by Britain and others at the UN Security Council, directly 
benefiting the Belgrade regime which by now controlled the Yugoslav 
Army and arms production facilities. It also offered a fa~ade of activity, 
whilst forestalling other, potentially more effective, policies. 
During the same month, a 'consensus' of EC foreign ministers, led by 
British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd, publicly declared that 
international military intervention was not contemplated in Croatia. The 
decision was carried against the judgment of most other major EC 
states, and a number of other countries outside the EC, and a Council 
of Europe recommendation. France and Germany demonstrated their 
continuing concern at the inadequacy of the EC response by seeking UN 
support for a military interpositionary force. 
The relative ease with which Britain was able to guide the consensus 
within the EC is partly attributable to EC structures which required 
unanimity in the sphere of foreign and defence policy; it was also due to 
the Netherland Presidency's concern to maintain EC cohesion in the 
lead-up to Maastricht and, not least, to the reluctance of European 
states to take responsibility for military action in which neither Britain -
arguably the strongest EC military power - nor the United States were 
prepared to participate. 
French opposition to Britain's non-interventionist policy was of 
continuing concern to the Foreign Office, however, since despite the 
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UK's membership of all major global institutions, and its track record in 
international diplomacy, French support was considered essential for 
what amounted to appeasement of Serbia. Fitzroy Maclean's visit to 
Belgrade had the dual purpose of bringing Serbia on board in support of 
the peace process, and encouraging Milosevic to approach French 
President Mitterand, known for his Serb sympathies, to do the same. 
Milosevic initially supported the EC proposals, only to reject them two 
weeks later, when they were formally presented to the republics. This 
was an unexpected obstacle for Lord Carrington and his associates who, 
over the weeks that followed, were prepared to accommodate the Serbian 
leader to the point of eliminating from the revised plan any reciprocal 
provisions for Albanians and other non-Serb minorities. Yet the gesture 
misfired. The Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina had already been 
unilaterally established by December 1990, coinciding with the election 
of Milosevic as president of Serbia. The EC Conference plea, therefore, 
for Serb minority rights to be respected in Croatia was, so far as the 
Krajina Serbs were concerned, quite misplaced, as they had never 
considered themselves a minority, but as having equality with other 
Croatian nationals, and would not have been assuaged by any 
Yugoslavia other than within a Serb-dominated framework. 
The collapse of the Hague Conference posed a dilemma for Lord 
Carrington. Since Serbia alone had blocked the EC proposal for a loose 
confederation, and since Croatia had declared itself prepared to amend 
its constitution to protect Serb minority rights more fully, many EC 
leaders felt that recognition of the republics which wished it could not 
reasonably be withheld for much longer. It was also clear that Germany, 
Italy, Belgium and Denmark, as well as several countries outside the 
EC, intended to recognise Slovenia and Croatia in any case. 
By early November, it was finally clear to the international community 
that Yugoslavia could be held together in a form acceptable to the 
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Belgrade regime only as a unitary state in which Serbia, by defmition 
the largest, most populous republic, and in control of the Federation's 
fmancial, military and foreign affairs, would dominate. This solution had 
now been rejected not only by Slovenia and Croatia, but by Bosnia and 
Macedonia as well. In consequence, two policies were gradually set in 
motion as an interim solution to the conflict, the so-called Vance Plan, 
on the one hand and, on the other, the process of offering international 
recognition to Slovenia, Croatia and other Yugoslav republics who 
fulfIlled the criteria laid down by the Badinter Arbitration Commission. 
What later became known as the Vance Plan was in fact initiated in 
Belgrade, and involved the deployment of UN troops along the 
confrontation lines in Croatia, once a ceasefire had been secured. 
Whilst Croatia had long sought UN peacekeepers, albeit along the 
republic borders, Serbia's endorsement, indeed its promotion, of the 
Plan was proposed at the Security Council by Britain and France, and 
followed up with alacrity by Lord Carrington, together with UN envoy 
Cyrus Vance and UN Under-Secretary for peacekeeping operations, 
Marrack Goulding. Yet no other single international policy contributed 
so directly to the escalation of the war to Bosnia-Herzegovina as the 
Vance Plan. For, in releasing the JNA from its Croatian offensive 
(indeed, insisting on its withdrawal) and at the same time freezing Serb 
territorial gains, the occupying UN peacekeeping force unwittingly 
provided the conditions for the JNA offensive to shift to Bosnia since, 
crucially, the JNA was able to carry out an offensive on one main front 
at a time only, mainly due to shortage of manpower. Moreover, as much 
of the JNA offensive had been conducted from Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
withdrawal was a relatively simple task. The JNA was well supported by 
the Serb police and civilian population who had been groomed over a 
number of months for the moment of takeover in their respective 
regions. 
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The German-propelled policy to recognise the independence of Croatia 
and Slovenia cannot be considered in isolation from the Vance Plan and 
its consequences. The allegation of 'premature' recognition (which 
originated in Belgrade) has frequently been cited as the main cause of 
the break-up of Yugoslavia, the collapse of EC policy, and the extension 
of the war to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet those allegations generally failed 
to take full account of the situation in Bosnia at that time. Along with 
the massive arms build-up orchestrated from Belgrade amongst Serb 
communities throughout Bosnia and Eastern Herzegovina during 1991, 
with the establishment of Serb autonomous areas, there was a gradual 
takeover of the media which was being used as a propaganda tool to 
engender fear amongst Serb communities outside Serbia. 
A quid-pro-quo deal may have been struck between Britain and 
Germany in exchange for German concessions on Maastricht, but the 
inevitability of eventually conceding recognition to all republics who 
qualified was clear. Equally, the sobering effect on Serbia of the 
international recognition of Slovenia, and especially Croatia, was short-
lived. Once it became clear that the Serbs could, with impunity, 
transfer their offensive to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the technicality of 
Croatian recognition, without any concomitant international military 
support to secure its borders, was seen by the Milosevic regime in 
particular as no more than a temporary hiccup. Having successfully 
galvanised his people into action through a combination of myth-making 
and propaganda, backed by the expropriation of the arsenal of the 
Yugoslav army, Milosevic saw the opportunity to gain control of large 
swathes of territory outside Serbia and, at the same time, offset the 
deepening economic crisis by a war of 'national liberation'. But none of 
these ambitious plans would have been realisable without the benefit of 
international policies which worked in Serbia's favour. In most of these, 
Britain took a leading role. 
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The British government also contributed to refming a number of myths 
issuing from Belgrade which lent legitimacy to the regime, and helped 
consolidate Milosevic in power. The myth that the war arose out of 
centuries of ethnic hatred, that it was 'tribal', or a 'madness', was 
incorporated into Foreign Office reports and academic analysis, 
suggesting that there was little outsiders could do, other than mediate 
evenhandedly. One of the most farfetched myths, that the breakup of 
Yugoslavia was the result of a German (and/or Vatican) plot, still 
prevails in some quarters. However, Croatia's 'premature' recognition 
continues to be proffered as the single most damaging policy into which 
Germany allegedly railroaded its EC partners. A number of European 
states had concluded, however, that recognition of the western 
republics, and others that fulfilled the criteria of the Badinter 
Commission, was inevitable after the collapse of the Hague Conference, 
and in the continued eschewal of military intervention. Without the 
'carrot' of Croatian recognition, it is most unlikely that Croatia would 
have acquiesced in the Vance Plan, as conceived by Milosevic, to deploy 
UN troops within the Serb enclaves, especially as the Croatian Army 
strengthened. The main difference between the Tudjman and Milosevic 
perspectives at this time was that Milosevic viewed Croatian 
independence as a temporary setback, and the UN occupation as 
indefinite, whereas Tudjman saw it the other way round. 
Another myth was the alleged centrality of Croatia's invidious role in the 
Second World War which was magnified, especially in the Serb media, to 
justify a Serb onslaught on Croatian civilians half a century later, 
instilling disproportionate fear in Croatia's Serb popUlation well before 
hostilities erupted. Elements of this propaganda found their way into 
British political and media circles, often stifling serious debate on 
contemporary developments on the ground, to the point where the 
flattening ofVukovar, despite vivid news coverage, was scarcely 
discussed, either at parliamentary or academic level. After Vukovar, a 
line was drawn in the sand. World leaders, with Lord Carrington, Cyrus 
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Vance and Marrack Goulding in the lead, responded to the graphic 
evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity by concluding 
another abortive ceasefire with the Serbian leader who had orchestrated 
the Vukovar tragedy. 
The war in Croatia was fought out in the margins of the Maastricht 
Treaty, and at the end of the Cold War. Britain's Balkans policy was 
dictated in great part by its perception of its position in Europe, 
especially after the reunification of Germany, and its wider role in the 
emerging post cold war configuration. Britain was also concerned to 
retain its position as a Permanent Member of the Security Council, and 
a leading world power which at times meant 'punching above its weight'. 
The unity and stability of Yugoslavia was considered essential by all 
leading Western powers in the environment of a disintegrating Soviet 
Empire but, as this became increasingly impossible to maintain, 
European powers had different and often conflicting views on how to 
address the crisis. The breakup of Yugoslavia presented an opportunity 
for Britain to recuperate some of its lost initiative within the EC, 
through asserting its will where it was strongest, through diplomacy, 
and with the authority of its military standing and expertise. But while 
France sought through the WEU to promote a European army, Britain 
opposed any plan which moved that objective forward, other than in 
purely rhetorical terms. Britain was also aware that any agreement on 
the use of force could involve UK troops in a leading role. The Northern 
Ireland experience was often quoted as pivotal to Britain's caution. 
There were other reasons for British opposition to peacekeeping troops 
in the Summer and early Autumn of 1991, however. Yugoslavia, with 
one of the largest armies in Europe, and in a crucial geostrategic 
position, had been viewed as a reliable ally in the Second World War, 
while British/Serbian co-operation dated from World War 1 and earlier. 
Initially, Britain supported Yugoslavia's unity, the Carrington Plan 
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representing the lowest common denominator position acceptable to all 
sides on the ground. Once this option had to be abandoned due to 
Serbia's wholesale rejection of the Plan, Britain supported Serbia, the 
largest and most powerful Yugoslav republic, as the natural successor to 
Yugoslavia. To some extent British policy, adapting with changing 
circumstances but always with these aims in mind, coincided with that 
of Slobodan Milosevic who, unlike the JNA generals, had discarded 
Yugoslav unity once it became an encumbrance. This is not to say that 
British policy was monolithic, nor necessarily always explicitly 
articulated. Indeed, Douglas Hurd often sought to assure his critics that 
the policy could change. The Belgrade regime realised early on, however, 
that whatever changes took place at Britain's instigation were likely to 
favour Serbia so long as its policy remained within certain understood 
boundaries. When Milosevic rejected the Carrington Plan, against 
Fitzroy Maclean's advice, the Serbian leader knew the ball was in his 
court, and the acceptance, and indeed promotion, of the policy of 
despatching UN troops to Croatia within Serb-held areas was the most 
convenient way of staving off an oil embargo and possibly military 
intervention, bearing in mind that Britain was in a minority position in 
the EC in opposing this. It was also, of course, a bonus as it froze, and 
virtually legitimised Serb territorial gains, releasing the JNA for battle on 
a new front, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BOSNIA 1992: CONSOLIDATING POLICY 
Introduction 
The consolidation of British policy in former Yugoslavia progressed 
apace, as the main focus of war moved from Croatia to Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Part 1 of this chapter assesses Britain's role in what was 
termed a 'twin-track' international policy, namely, the deployment of UN 
troops in Croatia, and the EC plan for the ethnic cantonisation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also examines the introduction and enforcement 
of UN sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro and their significance, both 
regionally and in the context of international policy. Part 2 examines the 
British EC Presidency [July-December 1992], including the London 
Conference, UN troop deployment in Bosnia, the debate on the air 
exclusion zone, the refugee issue, and the process of establishing a war 
crimes commission. Sources include parliamentary proceedings, 
governmental and non-governmental reports, academic and other 
relevant publications, local and international media reports, and 
meetings with key officials. 
It concludes that, despite an attempt by France to assume the leading 
role, Britain managed to retain the international initiative so that, by the 
end of the year, pressure from other international players and the 
general public for firmer military action in Bosnia and/or an end to the 
blanket arms embargo had been quashed in favour of a negotiated 
settlement. This, in view of the marked discrepancy in weaponry, and 
the fact that VRS forces by mid 1992 controlled over 70% of Bosnian 
territory, amounted to a tacit acceptance of 'ethnic cleansing', and left 
the Bosnian government with the choice between the pursuance of a war 
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of attrition and acceptance of an ethnically-partitioned Serb-ruled state, 
the latter meeting the main objectives of the Pale and Belgrade regimes. 
PART I 
At the beginning of the New Year, the Foreign Secretary reiterated 
Britain's objectives in the post Cold War era. 
In recent years, Britain has punched above her weight in the world. 
We intend to keep it that way ... Britain plays a central role in world 
affairs. We owe this in part to our history, but we continue to earn it 
through active diplomacy and a willingness to shoulder our share of 
international responsibilities. l 
The withdrawal of JNA forces from Croatia, and international recognition 
of Croatian and Slovenian independence in January 1992, marked a 
brief interval of relative peace, while the EC and UN developed a twin-
track policy to address the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation, involving 
the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops in Croatia, on the one hand 
and, on the other, a plan for the ethnic cantonisation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, under the auspices of the EC. While the international 
character of the twin-track policy was institutionally underpinned, 
however, both 'tracks' were initiated in Belgrade and, thereafter 
substantially steered by British politicians and diplomats. The 
convergent positions of London and Belgrade are illustrated in 
statements by senior politicians in the respective capitals. 
The United Kingdom Government, the European Community and the 
United Nations have a twin-track policy, the first element of which is 
to encourage the parties to participate in the negotiations under the 
chairmanship of ... Lord Carrington. The second track is that we 
strongly support the deployment of a peace keeping force [in Croatiaj2 
I Douglas Hurd, 'Making the world a safer place: our priorities'. Daily Telegraph. January 1, 
1992. 
2 Douglas Hogg, Yuaoslayia, March 5,1992, Hansard. Vo1.205, c.487. 
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It is quite rightly considered in the world today that the UN 
peacekeeping operation and the Brussels Conference on Yugoslavia 
are two complementary pillars supporting the entire unraveling of the 
Yugoslav crisis.3 
Two British diplomats, Marrack Goulding, the UN Under-Secretary 
General for political affairs, and Cedric Thornberry, the UN head of civil 
affairs in former Yugoslavia,4 oversaw the terms of UN deployment in the 
area. Lord Carrington, meanwhile, revived the moribund EC Peace 
Conference on Yugoslavia, and led negotiations for the future of the 
Serb-occupied areas of Croatia and, later, the so-called Cutileiro Plan for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 5 
The UN arms embargo, imposed on Yugoslavia in September 1991, was 
transferred to its successor states which, many experts contend, 
contravened Article 51 of the UN Charter which grants member states 
the right to self-defence.6 Since Yugoslavia's defence equipment 
industry had sufficient raw materials for three to five years' production, 
this arrangement considerably advantaged the well-armed Serbs over 
their Croatian and Bosnian Muslim counterparts) The day preceding 
3 Borisav Jovic, Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, March 19, 1992. 
Review of International Affairs. No. 1003, April 1, 1992, p.ll. 
4 Cedric Thornberry was considered by UN Commander in Bosnia, Lewis MacKenzie, to rank third 
behind UN Commander Satish Nambiar and Morillon in the overall mission. See MACKENZIE, 
Lewis. Peacekeeper: the road to Sarajevo, Douglas & McIntyre, 1993, p.l22. 
5 Interview with Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, Bosnian government representative in the EC 
negotiations, FeblMarch 1992, and Deputy Bosnian President (1992-4). 
6 See, for instance, CIGAR, Norman. 'The Right to Defence: Thoughts on the Bosnian Arms 
Embargo'. Institutefor European Defence and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper 63, 1995, and 
KIRKPATRICK, Jeane, former US representative to the UN, and ABRAMOWITZ, Morton, 
president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in New York Times. Op-Ed, April 
20,1994. For an opposing view, see GOW, James. The Serbian Project and its Adversaries. 
Hurst, 2003, p.97. 
7 BEAVER, Paul. Yugo-Arms: Enough to Export. The Yugofax Dossier, Institute for War and 
Peace Reporting (IWPR), 1992, p.45-6. See also Borba, January 17, 1992, p.9. 'Mala prakticna 
korist' (Little practical use). British officials let it be known that Croatia should not expect to use 
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Croatian and Slovenian recognition, the Foreign Secretary informed the 
Foreign Mfairs Select Committee that, with the UN arms embargo still in 
place, international recognition would be of little practical benefit to the 
newly independent states. 8 
In January 1992, following Marrack Goulding's recommendation to the 
UN Secretary-General, the UN decided that the local administration and 
policing in the Serb-held areas of Croatia was to remain effectively in the 
hands of the Serb authorities for not less than a year. It also rejected the 
Bosnian president's request to deploy UN troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
as a preventive measure, before the onset of hostilities. Goulding again 
visited the area at the behest of the UN Secretary General in early May 
once hostilities were well under way, and once more advised against the 
deployment of a UN force in Bosnia.9 A seasoned UN diplomat, Marrack 
Goulding had accompanied UN envoy Cyrus Vance on a number of trips 
to Yugoslavia in late 1991, when agreement was reached that 
UNPROFOR should be concentrated in areas where the Serbs formed a 
majority or a substantial minority, effectively perpetuating ethnic 
partition. Although this coincided with Milosevic's interests,10 it 
conflicted with those of the Croatian government. It also went against 
the advice of the EC President and others who had warned against 
recognition as a licence to ann. Milosevic had also calculated that independence for the republics 
meant little in security tenns. SILBERILIITLE, op.cit. p.241. 
8 "It has become clear really in the last few weeks recognition is not a major matter ... We have 
checked with the United Nations' legal services and it is clear recognition does not affect the arms 
embargo; the UN arms embargo, which is mandatory continues to apply to all the Republics of 
the fonner Yugoslavia ... The practical effects of recognition as opposed to the psychological are 
secondary." Douglas Hurd, Minutes of Eyidence taken before the Foreiin Affairs Committee, 
January 14, 1992, para.399. According to former UK ambassador to the UN, Anthony Parsons, 
"Resolution 713 would not have been put to the vote. But the damage had been done. The 
precedent, established with the lifting of Rhodesian sanctions in 1979, that only the Council can 
cancel what it has imposed, has precluded the possibility of lifting the anns embargo from the 
Bosnians only". PARSONS, op.cit. p.224. 
9 WOODWARD, op.cit. p.285 & 287. 
10 Borisav Jovic records the extreme satisfaction of the Serbian leadership with Vance's efforts. 
JOVIC, op.cit. p.430, January 27, 1992. Owen also records Vance's close relationship with 
Milosevic. OWEN, op.cit. p.Sl. 
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creating a Cyprus-type situation where the UN effectively froze territorial 
gains.! 1 
The flexibility demonstrated by the UN in accommodating the interests 
of the Belgrade regime (although not the Krajina leadership), 12 would not 
have been lost on Bosnian Serb leaders, as tensions between the 
communities in Bosnia mounted. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Prelude to war 
It is often argued that EC recognition of the independence of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was the main factor prompting the outbreak of war in that 
state. 13 Yet the Serb domination of large swathes of Bosnia had begun 
months earlier. 14 In May 1991, there had been military incursions into 
Bosnia from the Serb-dominated Krajina region of Croatia, described as 
'combat preparedness' missions and, by the Autumn, the army occupied 
important communications centres in Bosnia. 1S On July 12, 1991, 
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, anticipating the ethnic partition of 
the republic, had appealed in writing to the EC presidency, requesting a 
'goodwill' mission, a measure supported by Bosnian Croats Stjepan 
\I Reportfrom UN Secretary General to Security Council, December 11, 1991, S/23280. 
WYNAENDTS, op.cit. p.136, 139 & 141. Wynaendts notes that Vance would not have wanted to 
offend Milosevic whose support he sought to secure the consent of the Krajina leaders for UN 
troop deployment. 
12 Croatian Serb leader Milan Babic opposed the Vance Plan, and was later removed by 
Milosevic. 
13 See, for instance, GOULDING, op.cit. p.306. 
14 See Oslobodjenje, April 10, 12 and 13, and May 25 and 26, and June 10, 1991, for reports of arms 
smuggling into Bosnia-Herzegovina, and military manoeuvres, in early 1991. According to 
Yugoslav government sources, between 1991 and 1994 Belgrade paid $4.73 billion in aid to the 
Bosnian Serbs and Serb-held territory in Croatia. Evropske Novosti, August 5, 1994, quoted in 
CIGAR. 'The Right to Defence' op.cit. p.45n. 
IS MALCOLM, Noel. Bosnia, A Short History, Macmillan, 1994, p.230. 
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Kljuic and Ivan Markesic, leader and general secretary of the Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.16 In September 1991, 
the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) took major steps towards the ethnic 
partition of the republic. Four Serbian Autonomous Regions [SAOs] were 
declared, incorporating 32 municipalities. 17 It was also proposed to 
establish a northern corridor through Bosnia to the Serb-held Krajina 
region of Croatia. IS 
Meanwhile, Milosevic opened talks with Adil Zulfikarpasic, leader of the 
Muslim Bosniac Party (MBO), with just two seats in the Bosnian 
Assembly, to solicit the support of pliable Muslims. 19 On September 11, 
1991, the Bosnian government made a second, unsuccessful, request for 
EC monitors to Bosnia, and the following week, Bosnians began to 
mobilise territorial defence units in response to the massive Serb arms 
buildup throughout Bosnia, orchestrated by Serbian Socialist Party 
(SPS) MP Mihail Kertes, through the so-called RAM project, whereby 
large quantities of arms were despatched to Bosnia's Serbs during 
1990/91, in readiness for war.20 By early December 1991, Milosevic was 
already preparing the ground for the anticipated international 
requirement to withdraw non-Bosnian JNA personnel from Bosnia once 
it became internationally recognised. 21 In early January 1992, he issued 
16 Kljuic, a Croat from Sarajevo, challenged Tudjman's aim of dividing Bosnia between Serbia 
and Croatia, but was soon replaced on Tudjman's orders by Mate Boban, a Croat hardliner. 
17 Dubrovnik (with an 82% Croatian population, according to the 1991 census) was intended as 
the capital of one SAO based in Trebinje, if the Federation broke up. The largest SAO grew out 
of the regional association of municipalities of Bosanska Krajina, established in the spring of 
1991, before the conflict broke out. 
18 Borba, January 3, 1992, p. IX. 
19 CEROVIC, Stojan, in Vreme, August 22,1991. 
20 The RAM project was first exposed by the former Yugoslav Prime Minister, Ante Markovic. 
See testimony by Markovic in Milosevic trial. fCTY, October 23, 2003, p.28029-30. See also 
GLENNY, Misha. The Fall of Yugoslavia. Penguin, 1996, pp.l50-151, and evidence by 
Alexander Vasiljevic at the Milosevic trial.lCrY, op.cit. February 6, 2003. 
21 JOVIC, op.cit. p.420. 
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a secret order to transfer back to Bosnia all JNA officers born there, in 
preparation for transforming the Territorial Defence Forces into an 
army.22 By January 1992, a considerable amount of military hardware 
was concentrated in Bosnia. 
On January 8, 1992, the Serbian municipality of Zvornik was founded,23 
and on the following day, Serbs declared their own republic within 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite warnings that Bosnia's non-Serbs would be 
driven to press for international recognition. The Declaration, signed by 
Momcilo Krajisnik as president of the Serb People's Assembly, ensured 
the incorporation all SAOs established during 1991, with other Serb 
majority regions, including some areas where Serbs were in a minority. 
An eighth republic was proposed, as part of the 'Third Yugoslavia' of 
regions.24 This incorporated 27 municipalities, 19 of them with a Serb 
majority, and extended to 17,654 sq. km, with 1.2 million people.25 
Bosanska Krajina was to join up with Croatian Krajina, Western 
Slavonia, Lika, Banija and Kordun, and Eastern Slavonia and Baranja 
with Vojvodina, while Doboj would be incorporated into Bosnian 
Krajina,26 to link up with Bjeljina in North Eastern Bosnia, and 
Belgrade, the capital. Together, the Knin and Bosnian Krajinas would 
extend over 30,354 sq. km, with 1.6 million people, and an outlet to the 
sea, south of Zadar. 
22 SILBER/LITILE, op.cit4 p.240. 
23 Borba, January 8, p.5. 
24 Borba, January 10, 1992, p.l, and Le Monde, January 17, 1992, p.4. 
2S It was allegedly endorsed by Montenegro, Bosnian and Croatian Serbs, and communist 
movements of Macedonia, although the plan itself originated in Milosevic's office. It was also 
proposed to reorganise the JNA into four military regions, all of them commanded by Serbs. On 
the day of the Bosnian Serb declaration, Lord Carrington declared his conversation with 
Milosevic to be "more constructive than usual". Le Monde, January II, 1992, p.4. 
26 According to the 1981 census, only 39% of the population in the Doboj district were Serbs. 
Borba, January 10, 1992, p.3, & January 22, 1992, p.ll. 
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On April 11, 1991, Serb politicians in Banja Luka, the regional centre, 
had formed a community of Krajina Serbian municipalities and, in late 
1991, the Prijedor region of northern Bosnia was directed by the SDS 
leadership to prepare to control all levels of municipal life, including 
police, fmance and communications. The TV station transmitted from Mt 
Kozara was taken over by Serb paramilitaries, with programmes 
broadcast to Prijedor inhabitants from Belgrade and Banja Luka only, 
using virulent anti-Muslim and anti-Croat propaganda. Throughout 
Bosnia in early 1992, the JNA prepared for war, with troops and 
equipment stationed in strategic areas, including Zvornik and Foca; 
reserve units were activated in Brcko and Bosanski Samac, and non-
Serb Territorial Defence Forces (TOs) dismantled, with their weapons 
redistributed to Serb volunteers and paramilitaries. 27 
The evident self-assurance of Bosnian Serb leaders would have been 
prompted by a number of factors, domestic and international. With 
political and fmancial support from Belgrade, and the JNA under 
Serbian control, Bosnian Serb leaders would also have noted the 
'favourable' international climate, including the appeasement of 
Vukovar's destruction and the massacre of civilians, and the prompt, 
unquestioning acceptance by the UN Security Council of a peace plan for 
Croatia which had originated in Belgrade. The international reluctance 
to deploy a preventive force to Bosnia, while insisting on preserving the 
blanket arms embargo, regardless of the imbalance of weaponry on the 
ground, would have encouraged Serbs in Belgrade and Pale in the belief 
that their goals in Bosnia might also be achieved with relative impunity. 
Particularly crucial to the 'Greater Serbia' project was the position of the 
five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The Soviet Union 
and America, after early declarations supporting a united Yugoslavia, 
had taken a back seat on the conflict, while China could generally be 
27 See GOW, James. The Serbian Project and its adversaries, op.cit. p.121-129. 
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expected to assume a neutral stance. 28 British and French policy would 
have been closely monitored and noted, therefore, as would the mindset 
of the newly-appointed UN Secretary General and his advisers. 
Croatia: UNPROFOR deployment 
UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 743 dated February 21, 1992 
provided for the withdrawal of armed forces from Croatia, reconciliation 
between Croatia and the Croatian Serb communities, and a future 
constitutional settlement. United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) were 
to be established in areas where Serbs were in a majority or substantial 
minority, with a mandate to ensure the security and protection of the 
human rights of all persons living within those zones, and to facilitate 
the safe return of displaced civilians to their homes in the UNPAs. In 
areas like Eastern Slavonia where there had never been a Serb 
majority,29 the Plan implied that Croatian authority should be re-
established. Yet, without police restructuring, Croatian refugees were 
unlikely to return, especially since the UN troops were to be lightly 
armed, solely for self-defence. 30 
Sharp divergences emerged between the Serbian and Croatian positions 
on the interpretation of the UN resolution, which Marrack Goulding and 
other British diplomats played a key role in attempting to reconcile. 31 
28 The Soviet Union had disintegrated by December 1991, and its successor states were too 
embroiled with internal problems to become fully involved in developments in the Balkans. In 
the United States, with an election less than a year away, Yugoslavia had reportedly become a 
'tar baby'. ZIMMERMANN, op.cit. pp.170-1. 
29 Table 1 [page 73]. See also SHOUP, Paul. 'The Future of Croatia's Border Regions, RFEIRL 
Report on Eastern Europe. November 29,1991, pp.26-33, for an analysis of the ethnic 
composition of disputed areas in Croatia. 
30 As the EC Monitoring Mission head remarked "would not the [Vance Plan] in these conditions 
lead to the ratification and protection of Serb territorial gains?" WYNAENDTS_op.cit. p.140. 
31 Le Monde. February 23-24, 1992. pJ. & February 25,1992. p.3. Both Borisav Jovic and UN 
Commander Lewis MacKenzie record the influence wielded by Marrack Goulding and Cedric 
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DISTRICT 
AND YEAR 
Zupanja 
1981 
1991 
Vinkovci 
1981 
1991 
Vukovar 
1981 
1991 
Osijek 
1981 
1991 
Totals 
1981 
1991 
DISTRICT 
AND YEAR 
1981 
1991 
Ethnic Composition of Districts 
in Western Syrmia 
POPULATION CROATS SERBS 
48,001 
48,876 
95,245 
98,484 
81,203 
84,024 
158,790 
164,577 
383,239 
395,961 
(in percentages) 
86.8 3.3 
87.6 2.4 
74.8 13.4 
80.0 13.0 
37.1 31.0 
43.7 37.4 
57.2 18.0 
66.6 20.0 
61.0 17.7 
68.0 20.0 
Ethnic Composition of Baranja 
(Bell Manastir Region) 
YUGOSLAVS 
3.5 
1.4 
7.4 
1.9 
22.2 
7.3 
18.8 
5.0 
14.8 
4.0 
POPULATION CROATS SERBS YUGOSLAVS HUNGARIANS 
in percentages 
53,409 
54,160 
35.8 
41.7 
24.1 
25.5 
16.6 
7.9 
18.6 
16.5 
Sources: Nacionalni Sastav Stanovnistva SFR Jugoslavije po Naseljima IOpstiname 
[The National Composition of the Population ofSFR Yugoslavia by Settlements and Districts] 
(Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1991); and Bulletin of the Republican Institute for 
Statistics of the Republic of Croatia, July 19, 1991; and Vjesnik (Zagreb) July 29, 1991. 
Table 1 
Ethnic Composition of Eastern Siayonia 
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Under the conditions of implementation outlined by Goulding, the Plan 
would remain a dead letter in crucial aspects. 1 The international 
negotiators were aware, however, that Tudjman, a prisoner of his desire 
for acceptance within Europe, was considerably more malleable than his 
Serbian counterpart. Accordingly, Goulding exerted considerable 
pressure on Croatia to agree to longer term UN deployment, and to the 
local administration reflecting the postwar status quo, which would 
leave the UNPA zones (over 30% of Croatia) effectively in the hands of 
about 200,000 Serbs,2 with their borders protected by UN troops. It 
would also imply de facto UN recognition of illegitimate bodies set up in 
the wake of aggression. 
Croatia rejected Goulding's conditions, arguing that they not only 
contravened Croatia's territorial sovereignty but weakened the position 
of the UN troops, requiring them to seek the consent of Serb authorities 
instated by force 3 and, crucially, would block the return of the 300,000 
Croatians displaced by war. A flurry of diplomatic activity ensued from 
Goulding's visit, drawing in British Ambassador Peter Hall who enlisted 
the federal authorities to persuade Tudjman that the rapid deployment 
of UN troops was necessary to secure peace.4 On February 6, Lord 
Carrington visited Croatia, and met with Tudjman.5 The following day, 
Tudjman accepted the Plan. UNSCR 743 confmned that the UN force 
should remain at least one year. Croatia's request for a shorter mandate 
I The anomalies inherent in the Vance Plan were illustrated later that year, as UNPROFOR civil 
affairs chief, Cedric Thornberry, barred Croatian refugees from returning to Baranja where Serb 
forces threatened their safety. Nov; Vjesnik, August 16,1992, p.5A. 
2 See SHOUP, Paul. RFE/RL Report, November 29,1991, op.cit. 
3 'Plavi sljemovi, olovnih nogu', Borba, February 4, 1992, p.8, and February 5, p.l. See also Le 
Monde, February 1, 1992, p.6, for an analysis of the different standpoints of the Serbian and 
Croatian leaderships, and February 23-24, 1992, p.3. 
"'Mirovne snage iIi novi rat' [A peacekeeping force or a new war]. Borba, February 6, 1992, p.l. 
5 See WYNAENDTS, op.cit. p.142-3, for a description of the meeting where he recounts how 
Carrington's 'badinage' embarrassed Tudjrnan in front of his guests. 
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had been disregarded, breaking with the usual UN practice of securing 
the prior consent of all parties concerned.6 
Under pressure from Belgrade,7 Goulding later sought Croatia's 
agreement to a number of 'pink zones', areas under Serb control but not 
included in the Vance Plan.8 In September 1992, the UN Secretary 
General informed the Security Council that the Vance Plan was being 
used by the Krajina as a means of affirming its independence, and that 
the refusal of the Knin authorities to accept demilitarisation and the 
return of refugees had "undermined two fundamental principles of the 
UN Plan."9 Of course, the UN never formally recognised the "Serbian 
Republic of Krajina", but UN policy encouraged in the occupying power 
the sense that it was tolerated, affecting the ongoing negotiations for a 
settlement based on Croatian sovereignty, and laying the ground for an 
eventual Croatian counter-offensive. 
The UNPROFOR presence succeeded in considerably lowering the level of 
hostilities in Croatia, but it also cemented the ethnic divide. Before 
withdrawing, the Yugoslav Army had handed over a large quantity of its 
weapons and ammunition, and transferred some of its troops to local 
Serb paramilitary forces, contrary to the Vance Plan which required the 
demobilisation of all paramilitaries. A small number of heavier weapons 
were stored under the formal supervision of UN PROF OR but within 
reach of local militias so that demilitarisation, an integral part of the 
Vance plan, was never carried out in practice. 10 Serb territorial defence 
6 The Times, February 19, 1992, p.11. 
7 JOVIC. op.cit. p.439-440. The UN Secretary General later indicated that UNPROFOR and the 
EC observer mission should assist in reinstating the Croatian authorities there, and expressed his 
gratitude to the Croatian government for its flexibility relating to the 'pink zones'. 
9 Report by UN Secretary General to the Security Council, September 28, 1992, S/24600. 
10 Wynaendts records the continuing presence of heavy weaponry, blue-painted APCs, and police 
fonnations. The UN Secretary-General also reported the Serb enclaves' economic dependence on 
Belgrade, which could have forced demilitarisation, had it chosen to do so. UNSG Report to the 
Security Council. November 24, 1992, S/24848, quoted WYNAENDTS, op.cit. p.145. 
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units and local militias were mostly reconverted into police units, in 
defiance of UNPROFOR The local militias remained omnipresent, and 
the 'blue berets could not prevent intimidation and the most brutal 
forms of ethnic cleansing', 11 Moreover, secure in the presence of 
UNPROFOR, the Serb authorities in the "protected areas" began the 
mass expulsion of the non-Serbian population from occupied territories, 
looting and destroying their property, and creating conditions for the 
permanent separation of these areas from Croatia, to the point that 
UNPROFOR officers declared that security conditions did not permit 
their repatriation,12 thereby unwittingly reinforcing the objectives of the 
Krajina leaders. By November, the UN Secretary-General, Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, had concluded that UNPROFOR's failure in Croatia was 
due to the increasing contempt displayed by the Knin authorities 
towards both the Security Council and UNPROFOR13 
The Cutileiro Plan 
In January 1992, Portugal took over the EC Presidency, and the Peace 
Conference moved to Brussels, Since Serbia's rejection of the EC 
Conference proposals in October there had been no further formal 
meeting, and Lord Carrington, who considered Croatia's recognition had 
scuppered the Conference, briefly contemplated resigning, 14 but was 
persuaded to remain and address the political future of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The plan he developed, in close coordination with Belgrade, 
came to be known as the Lisbon Agreement, or the Cutileiro Plan after 
Portuguese foreign minister Jose Cutileiro, who chaired the EC Council 
II WYNAENDTS, Ibid. p.145-6. 
12 Nov; Vjesnik, op.cit. p.5A. 
13 UNSG Report to the Security Council, op.cit. 8/24848. 
14 'Lord Karington odustaje?' (Will Lord Carrington resign?) Borba, January 3, 1992, p.6. 
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of Ministers. 15 The Cutileiro Plan introduced into the international peace 
process the concept of territorial division according to ethnic criteria 
which characterised all subsequent peace plans and, in November 1995, 
formed the basis for the Dayton Agreement. 
In early February, Lord Carrington travelled to Belgrade to set in motion 
a conference for the cantonisation of Bosnia. Mindful perhaps of 
Milosevic's warning of the inevitability of civil war in Bosnia without an 
agreement between the three communities prior to independence, 16 
Carrington intended that the conference precede the referendum called 
by the Bosnian government for March 1, in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Arbitration (Badinter) Commission. Carrington's 
initiative was well received by the Bosnian Serb leadership. 17 Indeed, 
Radovan Karadzic referred to 'a good degree of understanding' with the 
chair of the Peace Conference, and of plans for 'Switzerland, Bosnian 
style'. IS The ethnic partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the ethnic 
communities were so intermingled, would not have been feasible without 
large-scale population resettlement. But the EC Conference 
endorsement of the initiative facilitated Karadzic's argument that the 
international community had 'recognized our right to a separate state, 
15 Cutileiro was often considered an 'anglophile', having obtained a doctorate at Oxford 
University, followed by six years at St. Antony's and the LSE. According to one of the Bosnian 
government delegates to the talks, however, Lord Carrington was the main force behind the 
'Cutilerio' Plan. Author's discussion with former Deputy Bosnian government leader, Rusmir 
Mahmutcehajic,op.cit. See also Muhamed Filipovic's account of the negotiations in Dani, 167, 
August 11,2000. For further discussion of proposals for Bosnia's partition, see also BURG & 
SHOUP, op.cit. p.104. 
16 WYNAENDTS, op.cit. p.50. 
17 The reference here is to the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) of which Radovan Karadzic was the 
leader. However, it should be noted that Serbs who opposed the SDS ideology were often victims 
of harassment, dismissal and incarceration. Many were killed by the Bosnian Serb Army for 
attempting to defend their Muslim neighbours. US State Department Report, January 31, 1994, 
Section2a. 
18 'Svajcarska na bosanski nacin'. Borba, February 9, 1992, pJ and S. 
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based on an ethnic principle'.l9 In Lisbon on February 23, the three 
Bosnian leaders, Alija Izetbegovic, Radovan Karadzic and Mate Boban20 
agreed in principle to the EC proposal for a confederation divided into 
three ethnic units. Karadzic was reported to be 'ecstatic' over 
developments in Lisbon. 21 Izetbegovic, however, voiced strong 
reservations, insisting he had agreed only due to European pressure. 22 It 
has since been claimed that the Plan was the last chance for peace in 
Bosnia, and that US Ambassador Warren Zimmerman was responsible 
for Izetbegovic's rejection of the Plan. 23 Zimmerman himself records that 
he encouraged the Bosnian leader to adhere to what he had agreed to, 
and argue the details later. According to Zimmerman, Cutileiro 
confirmed it was the Bosnian Serbs who had rejected the map.24 
On March 16-17, 1992, a new series of negotiations took place in 
Sarajevo, headed by Cutileiro. In the early hours of the following day, the 
19 In a State of the Republic address in 1996, Karadzic stated: "the significance of the Lisbon 
Agreement was much larger than it sometimes seems. Before the recognition of independent 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Republic of Srpska was recognized as a condition for that recognition. 
This Parliament had established Srpska two months before the Lisbon Agreement, under the 
name ofSrpska [Serb] Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina. That recognition within the scope of the 
Lisbon Agreement was the recognition of our centuries-old historic national rights, and came as a 
result of the legal political struggle of the Serb deputies in the Bosnian Parliament and the support 
of all patriotic forces in the former Bosnia and our motherland and Serb Krajina." Telegraf, 
Belgrade, April 16, 1996. [Published in translation] 
20 On February 2, 1992, Tudjman replaced Stjepan Kljuic, a moderate Croat from Sarajevo who 
had consistently opposed ethnic partition, with Mate Boban, a HDZ hardliner. 
21 ZIMMERMAN, Warren, Origins o/a Catastrophe. Times Books, 1999, p.189. 
22 'I was astonished by the EC proposal for the creation of ethnically based regions. This could 
create three states within Bosnia and amount to partition from within'. Izetbegovic to 
Zimmerman, Ibid. p.190. 
23 Radovan Karadzic, Telegraf, April 16, 1996, op.cit. WOODWARD, op.cit. p.281; BINDER, 
David. 'U.S. policymakers on Bosnia admit errors in opposing partition in 1992'. New York 
Times August 29, 1993, George Bogdanich, Diplomatic License, CNN, March 30, 2002, and 
Radovan Radinovic, Krstic Trial, JCTY, December 4,2000, p.7813. For further discussion of the 
Cutileiro proposals, see BURG & SHOUP, op.cit. pp.l08-116. 
24 Zimmerman, Ibid. p.190. It was only following the 'bread queue' massacre in Sarajevo on May 
27 that the Bosnian government broke off negotiations. See Povratak u buducnost, (Return to the 
Future), Dani, No.215, July 20, 2001. 
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three Bosnian leaders agreed to a "declaration of principles", according 
to which Bosnia and Herzegovina would be composed of three 
constitutive units, established on ethnic principles, with account taken 
of economic, geographic and other criteria. The assembly was to be 
composed of two chambers, one elective, the other constituting an equal 
number of representatives from each constitutive unit. The Serbs 
interpreted this as permitting the right to each of the communities to 
establish a distinct and coherent geographic entity, while the Bosnian 
government believed such a division to be unrealisable. To create 
cantons with an absolute ethnic majority would have involved resettling 
at least 250,000 people in five municipalities. A further 22 
municipalities, with a combined population of 1,200,000, were so 
ethnically mixed that many communities would have needed to be 
uprooted. The following week, the Serbs proclaimed the Serb Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a Serb police force. The partition lines were 
drawn, and warlords Seselj and Arkan moved their forces into eastern 
Bosnia, which remained one of the main Serb strategic objectives 
throughout the war.2S 
The Cutileiro Plan foundered partly because it was unrealisable on the 
ground but, more directly, because the territorial demands of the 
Bosnian Serb leadership exceeded what, at the time, the EC was 
prepared to offer, since both union with Serbia and a state within a state 
- a Serb republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina - were solutions which 
would have created unacceptable international precedents. One of the 
main legacies of the Plan, however, was the implicit endorsement of 
'ethnic cleansing' which had begun well before, and indeed prompted, 
Bosnia's vote for independence in October 1991, by which time the Serb 
25 See BELL, Martin. In Harm's Way, Hamish Hamilton, 1995, p.l9-21, for an eyewitness 
account of the expulsion of Zvomik's Muslims in the first week of the Bosnian war, and 
SUDETIC, Chuck. Blood and Vengeance, Norton, NY, 1998, p.l20-125, for the expulsion of 
Visegrad's Muslims. By April 12, 1992, UNHCR officials noted that 'almost overnight the 
republic broke apart', estimating that 10,000 had fled from Zvomik, 5,000 from Cajnice and 
Gorazde, 5,000 from Foca, 2,000 from Bosanski Brod and 5,000 from Kupres. HONIG, Jan 
Willem and BOTH, Norbert. Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime. Penguin, 1996, p.73. 
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autonomous areas had already been consolidated, and weapons 
distributed to Serb communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina from Belgrade. 
The Plan also confirmed that the European Community was prepared to 
accept territorial division based on primarily ethnic considerations, 
which was used by Karadzic and others in arguing for ethnic separation 
at subsequent peace talks. The Cutileiro Plan attempted to preempt war 
in Bosnia by appeasement of the strongest group, the Serbs. The 
Bosnian Serb leaders, however, mindful of the international handling of 
the Croatian war, evidently calculated that they could achieve more by 
war than at the Conference table. The Cutileiro Plan was succeeded by 
other partition plans, mainly under the aegis of British diplomats, until 
the establishment of a Serb republic within Bosnia, Karadzic's main war 
objective, was eventually achieved through the Dayton Agreement in 
1995. 
House of Commons: January/March 1992 
British parliamentary proceedings in 1992 followed much the same 
pattern as the previous year in regard to the Yugoslav crisis, with 
decisions taken outside parliament, and where the information imparted 
by ministers and expert witnesses did not always contribute an accurate 
contribution to Members' understanding of the issue. 
A report by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 
(FAC) warned of the impending conflagration in Bosnia.26 Yet, during two 
FAC sessions in mid January, despite discussion on conflict prevention 
in general terms, the issue of imminent war in Bosnia was not raised, 
and British senior policy advisers questioned by the F AC were unable to 
26 " ... The Select Committee, whose members visited parts of the former Yugoslavia, found again 
and again witnesses saying that what had been going on in Croatia ... was merely the prelude to 
further conflicts ... as we debate the issue ... Bosnia-Herzegovina is in great danger ... We hear 
reports that Sarajevo is like a tinder-box, that peace is on a knife edge ... " David Howell, 
YUioslayja, March 5,1992, Hansard, Vo1.204, c.461-2. 
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shed light on a number of technical and other questions arising from the 
recognition of the two ex-Yugoslav states. 27 In British political circles, 
the preference was seemingly to let matters take their course. 28 The 
foreign secretary set the tone. Questioned in mid-January on the EC role 
in preventing Bosnia's disintegration, Hurd replied, "more time and 
negotiation is needed on that. I do not know of anyone with an impulse 
to make haste on that. "29 
The House of Commons debate on the FAC Report in early March proved 
to be the most wide-ranging, albeit inconclusive, debate on the crisis 
since the beginning of the war. Senior Conservative MPs Bernard Braine 
and Julian Amery made broad-ranging contributions to the debate, in 
reminding the House that Serbs had been Britain's allies in two world 
wars, and would require a formidable international force to defeat them. 
This influenced the thinking of some MPs, and would have been noted 
with interest in Belgrade. Their speeches, therefore, merit some analysis. 
Julian Amery, claiming personal wartime experience in Yugoslavia, 
reminded the House of the reunification of Germany and its current 
dominance in Europe, in terms recalling graphic images of World War 
11,30 counterposing this with " ... a word about the Serbs. I am all against 
people making hobbies of Balkan countries. This has bedeviled our 
studies of them both before and after the first world war ... The Serbs are 
27 Evidence offered by Michael Jay, Under Secretary of State of the European Community, 
Michael Tait, Assistant Under Secretary of State, Eastern Europe, John Goulden, Assistant Under 
Secretary of State, Arms Control, and Peter Ludlow, Director of the Centre for European Policy 
Studies in Brussels, was examined. Foreh:n Affairs Committee, January IS, 1992. 
28 ForeiKn Affairs Committee. January 14, 1992, para.412. 
29 Julian Amery, Yuaoslayia. March 5, 1992, op.cit., c.469. 
30 'Germany dominates the scene today and Austria is once again a part of Germany. It is not an 
official anschluss, but the strength of Germany is once again not very different from what it was 
at the beginning of 1938 .. .1 do not know the extent of the lebensraum that Germany quite 
naturally ... will seek'. Julian Amery, Ibid. c. 470. 
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a remarkable nation."3l Amery recalled that "in the second world war, 
their people rose like one man to throw out the Government who were 
prepared to make them satellites of Hitler. Much as they fought each 
other, their resistance movements were the most remarkable in 
Europe."32 He was less impressed by the Sandzak people. '[lIn my 
experience [they] are Albanian on Monday, Serbian on Tuesday, 
Christian on Wednesday, Muslim on Thursday, and at the weekend I am 
not sure what they are. I do not think that they have changed very 
much .. .' Amery appeared unaware of the World War II record in the 
Sandzak of what he referred to as the 'remarkable [Serb] nation'.33 
More significant for his British listeners were Amery's warnings against 
entering war with Serbia: ' ... this is a formidable country with formidable 
people, and the decisions that we must take could put us on the wrong 
side of them'. 34 When veteran MP Tam DalyeU, later to prove one of 
31 Julian Amery, Ibid, c.470. 
32 Following the initial coup by Serbian officers in Belgrade on 27 March 1941, there was a total 
collapse of the Yugoslav anned forces on all fronts. According to one of the leaders of the coup, 
General Simovic: "Almost all generals were against fighting .... When the generals wanted the 
annistice as soon as possible, in order to return to their families, what could one expect from the 
rank and file?" TOMASEVIC, Jozo. The Chetniks. War and Revolution in Yugoslavia. 1941-
1945. Stanford University Press, 1975, p.75. According to another historian, by late 1941 'the 
Cetniks in Serbia ceased to be a fairly compact and autonomous resistance group and gradually 
became attached to collaborationist 'legalised' leaders, where they functioned as police 
detachments with at least some loyalty to the puppet regime in Belgrade as well as to Mihailovic 
[who] was losing control of some of his officers and had virtually no effective fighting force left 
under his immediate command'. MILAZZO, Matteo 1., The Chetnik Movement & The Yugoslav 
Resistance, John Hopkins University Press, 1975, pp.40-41. After 1990, much revisionist writing 
appeared, promoting the Cetnik contribution. See, for instance, LEES, David. The Rape of Serbia. 
op.cit. and BELOFF, Nora. rito's Flawed Legacy, op.cit. 
33 In December 1941, the Cetnik leader Draza Mihailovic had ordered the Montenegrin Cetniks to 
concentrate their efforts near the Sandzak, Kosovo and Albania to fight the Muslims and 
Albanians. Captain Pavel Djurisic, appointed by Mihailovic as commander of all 'regular and 
reserve troops' in central and East Montenegro, and part of Sandzak, was to remove the Muslim 
and Arnaut [Albanian Muslim] population from Pestar; another group was to push in the direction 
of Metohija "to clear out the Arnauts"; still another detachment was to seize Scutari and protect 
Southern Montenegro against 'Arnaut attacks from Albania'. By 1anuary 1942 'Cetnik activity in 
the Sandzak was significant enough for a CP Central Committee directive to instruct the partisans 
to mobilize Muslim anti-Serb resentment to boost their own ranks. MILAZZO, Ibid. p.46. Both 
Milazzo and Tomasevich drew extensively on unpublished source materials, including records of 
Italian and Gennan occupation forces and Cetnik and Yugoslav government-in-exile papers. 
34 Amery, YU2oslavia. op.cit. c.470. 
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parliament's most outspoken opponents of military intervention in 
Bosnia,35 asked whether to commit troops "albeit with United Nations 
berets, into that mire, would beg the question: in what circumstances 
could those troops ever be withdrawn?" Amery replied, 'I thought that I 
went rather further than that when I recalled that Hitler needed nine 
divisions to keep the roads open'. 36 The myth of Serbian military 
invincibility, carried through the corridors of Whitehall and several 
academic institutions, was a major inhibiting factor in the context of 
international military intervention in Bosnia.37 
Sir Bernard Braine took up the theme: ' .. during the two world wars, the 
Serbs were our gallant allies from the beginning. I have never forgotten 
the resistance of Yugoslavia and Greece during the second world war' .38 
Asserting that Yugoslavia made a major contribution to the ultimate 
defeat of the Nazis, Braine concluded: 'We cannot be unsympathetic to 
the Serbs. We must remember that Croats in Nazi uniform massacred 
vast numbers of Serbs. The memory of that is still vivid in Serbian 
minds .. .'39 
The apparent confusion about the Serbian, as opposed to the overall 
Yugoslav, partisan contribution to the defeat of the Axis powers in 
Yugoslavia in World War II led to a number of miscalculations on the 
part of certain Western commentators and others in the 1990s, in 
assessing the number of troops needed to suppress the fighting and 
restore peace to the region. In their tributes to Serbia, Amery and Braine 
3S Three years later, Dalyell quoted Amery on the 'strength, determination and training of 
Yugoslavian soldiers'. Bnsni.a. May 31, 1995, Hansard. Vo1.208, c.1 049. 
36 Amery, YUios1ayja, op.cit. c.471. 
37 For a different view of the Serbian military strength, see STONE, Norman. 'Shooting down the 
myth of Serbia's mighty guerillas'. Sunday Times, August 16,1992. 
38 Sir Bernard Braine, YUios1ayia, op.cit. c.477. 
39 Ibid. 
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seemed to be arguing that Serbia equals Yugoslavia, ergo Yugoslavia 
equals Serbia! All wartime achievements in occupied Yugoslavia were 
consequently attributed to Serbia, despite evidence to the contrary.40 
Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg, in summing up, made little comment on 
concerns raised in the debate by a number of MPs, including the rising 
tensions in Bosnia. The government position was evident, however, in 
the respective emphasis placed on the rights of Serbs in Croatia and 
Albanians in Kosovo. On the latter, Hogg merely proposed that they be 
addressed within the context of the Peace Conference, whereas 'the 
rights of the Serbs in Croatia are of critical importance ... The matter 
plays an important part in the draft treaty prepared by ... Lord 
Carrington'.41 At that time, while the percentage of Albanians in Serbia 
exceeded that of Serbs in Croatia, there was a distinct human and civil 
rights disparity between the two minority groups. The Yugoslav crisis 
was not debated fully in the House of Commons again before the 
summer recess. 
Sarajevo: April/May 1992 
In early April, the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognised 
by the United States and the European Community. At this time, the 
sporadic fighting which had already broken out in a number of areas 
intensified, exacerbated by the JNA withdrawal from Croatia under the 
terms of the Vance Plan. Sarajevo came under siege, and a massive 
campaign of bombardment and 'ethnic cleansing' ensued, extending to 
40 See OROVIC, Savo. Ratni Dnevnik /94/-/945. Hronometar, Belgrade, 1972, pp.617-627, for 
details of the formation of battalions in the Yugoslav partisan resistance movement. According to 
Professor Ivo Banac of Yale University, only a minority of Croats sided with the Ustasa and, in 
the absence of a Croat non-communist resistance movement, Croats joined up with the Partisans. 
"The fearful asymmetry of war: the causes and consequences of Yugoslavia's demise" Daedalus, 
121(2}, 1992, p.l54. 
41 Douglas Hogg, Yu&oslayia, op.cit. c.489. 
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most parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, bringing nearly 70% of the state 
under Serb control, a situation viewed by the ICRC as having 'elements 
both of an international armed conflict ... and of an internal armed 
conflict' .42 
On April 14, US Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger was 
sent a confidential memorandum by a staff analyst, detailing 'the clear 
pattern of use of force, intimidation and provocation to violence aimed at 
forcibly partitioning [Bosnia] and effecting large forced transfers of 
population .. .in a manner which would create a "Serbian Bosnia. "'43 By 
May 1992, US intelligence, through agents on the ground, spy satellites 
and extensive interception of radio and telephone communications, 
reportedly had lmowledge of the Serb camps,44 and, by June, detailed 
accounts of an organised effort to displace and terrorise an estimated 
500,000 Muslims in Bosnia.45 The Bush Administration did not officially 
condemn the camps, however, until their public disclosure in early 
August by Western journalists. 
In early April, a Canadian General, Lewis MacKenzie, was appointed UN 
commander to oversee the Croatian UNPA mission, and based in 
Sarajevo, the headquarters chosen by the UN as a token presence in 
Bosnia. Curiously, MacKenzie and his team were transported via 
Belgrade to Sarajevo in JNA transport, and initially accommodated in 
JNA barracks.46 From the outset, MacKenzie adopted a view so markedly 
hostile to the Bosnian Presidency that it led to his precipitate removal 
42 Report o/the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/55 (/998). 
"Srebrenica Report. p.8/16. 
43 POWER, Samantha. "A Problemfrom Hell". America and the Age of Genocide. Basic Books, 
2002, p.264. 
44 POWER, Ibid. p.269. 
4S San Francisco Chronicle, August 15, 1992, A11/12. 
46 MACKENZIE, Lewis. Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo. Douglas & McIntyre, 1993, p.l22. 
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from Bosnia just four months later.47 MacKenzie's role in the crucial 
early weeks of the Bosnian war would have had a significant impact on 
external perceptions. Also, MacKenzie's briefing by the UN Secretariat in 
New York, and his sojourn in Belgrade prior to deployment in Bosnia, 
may not have been irrelevant to the speed with which the Canadian 
general arrived at his controversial conclusions. 
On May 6, MacKenzie noted that he spent the day briefmg Marrack 
Goulding, who had also travelled by JNA helicopter to Pale, the Bosnian 
Serb headquarters outside Sarajevo.48 Following Goulding's visit, the 
editor of Oslobodjenj,e Zlatko Dizdarevic, commented: 
When Marrack Goulding ... arrived here as a high-ranking UN official, 
and after seeing all that has happened here ... declared that 'all sides 
are equally responsible', we had to realize at last that this latest 
maneuver was no more than a matter of dirty politics.49 
On May 7, Goulding met in Belgrade with Borisav Jovic, the UN Force 
Commander, Satish Nambiar, and UN Civil Affairs Director Cedric 
Thornberry. Jovic noted that at the meeting 
Goulding stressed that arrangements concerning the army must be 
worked out very carefully because 'around 80% of the JNA would 
pass to Dr Karadzic. That will have a very negative influence in 
securing a political solution.' If now, Goulding says, the federal 
organs 'lift their hands' from the JNA in [Bosnia] and if they say that 
the solution is nothing to do with them, that will only increase the 
danger of a wider conflict. In this transitional phase, [Goulding] 
47 In a letter to '50 friends and colleagues' on April 19, MacKenzie described Bosnia as being in a 
state of anarchy, with 'enough blame to go around for all sides', and alleged that the actions of the 
Bosnian forces were beginning to have 'serious repercussions in Sarajevo'. Describing the Serbs as 
showing 'considerable constraint', MacKenzie ascribed their shelling of Sarajevo to Serb 
'overreaction' to Bosnian provocation, and consistently argued that the Bosnian Muslims were 
shelling their own people in order to provoke international military intervention. Ibid. pp. 152 & 
159. 
48 Ibid. p.178. 
49 DIZDAREVIC, Zlatko. Sarajevo - A War Journal. Fromm International, New York, 1993, 
p.16. Dizdarevic notes that Marrack Goulding was known in Sarajevo as 'Milosevic's last official 
comrade'. Ibid. p.49. 
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considers, the JNA under the command of General Adzic has been, 
and can be, a stabilising factor.50 
The UN Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, dated May 
12, based on Marrack Goulding's visit, 51 concluded that 
All international observers agree that what is happening is a 
concerted effort by the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the 
acquiescence of, and at least some support from, the JNA, to create 
'ethnically pure' regions in the context of negotiations on the 
'cantonisation' of the Republic ... Further concern has been caused by 
the decision of the Belgrade authorities to withdraw from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by 18 Mayall JNA personnel who are not citizens of that 
Republic. This will leave in Bosnia and Herzegovina, without effective 
political control, as many as 50,000 mostly Serb troops and their 
weapons. They are likely to be taken over by the Serb party ... The 
fighting and intimidation have led to massive displacement of 
civilians ... The international community's efforts to bring succour to 
these suffering people are greatly obstructed by the warring parties 
whose demographic objectives they may frustrate ... The situation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is tragic, dangerous, violent and confused. I 
do not think that in its present phase this conflict is susceptible to 
the United Nations peacekeeping treatment... One of the more 
distressing features of the current situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is that, for all their fair words, none of the parties there 
can claim to [respect the United Nations, its personnel and its 
mandate] ... 52 
The report sent a crucial signal to all the communities, not least the 
Serbs. While it identified Bosnian Serb responsibility, with JNA support, 
for the 'ethnic cleansing' and linked it to the Cutileiro Plan, it reduced 
the impact of that statement by implying that the withdrawal of non-
Bosnian JNA personnel would have a destabilising effect in Bosnia, 
which demonstrated a total lack of understanding of the role of the JNA, 
but reflected the tone of the meeting in Belgrade.53 The report also 
so JOVIe, op.cit. p.449-450. [author's translation] 
SI Wynaendts remarks that the UN Secretary-General himself was 'extremely laconic' on the issue 
of UN troop deployment. WYNAENDTS, op.cit. p.141. 
S2 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.9124 & 26. 
S3 See account of the meeting by JOVIC, op.cit. p.449-50 
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referred to 'as many as 50,000 Serb troops' left in Bosnia after the 
withdrawal of non-Bosnian JNA personnel, whereas Jovic in his diary 
records that there were as many as 90,0001 54 Equally, reference to the 
'warring parties' with 'demographic objectives' suggests an equivalence 
of guilt, and takes no account of the nature of the events unfolding on 
the ground and the systematic execution of the Serb expansionist policy. 
The report implied further moral equivalence by stating that the 
behaviour of all sides had been responsible for the decision not to deploy 
UN troops. That decision, and the bias of the Secretary-General's report 
(based on Goulding's visit), in the absence of any alternative beyond 
sanctions to halt the onslaught, effectively gave the green light to the 
perpetrators. 
The US State Department was less supine. On Apri114, it had 
condemned the JNA for military interference in Bosnia's internal affairs, 
naming the Serbian leadership as the main culprit and warning that 
measures would be taken to isolate Serbia economically and politically, 
provoking an angry response from the Serbian government. 55 Lord 
Carrington, however, brought Croatia into the guilt frame, warning both 
Croatia and Serbia that they would face severe international sanctions if 
they continued to interfere in Bosnia-Herzegovina's internal affairs.56 
Carrington had also visited Sarajevo in May, with a single message for 
Bosnian President Izetbegovic - to negotiate. 57 
54 Ibid. p.448. 
55 Chronology of events in Yugoslavia, 1992. www.balkan-archjye.ori.YU 
56 Also, EC President Joao de Pinheiro stated on British television that 'Serbia is not the only 
culprit for the situation in Bosnia'. Ibid. While some senior Croatian politicians had similar 
territorial ambitions to the Serbs, the HVO (Bosnian Croat Army) at this time fought against the 
Bosnian Serb Army (VRS), alongside the embryonic Bosnian government forces. 
57 When Izetbegovic replied that capitulation was the only basis on which Karadzic would 
'negotiate', Carrington retorted 'you obviously don't know what you're dealing with. I'm sorry but 
you don't have any chance', IZETBEGOVIC, Alija.lnescapable Questions,.The Islamic 
Foundation, 2003, p.476. 
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In the meantime, a Serbian exile resident in Paris, Boris Vukobrat, 
working closely with Sir Fitzroy Maclean in Scotland, produced a 
programme for the reconstitution of Yugoslavia on a regional basis.58 In 
the climate prevailing in much of former Yugoslavia in June 1992, it is 
unlikely that the programme, as proposed, would have been considered 
by non-Serbs. The involvement of in such a plan by senior diplomat, 
close to the Foreign Office, however, suggests that UN recognition of the 
Yugoslav successor states may not necessarily have been perceived 
within British diplomatic circles as a permanent solution. 
UN Sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro 
On May 30, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Serbia and 
Montenegro, including a trade and air embargo, and suspension of 
sports and cultural contacts, with exemption for food and medicine. 59 
According to the UN Srebrenica Report, however, 
most of the territory captured by the Serbs was secured by them 
within the first 60 days of the war ... During those 60 days, 
approximately one million people were displaced from their homes. 
Several tens of thousands of people, most of them Bosnian Muslims, 
were killed.6o 
All this activity took place, in other words, before the imposition of UN 
sanctions. The British government's promotion of sanctions against 
Serbia and Montenegro fuelled the argument that Britain had conducted 
n VUKOBRA T, Boris I. 'Projekat za novu zajednicu'. May 1, 1992. Unpublished manuscript. 
See also VUKOBRA T, B. 'L'impasse yougloslave', in Le Figaro, March 3, 1992, and Ibid. 'Now 
Help Put Yugoslavs Back Together', International Herald Tribune, April 15, 1992. 
59 Security Council Resolution 757, May 30, 1992. 
60 Srebrenica Report. op.cit. 
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an anti-Serb policy during the Bosnian war,61 or that it was at least 
impartial. On the other hand, as one critic remarked, sanctions provided 
a stopgap response to those who argued that more should be done, 
temporarily silencing the proponents of military intervention.62 US 
Secretary of State James Baker, in particular, had begun to press for 
stronger measures against the Serbs, and a few experts within British 
academic circles began to view military intervention as feasible. 63 
On June 2, the Foreign Secretary made a statement to the House of 
Commons, announcing the measures adopted.64 Thirty minutes were 
allocated for questions which came from across the political spectrum, 
demonstrating a wide variety of concerns. Cross party splits emerged, 
even amongst Ulster Unionists, on the international response to the 
conflict. This was in marked contrast to the clear accord between the 
government and the opposition Front Bench on the issue. The Foreign 
Secretary acknowledged that 
under the pretext of withdrawal, [Milosevic] has transferred large 
parts of the federal army to local command in Bosnia. Those warlords 
are using terror as a political weapon to create ethnically pure 
Serbian areas which will be attached to Serbia itself.65 
He nonetheless confirmed that the arms embargo would not be 
lifted, and demonstrated little commitment to enforcing the sanctions. 
61 Jasna Dragovic-Soso, at School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, 
June 17, 2000. 
62 EY AL, Jonathan, Director, Royal United Services Institute, June S, 1992. 
63 'The Institute of Strategic Studies and other military people say that, if we had the will, the 
fighting could be stopped within 24 hours'. John McFall, YUioslayja (Sanctjons), June 2, 1992, 
Hansard, Vo1.208, c.722. 
64 Ibid. c.714. 
65 Douglas Hurd, YUioslayja (Sanctions), op.cit. c.714. 
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There are no plans for [a naval blockade] at present ... a monitoring 
committee has been set up in New York. We shall have to see what 
happens, especially with regard to oil supplies, which traditionally 
have come down the Danube through Romania, but it is premature to 
assume that people will not comply with their obligations ... The 
monitoring committee ... will be able to pick up breaches, and we will 
then need to decide what measures might be useful in dealing with 
them."66 
In other words, the burden of enforcement was to fall to neighbouring 
states.67 When asked in more specific terms how sanctions would be 
monitored, the foreign secretary responded through ridicule, a style he 
not infrequently adopted in parrying difficult questions: 
I have just answered the ... hon. gentleman's question. He was too 
busy preparing it to listen to my answer ... There is some oil 
production in Serbia and Croatia, but most oil is imported. It is 
therefore important that the flow of oil should be monitored by the 
sanctions committee, which I described to the House when [he] was 
not listening.68 
Later, however, it was acknowledged that the sanctions committee had 
not succeeded in stemming the flow of oil into Serbia.69 In fact, the 
sanctions made little contribution to ending the war, but they did 
harden Serbian intransigence. Six months later, the importation of oil 
and consumer goods had become highly lucrative, with local banks 
paying hard-currency depositors 12-14% monthly interest to raise funds 
to underwrite imports. Half a million Serbs opened accounts with the 
Yugoskandic and Dafiment banks, the latter boasting an estimated $6 
billion in capital and accounts. Meanwhile, a third of the workforce was 
unemployed, with inflation at around 60% a month.70 Also, while 
66 Ibid. c.717 & 720. 
67 When the Romanian authorities stopped a Serbian tanker on the Danube in late November, the 
Serbs retaliated by seizing six Romanian barges. New York Times, December 6,1992, p.6. 
68 YUioslayia (Sanctions), op.cit c.7IS. See also Hurd's reply to John McFall during the same 
debate on the feasibility of the UN taking control of Sarajevo airport. Ibid. c.722. 
69 See Douglas Hogg, Written Answers, February S, 1993. Hansard. Vo1.218. 
70 Guardian, December 21, 1992, p.S. 
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sanctions were fairly rigorously implemented on the Adriatic, preventing 
arms from reaching Croatia or Bosnia, monitoring on the Danube where 
supplies reached Serbia from north and south was much poorer.71 The 
trafficking of drugs, cigarettes and other goods may have enriched many 
in Serbia, but it also led to the formation of a mafia culture which was to 
penetrate all state structures after the war, blocking meaningful 
reform.72 In early September, the WEU recommended "a complete and 
total land, air and sea blockade of Serbia and Montenegro, the cessation 
of all financial, economic and other international assistance" and 
recommended that WEU forces be made available to the UN under 
European command and operational control to carry out Resolution 770 
effectively.73 It was only later, following considerable international 
pressure on Britain to enforce the no-fly zone, that Douglas Hurd 
conceded the need for more stringent UN sanctions to seal the borders, 
cut postal services and detain ships on the Danube.74 
On June 19, it was reported that US Secretary of State James Baker 
advocated the selective bombing of Serbian targets. 75 The following week, 
he wrote to European leaders, describing the deteriorating situation as 
'intolerable', and urging NATO and the EC to propose a new strategy.76 
71 "Newspapers have reported today that petrol queues in Belgrade are almost non-existent and ... a 
community member, Greece, is colluding with sanctions-busting. Calum MacDonald, &mntr 
Yuioslayja. November 16,1992. Hansard, Vo1.214, c.7S. See also Guardian, November 5, 
1992, p.S, and The Times, November IS, 1992, p.13. 
72 DUe. January 21, 2003. 
73 United Nations Operations: UK RoJe, House of Lords, September 25,1992, Hansard. c.563. 
74 Independent, December 17 1992, p.l. 
" New York Times International,June 19, 1992. Baker's stand was not backed by the US 
President, however. 
76 CANIVEZ, Patrice. 'La France face a la guerre en ex-Y ougoslavie' in Vukovar. Sarajevo .... in 
NAHOUM-GRAPPE, Veronique,[ed.] Esprit, 1993, p.123, Canivez viewed the hardening of 
Mitterand's attitude to Serbia in June 1992 as no more than fleeting, however. 
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At the EC Lisbon Summit in late June, support grew also for a WEU-led 
operation to break the siege of Sarajevo airport. Strong pressure for 
tougher action also came from France, Italy and Holland. British officials 
were more muted ruling out, as they put it, 'fighting our way into the 
airport' . 77 
At this point, President Mitterand assumed the initiative and, without 
warning, flew direct from Lisbon to Sarajevo, upstaging his EC allies in a 
lone bid to break the siege. At a meeting with Bosnian President 
Izetbegovic, Mitterand was informed of the camps: 
What is going on in our towns and villages is frightening, Muslims 
are grouped in squares, men separated from women and children. 
The women are expelled after having been raped, and innocent male 
civilians, unarmed, are being directed to extermination camps.78 
The information was repeated at a press conference that evening. Yet 
when the story reached the media headlines six weeks later, world 
leaders professed ignorance of the events. 
According to French Minister for Humanitarian Affairs Bernard 
Kouchner who accompanied Mitterand on the trip, the French President 
based his reasons for rejecting military intervention on the advice of 
Fitzroy Maclean who had cautioned him on the invincibility of the 
Serbs.79 Mitterand's beau geste did not bring about significant benefits 
on the ground, apart from a brief moment of euphoria. But it did place 
France temporarily in the forefront of international diplomacy in the 
Balkans, as Britain took over the EC Presidency. 
77 Guardian, June 27,1992, p.1, and Sunday Times, June 28, 1992, p.24. 
78 KOUCHNER, Bernard, Ce queje crois. Grasset, Paris, 1995, p.47. 
79 Ibid. p.S1. See also STONE, Norman. 'Shooting down the myth of Serbia's mighty guerillas'. 
Sunday Times, August 16, 1992, op.cit. 
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PART 2 
The British EC Presidency 
Britain prepared to run what it called an 'active' presidency, in contrast 
with its predecessor, Portugal. As Britain took over on July 1, however, 
Lord Carrington's peace conference came under increasingly sharp 
criticism.8o Carrington's bid, during a brief stopover in Sarajevo on July 
3, to recapture the international initiative in Bosnia, faltered as the 
ceasefire he brokered was violated within hours. 81 Carrington's 
reputation within Bosnian government circles was articulated most 
colourfully by the Bosnian Vice President, Ejup Ganic: 
Talks with Lord Carrington is glamour, it's like Dynasty. He 
introduced the terminology that is killing us. He introduced the 
concept of three communities ... now 50,000 people dead and 1.5 
million refugees.82 
An internal UN memo, dated July 3, described the treatment of Bosnian 
Muslims, including regular beatings, and deprivation of food and 
water.83 Sent to the Bosnian ambassador in New York, and then leaked 
to the press, the memo raised objections from Marrack Goulding on the 
grounds that it was confidential and had been meant for the Red Cross, 
which had a mandate to protect war detainees. 84 The UN justified not 
80 One Be source likened the British attitude to that of Chamberlain. European, August 13-16, 
1992, p.7. 
81 According to Izetbegovic, Carrington advised the Bosnian president to try to negotiate with the 
Serbs, commenting 'It's the only way out'. On July 26, Izetbegovic wrote to Carrington that mass 
atrocities had taken place since their last talk, with concentration camps springing up all over 
Bosnia. If heavy weapons were not put under international control, the talks would 'merely be a 
cover for the continuation of aggression and the legalisation of the occupation of territory by the use 
offorce and ethnic cleansing'. IZETBEGOVIC, Alija.lnescapab/e Questions, op.cit. p.248-9. 
82 Guardian, July 3, 1992, p.8. The figures quoted appeared exaggerated at the time, but were 
later confirmed. 
83 Independent, August 7,1992, p.1 & 8. 
84 GUEST, lain. On Trial. Refugee Policy Group, September 1995, pA3. The ICRC had 
temporarily withdrawn from most of Bosnia, returning in early July. 
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interceding on the grounds that they had no mandate to monitor human 
rights. A later US Senate report confmned that neither the UN or the US 
State Department followed the matter up which, the report concluded, 
amounted more to a systemic failure in both the UN and US human 
rights machinery than mere bureaucratic inattention. In Britain, Lady 
Miloska Nott, wife of a former British defence secretary, revealed that 
Douglas Hurd had rejected the opportunity to hear about the detention 
camps as early as June. Lady Nott had heard first hand accounts of 
atrocities against Muslims in Serb camps but, on seeking a meeting with 
the foreign secretary, was informed that this was not possible before the 
end of the month.8S 
At the G7 annual summit that year, the war was singled out on the 
agenda as carrying considerable risks for European stability. In an 
attempt to re-inject life into his discredited peace conference, Lord 
Carrington proposed expanding it, an idea promptly quashed by the 
French foreign minister.86 Germany sought outright recognition of 
Serbia's culpability for the onslaught but, in deference to Britain and the 
US, the G7 declaration shared out the blame.87 Ruling out the use of 
British troops, the Foreign Secretary was reported as cautioning the 
more 'trigger-happy' countries that 'the achievement of political 
ambitions by military means is a will 0' the wiSp'.88 
As the international cavalcade moved from the G7 summit to the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Helsinki, Bosnia 
continued to dominate the talks. Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic 
informed the Conference of the mass expUlsions and murders carried 
85 Observer, August 9, 1992, p.16. 
86 WYNAENDTS, op.cit. p.179. 
87 Guardian, July 8, 1992. 
88 Ibid. 
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out in Serb-occupied parts of Bosnia, and that "some 80,000 troops 
have remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina, alone with more than 600 
tanks, a huge quantity of heavy weapons ... and 50 fighter aircraft."89 The 
US President met the Bosnian delegation intimating, however, that 
America regarded Bosnia as primarily a European issue. Following the 
Conference, the US ruled out ground troops, but did not exclude naval 
or air force.9o More decisive military action was also supported in 
different degrees by France, Italy and Germany. 91 France announced the 
deployment of five heavy Puma transport helicopters and four Gazelles. 
French foreign minister Roland Dumas also urged a more heavyweight 
forum to address the conflict, embracing the UN, to supplant 
Carrington's peace conference, which received support from the UN 
Secretary-General.92 US Secretary of State James Baker demanded the 
surrender of Serb heavy weapons handed over by the departing JNA, in 
accordance with UN Security Council resolutions. Lord Carrington took 
a different view, however, arguing that it was unrealistic to expect the 
Serbs to surrender their heavy weaponry.93 Douglas Hurd confirmed 
from London that there was 'no appetite' for sending troops.94 Instead, 
he offered 1,100 officers to Bosnia to supervise heavy weapons 
collections throughout the country. 
89 IZETBEGOVIC, op.cit. p.130-2. 
90 Independent, July 10, 1992, p.l. 
91 See GLENNY, Misha. 'Yugoslavia: The Revenger's Tragedy', New York ReView, August 13, 
1992, p.43. The German constitution at this time excluded military involvement. German foreign 
minister Klaus Kinkel, however, pressed the Ee to adopt a tougher interventionist policy towards 
Belgrade, denouncing his British counterpart over his "pathetic" approach to the Balkan crisis. 
Kinkel's sense of urgency would also have been prompted by the disproportionate refugee burden 
assumed by Germany. The Times and Guardian, July 23 1992, p.l. 
92 Independent, July 24, 1992, p.l O. 
93 Ibid. p.l. 
94 BBe Radio 4, The World At One, July 10, 1992. 
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Meanwhile, with the assistance of a former Conservative parliamentary 
candidate John Kennedy,95 Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic 
conducted a publicity campaign, coinciding with the start of the British 
EC Presidency, where he argued that a civil war was taking place in 
Bosnia, and that 'premature recognition was a catalyst that sparked off 
the war', 96 a refrain which was subsequently taken up by many 
defenders of the Belgrade regime. On July 15, a press conference was 
held at the House of Commons, chaired by Henry Bellingham MP, then 
Parliamentary Private Secretary to Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, 
at which Karadzic presented a document entitled "Concentration Camps 
in the New Europe 1992". The document contained details of alleged 
'concentration camp sites and detention facilities used for the 
imprisonment or extermination of Bosnian Serbs', and of 'ethnic 
cleansing' of Bosnian Serbs from Bosnia.97 The Serbian Information 
Initiative later distributed the document bye-mail and other means, 
calling it "an appeal to the civilised world". The seed had been sown by 
Serb lobbyists, feeding the 'civil war' myth98 and suggesting a symmetry 
of guilt, while the platform chosen - the House of Commons - lent a gloss 
of credibility. 
On the same day, a meeting took place in London between Lord 
Carrington and the three Bosnian leaders where it was agreed, and later 
confirmed by Security Council President David Hannay, that all heavy 
weapons be placed under UN control. But no UN official had been 
invited to the meeting, or consulted. A public clash ensued between Lord 
Carrington and the UN Secretary-General who commented that it was 
"most unusual for the UN to be asked to help implement a politico-
9S See HODGE, C. The Serb Lobby ... op.cit. for Kennedy's lobbying efforts in Britain. 
96 The Times, July 1, 1992. Letters to the Editor. 
97 Even verifiable statistics were falsified, e.g. that the Serb population in Tuzla was 33% in 1991. 
98 According to one analyst, 'the conviction that this was a civil war was central to the Ministry of 
Defence advice on the conflict during its early months.' URBAN, Mark. UK Eyes Alpha, The 
Inside Story of British Intelligence. Faber 1997, p.213. 
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military agreement in whose negotiations it has played no part."99 In a 
report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary-General explained that, 
for practical reasons, the United Nations was not able to respond to the 
Security Council's demand to take charge of the heavy weapons. 100 Lord 
Carrington had been publicly rebuked for acting unilaterally. His plan 
for the ethnic cantonisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was also under fire, 
some critics claiming it had given Serb forces the green light for the 
massive displacement of Bosnian civilians. 101 Bosnian Serb and Croat 
leaders, Karadzic and Boban, on the other hand, both applauded Lord 
Carrington's mediation efforts, which they evidently regarded as an 
opportunity to legitimise territory taken by force. 
Douglas Hurd, meanwhile, leaving London on July 15 for his first visit to 
Sarajevo, stopped off in Paris to meet the French foreign minister Roland 
Dumas. 102 According to a French source, Hurd arrived, declaring "I am 
the head of Europe now. There are a couple of questions I want to 
discuss with you, and the first is what we do about Lord Carrington's 
peace conference and your proposals for a different forum" .103 Defending 
Carrington as a pessimist who nonetheless achieved success in the long 
run (Rhodesia was cited), Hurd reportedly argued for the Conference to 
continue. 
The day after the news of the Serb concentration camps became public, 
an advert was placed in the New York Times, paid for by the Serb lobby 
99 Guardian, July 23, 1992, p.1 O. This was one of many instances when the UN was tasked with 
commitments it was not given the means to meet. A clash also occurred between the UN Secretary 
General and the British Ambassador to the UN, David Hannay. OWEN, David. Balkan Odyssey. 
Gollancz, 1995, p.21. 
100 UN Secretary General's report to the UN Security Council, July 21, 1992, S/24333. 
101 The Times, July 4, 1992, p.16. According to the UN, three million people in fonner 
Yugoslavia had now been displaced. Observer, July 19, 1992, p.l. 
102 Independent, July 18, 1992, p.10. 
103 Ibid. 
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group, SerbNet Inc., where US leaders were urged to stay neutral in a 
'civil' war, and called for the return of Cyrus Vance 'who had the respect 
of both sides'. It also endorsed the 'neutral' approach of Carrington. 104 
The news of the camps prompted an international outcry for action, and 
exposed serious divergences amongst Western leaders, particularly 
between Britain and the United States, on how to respond, and in 
particular about how far any new UN resolution should go in promising 
to use 'all necessary means' to achieve peace in Bosnia. In a BBC 
interview Douglas Hurd acknowledged the split between Britain and the 
US,lOS but argued that the sanctions were already prompting the Serbs 
to open up their camps,106 an argument which revealed Hurd's 
awareness of the influence of Belgrade on the Bosnian Serb leadership, 
since sanctions had not been imposed on Bosnia! 
At an emergency weekend meeting at the UN Security Council, John 
Major withheld support for a UN resolution proposed by America on the 
lines of the Gulf war that had enabled allied forces to bomb Iraq. 107 
Instead, he argued for convoys operating with the agreement of the 
'warring parties' with the power to fight off attacks by 'bandits',l08 The 
Prime Minister's terminology inferred a moral equivalence, while 
trivialising the facts on the ground. Later that week, Foreign Minister 
104 New York Times, August 3,1992. 
lOS "It will take a few days to sort out the text, we are not satellites." Guardian, August 1 0, 1992, 
p.1, and Independent, August 11, 1992, p.l. 
106 Guardian, August 10, 1992, p.8. A US Senate press release noted that the sanctions had 
mixed and sometimes perverse results. While slowly wearing down the economy of the 
federation, they did not apply to Serb-controlled regions of Bosnia. So the most culpable party in 
the conflict had full legal access to international markets and supplies, including oil. It was also 
noted that 'certain foreign governments' appeared complicit. US Senate Committee 00 Foreiao 
Relations. Press release, August 18, 1992. 
107 Interestingly, Major had written to David Owen the previous week, giving as his reason for 
rejecting military action that 'We could not unite the international community behind such a 
policy'. OWEN, op.cit. p.18. 
108 Sunday Times, August 9,1992. 
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Douglas Hogg returned from Sarajevo with a promise from Karadzic to 
consider guaranteeing the safety of relief convoys to Sarajevo, 109 and 
concluding that military intervention was unnecessary, and would 
prevent the UN from fulfilling its essential objectives. 
By now, many senior officials in the US and EC, together with a majority 
of the public worldwide, supported some form of military intervention in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to a US opinion poll, this included 53% 
of Americans, with only 33% opposed. 110 In the UK, just 27% of the 
public interviewed in an NOP poll were satisfied with the British 
handling of the crisis, while 61 % supported sending troops as part of an 
international force, and 37% favoured despatching the RAF to bomb 
Serbian artillery positions. III In France, which already deployed 2,700 
troops in Bosnia and Croatia, public opinion showed that 66% favoured 
sending in more French troops. 112 Also, opposition parties in France 
proved far more vocal critics of government policy than their British 
counterparts. 113 General Etienne Copel, former deputy chief of staff of 
the French Air Force, argued for the use of helicopter gunship escorts to 
protect convoys: 
True, they are vulnerable to ground-to-air missiles but the Serbian 
militia has not very sophisticated equipment and on patrol there is 
always another helicopter to fire back - a powerful deterrent ... The 
logistics of an operation using both armour and helicopters to protect 
supply convoys would perhaps involve deployment of thousands of 
men but not hundreds of thousands. This limited task is in the 
109 Ibid. August 16, 1992. 
110 POWER, op.cit. p.276. 
III Independent, August 16, 1992, p.l6. 
112 European, August 13-16, 1992, p.9. 
1\3 Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac attacked Mitterand's policy as being essentially pro-Serbian. 
According to Chirac, priority should have been given to a 'credible embargo' followed by air 
strikes to neutralise the Serb artillery. Criticism also came from Alain Lamassoure of the Union 
for French Democracy, and from former European parliament president Simone Veil. 
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power of any single middle-rank power such as the UK, France or 
Italy. 114 
From Brussels, the most outspoken call yet for intervention came from 
European Commission President Jacques Delors who argued for military 
action, without limits or conditions, as the only way to curb Serbia. 
It seems that without the credible perspective - I underline credible -
of a military intervention, nothing will be able to stop the subtle, 
deadly strategy of the Serbian leadership. lIS 
During the same week, the Bosnian Serb leadership wrote to the 
Security Council asking for advice in order to 'avoid military intervention 
and the bloodshed that would accompany it' .116 
Differences also emerged between Britain and other NATO members. A 
group in the US State Department, headed by James Baker, pressed 
NATO to threaten air strikes at specific military targets in Serbia, with 
an ultimatum to Belgrade to force its surrogates in Bosnia to open the 
camps and allow free aid passage. 117 American joint chiefs of staff 
opposed the 'minimalist' approach favoured by British Chief of the 
General Staff General Sir Peter Inge,118 seeking either a massive 
commitment, aimed at controlling all territory within 20 miles of 
Sarajevo airport and a 200 mile corridor from Split to Sarajevo, or none 
114 Etienne Copel, European, August 13-16, 1992, p.9. For an opposing argument, see Overseas 
Development Secretary Lady Chalker's speech in United Nations Operations; UK Role, House of 
Lords, September 25, 1992, op.cit. c.595-563. 
liS Speech to emergency hearing of the European Parliament, Brussels, reported in Independent, 
August II, 1992, p.6. 
116 Guardian, August 12, 1992. 
It7 Sunday Times, August 9, 1992, p.l. Planners at SHAPE, the NATO military HQ, revealed 
plans to commit up to 100,000 NATO forces, to seize and hold Yugoslav territory, and provide a 
safe corridor through which aid could flow. 
118 Sunday Times, August 16,1992, p.10. 
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at all. When NATO ambassadors met in Brussels, British officials sought 
to persuade the Pentagon that the kind of massive commitment 
envisaged was unnecessary, and SHAPE planners were ordered to 
produce some less dramatic military options. 1l9 Both America and 
France (although not Mitterand himself) favoured air and naval cover, 
which was also the Bosnian government preference. 120 
The international debate resulted in Security Council Resolution 770 on 
August 13, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which called 
on states to 'take nationally or through regional agencies or 
arrangements all means necessary' to facilitate the UN in the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed elsewhere in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 121 This suited neither Britain nor the UNHCR, 
Britain because the term: 'all means necessary' was considered 
tantamount to a declaration of war on the Serbs, while the UNHCR felt 
its neutrality compromised by cooperation with national military forces 
outside the control of the UN .122 Meanwhile, pressure was mounting on 
all sides for firmer international action. In the United States, acting 
Yugoslav desk officer George Kenney resigned from the State 
Department in protest at what he saw as America's ineffective handling 
of the crisis. 123 During the same week, an extensive report by the 
influential US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 'ethnic 
cleansing' in Bosnia Herzegovina concluded that the death toll in Bosnia 
was far greater than previously estimated: 
\19 Ibid. 
120 'We think the Americans could use their sophisticated technology to silence the Serb artillery, 
and we can do the rest'. Bosnian government adviser, Hajrudin Somun. Guardian, August 12, 
1992, p.6. 
121 The US Senate supported the Bush Administration initiative, despite a Pentagon vote of 72122 
against the resolution. www.balkan-archive.org.yu 
122 Independent, August 20, 1992. 
123 POWER, op.cit. p.286, and p.264-269 and p.296-300 for broader dissent within US political 
circles. 
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We believe the death toll associated with forcible removal of the 
Muslim village population of Bosnia and Herzegovina far exceeds the 
death tolls from the bombardment of cities or from killing in prison 
camps. Unfortunately, this most lethal aspect of ethnic cleansing has 
received the least amount of public attention. 124 
The report also concluded that the arms embargo in no way diminished 
the capabilities of the well-armed Serbs. 
In Britain, there were no political resignations, and little reaction from 
the academic community. On the other hand, a monograph by John 
Zametica, entitled The Yugoslav Conflict, published by the Institute of 
Strategic Studies (IISS), received considerable acclaim. 125 In 1992, 
Zametica, a British academic of Serb origin, was a research fellow at the 
IISS, and later a lecturer in European security studies at Westminster 
University. His monograph concluded that 'there are limits to what the 
international community can achieve in Yugoslav-type conflicts', 126 
reflecting the views of the Foreign Secretary and other British 
government ministers. The following year, Zameticajoined the Bosnian 
Serbs as Karadzic's political adviser in Pale and, in 1994, threatened to 
down NATO planes over Bosnia. 
On August 18, John Major interrupted his holiday to chair an 
emergency Cabinet meeting in Downing Street. 127 Four options were on 
124 The report, published on August 18, was based on a visit between 7-10 August by Senate staff 
members, meeting eyewitnesses and survivors, representatives of UNHCR, JCRC, the local Red 
Cross, humanitarian and refugee organisations, human rights activists, advisers to the new 
Yugoslav federal government and US mission country teams in Belgrade and Zagreb. 
125 The paper, published in the IISS Adelphi series, has now been expunged from the Institute's 
listing, however. 
126 The Yugoslav Conflict, lohn Zametica, Adelphi Paper 270. Institute of International Strategic 
Studies. Summer 1992, p.76. The paper received positive reviews from a number of critics, 
including Spyros Economides and Christopher Bellamy. Independent, August 20, 1992, and 
August 5,1992, p.8. 
127 'I had asked the military chiefs of staff whether the three warring factions could be kept apart, 
and if so, how many troops would be needed to do the job. The answer was startling: 400,000 -
nearly three times the size of the whole British Army'. MAJOR, John The Autobiography. 
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the table, ranging from the deployment of 1,000-2,000 troops to escort 
aid convoys, to the use of 100,000-300,000 troops, to secure corridors to 
allow convoys to pass. The minimalist approach was chosen. Major 
notes in his autobiography that there was no clear consensus for an 
alternative policy, either in the Commons or in the country, and that 'at 
no point did the opposition call for a division on the issue of Bosnia.'128 
Two items had been tabled for the Cabinet to discuss: Iraq and Bosnia. 
The following day, media headlines announced UK action in both 
countries: an air exclusion zone in Southern Iraq, and the despatch of 
1,800 soldiers to protect UN aid convoys in Bosnia. This dual 
announcement might have lent the impression that Britain was taking 
resolute action against human rights miscreants on a global scale. As it 
was, action on Iraq (no more or less urgent than earlier) masked inaction 
on Bosnia. The UN had not been consulted before the decision. Ministers 
discussed Iraq only during the first half hour of a six-hour session, with 
the rest of the time devoted to Bosnia. To obviate any misunderstanding, 
the Prime Minister gave the assurance that the troops would not be 
required 'to fight to Armageddon and back ... There are no heroes and no 
villains - just a lot of fighting and a lot of people losing their lives', The 
following day, The Times printed an extended letter from Radovan 
Karadzic, playing on the 'ancient ethnic hatreds' myth, referring to 
'centuries of spilled blood', and to the alleged invincibility of the Serb 
military: 'an area which has broken all who have gone before', The 
editorial quoted from Karadzic's letter, opining that Serbia had 'all but 
won',129 
HarperCollins, 1999, p.535. Jonathan Eyal of the Royal United Services Institute opined that 
'hundreds of thousands of soldiers on the ground' would be needed. Guardian, Comment page, 
August 13, 1992. 
128 MAJOR, Ibid. p.536. The House of Commons had not been recalled to debate the issue, while 
national opinion polls contradicted the prime minister's statement. 
129 The Times, August 19,1992, p.ll. 
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On September 14, UNSCR 770 was followed by UNSCR 776, which 
recommended the expansion of the UNPROFOR mandate in Bosnia to 
provide armed escort for UNHCR humanitarian convoys, paid for by the 
contributing states. No reference was made to Chapter VII of the 
Charter, authorising "all necessary means". The UN resolution had been 
diluted, rejecting the use of force in any of the forms proposed by 
France, the United States and other countries. It accorded, however, 
with the decision made at the emergency Downing Street Cabinet 
meeting, and was endorsed through the London Conference. 
The London Conference 
The British-hosted international peace conference, held in London on 
26-27 August, resolved several problems. It eclipsed the French 
initiatives; it deflected criticism of Carrington's failed Conference; it 
mollified the UN Secretary General, who co-chaired the Conference, in 
incorporating the UN officially into the political decision-making process; 
it stilled the voices for intervention coming from the US, Islamic 
countries and some parts of Europe; and it reasserted Britain's role. As 
Lord Carrington bowed out, another former British foreign secretary and 
lord, David Owen, took his place, personally appointed by John Major 
who ignored disgruntlement in Europe over Britain's virtual monopoly of 
proceedings and players,130 while Peter Hall, Britain's ambassador in 
Belgrade, was appointed as Owen's deputy secretary. 
The London Conference also simultaneously shifted the political 
spotlight and responsibility from London to the UN in Geneva where the 
130 According to David Owen, his appointment was arranged between British ministers and 
government officials and Cyrus Vance during the week of August 11-17. OWEN, op.cit. p.21-23. 
Owen was a useful choice from the British standpoint. An experienced politician, with proven 
negotiating skills, titled and tough, but also without party allegiances, Owen had publicly 
criticised British policy, advocating air strikes, but was now neutralised, Douglas Hurd requiring 
him to 'discuss a form of words to cover his previous statements about the use of air power ... ' 
OWEN Ibid. p.24. 
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permanent conference - the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICFY) - was to be based. Geneva was remote and 
respectable, but it was also a slow-grinding bureaucracy. For those who 
were anxious to maintain the so-called 'evenhanded' policy (which, by 
virtue of the blanket arms embargo, implied the eventual supremacy of 
the Serbs) the Geneva Conference was a welcome development. 
The arrangement also suited America. As with other nations, it allowed 
space for US involvement without accountability, the United Nations 
umbrella shielding members from individual responsibility. It was of 
particular advantage to George Bush, in the run up to the US 
presidential elections, while the United Nations itself could claim that, in 
the final count, it was no more than the sum total of its member states, 
and therefore could act only within the mandate handed down through 
the Security Council within which, in turn, members could shift blame 
for perceived wrong decisions, and prevaricate on the difficult ones. 
The London Conference, therefore, notwithstanding the 'principles' 
drafted by its British hosts, served to blur the contours of international 
responsibility in resolving the conflict, at the same time setting the 
framework for the various tensions which were to recur between states, 
and between and within international institutions throughout the war. 
The clashes between the UN and NATO, the erosion of public credibility 
in the United Nations, the deepening rift between the United States and 
Britain, and the antagonisms within, and ignominy endured by, a 
European 'Union' which had failed to subdue a European war, were 
factors arising, in great part, out of the contradictions inherent in the 
London Conference. 
The London Conference laid down a groundwork of basic rules, but did 
not indicate the penalties for not adhering to them. No punishment was 
proposed for crimes already committed (apart from the longer term 
proposal for a war crimes tribunal), and there was no threat, beyond 
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verbal censure, for potential future crimes. The message from London to 
the Serb leaders, in other words, was that they could continue much as 
before, with relative impunity. The London Conference had offered 
Milosevic more room for manoeuvre than he had anticipated. Tougher 
sanctions were vaguely proposed, but without any details worked out; 
UN monitors were to be posted on the Serbian-Bosnian border, but two 
years later had still not arrived; and there was no pressure to restore 
autonomous status to Kosovo or Vojvodina. The Conference statement 
called for the 'return of territories taken by force' with 'just and adequate 
arrangements' for those expelled from their homes. But Karadzic's 
instant rejoinder, to offer mortgages for dispossessed Muslims, made a 
mockery of the whole proceedings. The status of Macedonia remained 
unresolved and, although there was a 96-hour deadline for Karadzic to 
place his heavy artillery under UN guard, no-one was able to say when 
the 96 hours should begin. In fact, it never did. Most important of all, 
the threat of western military intervention had once again been deferred. 
Milosevic's mood at a rare interview on the final evening before returning 
to Belgrade was indicative of the perceived Serb victory. Described as 
being in a relaxed mood, sipping a whisky, 'he joked and exuded 
bonhomie'. 131 Although Serbia had been warned that it risked total 
economic, cultural, political and diplomatic isolation, Milosevic informed 
the interviewer that he was not planning to change his policies. When 
asked whether he feared that this could lead to increased tension, or 
worse, between Serbia and the rest of the world, Milosevic replied: "No, I 
don't believe so. I believe that they will clarify their picture of Serbia." 
A comment by Henri Wynaendts, Head of the EC Monitoring Mission in 
former Yugoslavia, perhaps best summed up the Conference: 
13\ Independent, August 31,1992. 
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I had the feeling we were to be going through the negotiations of the 
previous year. Promises not kept and in the meantime the carnage 
would continue. I had a very sad feeling that day. 132 
Sequel to the Conference 
The immediate aftermath of the Conference was marked by an upsurge 
in artillery and mortar fire throughout Bosnia. Front page headlines 
told the tale: 'Slaughter in the marketplace'133, 'Mortar blasts London 
peace hopes'.134 Within two days of the Conference, 34 civilians were 
killed and 130 injured135 and, within weeks, Jajce, a town of some 
45,000 people, 80% of them non-Serb, fell to VRS forces, following 
sustained aerial bombardment. 136 
In Belgrade, the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), 
Dobrica Cosic, applauded the decision to institute a standing peace 
conference in Geneva, proposing the demilitarisation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and the creation of a Balkan confederation. In an article 
drawing a symmetry of guilt, Cosic also called for "international factors 
of the Yugoslav crisis [to] overcome their role of biased arbitrators and 
establish the equality of all the Yugoslav participants" .137 Delegate Milos 
Dromnjak also praised the London Conference, naming Serbia's 
perceived friends and foes on the international scene. 'The "cynical 
132Henry Wynaendts, quoted in GOWING, Nik. 'Diplomacy & Deceit'. Channel., Bloody Bosnia 
Week. August 1, 1993. A similar sentiment was expressed by Wynaendts at a meeting with this 
author (Paris, February 1996). 
133 The Times, August 31, 1992, p.1 
134 Independent, August 31, 1992, p.l. 
m Guardian, August 27,1992, p.l. 
136 Jajce (19% Serb in 1991) was crucial to the Serbs, its two hydro-electric plants supplying the 
Serb capital, Banja Luka. Lord Owen, Evidence before the Select Committee for Foreign Affairs, 
December 10, 1992, 165. 
137 Review of International Affairs, Vol.XLIII, 1007-8,1 AugustllSeptember 1992, p.1-2. 
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group", as Dromnjak termed it, consisted of Albania, Austria, Germany, 
Holland and to some extent Hungary, Turkey and partly Belgium. The 
other moderate and more rational group that set the tone to the entire 
Conference consisted of the representatives of Russia, France, China 
and in great measure of the United Kingdom and Romania .. .' 138 
On November 27-28, a 'scientific symposium' was held in Belgrade, 
entitled World and the Yugoslav Crisis,[sic] where the London 
Conference and other themes were discussed, including external 
attitudes to the war, the question of the continuity of the FRY, and 
conditions for the lifting of sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro. Of 
particular note was the speech delivered by the 'Yugoslav' foreign 
minister, Ilija Djukic, not only for his conclusions on the London 
Conference, but for the relevance of his comments to later developments 
between Serbia and the international community, in particular the UN 
Security Council. Djukic paid tribute to the London Conference, in 
which he felt Serbia's performance was impressive, as an attempt by the 
international community to help Serbia emerge from its 'difficult 
situation'. He expressed relief that the federation, albeit reduced in size, 
had been, as he saw it, de facto recognised by the international 
community, pointing out that "no serious politician, no representative of 
serious countries playing a key role today in settling the fate of Europe 
and our own fate ... has questioned our new borders. Or Kosovo, our sore 
point..."139 Djukic stressed that Serbia should nurture its friends and 
allies in the world, and look to the UN for 'support and understanding ... 
We are in the right and we should wait for the realization to sink in that 
Yugoslavia belongs to the international community ... Even more vitally 
important is the question of sanctions. We must get them lifted. The 
138 Ibid. p.5-6. Three Pennanent Members of the UN Security Council were, according to this 
perception, considered Serbia's allies, with a fourth, Britain, as a qualified ally. The qualifications 
regarding the UK may have been a reflection of Britain's ambivalent role (in Cetnik terms) in 
World War II, when Churchill transferred allied support to Tito's partisans from the Cetnik 
leader, Draza Mihailovic. Mihailovic was rehabilitated in the early 1990s. 
139 Ibid. 1009-11, 1 October/l December 1992, p.I-3. 
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United Nations must do its bit'.l4o He referred to the principles in the UN 
Charter and their value in the 'birth of the new world order', but also of 
the necessity 'to bring the Charter up to date .. .In this process, 
Yugoslavia will take an active part ... We hold the central position in the 
Balkans. There is a possibility for us to become the centre of gravity for 
European movement in the Balkan area'. 141 
The partial rehabilitation of Serbia and Montenegro was principally due 
to the support of Britain, France and Russia. Without making any 
tangible concessions, the Belgrade regime managed to have sanctions 
eased and, imperceptibly, to manoeuvre Serbia into a central position in 
the Balkans to the point where, until early 1999, Milosevic was mostly 
viewed as the main regional peace broker. 142 In view of its continuing 
role in Bosnia's war, Serbia's partial readmission into the international 
community at this time was a considerable achievement. 
UNPROFOR deployment to Bosnia 
On September 14, UN Security Council Resolution 776 approved the 
expansion of UN PROF OR by up to 6,000 troops, including 1,800 from 
Britain. The concept of "protective support" - the term used for the UN 
mandate to protect humanitarian aid deliveries - was a British initiative 
which, as Head of the Foreign Office UN Department Glynne Evans put 
it, 'we then sold to some of our closest friends and allies'. 143 Nonetheless, 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid. 
142 See ROBINSON, Edward. 'Managing Milosevic's Serbia'. Discussion Paper 54, Royal 
Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), 1995. Robinson, Attache at the British embassy in 
Belgrade, 1992-1994, and later Visiting Fellow at the RIIA, argued in the paper for 'a concerted 
and forward-looking policy towards Serbia', 
143 DUDLEY EDWARDS, Ruth. True Brits: Inside the Foreign Office, p.5S. John Major also 
confIrmed this in a statement to the House of Commons, European Council (Birminihaml, 
October 20, 1992, Hansard. Vo1.212, c.320. 
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although despatched under a 'humanitarian' mandate, the decision was 
not taken on humanitarian or defence grounds. As Defence Secretary 
Malcolm Rifkind pointed out: 
The decision to send soldiers to the former Yugoslavia was not a 
decision taken by the Ministry of Defence alone on purely defence 
grounds: it was taken by the Government with regard to its overall 
foreign policy interests and objectives. 144 
Deployment of British troops into a war zone was effected without 
reference to the House of Commons, however, where it was debated post 
factum at a hard-fought-for adjournment debate on September 25. 145 It 
was a 'minimalist' decision, which maintained Britain in the forefront of 
international diplomacy, while deflecting from growing calls for full-scale 
military intervention. 
The lack of groundwork preparation was evident from the beginning. 
Commander of the first British UNPROFOR mission to Bosnia, Bob 
Stewart, following his briefing at the Ministry of Defence the same week, 
summed up some of the concerns expressed by MPs during the debate: 
The whole business was still a long way from being put together 
properly. Not only was it unclear where we could operate but 
command and control arrangements as well as Rules of Engagement 
were still in nascent form. 146 
144 Secretary of State for Defence Malcolm Rifkind, Select Committee for Defence. October 29, 
1992, para.594. 
145 Parliament was recalled at the request of Labour leader, John Smith. An earlier request by 
senior Labour MPs Clare Short, Dawn Primarolo and Tony Banks to debate the issue was 
refused. John Cunningham voiced the Labour Party's view. 'I believe that Parliament should have 
been recalled some weeks ago to discuss ... in particular, the decision to deploy British troops. 
Some important questions need clarification ... there have been, I believe, 17 occasions since 1939 
when the House has been recalled to discuss emergencies or crises of one kind or another and ... 8 
of those occasions have involved foreign affairs. It was remiss of the Government to postpone, or 
at first, to reject the request.. . for the recall of Parliament before now'. United Nations Operations, 
Hansard. op.cit. c.134-S. 
146 STEWART, Bob. Broken Lives. Harper Collins, 1993, p.23. The Foreign Secretary gave a 
different impression of the anny's preparedness for the Bosnia mission, claiming that "the British 
Government should never deploy British troops without careful preparation and assessment of 
what their role and objectives should be". Douglas Hurd, United Nations Operations. Ibid. c.l19. 
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In all essential respects the UNPROFOR mission failed, but the presence 
of UN ground troops was to provide an effective pretext for opposing air 
strikes and maintaining the arms embargo. UK and other troops were 
not only compromised by the lack of an explicit mandate, but the 
deployment of lightly-armed non-combat forces under UN auspices was 
later to thwart the international peace process, as hundreds of troops 
fell hostage to the VRS forces, and to discredit the UN which had failed 
to protect the civilian population in accordance with Security Council 
resolutions. Also, while the presence of troops facilitated delivery of 
humanitarian aid in some areas, UNPROFOR had limited access in 
others, including the eastern Bosnian enclaves where aid was most 
needed. Equally, the operation depended 'on the goodwill of the 
combatants'147 which meant that Bosnian Serb General Mladic's forces, 
which controlled most of the communications lines, also controlled most 
of the aid distribution so that, as with the arms embargo, the policy 
advantaged the Pale regime, often at the expense of the victims. 
The Adjournment debate of 25 September was the first Commons debate 
since the summer recess, and the first on Bosnia in six months of 
conflict. It included developments in Iraq and Somalia, as well as an 
update on the UNPROFOR operation in Croatia. The Foreign Secretary 
spent the first ten minutes of his statement discoursing on the historical 
background to the war which, he opined, had its roots in centuries 
past. 148 He did not announce the British troop deployment until some 
fifteen minutes into his speech, discouraging debate on the escalating 
crisis in Bosnia. 
147 The Prime Minister, Oral Questions. 20 October 1992, Hansard, Vo1.212, c.332. 
148 '12 million people with very different histories were mingled inextricably in the north-west of 
the Balkans'. Douglas Hurd, United Nations Operations. op.cit. c.130. 
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I do not need to tell the House how the storm then shifted to Bosnia. 
I shall not go into it, because we and our constituents have seen, 
night by night, that storm blow up into tragedy throughout the 
summer. 149 
Judging from the questions, however, this was just the information MPs 
required, especially in light of Britain's leading role both through the 
peace conference and the British EC presidency. Describing the war as a 
'storm', moreover, tended to neutralise events, conveying the impression 
of uncontrollable turmoil, as opposed to a pre-planned, systematic 
military offensive on the civilian population. 
As earlier, Douglas Hurd identified the Serbs as carrying the main 
responsibility for both starting and continuing the war, but continued to 
discourage any discussion on military intervention: 
It is natural that people watching the atrocities on television, seeing 
the bombardment of Sarajevo and the emaciated figures emerging 
from the camps, should urge military action by air or land against 
those responsible. Personally, I felt and said that such action would 
have been morally justified if it could have been effective in bringing 
those atrocities to an end. Air strikes were the option most often put 
forward, and we and others considered that suggestion more than 
once. However, given the terrain, the weapons being used for most of 
the killing - which were not heavy weapons - the way in which the 
civilians and military .... live side by side and the likelihood that such 
military action would immediately bring to an end the humanitarian 
activities of the Red Cross and United Nations agencies, we and our 
allies and partners have come down against that option each time it 
has been considered. ISO 
This was not strictly accurate. The air strikes option was discarded 
mainly due to a lack of consensus, Britain having consistently opposed 
it, even to the point of excluding it from the agenda of the August 18 
emergency Cabinet meeting. Neither was the argument that air strikes 
would bring aid delivery to a halt a main concern of the Bosnian 
149 Douglas Hurd, Ibid. c.120. 
ISO Douglas Hurd, Ibid. c.123. 
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government, whose stated priority throughout the war was for the 
removal of the arms embargo. 151 Douglas Hurd's comment on the 
embargo, that 'there is an arms embargo against all the republics'152 was 
an interesting one, since Bosnia-Herzegovina was no longer a republic 
but a sovereign state I Either this was a slip of the tongue, or the Foreign 
Secretary chose his words circumspectly. Referring to the no-fly zone 
over Bosnia, agreed at the London Conference, Hurd proposed 
enforcement by 'monitors on the ground, although this was considered 
an insufficient deterrent by most other major western powers. The 
foreign secretary concluded his speech by reference to the 'ancient 
hatreds' myth. 'Once old hatreds have been aroused, they are hard to 
put to sleep again',153 and by confirming that '[n]either we nor the CSCE 
nor the UN yet have the aptitude or the powers to sort out problems 
within central or eastern European countries .. .' 154 The suggestion of 
collective international impotence to stem the Serb assault on Bosnia 
was tantamount to offering carte blanche to the Serb forces to pursue 
their military strategy with impunity, a position questioned even by 
some Conservative MPs.155Newly-appointed Labour spokesman for 
foreign affairs, John Cunningham, addressing the Commons for the first 
time on Bosnia, admitted he had much to learn. 156 Cunningham 
endorsed government policy in deploying British troops, and ruling out 
the military option. Overall, Belgrade would have been reassured that 
lSI According to former UK ambassador to the UN, Anthony Parsons: 'Having made it impossible 
for the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina to acquire the arms needed to defend itself, the UN owed it to 
the government to do more than mediate and engage in non-threatening peacekeeping ... The high 
technology weaponry and delivery systems were there for both contingencies without putting 
troops on the ground: by the time UNPROFOR was deployed throughout Bosnia it was too late.' 
PARSONS, op.cit. p.232. 
J52 United Nations Operations. op.cit. c.12I. 
IS31bid. c.l2S. 
IS41bid. c.126. 
ISS Michael Colvin, Ibid. c.123 and Michael Lord, Ibid. c.12S. 
IS61bid. c.131. 
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the Labour Opposition continued to present little challenge to 
government policy. 
More than twenty backbenchers spoke, the majority expressing serious 
concerns as to the viability of the mission. The government was in tum 
accused of incompetence and prevarication,157 inconsistency of 
approach 158 and a lack of adaptability and co-ordination. One speaker 
claimed that the decision to send British forces to Bosnia was merely a 
sop to placate public opinion, pointing out that it was humiliating for 
forces to have to argue their way through warlords' domains. 159 Another 
felt that the UN mandate was treating the symptoms not the cause, 
allowing the situation to fester. 160 Secretary of State for Defence Malcolm 
Rifkind, in his closing speech, did not address the main concerns raised, 
and had little to say about the command structure or rules of 
engagement either then or the following month in his evidence before the 
Defence Select Committee, by which time a further 600 British troops 
had been deployed to Bosnia. 161 
The House of Lords held a parallel debate on the issue that day, in 
which Members' views, as in the House of Commons, did not fall within 
the traditional party political divisions, and where (reflecting the House 
of Commons debate on March 5) a number of speakers who claimed 
personal knowledge of the area - mostly acquired during World War II -
took a view which reflected the Serb position. 162 Interestingly, Overseas 
1S7 Ernie Ross, Ibid. c.lS6. 
1S8 Ieuan Wyn Jones, Ibid. c.169. 
1S9 Bruce George, Ibid. c.I64. 
160 Jacques Arnold, Ibid. c.17S. 
161 The Defence Secretary stipulated, however, that "it will be no part of the role of our forces to 
seek to fight their way through to their destination," Minutes ofeyjdence taken before the 
Defence Select Committee, October 29, 1992. para.SSt. 
162 Lord Merlyn-Rees advised against British intervention, and deplored Croatia's 'premature' 
recognition. United Nations Operations; UK Role, op.cit. c.sSl-SS4; Lord Chalfont spoke of ' a 
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Development Secretary Linda Chalker warned Bosnians and Croats 
against forming a defence pact. 
I would regard that as very serious indeed, certainly if there are plans 
for the further use of force .. .I hope they will desist immediately from 
all provocative military movements ... further violence will increasingly 
alienate any foreign sympathy which they still enjoy. 163 
In view of the conditions on the ground, this could have been interpreted 
as advice to succumb to Serb aggression. It also echoed the advice given 
by Lord Carrington to the Bosnian president some weeks previously. 
The timing of the troop deployment is pivotal to an understanding of 
British policy in Bosnia. The decision was made at a time when public 
outrage, following the discovery of the Serb concentration camps, was at 
its peak. The introduction of British and other UN troops into Bosnia to 
escort UN aid deliveries, lightly armed,164 in small numbers, and under a 
limited and unclear mandate, responded to the 'something must be 
done' lobby, but it did not contribute to reducing hostilities. Placed in 
vulnerable, often humiliating, situations in the middle of a war zone, the 
troops were potential (and, later actual) political hostages, where their 
presence was used as a pretext for blocking other means of ending the 
war. 
nightmare terrain for any military commander', Ibid. c.SS6; and the Earl of Lauderdale, with 
'some knowledge of the lingo', cautioned against 'bludgeoning of the Serbs' with sanctions,lbid. 
c.559. 
163 Ibid. c.S91. 
164 'There will be no tanks, artillery or combat air support. That would profoundly alter the 
essence of the operation.' Armed Forces Minister Archie Hamilton, Former YUKoslayia, 
November 16,1992. Hansard, Vo1.214, c.82. 
116 
House of Commons: November, 1992 
Following the deployment of British troops to Bosnia, a number of issues 
were raised by Members of Parliament relating to government policy. An 
adjournment debate dedicated to former Yugoslavia was called in mid-
November by the Liberal Democrats. It was the only Commons debate 
with a division during the Bosnian war. The motion " ... That this House 
regrets that the response of the European Community and notably Her 
Majesty's Government, since it has assumed the Presidency, to the crisis 
in former Yugoslavia has been too little and too late.,," was overturned 
by the Minister for the Armed Forces, Archie Hamilton. 165 Most Labour 
MPs, including the Shadow Front Bench, boycotted the debate, allegedly 
in a quid pro quo for not receiving Liberal Democrat support in an 
earlier debate on pit closures. 166 During the debate, thirteen MPs from 
four different parties, including two Conservatives, made specific 
criticisms of various aspects of British government policy in Bosnia. In a 
brief summing up, Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg addressed few of 
these points. There was one aspect of the UNPROFOR mission on which 
both he and the Minister for the Armed Forces. Archie Hamilton, were 
unequivocal: 
We are not in the business of going to war with the Serbs ... 
If the troops cannot get an agreement from the warring factions, they 
will not start out in the first place ... 167 
16SThe Conservative minister moved that the House "congratulates the European Community and 
notably Her Majesty's Government in its capacity as Presidency on its unremitting work for a 
solution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia ... " [Archie Hamilton,lbid.] Archie Hamilton 
resigned from office the following year. "The aid that we have given to Bosnia may have 
prolonged the conflict and more people may have died than would have done so if we had had 
nothing whatever to do with it. We must face the agonising and difficult issue that throughout the 
conflict we have been feeding the warring factions in Bosnia." 
166 Information from George Galloway, MP, Glasgow Labour Party Constituency Office, 
December 5, 1992. 
167 Archie Hamilton, Ibid. c.79 and 82. 
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We are not in the business of fighting through obstacles. We are in 
the business of negotiating passage. Anything else is bound to fail 
because it will run to a war. 168 
In the view of a former British ambassador to the UN, Anthony Parsons, 
however, 
UNPROFOR had been deployed as a traditional peacekeeping force 
with blue helmets in white painted vehicles, without supporting 
artillery, nor significant heavy armour, nor close air support. This 
with the non enforcement of the NFZ amounted to a message to the 
aggressors that the UN, i.e. the major west European and other NATO 
powers, with the most awesome military force at their disposal, were 
not prepared to engage in combat, even to convey aid. This meant 
General Mladic and, to a lesser extent, Bosnian Croat forces, had a 
free hand to continue ethnic cleansing. 169 
The debate aired many concerns raised elsewhere in parliament, 
including Britain's refugee policy, the no-fly zone and the 
implementation of UN sanctions. These are considered below. 
The refugee crisis 
[this House] ... insists that Her Majesty's Government must respond 
much more generously to the refugee problem, both fmancially and in 
the numbers accepted [and] calls on Her Majesty's Government to co-
ordinate a European Community wide strategy for refugees as 
proposed by Germany and for further urgent and appropriate 
action ... 170 
At this time, there was no coordinated European policy to address the 
refugee crisis. While Germany and other European countries admitted 
large numbers of Bosnians in 1992, the United Kingdom became 
168 Douglas Hogg. Ibid. c.lli. 
169 PARSONS, op.cit. p.232. 
170 Former YUioslayia. November 16, 1992. op.cit. c.n. 
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distinguished as the only country which had actually deported Bosnian 
asylum-seekers. 171 
Confronted at the House of Commons with criticism of the government's 
refugee policy, the Armed Forces Minister pointed out that "since the 
conflict began in Yugoslavia, more than 40,000 Yugoslav nationals have 
arrived in this country already,"172 a figure which was grossly 
misleading, and conflicted with Home Office information indicating that 
90% of the arrivals were visitors and students. 173 By mid-November, 
there were an estimated 2.5 million refugees and displaced people in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, just over four thousand of them in Britain. 174 
On November 6, the British government introduced new visa restrictions 
which precluded Bosnians from applying within Bosnia, where there was 
no British embassy. Over 180 Bosnian refugees, predominantly women 
and children, who had applied for visas to visit the United Kingdom, 
were held at the Slovenian/ Austrian border. 175 The government later 
decided that only six of the refugees with family ties in the UK should be 
granted visas. 176 The rest of the group were refused visas to the UK and, 
after an extended diplomatic wrangle, were offered asylum in Austria. 
The event caused a furore in the House of Commons, where no minister 
was able to clarify the issue. Two weeks later, junior Home Office 
minister Charles Wardle made a statement in the House, announcing 
171 Under the Dublin Convention, any Be member could return a refugee to the country of fll'st 
entry. Accordingly, in July, 36 refugees were returned from Britain to Germany and Belgium The 
New Republic, September 21,1992, p.29. 
\72 Archie Hamilton. Former YUios1ayja, November 16, 1992. op.cit. c.76. 
173 According to Home Office Minister Charles Wardle, 'total admissions [were] 33,200, of whom 
visitors 21,900, students 1,680, spouses, fiances, children SO, others [mainly passengers returning 
and transit passengers] 9,540 ... persons applying for asylum at UK ports 930'. Written Answers, 
October 23, 1992, Hansard, Vo1.212. 
174 The Times, November 18, 1992, p.2. 
175 Channel 4 News, November 13,1992. 
176 Archie Hamilton, Former YUioslayia, op.cit. c.77. 
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that, in addition to the first group of 150 former detainees from camps 
in Bosnia, the government were now willing to receive up to 1,000 
former detainees, together with a maximum of 3,000 dependents. 177 He 
added that the selection of the ex-detainees would be a matter for the 
UNHCR, together with the ICRC.17S What he did not say was that each 
application submitted by the UNHCR would be considered by the Home 
Office on a case-by-case basis, causing interminable delays. Most of the 
1,000 quota for ex-detainees had still not been used by 1995.179 
The reluctance to admit Bosnian refugees to Britain was in part a 
reflection of Britain's overall immigration policy, then widely 
acknowledged as amongst the most stringent in Europe. A significant 
number of those arriving before the visa restrictions were introduced 
were from Serbia and Serb-held territory in Bosnia, who had easier 
access via Belgrade. ISO Some were draft-dodgers, others 'economic' 
migrants, often with fairly fluent English, unlike the majority of Bosnian 
Muslims who had been forcibly displaced. Discrimination also occurred 
in local housing policy, and interpreting presented a particular problem. 
Bosnians, offered exclusively Serb interpreters for highly sensitive 
interviews with Home Office officials attempted to object, but mostly 
without success. There were more Serbs in Britain available to 
interpret. On the other hand, opportunities to use non-Serbs were often 
not taken up. lSI The policy that 'refugees should be looked after as close 
177 Bosnian Reful:ees. November 30,1992. Hansard, Vol.215, c.30. 
178 Ibid. c.3l. 
179 From the 1,000 quota offered, only 387 ex-detainees, plus 1,001 dependents had been 
admitted to Britain. UN Information Notes, June 1995, p.2l. The only two other European 
countries with a higher remaining quota of ex-detainees were Germany and Switzerland which 
had by late 1992 already accepted 235,000 and 70,450 refugees respectively. The Times, 
November 18,1992, p.2. 
180 The Bosnian Serbs had declared that no more than 5% of non-Serb ethnic groups would be 
permitted to remain in any municipality in Serb-occupied territory. 
181 On occasion, Serb interpreters were allocated even in areas where non-Serbs were available. In 
Glasgow, for instance, over a hundred refugees who had been expelled from northern Bosnia by 
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to their homes as possible'182 and that 'our troops will try to remove 
people from the areas where their lives are most threatened to areas 
which are relatively safer" 183 was crucial for the British government, 
since the creation of a significant refugee problem affecting the wider 
community would automatically internationalise the issue, and provide 
grounds for military intervention. 184 
War crimes 
In late 1992, a number of reports from the US State Department, UN 
Human Rights Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Medicins sans 
Frontieres, Medicins du Monde, and others, documenting the 
widespread and serious abuse of human rights in Bosnia, and the later 
Warburton Report alleging some 20,000 cases of rape, reactivated the 
London Conference decision for a commission to investigate war crimes 
in former Yugoslavia. From the outset, however, Britain placed obstacles 
in the way of the commission, in relation to funding, field investigation, 
collection and handing over of testimonies, the chairing of the 
commission, and even the name. 18S The US State Department had 
wanted the commission referred to as a 'war crimes commission' to link 
with the 1943 UN War Crimes Commission, established to prepare for 
Serb forces were only offered Serbian interpreters in their debriefing interviews with the Home 
Office, where explicit details of their home situation, background and capture, were interpreted 
by Serbs, at least one of whom had links with the Belgrade regime. Non-Serbs who offered to 
interpret (some on a voluntary basis) including, in one case, a qualified court interpreter, were 
rejected. 
182 Douglas Hurd, United Nations Operations. 25 September 1992. op.cit. c.124. 
183 Archie Hamilton, Fonner Yuios1ayja. 16 November 1992. op.cit. c.84. This was also 
supported by the International Red Cross. 
184 See HIGGINS, Professor Rosalyn, Q.C. Eyidence before Foreiin Affajrs Committee, 
Hansard, February 17, 1993,392-3. 
18S For another account corroborating the British and French reluctance to support the 
Commission of Experts see SCHARF, Michael P. Balkan Justice, Carolina Academic Press, 
1997, ppA0-42, 52 & 75-77. 
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the Nuremberg prosecutions. Britain opposed this title, resulting in the 
compromise title of 'Commission of Experts', with no reference to war 
crimes. Britain also argued that funding for the Commission should be 
from existing sources. When a trust fund was later established to 
enable the Commission to conduct investigations, Britain was not 
amongst the thirteen contributing countries (which included the United 
States, Canada, Norway and Holland),186 nor did it offer help in 
kind,187claiming to be too 'over-extended' to offer logistical and security 
support for exhumations. 188 
The US and Britain had an entirely different concept of how the 
Commission should work, the US envisaging a pro-active investigation, 
while the British preference was for a more passive group which would 
analyse information submitted to it. l89 In early 1993, former camp 
detainees granted asylum in Britain were extensively interviewed at a 
British military base in Kent, where they offered first-hand, 
substantiated information. A Foreign Office file obtained by the BBC, 
however, claimed that the goal of the exercise was military intelligence. 
By July 1993, the British government had handed over just one sample 
affidavit. It was only immediately prior to an interview given by 
Commission Chair Cherif Bassiouni to the BBC for a Panorama 
programme that the government was prompted to produce a further 
batch of affidavits.l90 There was also a uneasy relationship between the 
Commission and UNPROFOR, which had blocked the Commission's 
186 Final report o/the Commission o/Experts, UN document S/1994/674, May 27,1994, ref.4. 
187 These included the United States, Canada, Norway and Holland. See GUEST, op.cit. p.64. 
188 Ibid. p.68. 
189 Ibid. p.61. 
190 Getting Away with Murder, BBC Panorama, December 13, 1993. It was reported that when 
Britain handed over the EC Presidency chair to Denmark at the end of 1992, many files covering 
the first crucial period of ethnic cleansing were taken back to London. GUEST. op.cit. p.66. 
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travel to the region for several months until March 1993, on security 
grounds.I91 
One comprehensive study of the work of the Commission of Experts 
concluded that it was 
consistently denied the kind of support that it required. Everything 
was harder than it should have been - acquiring information, 
launching investigations, securing funding ... from the UN Secretary-
General on down, [the UN] simply failed to exploit the Commission's 
potential as an independent enquiry ... Britain's opposition was most 
notable. 192 
Perhaps the most revealing statement of the British government position 
on prosecuting perpetrators of war crimes in former Yugoslavia came 
from Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg: 
We assert and will continue to assert, that those who commit such 
crimes, either directly or indirectly, should be held personally 
accountable. However, there is another problem ... If the authority-
the responsibility for those crimes goes as high as the hon. 
Gentleman and I expect, we must ask ourselves what is the priority; 
is it to bring people to trial or is it to make peace? This is the sort of 
tension with which we must deal. 193 
This was as far as any British minister came to acknowledging that the 
international community was conducting peace negotiations with war 
criminals, which a war crimes tribunal might risk exposing. 
191 Ibid. p.58. 
192 Ibid. p.94-S. There was one notable exception to this. the UN Human Rights Rapporteur, 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, had coordinated closely with the Commission, realizing the importance of 
exposing war crimes, both as a deterrent and as part of the healing process. But Mazowiecki, too, 
experienced difficulties with the UN in attempting to fulfil his mandate, and eventually resigned 
after the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. 
193 Douglas Hogg, Oral Questions. February 10, 1993, Hansard, Vo1.218. 
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The following year, just months into office, the Chairman of the UN 
Commission of Experts resigned from his post because, he claimed, 
frustration at the UN bureaucracy and obstruction by Western 
governments had harmed his health. 194 
The No-fly zone 
UN Security Council Resolution 781 on 9 October 1992 imposed an air 
exclusion zone over Bosnia but without authorisation for its 
enforcement.l95 When Jajce fell to VRS forces, who openly defied the no-
fly zone in towns in central and northern Bosnia. the question of 
international military intervention again arose, especially in America. 196 
This was temporarily deflected by the British government and Russia. 197 
Britain's views on interdicting air space over former Yugoslavia were 
clearly on record a year earlier, and had not changed. 
194 'The Commission did not have the full political support of major governments', Fritz 
Kalshoven. Reuters report, October 1, 1993. International Human Rights Institute Collection 
(IHRLI) Sarajevo Source File. Open Society Archives. October 1993. 
195 Owen claims he forged an agreement with Radovan Karadzic at that time to respect the NFZ 
ban, but would not have been able to do so without the warning by President Bush days earlier 
that the US was prepared to enforce the ban in the case of infringement. Foreiin Affairs 
Committee, December 10, 1992. No.168. 
196 The Times, November 25, 1992. A Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report stated the 
only hope for ending conflict was large-scale UN military intervention. San Francisco Chronicle, 
Nov 261992, A14. According to UN sources, the US was ready to act if the Balkans 'blew up'. 
Sunday Times, November 29, 1992. David Gompert (US Security Council 1990-93) observed that 
'history might have taken a different course if the day after we had insisted that all the terms of 
the London Conference be upheld ... we felt even then that the use of force to enforce the terms of 
the London Conference was probably essential. That was the only thing the Serbs would respect.' 
Channel 4, Bloody Bosnia Week, August I, 1993. 
197 In the view of Colonel Michael Dewar, Deputy Director of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 'military intervention is perfectly feasible from a military point of view ... 
Douglas Hurd and others for entirely political reasons are fighting shy of saying that it is viable. 
What they mean is that they do not think it is politically desirable'. Guardian, Comment, October 
23, 1992. See also 'Intervencija u BiH ne bi zaustavila rat', Borba, November 24, 1992, p.l, 
November 25,1992, p.16, and November 26, p.7. 
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I am not sure whether the practical suggestion .... about interdicting 
air space is meaningful. Obviously it has crossed our minds, and I 
have read about such a suggestion. It would probably involve activity 
by the United States and others which could be authorised only by 
the United Nations, and I doubt whether the United Nations would 
authorise it. That proposal would not be viable ... 198 
Britain's efforts in staving off enforcement of the no-fly-zone over Bosnia 
were an illustration of the successful workings of British diplomacy at 
various levels in shaping the international response to the war, but they 
came under serious challenge in late 1992. 
A declaration by the 50-member Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
[OIC) on December 1 in Jeddah brought some focus to the international 
debate. Calling for 'full implementation of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, 
including Section 42, to force the Serbs and government of Belgrade to 
comply with Security Council resolutions',199 a deadline of 15 January 
was issued, failing which Muslim states would consider supplying arms 
to Bosnia's Muslims. The Syrian deputy secretary-general of the Arab 
League, Adnon Omran, alleged a 'terrible double standard in the West'. 
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic was more specific, singling out 
Britain as 'the biggest brake on any progress'.200 
Within days of the OIC declaration, British UN troops in central Bosnia 
was forced to withdraw when coming under Serb fire, 201 and pressure 
grew for a fundamental review of international policy on Bosnia, with 
America in the forefront. Senior Bush Administration officials, led by 
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, and nudged by president-elect 
Bill Clinton, concluded that the Serbs were routinely violating the UN 
198 Douglas Hurd, Debate on the Address. November 1, 1991, Hansard, Vol.198, c.122. 
199 Independent, December 2, 1992, p.l2. 
200 Wall Street Journal, December 3, 1992. 
201 European Commission President Jacques Delors described the UN troop withdrawal under 
Serb fire as 'a symbol of international impotence'. Borba, December 10, 1992, p.2. 
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no-fly zone, and called for an early resolution to enforce the flight ban, 
and possible exemption of the Bosnian Muslims from the arms 
embargo.202 Former Secretary of State George Shultz specifically called 
for military force, describing intervention to uphold the UN resolution as 
'a defmable, doable mission'.203 Endorsing this, NATO Secretary-General 
Manfred Womer announced contingency plans for a military operation, 
should the UN request the Alliance to intervene. 204 
France was by now also persuaded of the need for military enforcement 
of the no-fly zone,20S and opened talks with other Security Council 
members on December 14 for a resolution which would allow firing on 
aircraft violating the ban.206 The head of the French joint chiefs of staff, 
Admiral Jacques Lanxade, went further, arguing that an air and land 
blockade of the Serb forces operating in Bosnia could be established 
within two weeks of the UN passing the necessary resolution: "Either 
you use force or you withdraw.''207 The UN commander in Sarajevo, Brig. 
Gen. Hussein Ali Abdel Razek, startled the UN hierarchy by declaring 
that the UNPROFOR operation had 'completely failed' and that only 
western military action could prevent further Serb attacks. 208 The 
secretary-general of the WEU, Willem van Eekelen, described the UN 
operation in Bosnia as a shambles, with the humanitarian effort lacking 
202 BBC Newsnight, December 14,1992. The UN General Assembly voted to lift the arms 
embargo by 102/0, with 57 abstentions, including Britain. Independent, December 19, 1992, p.1. 
203 New York Times, December 9, 1992. 
20.4 New York Times, December 12, 1992. 
20S President Mitterand who had been amongst the most opposed in the French government to 
military intervention, now pushed for firmer action. 'Arbitration, conciliation and dialogue have 
been tried ... [1 am] counting on the UN Security Council to authorise enforcement of the no-fly 
zone, and clear roads to permit entry to camps and towns and cities'. Liberation, January I, 1993, 
p.l. 
206 Borba, December 14,1992, p.3. 
207 New York Times, 10 December 1992, Sunday Times, 13 December 1992, p.14, and BBC 
Newsnight, 14 December 1992. 
208 The Times, December 9, 1992, p.11, New York Times, 9 & 13 December 1992, p.13. 
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any credibility,209 while the WEU parliamentary assembly, called on its 
nine member states to start planning for military intervention. 210 This 
was backed by the Netherlands foreign minister who offered Dutch air 
force help to enforce the exclusion zone. 211 Dutch premier Ruud Lubbers 
accused the British EC Presidency of acting as if Yugoslavia was 'at the 
other end of the world'212 and, on the eve of the EC Edinburgh Summit, 
EC President Jacques De10rs again criticised EC leaders' vacillation, 
reiterating that the only way of defeating the 'monstrous ideology' was 
through a credible threat of the use of force. 213 
On December 14 at the CSCE conference in Stockholm, acting US 
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger did a surprising volte-face. 
Having opposed military intervention since the Croatian war, 
Eagleburger now sounded out governments on enforcing the no-fly-zone, 
and lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia. To the reported consternation 
of senior British officials,214 Eagleburger also named ten 'war criminals' 
including Slobodan Milosevic, to be tried for war crimes. 
British leaders knew that the issues raised could not be indefinitely 
deferred. John Major had managed to subdue criticism from 
backbenchers at the House of Commons,21S but a more convincing 
response was required for Britain's western allies, particularly in view of 
the OIC deadline, and America's unexpected threat to support the 
removal of the arms embargo on Bosnia. Through a number of adroit 
209 The Times, 9 December 1992, p.11. 
210 Guardian, December 4, 1992, & Borba, December 3, 1992, p.2. 
211 The Times, December 15, 1992, p.l. 
212 Borba, December 4, 1992, p.S. 
213 Politicari iii 'majke Tereze', (Politicians or 'Mother Teresas') Borba, December 10, 1992, p.2. 
214 Observer, December 20, 1992. 
215 Oral Questions. December 3,1992. Hansard, Vol.2IS. 
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diplomatic manoeuvres conducted in the margins of international 
conferences and elsewhere, Britain gradually succeeded in re-
establishing its own policy parameters. The arms embargo issue was 
relegated to the background, and the question of military intervention 
whittled down to the no-fly-zone issue. Even this decision was 
postponed, initially till the New Year, and then till the end of March 
1993, by which time much of Eastern Bosnia had fallen to the VRS 
forces. 
Britain argued the case against military intervention and for retaining 
the blanket arms embargo on several fronts, citing the threat to the 
safety of UN troops on the ground, and to the survival of the Geneva 
peace conference. While Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind expressed 
concern about a Serb retaliation against British troops, Douglas Hurd 
intimated that it might derail the peace conference. At the same time, a 
Downing St official contacted the foreign policy advisers of President 
Mitterand who supported enforcement of the NFZ, with the information 
that no combat flights had occurred for two months. David Owen, 
meanwhile, worked to persuade other European leaders not to 
jeopardise the UN operation for the sake of shooting down 'a few 
militarily insignificant' Serbian helicopters.216 Ironically, just days 
earlier, Owen had testified at the Foreign Affairs Committee that the 
Serbs were 'infringing [the no-fly zone] in significant numbers.'217 On the 
ground in Bosnia, the British UN commander, Colonel Bob Stewart, took 
the unusual step of publicly airing his concern about the NFZ 
216 Independent, December 18,1992. Owen met the Belgian Foreign Minister, Willy Claes, to 
warn him of the possible consequences to UN troops of enforcing the NFZ. ICFY: Record Qf 
Lord Owen's meeting with Be1aian foreieD minister, ref. CD92L09.PAR, December 9, 1992. He 
also met Spanish Premier Felipe Gonzales and Foreign Minister Javier Solana, to convey a 
similar message. ref: CD92K26.PAR. 
217 Owen further asserted that "it is a serious breach of the UN Secruity Council resolution ... and 
that the Security Council will have to ensure this is fulfilled." ForeilPl Affairs Committee, 
Minutes of Evidence, December 10,1992,168. 
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enforcement.218 In Geneva, British Ambassador Peter Hall, seconded to 
the peace conference from Belgrade, wrote a diary note in Borba, 
commenting that 'if a large number of people want war, it is hard to 
bring peace to the others.'219 From Kings College London, former 
military commander Julian Thompson put the case against military 
intervention, proposing 'safe havens' for the Bosnian Muslims.22o From 
London there were conflicting signals. It was leaked that Douglas Hurd 
would confirm an enforcement resolution at the CSCE meeting,221 
whereas the Ministry of Defence was said to be taking a less flexible line. 
In fact, mainstream thinking in both ministries was indistinguishable. 
The confusion simply helped to blur the contours of British policy at a 
crucial moment. 
According to Cabinet sources, the long-term strategy now emerging from 
British ministers was for a settlement to be reached based roughly on 
current Serb territorial gains, with the provision of a 'protected zone' for 
Bosnia's Muslims.222 Serbs and Croats would be allowed to annex those 
parts of Bosnia where they were in the majority, with the remainder 
forming a Muslim mini-state. This would imply recognition of a 'Greater 
Serbia.223 
218 The Times, December 17,1992, p.lO. 
219 Borba, December 12-13 1992, XII. 
220 Observer, December 20,1992, p.16. 
221 Guardian, December 15 & 16, 1992. Douglas Hurd stopped short of recommending the 
bombing of Serbian artillery, however, which was at that time proposed by France. In this, Hurd 
was supported by the US Defense Secretary and US Chief of Staff, Colin Powell. 
222 The Times, December 18,1992. 
221 'Just maybe we could live with a greater Serbia', MARR, Andrew. Independent, December 18, 
1992. The Sunday Times editorial put this in more graphic terms. "Yugoslavia today needs a new 
Lord Curzon with a ruler and red pen, ready to redraw the map and move the population 
accordingly. The only feasible answer is a sort of Bosnian Bophuthatswana based around 
Sarajevo and poised between the new, enlarged states of Serbia and Croatia." Sunday Times, 
December 20,1992, p.17. 
129 
On December 14, at a meeting of the Defence and Overseas Policy 
committee of the Cabinet, a gradual approach was decided on, with the 
purpose of delaying a resolution to enforce the NFZ. An initial report 
would be made to the UN Security Council on violations of the NFZ, to 
decide what constituted a violation, which could then be followed by 
another UN resolution aimed at warning off the Bosnian Serbs, rather 
than triggering the immediate downing of helicopters. 224 
France now retreated from its stand over pre-emptive strikes on Serbian 
artillery positions although it continued to support enforcement of the 
NFZ. A timely letter from Karadzic to the British Prime Minister, 
threatening a Serb attack on UN troops in the case that Serb aircraft 
were targeted, may have helped to modify the French position. A further 
letter from Karadzic, which he termed 'a letter of intent', condemned 
plans to enforce the NFZ, and threatened war crimes proceedings 
against several international figures, including Lawrence Eagleburger, 
James Baker, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Austrian Foreign Secretary 
Alois Mock. Interestingly, no British name was listed due, as Karadzic 
put it, to Britain's 'refined diplomacy'.225 NATO member states accepted 
the British proposal for a 'goodwill' breathing space before deciding on 
enforcing the NFZ.226 On December 30, Douglas Hurd summed up his 
position on Bosnia: 
We can guide and encourage, but we cannot dictate or guarantee 
peace in the Balkans ... The war in Bosnia is a civil war ... precision 
bombing of Serb targets .. .is unlikely to be effective against the Serbs 
224 The Times, December IS, 1992, p.ll. 
225 The Times, December 23 & 24,1992, p.l. The following week, Yugoslav Army chief of staff 
Zivota Panic stepped up the pressure, warning that military intervention would be resisted 'with 
all our means', threatening a third world war. New York Times, December 31, 1992. 
226 New York Times, 19 December 1992. The ambivalent positions of Russia and China were also 
cited as reasons for a pause, despite the fact that Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev had 
stated that Russia 'if necessary will take joint measures to punish' those violating the NFZ. 
Guardian, 24 December 1992, p. 7, and Independent, 31 December 1992. 
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unless backed by action on the ground .. .1 do not myself believe in half 
an arms embargo.227 
British diplomacy had again prevailed. 
Conclusion 
An examination of the international response to the main developments 
in Yugoslavia and its successor states during 1992 has ascertained the 
part played by Britain in the formulation of international policy, as the 
war moved from Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina. It concludes that 
British-inspired efforts to secure a solution based on a negotiated 
settlement, acceptable to all sides, continued to dominate international 
policy through 1992, and that Britain assumed a leading diplomatic 
role, whilst averting all initiatives directed towards the effective threat or 
use of force. Although Britain was by no means consistently isolated in 
its position, it was the only major western power which held an almost 
unwaveringly consistent policy. 
In the early months of 1992, there was a general consensus within the 
European Community and, initially, with the United States, on the main 
aspects of international policy. British politicians and diplomats played a 
leading role in refining the UN mandate in Croatia, promoting the 
cantonisation plan for Bosnia, and overseeing the transition of the arms 
embargo from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to its 
successor states, as well as blocking the extension of the UNPROFOR 
mandate to Bosnia, both as a preemptive measure before hostilities 
began, and in the early stages of the war, at a time when the JNA 
227 Douglas Hurd, Daily Telegraph, December 30, 1992. 
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offensive clearly violated Bosnia's national sovereignty as a UN member 
state. 
When the Vance Plan for UN troop deployment in Croatia - originating in 
Belgrade and assisted through the Security Council by Britain and 
France - was rejected in part by the Croatian government, Croatian 
President Franjo Tudjman was subsequently persuaded, mainly through 
the intervention of British diplomats and officials, to accept the Plan, 
without any guarantee that it would be fully implemented. In the event, 
key aspects of the Plan were violated by the Krajina Serbs, with tacit UN 
acquiescence, both by officials on the ground and in New York. There 
was no attempt to disarm Serbian paramilitaries, which rendered the 
UNPA zones unsafe for the return of non-Serbs displaced by the war, 
and generated further resentment and frustration, while the UN troops 
were denied the resources and mandate required to implement Security 
Council resolutions. 
The JNA, judging by its difficulties in sustaining the frontline in Croatia, 
especially in Western Slavonia, and the level of disillusion within its 
ranks, would not have been in a position to open a second front in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina without the introduction of the UNPROFOR mission 
to protect its territorial gains in Croatia. The readiness with which the 
UN Security Council accepted Belgrade's proposal for a UN force within 
the Serb-occupied enclaves, along with its appeasement of crimes 
against humanity, not least in Vukovar, would have encouraged Serbia's 
leaders in the next stage of their 'Greater Serbia' project - the 
establishment of a Serb republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina. With large 
areas of Bosnia already under Serb control, and the UN arms embargo 
extended to Yugoslavia's successor states, Bosnian Serb nationalists, 
backed by the JNA and the Belgrade regime, were favourably placed to 
dictate the future order of Bosnia, irrespective of its international 
recognition, following the referendum carried out in accordance with the 
Badinter Commission recommendations. The Security Council did act to 
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demand JNA withdrawal from Bosnia, but the resolution was tardy and 
without enforcement powers. The JNA withdrawal, therefore, was largely 
cosmetic, and carried out after much of the 'ethnic cleansing' had 
occurred. 
As demonstrated, Britain's policy was based on the decision to negotiate 
with, rather than confront, the Serbs at an early stage of the war and, 
while the introduction of economic sanctions over Serbia and 
Montenegro were supported by Britain, they were not firmly enforced, 
especially along the Danube where oil and other goods entered Serbia in 
abundance, and proved little more than a gesture, serving to allay public 
concern, while deferring talk of military intervention. Sanctions also 
helped to portray Serbia as a victim, a status which, in terms of their 
impact on the population was not wholly unmerited. Conversely, 
however, they created a sense of solidarity amongst Serbians, deflecting 
from Serbia's economic problems, and reinforcing Milosevic in power. 
France, as a result of President Mitterand's dramatic flight into besieged 
Sarajevo, temporarily seized the initiative from Britain, prompting a 
reappraisal of Lord Carrington's plan to cantonise Bosnia, and moves 
towards a wider-based conference. Britain, holding the EC presidency, 
responded to the challenge and called an international conference, 
which was co-hosted by the British Prime Minister and the UN 
Secretary-General, serving both to reassert British influence in the 
international arena and, once again, to deflect calls for military 
intervention. Meanwhile, Lord Carrington was succeeded by another 
former British foreign secretary, David Owen, as EC envoy to an 
enlarged conference, renamed the International Conference on Former 
Yugoslavia, and relocated to Geneva. The inclusion of the UN responded 
to French pressure for an enlarged Conference and assuaged the 
sensitivities of the UN Secretary-General who had previously been 
expected to implement policies instigated in London or Brussels. Cyrus 
Vance was, meanwhile, appointed as UN envoy which, due to his track 
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record in protecting the Serb-held enclaves in Croatia, rendered him 
eminently qualified from the perspective of Belgrade. 
The Foreign Office proposal for UN troops to be deployed as aid escorts 
was, in effect, applying a humanitarian policy to a political crisis. It 
temporarily assuaged some of the champions of military intervention, 
while demonstrating Britain's commitment on the ground. It also, 
however, inhibited alternative solutions to end the war. In addition, the 
despatch of lightly armed UN troops on a limited and ill-defmed mandate 
would have clarified to the Serbs the limits of international intervention. 
Equally, the Geneva Conference which was established within the 
London Conference, and mandated to formulate a peace plan acceptable 
to all sides, provided a pretext for deferring pressure exerted in varying 
degrees by the United States, France and other countries, for military 
intervention to bring the Serb offensive to a halt. In so doing, it also 
provided a 'breathing space' to the Bosnian Serb Army to reinforce its 
frontlines, and to secure further the crucial 'northern corridor' linking 
Serb-held territory in Croatia with Serbia. The war crimes commission, 
proposed by the United States and Germany, was one of the few London 
Conference recommendations to bear fruit in the longer term. Yet Britain 
was later singled out as having thwarted its development at all stages, 
including the provision of funding, the collection and handing over of 
evidence, the chairing, and even its naming. 
Britain's response to the mounting refugee situation in 1992 was to 
support 'safe areas', recommending that all displaced people should 
remain as close to their homes as possible. This policy, although totally 
discredited by 1995, at the time served the dual purpose of reducing 
both the costs involved in hosting large numbers of refugees and the 
impact of a potential Bosnian lobby in Western Europe. As a further 
precaution, the British government, already having accepted a 
proportionally lower number of refugees vis-a.-vis most other European 
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countries, tightened its immigration laws, and introduced a visa 
requirement for Bosnian refugees. 
British government decisions on the Balkans, including the deployment 
of UK troops in a war zone, were reached in the absence of prior 
parliamentary debate, and often without the production of sufficient, or 
sufficiently accurate, information on which Members could base their 
own views. There was, on the other hand, a significant lobby within 
Parliament, in seniority if not in size, in support of the Serbian position, 
often dependent on historical analogy, which later evidence suggests had 
a bearing on parliamentary opinion. And, while British parliamentary 
procedure traditionally tended to confme foreign policy matters to 
ministerial level, it may be reasonable to conclude that the degree of 
public concern, and its dissatisfaction with the government's Balkans 
policy, together with the wider implications of the conflict itself, 
warranted more frank and open debate. 
The diplomatic manipulation on the part of British players towards the 
end of 1992 over the no-fly-zone issue was both a reflection of earlier 
diplomatic manoeuvring surrounding the Vance Plan, UN troop 
deployment, the London Conference and other policies, and an 
indication of the manner in which policy was to be conducted thereafter. 
In 1992, the policies formulated the previous year were confirmed. The 
Belgrade regime and Serb leaders in Bosnia and Croatia were further 
appeased, and military intervention, the threat which both Serbian 
President Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb leaders most feared, was 
deferred indefinitely. The following year would see the Serbian leader's 
rehabilitation as a key player in international policy in the area, and the 
gradual acceptance of the 'civil war' theory, implying an equiValence of 
guilt. 
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CHAPTER 3 
1993: DIPLOMACY BY CARTOGRAPHY 
Introduction 
On January 2, Cyrus Vance and David Owen, co-chairs of the 
International Conference for Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), introduced what 
became known as the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) which, while 
accepting in principle the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina, divided the 
state into ten provinces. This chapter assesses the VOPP and its 
consequences on the ground, and the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan which 
succeeded it, and examines the British role in the evolution of 
international policy, including the 'safe areas' concept, the presentation 
of policy in parliament and through the media, and Britain's position 
vis-a.-vis those held by other states and institutions. 
It concludes that the British government and its representatives 
continued to playa major role in international policy in former 
Yugoslavia, in deflecting from, or obstructing, other options which may 
have led to an earlier resolution of the conflict, often misleading 
parliament and the public on key developments related to the war and 
other perspectives. 
Sources referred to include Hansard, testimony at the International 
Tribunal at the Hague (ICTY), the UN Srebrenica Report, ICFY 
COREPERS, personal memoirs and biographies, academic and other 
relevant publications, and local and international media reports. 
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At the beginning of 1993, Britain was in a particularly vulnerable 
position, both regarding its policy in former Yugoslavia, and internally. 
Britain's diplomatic success in managing to secure a postponement in 
the no-fly-zone (NFZ) enforcement over Bosnia-Herzegovina now 
appeared a Pyrrhic victory, as the UNPROFOR mission, and Europe's 
Balkans policy as a whole, came under increasing criticism, to the point 
of threatening Britain's position as a permanent member of the Security 
Council, a privilege acquired in the altogether different post-World War 
climate. l Additionally, the US Democrat election victory meant the 
arrival at the White House of a president who had not only advocated a 
tougher line against Serb aggression when in opposition, but whose 
election campaign had been actively thwarted by the British 
Conservative party, jeopardising Britain's so-called 'special relationship' 
with America.2 The new Clinton Administration identified Bosnia-
Herzegovina as its main foreign policy concern, 3 while expressing 
reservations concerning the Vance-Owen Plan. In France, too, senior 
politicians, military heads and human rights' groups were pressing for a 
more robust approach to end the Bosnian war.4 French UN troops, 
unlike the British, were stationed on the front line in Sarajevo and thus 
more vulnerable to attack and humiliation.s In his New Year message, 
IOn assuming office, Secretary of State Warren Christopher served notice that the UN Security 
Council should be brought "into tune with 1993 realities rather than with 1946 realities", and 
intimated support for German and Japanese membership of the Council. Independent. January 28, 
1993, p.S, and Sunday Times. January 31, 1993, p.11. 
2 Conservative officials had been despatched to the US during the election campaign to advise the 
Bush administration on the tactics that had helped Major win the 1992 election in Britain. Sunday 
Times, Ibid. 
3 Guardian, January 23, 1993, p.13. 
4 French foreign minister Roland Dumas declared that France was prepared to act alone if necessary 
to liberate Bosnian prison camps by force. Independent, January 11, 1993, p.l. French Chief of 
Staff Jacques Lanxade declared that the choice lay between the use of force or withdrawal: 'France, 
un soupcon de serbophilie', Liberation. March 12, 1993. Medicins du Monde, meanwhile, 
commissioned a campaign comparing Milosevic to Hitler. European, January 21-24, 1993. 
5 On January 8, Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister Hakija Turajlic was assassinated by Serb forces 
while under French UN escort, prompting sharp reaction across the French political spectrum. The 
assassination occurred on the airport road, officiatly considered by the UN to be demilitarised and 
under its control. The Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, Bernard Kouchner called for military 
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President Mitterand stated that France would be willing to take part in 
military operations in Bosnia if other Europeans and America also 
participated under the UN fiag. 6 Deputy Chief of Staff of the French Air 
Force, General Etienne Copel, asserted that 
In a single day one air division, using combat and transport 
helicopters, could open up a camp, free the prisoners, and make itself 
scarce ... to assist the defence forces in those areas under pressure from 
the Serbian militia ... the best step would be to isolate the assailants 
from their bases in Serbia ... cutting off their access routes ... A11 that we 
require are professional troops of qUality. Every major European army 
possesses them, in particular the British and French.7 
Positions diverging from that of Britain were also evident elsewhere in 
Europe, as well as in most Islamic and non-aligned countries. 8 
On the domestic front, the ERM debacle the previous Autumn, the 
recession and the parlous state of the British economy as a whole9 may 
have been factors reinforcing the resolve of ministers in their endeavours 
to establish a post Cold War European order best serving Britain's 
perceived interests - not least in stemming the European Community 
drive towards political union and a viable common foreign and security 
policy - whilst forming or reinforcing alliances which would, directly or 
indirectly, assist in that objective. In this, both Serbia and Russia had a 
role. In early 1993, Serbian President Milosevic became partially 
action in the case offailure of the Geneva talks, as did Socialist party leader Laurent Fabius, and 
Gaullist opposition leaders Jacques Chirac and Edouard Balladur. The Times. January II, 1993, p.8. 
6 Independent, January 4, 1993, p.6. 
7 European, January 7-10, 1993, p.9. 
8 EC Foreign Affairs Commissioner Hans Van den Brock, for instance, advocated the use of troops 
to combat Serb aggression. a view summarily dismissed by the Foreign Secretary: 'Mr van den 
Broek has held this position in public for a long time now ... and it is not a position we agreed with ... ' 
Douglas Hurd, Foreian Affairs Committee, Hansard, January 28, 1993. No.276. 
9 A confidential study by the Department of Trade and Industry concluded that, contrary to 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont's attacks on the 'self-denigrating myth' of 
manufacturing decline, British industry was fundamentally weak, and had little prospect of catching 
up with international competition for decades. Productivity levels in British manufacturing were still 
at least 25% below those of France and Germany. Sunday Times, March 14, 1993, p.l. 
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rehabilitated and regarded as an essential partner in the international 
peace process, his part in instigating the regional turmoil now largely 
overlooked. 10 At the same time, Russia was gradually drawn into the 
decision-making process. 
In early 1993, British ministers and diplomats made a number of moves 
to secure the support of the European Community, the US 
administration and the British establishment in its Bosnia policy. On 
January 22, John Major chaired a cabinet committee meeting, also 
attended by Lord Owen, where Britain's policy in ruling out combat 
action was further endorsed. 11 It was also agreed that the Security 
Council should not be asked to authorize enforcement of the NFZ over 
Bosnia-Herzegovina without the recommendation of the ICFY co-chairs. 
Owen, meanwhile, approached a number of European leaders including, 
on the eve of the Danish EC Presidency, Danish Foreign Minister Uffe-
Ellemen Jensen to gain support for delaying enforcement of the NFZ.12 
During the same week, John Major wrote to Presidents Clinton and 
Mitterand to urge them against supporting military intervention in 
Bosnia,13 following indications that the US, viewing the peace plan 
10 UN mediator Cyrus Vance gave public credit to Milosevic, stating he had 'helped very 
considerably ... to bring a tumaround ... He contributed much', prompting some US commentators to 
comment that Vance had crossed the line dividing negotiation from appeasement. Guardian, January 
14, 1993. There were also indications of a tacit agreement by Vance and Owen that the names of 
Milosevic and his allies would be dropped from the US government list of alleged war criminals. 
European, January 14-17, 1993, p.t. 
\I Guardian, January 23, 1993, p13. There was, however, some disagreement amongst senior 
government ministers at the meeting, Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind favouring an early 
withdrawal of British forces in Bosnia. Guardian, January 2S, 1993, p.g. Rifkind's position may 
also have been conditioned by the Options for Change defence programme which envisaged a cut in 
infantry battalions from 55 to 38 by 1995. The Times, January 28, 1993, p.l. 
12 'I don't sense that the existing draft Security Council Resolution adds anything. The American 
message that they are prepared to use force is still resounding around Belgrade ... Certainly I believe 
the Secretary General's request to the Security Council for a pause makes the utmost sense and you 
would be right to assume that Vance and my hands lie behind this'. David Owen. Letter to Danish 
Foreian Minister EUemen-Jensen. December 31, 1992. COREU [communication through 
confidential EC telex network] Ref: CD92L31.PAR. 
13 Sunday Times, January 31, 1993, p.l. It was confumed by Douglas Hurd that the Prime Minister, 
the Foreign Office and the British embassy in Washington had all been mobilised to convince the 
Clinton Administration that intervention would do more harm than good. A Foreign Office source 
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advanced by Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance as deeply flawed, was poised 
to order military air strikes and exempt the Bosnian government forces 
from the arms embargo. 
At a speech at the Royal Institute of International Mfairs (RIIA) at 
Chatham House on January 27, the Foreign Secretary defended Britain's 
role on the world stage, calling for a major international effort to avert 
the 'continuing slide into disorder'.14 At the same time, he defended the 
government's refusal to intervene directly to stop the Bosnian war 
declaring that, in the absence of a durable ceasefire, Britain would resist 
UN demands for British troops already deployed to assume the wider 
role of separating the parties to the war. Hurd also opined that 'to 
impose and guarantee order in the former Yugoslavia would take huge 
forces and huge risks over an indefmite period - which no democracy 
could justify to its people'. 15 This, as well as contributing to an 
unsubstantiated Serb myth, also revealed a somewhat curious 
understanding of the concept of democracy I 16 Describing the Bosnian 
war as just one of many dramas and tragedies which, while not directly 
affecting Britain, contained the seeds of wider conflict, and emphasized 
that there was nothing new in mass rape, the shooting of civilians and 
ethnic cleansing, the difference being that the media now brought those 
atrocities into sitting rooms around the world. 17 The Foreign Secretary 
omitted to mention however that, unlike the other wars cited, the 
commented that By selective bombing you can destroy a bridge or an airport but you cannot 
persuade the Serbs by such means to alter their policies ... you do not improve the situation by 
lifting the arms embargo for Bosnians'. Guardian, January 29, 1993, p.1 O. 
14 Independent, January 28, 1993, p.l. 
IS Ibid. 
16 National opinion polls challenged this view. See footnote 73. 
17 'In Georgia, in Azerbaijan, in Tajikstan, there is fighting of a greater savagery and intensity than 
anything happening in Bosnia. The public are barely aware of those conflicts, because the cameras 
do not often visit them· but they exist. .. ' Douglas Hurd, International PeacekeCl)ini. Hansard. 
February 23,1993, Vol. 2 19, c.774. See also The Times, January 28,1993, p.l & 8. 
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international community had already intervened in Bosnia, not least in 
the introduction of a blanket arms embargo. 
At the Foreign Mfairs Select Committee on January 28, the Foreign 
Secretary confirmed that British troops would not be used in combat 
missions in the Balkans. IS Addressing the Royal United Services 
Institute, Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind also warned against 
military involvement in Bosnia,19 as did Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg: 
We are almost all agreed that the conflict in Bosnia bears all the 
hallmarks of a civil war ... there is general acceptance, too, that it is 
impossible to enforce by external force, a settlement of a civil war ... 20 
The 'civil war' argument, increasingly used to justify British policy in 
Bosnia, implied less international responsibility to intervene, other than 
in a humanitarian context.21 The Foreign Secretary was equally 
confident of his ability to defend Britain's perceived interests within the 
European Community: 
I must say that I am strongly in favour of such co-operation as it is 
at present practiced and as it is laid down for the future in the treaty. 
I and others have been trying to work the system for three years and 
I believe that I have some knowledge of both its strengths and its 
limitations ... 
I am quite clear in my own mind that this system of co-operation, 
although not magic, adds to the effectiveness of British foreign policy 
without reducing our ability to protect our own British interests."22 
18 Independent, January 29, 1993. 
19 Guardian, January 21,1993. 
20 Douglas Hogg, International Peacekeepin~, op.cit c.8SS. 
21 According to one expert on international law, the request by the Bosnian government, regarded by 
the UN as the only legitimate representative of Bosnia, for international armed action to stop the 
slaughter of civilians may well have been sufficient justification for intervention'. WELLER, Mark. 
Security Council stumbles over 'safe havens'. The Times, April 21, 1993, p.9. See also HAMPSON, 
Francoise. 'Law and War', in DANCHEV, Alex and HALVERSON, Thomas [ed.] International 
Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict. Macmillan, 1996, pp.148-17S. 
22 Douglas Hurd, European Communities (Amendment) Bill, March 30, 1993, Hansard, Vo1.222, 
c.169-170. 
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EC Council of Ministers' meetings were increasingly less viewed as a 
means of shaping Balkans' policy, having been superceded by the 
Geneva Conference. In a letter to the Danish foreign minister, Owen 
revealed his close cooperation with Croatian Defence Minister Gojko 
Susak in drawing up the peace plan, which adopted a number of 
Susak's proposals, as well as his reliance on Milosevic as a peace broker . 
... essentially the matter will be resolved by Milosevic. It is worth 
remembering that he negotiated the Croatian/Serbian deal with 
Cyrus Vance on January 2, 1992. 23 
There was no reference to consultation with the Bosnian government. 
The Vance-Owen Peace Plan 
The International Conference for Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), also known 
as the Geneva Conference, which drew up the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, 
was established by the London Conference in August 1992. From the 
outset David Owen, a British appointee and former British foreign 
secretary, assumed the more 'hands on' role in the Vance-Owen 
partnership, remaining co-chair of the ICFY till June 1995.24 Before his 
appointment, Owen had advocated strategic air strikes against Serb 
positions but his view soon came to reflect that of the British 
government, with the difference that he did not rule out air power to 
23 'the Croatian deal. .. is essentially twofold; they will accept putting their potential Posavina 
province up in the north around Bosanski Brod in with Banja Luka province. This would give one 
northern province stretching from Banja Luka to Bijeljina and guarantee a corridor, which is the 
emotive question for the Bosnian Serbs, into Serbia .. .1 went over this potential deal, which had only 
been proposed to me the night before in Zagreb by Susak, in great detail with Milosevic during our 
two hour meeting. He didn't say yes but he didn't say no .. .' Letter from tord Owen to Danish 
ForeiiD Minister. December 31, 1992, op.cit. 
24 Vance missed several meetings and resigned in April 1993. The Times, April 2, 1993, p.17. 
See also SIMMS, op.cit. Chapter 4, for Owen's role in the negotiating process. 
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enforce his plan.25 In drawing up the VOPP, European leaders tended to 
be advised by Owen rather than consulted, often on a bilateral basis. 26 
The Vance-Owen Peace Plan, first presented to the Bosnian government 
and to Serb and Croat leaders on January 2, proposed the division of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten autonomous provinces within a 
decentralised state, with most power devolved to the provinces, and 
progressive demilitarisation under UN supervision.27 An intricate set of 
proposals for a bicameral parliament and national executive was drawn 
up, along with detailed work on the territorial divisions. The main 
drawback in implementation terms, however, was that despite the 
requirement for Serb forces to withdraw from around 27% of conquered 
territory, there was no enforcement provision included in the Plan. In 
fact, apart from the number of provinces proposed, and the considerably 
larger proportion of territory awarded to the Croat side, there was little 
substantive difference from the Cutileiro Plan. 28 The Croats, not 
surprisingly, accepted the Plan promptly, and in its entirety. Although 
representing just 17% of the population, they had under the VOPP been 
awarded approximately 27% of Bosnia-Herzegovinian territory. The 
divisive nature of the VOPP, especially vis-a-vis Croat/Bosniac relations, 
whereby towns like Travnik with a Bosniac majority were allocated to 
Croat administration, sowed the seeds for conflict in Central Bosnia. 29 
25 As Owen observed, however, 'We have had to face the situation that if there is no international 
will to take up arms, it reduces our diplomatic room for maneuver'. David Owen, Foreign Affairs. 
Spring 1993, pp.5-6. 
26 Owen missed the EC Council of Ministers' meetings in October and February. OWEN. op.cit. 
pp.S8 & 106. 
27 See map 2, p.351. 
28 David Owen argued strenuously that the VOPP was an improvement on the Cutileiro Plan, in that 
the provinces were not structured primarily on an ethnic basis. Elsewhere, Owen contradicted 
himself however. 'The rural Bosnian Serbs sat on over 60% of the country before the war, and we 
are offering them three provinces covering 43%.' Interview with David Owen, Foreign Affairs. 
op.cit. p.3. 
29 Hostilities had already flared up between these two groups in Prozor the previous Autumn, but 
elsewhere were largely contained before 1993. 
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The Bosnian government later signed up to the VOPP under acute 
international pressure, while Serb leaders withheld agreement, other 
than in principle, requiring a surrender of power over much of the Drina 
valley, allocated to the Bosnian government under the VOP? The 
following month, VRS forces launched a major offensive in an attempt to 
gain overall control of the Drina valley, both for strategic reasons and to 
improve the Serb bargaining position at the negotiating table. 
While the European Community, for the most part, initially defended the 
VOPP, in America it was widely criticised as unworkable, and appeasing 
'ethnic cleansing'. When Bill Clinton took over the US presidency he 
pledged to take a more interventionist role than his predecessor. To this 
end, a full review of the situation was instigated by the State 
Department, including stringent sanctions' monitoring. The list of 
options considered included exempting the Bosnian Government from 
the UN arms embargo, and using strategic air power against Serb 
positions.30 US Secretary of State Warren Christopher presented a six-
point plan on February 10, 1993, which confirmed active US 
participation in the ICFY process. The crucial point relating to 
enforcement, however, was somewhat ambiguously worded: 
The United States [is] prepared to do its share to help implement 
and enforce an agreement that is acceptable to all parties. If there 
is a viable agreement containing enforcement provisions, the 
United States would be prepared to join with the United Nations, 
NATO, and others in implementing and enforcing it, including 
possible US military participation.31 
The operative word was 'viable'. The US Administration was aware of the 
inherent contradictions in the VOPP as, indeed, were President 
Milosevic, former FRY President Dobrica Cosic, and others in Belgrade 
who, in strongly urging Bosnian Serb leaders to sign, did so in the firm 
30 New York Times, January 28,1993, A17. 
31 Statement by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, February 10, 1993. 
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belief that the VOPP would not (and could not) be implemented on the 
ground.32 Milosevic was also convinced that the VOPP would eventually 
provide a channel for achieving his main war aim, a Serb state within 
Bosnia, 33 confident that UN troops were unlikely to be deployed in a 
combat role against the Serbs, and that the blanket arms embargo 
would remain in place, hindering the formation of a viable Bosnian 
army. The Serbian president's confidence derived not least from his 
experience of international negotiations over the previous two years 
where British and, to some extent French, influence had prevailed, with 
America remaining on the sidelines. Milosevic's position was also 
buttressed by public acknowledgement on the part of Owen, Hurd, 
Vance and others of his 'peace-brokering' role in the war. 34 
As the new US president vacillated in face of his main European ally's 
intransigence British players, consistent with earlier practice, declared 
that, while Britain fully endorsed the VOPP, it rejected the threat or use 
of military force to implement it.35 Also in contrast to other countries, 
Britain expressed reluctance to commit further troops to Bosnia until 
the ceasefire was seen to be holding,36 a 'playing-for-time' approach 
which had much in common with that of Lord Carrington in Croatia in 
late 1991, after the Vance Plan was introduced, when withholding 
deployment of a UN force until a durable ceasefrre had been secured had 
32 SILBERILITTLE. op.cit. p.309-1 0 
33 Ibid. p.309. 
34 "I think that Milosevic is the most important figure in the whole region .. .I sense a realistic 
politician who will distance himself from [Seselj and Arkan] ... He has been helpful in the Geneva 
process. Now we must persuade him to playa role in forcing the Bosnian Serbs to accept the place 
plan. The choice is Milosevic's; on what he decides hangs the fate of the Balkans". OWEN, David. 
Foreign Affairs, op.cit, p.9. See also Douglas Hurd, Hansard. Ra.miL April 29, 1993, Hansard. 
Vol.223, c.lln, and Cyrus Vance, Guardian, January 14, 1993. 
3SSee Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd in The Times, April 20, 1993, p.8, Defence Secretary 
Malcolm Rifkind and Col. Michael Dewar, Deputy Director of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies in Guardian. April IS, 1993, p.8, and Cedric Thornberry, UN Head of Civil 
Affairs. Diplomacy & Deceit. Bloody Bosnia Week, Channel 4, August 1, 1993. 
36 Sunday Times. April 11, 1993, p.20. 
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facilitated ongoing Serb offensives in Eastern Slavonia and Dubrovnik, 
conducted in flagrant disregard of the proposed peace plan. In Bosnia in 
1993, the tactic of waiting for a lasting cease fire before despatching 
further UN troops, in the absence of significant international pressure 
ensured indefmite delay, and facilitated further territorial conquest. 
The British government's flaccid approach to the implementation of the 
VOPP was evident at the Foreign Mfairs Select Committee when Douglas 
Hurd, asked whether the Vance-Owen Plan meant 'a new major role for 
new UN involvement in ... Bosnia',37 replied: 
The first aim must be the fighting should stop on the basis of 
agreement on the plan, or something like that [sic] ... There would need 
to be a UN involvement not as a protectorate but on the basis of 
helping those concerned in Bosnia to implement the plan on which 
they had agreed, and the nature of that involvement is far from clear ... 
What we are looking for is an agreement between people who are weary 
of the fighting and do not see a prospect for themselves and their 
future by continuing to fight and looking for an agreement which will 
enable them to stop fighting without sacrificing something which they 
agree to be essential ... that agreement will need to be based on people's 
perception of self-interest. It will need UN help but it will not need a UN 
protectorate because if it required that, it would not be based on 
agreement but on force, and that is not I believe realistic ... 38 
The statement was somewhat disingenuous. The Foreign Secretary 
would have been aware that agreement by the sides to implement the 
plan "without sacrificing something which they agree to be essential" 
was, in the circumstances, unachievable. The overtly casual approach 
adopted by Douglas Hurd at this juncture of the negotiations, and the 
further clarification that force would not be used, was tantamount to an 
invitation to the Serbs to pursue their objectives till they were, as Hurd 
put it, "weary of the fighting". The Serb leaders' main concern, the threat 
37 Ted Rowlands, ForeiiD Affairs Committee. January 28, 1993, 272. 
38 Douglas Hurd, Ibid. 272-4. 
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of international intervention,39 had been allayed by the Foreign 
Secretary. Interestingly, Hurd made no reference to the 70,000 troops 
estimated by NATO as necessary for implementation of the VOPP. 
Hurd's remarks were also significant in light of the perceptions and 
declared objectives of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic: 
I wish to tell our forces not to worry, not to look at the maps ... Our 
forces must hold their positions ... We are a constitutional and sovereign 
nation and we want ethnic separation. This could, if necessary, be in a 
number of provinces as an interim phase. However ... there must exist, 
and does exist, Republika Srpska, regardless of the number of 
provinces it constitutes. We will not accept anything that will prevent 
us from achieving our goals, directly or indirectly ... 40 
Karadzic viewed the Vance-Owen Plan as merely a phase in the broader 
process of establishing a Serb state within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Indeed, 
even after signing the VOPP on May 2, Karadzic made it clear that the 
Serb goal of a separate republic had merely been postponed. 41 Also 
significant from the Serb viewpoint was the fact that the VOPP failed 
significantly to reflect one of the main principles of the London 
Conference, namely, 'the non recognition of all advantages gained by 
force or fait accompli'.42 
America, as the only remaining superpower, was ostensibly the key 
international player. Yet, faced with the declared position of a major 
NATO ally, Britain, that British combat troops would not be deployed in 
Bosnia in any circumstances, the US administration was left with few 
options, all of them unpalatable. It could acquiesce in the VOPP, in the 
39 Karadzic said he could not accept the plan 'because I knew that the international community 
needed only 10,000 troops in Zvomik and the Posavina corridor to neutralize the Serbs.' 
SILBER/LITILE, op.cit. pJ09-10. 
40 Radovan Karadzic, Be/grade Radio, January 12, 1993. [Author's translation] 
41 Guardian, Comment, May 3,1993. 
42 The London Conference, Statement on Principles, (ii). 
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knowledge that (a) it was inequitable, and (b) any troops deployed to 
Bosnia in the non-combat role insisted on by Britain would constitute 
potential hostages, or it could activate its lift-and-strike policy without 
the consent of at least one major NATO ally whose troops, acting under a 
UN mandate, would be in the flring line. Such action could provoke the 
withdrawal of most UN troops from Bosnia (already threatened by 
Britain and France), leaving America shouldering the main responsibility 
for ending the war, and the obligation of assisting NATO member states 
who had deployed troops to Bosnia without a clear exit strategy, to 
withdraw in safety. It could also damage NATO irreparably. The Clinton 
Administration had not, contrary to claims by David Owen and others, 
adopted a supine position with regard to the Balkans.43 It had inherited 
a situation with little room for manoeuvre, which it attempted to address 
in a number of ways. In February, Clinton despatched a 26-member 
team of experts to Bosnia, including state department and Pentagon 
offIcials, USAID offIcials, and doctors from the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention in Atlanta. The executive summary of their 
report prepared in March, stated that 
Even the best humanitarian program will be limited as long as more 
direct or forceful means are not applied to end the conflict itself or, at 
least, to shift its focus away from the civilian population.44 
The team concluded that the main threat to Bosnian civilians was not 
starvation but attacks by VRS forces, and that deliveries of food and 
supplies were doing little to address the real cause of suffering. The 
authors urged Washington seriously to consider military intervention.45 
On April 17-18, US leaders met to review the options. Lifting the arms 
embargo, with the backing of air strikes to preempt a major Serb 
43 Owen claimed that the Clinton administration had completely reversed its predecessor's policy on 
the Balkans, alleging this was partly due to the 'very emotive position' adopted on the issue by New 
York Times. editors, 'on the basis of so little factual knowledge'. Foreign Affairs, op.cit. pJ. 
For other critics of the US position, both military and academic, see SIMMS, op.cit. pp.238·240. 
44 Quoted in The Times, April 12, 1993, p.9. 
45 The Times, Ibid. 
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offensive, was the option most favoured by Vice President Al Gore, 
Security Adviser Tony Lake, Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright, 
senators of both parties, and Balkans experts within the State 
Department who, regarding western policy in Bosnia as a failure, 
pressed Christopher to announce strong military action to counter 
genocide. 46 Also, a multi-national team headed by Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe General John Shalikashvili, after a year 
collecting intelligence and drawing up plans for intervention, concluded 
that an outright invasion and occupation of Bosnia could be achieved in 
'a matter of days', while in a primarily airborne operation, 'the fighting 
would be over in less time than [the ground campaign] in Desert Storm', 
with few casualties.47 The Pentagon, however, sti11led by General Colin 
Powell and entrenched in the Vietnam syndrome, continued to be the 
main forum in the United States resistant to military action in Bosnia. 
On May 1, the US President publicly endorsed the lift-and-strike 
policy.48 The following day, Serb leader Radovan Karadzic signed the 
VOPP in Athens, although deferring the final decision to the self-styled 
Bosnian Serb Assembly in Pale. Owen interpreted Karadzic's apparent 
submission as the outcome of a combination of months of peace-
brokering on the part of the JCFY co-chairs and pressure from Milosevic. 
A more probable reason for the Bosnian Serb leader's volte face, 
however, was the imminent threat of NATO air strikes. According to the 
assessment of Serbian General Zivota Panic, Serbia at that time could 
withstand US air strikes for two days at the most, after which its anti-
aircraft defences would collapse. 49 
46 DREW, Elizabeth. On the Edge. The Clinton Presidency. Touchstone, 1995, p.152. See Samantha 
Power for a detailed account of opposition to international policy on Bosnia amongst US State 
Department officials. POWER. op.cit. p.264-9. 
47 Newsweek. May 10, 1993, p.26. The Pentagon had prepared an armada of over 250 fighters and 
bombers to move into the area in preparation for air strikes. Sunday Times, May 2, 1993, p.l. 
48 DREW. op.cit. p.155. 
49 European, May 6-9, 1993. 
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The following day, Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited EC 
capitals and Russia to solicit support for the lift-and-strike policy. As he 
arrived in London, newspaper headlines announced that Britain would 
veto through the UN Security Council any US plan to arm Bosnia's 
Muslims.so Meanwhile, Owen appealed to the West to withhold threats of 
air strikesSl and, just hours before Warren Christopher was due to meet 
the British Prime Minister, announced he had secured Bosnian Serb 
backing for the peace plan. Christopher's mission to Europe had been 
virtually aborted at the outset. According to one British diplomat, "there 
was nothing Christopher could have done to get a different outcome."S2 
Britain found an unexpected ally in the US Ambassador to Britain, 
Raymond Seitz. Accompanying Christopher on his trip to Chevening to 
meet the British Prime Minister and the Foreign and Defence 
Secretaries, Seitz dismissed the US proposal as 'a cockamamie 
idea .. .largely ... designed to satisfy the cantankerous Congress'.S3 That 
this view was not substantiated in the intensive high-level debate within 
the Clinton Administration prior to Christopher's trip was beside the 
point. In his memoirs, Seitz notes that he himself had suggested to John 
Major to inform Christopher that the British Cabinet would not accept 
the proposal, reflecting somewhat disingenuously that "[alt a time of 
almost manic killing on European territory, the British and Americans 
seemed unable to fmd common ground"\S4 Immediately after 
Christopher's return to Washington, the Administration considered 
putting the proposal to the Security Council, but was deterred by the 
so 'Britain vetoes US plan to arm Muslims', Sunday Times, May 2,1993, p.l. 
SI 'Now is the time to talk of peace not war'. Lord Owen, quoted in Independent, May 3, 1993, p.l. 
52 DREW, op.cit. p.lSS. 
53 SEITZ, Raymond. Over Here. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998, p.328. According to one US 
historian, Seitz was not an admirer of the new US administration. See HALBERSTAM, David. War 
in a Time of Peace. Scribner, 200 1, p.227. 
54 SEITZ, Ibid. p.330. 
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threat of a British veto. 55 The Secretary of State was later reported to 
have made little effort to sell the policy in Europe. But, as one official 
who travelled with Christopher remarked, 'it was in the interest of the 
British and the French to tell the press ... that Christopher hadn't really 
tried to sell [the policy]'.56 
The British and French response to the US lift-and-strike proposals had 
a major impact on America's Bosnia policy. 57 Unilateral US intervention 
would risk an irreparable split in the NATO Alliance, and force America 
into assuming the leading role, with concomitant responsibilities. 
Christopher now sought to rein in US policy, even to the point of 
adopting some of the terminology of former detractors. On May 18, 
testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Secretary of 
State pointed to 'atrocities on all sides', even suggesting that the 
Bosnian Muslims had committed genocide. 58 
The US lift-and-strike policy had foundered along with the Vance-Owen 
Peace Plan. However, whilst the US threat of force prompted the Serb 
leader to sign the peace plan, the plan itself was instrumental, at least in 
part, in the sharp escalation of hostilities in eastern and central Bosnia. 
Britain's role in these developments is analysed in the following two 
sections. 
The Serb Offensive on the Drina, Spring 1993 
55 MAJOR, op.cit. p.374. 
56 DREW, op.cit. p.156. 
57 HALBERSTAM, op.cit. p.229. Germany and the Netherlands were more supportive of US policy, 
Germany favouring exempting the Bosnian government from the arms embargo, and Holland the 
adoption of strategic air strikes against the Serbs. 
58 Hearina of the House Foreian Affairs Committee, Federal News Service, May 18,1993, quoted in 
POWER, op.cit. p.308. See also WOODWARD, op.cit. pJ06-7. 
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The Drina Valley in Eastern Bosnia was of vital strategic importance to 
both the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia itself. Full control was essential to 
facilitate Serb access to the Adriatic sea, and to provide a buffer zone for 
Serbia. Much of the area was captured by Serb forces in the spring and 
early summer of 1992. From some 200,000 non-Serbs in 1991, there 
remained a year later no more than 120,000, almost all of them herded 
into five enclaves, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Zepa, Konjevic Polje and Cerska. 
From the outset, access was a major problem. Only one aid convoy had 
reached Gorazde and Srebrenica between April and December 1992. 
Reports mtered through of large numbers dying of starvation or disease, 
of refugees expelled from surrounding areas being forced to sleep outside 
in sub-zero temperatures, and children undergoing amputations 
resulting from shrapnel wounds, without anaesthetic. 59 Britain, as a 
main troop contributor, had an influential role in organising aid delivery 
in Bosnia. Ministry of Defence official Col. Austin Thorp clarified the 
strategy to the Foreign Affairs Committee: 
Because of the UNHCR-Ied operation, it became apparent very early on 
in the experience of Bosnia that proceeding by consent was much 
easier if you did not have to cross the front lines where consent tended 
to break down because the perception of the parties was that one was 
delivering sustenance to their enemies. That led the UNHCR to develop 
a concept whereby they now deliver aid to Central Bosnia from Split, to 
Eastern Bosnia from Belgrade .... thereby in most instances avoiding 
crossing front lines.60 
Since, as the MoD official confirmed, aid to the Bosniac-inhabited 
enclaves in eastern Bosnia was delivered from Belgrade, and could only 
proceed by consent, it followed, therefore, that the deliveries were totally 
under Serb control. 
'9 Simon Mardel, a World Health Organisation doctor, travelling to Srebrenica as part of UN 
General Morillon's team, reported at least 2,000 sick and wounded, dying at the rate of 20-30 daily, 
and hundreds suffering from pneumonia and malnutrition. HALBERSTAM, op.cit. p.202. 
60 Col. Austin Thorp. Directorate of Military Operations, Ministry of Defence. Foreian Affairs 
Commjttee, Hansard, March II, 1993, 517. For convoy routes, see map 6, p.353. 
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The Assistant Under Secretary of State (Commitments) Bill Reeves 
clarified the position further: 
[T]he mandate and the Ministerial decision to commit troops were both 
based on the intention to deliver aid by negotiation of safe passage; 
there was to be no fighting of the aid through. I do not believe 
Ministers would wish to cross this bridge even if it were desirable. I do 
not think it is desirable or necessary anyway, because in general aid 
delivery has succeeded very well ... the rules of engagement have been 
more than adequate to allow our soldiers to defend themselves if they 
are attacked ... 61 
The bankruptcy of a strategy which relied on the mutual consent of 
unequal parties had been unwittingly exposed by the MOD officials. 
Moreover, the Foreign Affairs Committee had been misinformed. 
In early December 1992, one convoy managed to reach Srebrenica, but 
all the medical supplies had been removed by the Serb militia at 
checkpoints. There were no further deliveries and, in February 1993, the 
Drina valley came once more under heavy Serb bombardment. 
Weeks later in the House of Commons, the Foreign Secretary spoke with 
confidence of the aid delivery programme: 
Our troops on the ground ... have done superb work ... have so far 
escorted 450 convoys carrying 34,000 tonnes of aid ... 62 
The UNHCR Special Envoy in Bosnia, Jose-Maria Mendiluce, had a 
different perspective: 
How can one qualify as "success" our ability to cross front 
lines to feed the people in enclaves, besieged areas, etc. while 
at the same time the same people were killed under shelling, 
sniper fire, were raped, and terrified. How to accept the tendency 
to consider our role more or less as a trucking and airline company, 
reducing our objectives just to feed those persons lucky enough to 
61 Assistant Under Secretary of State (Commitments), Bill Reeves, Ibid. 524. 
62 Douglas Hurd. B2snia. Hansard, Vo1.223, April 19, 1993, c.21 
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survive?63 
Later that year, the whole humanitarian operation came under 
increasing criticism, including from David Owen, and the former armed 
forces minister. 64 
In February, America initiated the airdrop programme which provoked 
criticism from a number of British politicians who expressed fear of Serb 
reprisals. Despite the obvious shortcomings of the programme, however, 
air drops were the only means of getting aid to the area during that 
period.65 In early March 1993, two of the enclaves, Cerska and Konjevic 
Polje, fell to Serb forces as thousands of civilians fled the Serb advance, 
and there was renewed public pressure for UN action to end the 
slaughter, and lift the siege of the enclaves. 66 The UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, opined that, even based on 
the most conservative reports, Serbs were carrying out a massacre of 
Muslims in eastern Bosnia.67 
63 MENDILUCE, Jose-Maria. Former UNHCR Envoy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 'Limits of 
humanitarian action: the case of Former Yugoslavia'. Preliminary background paper for Conference 
on Conflict and Humanitarian Action, October 1993 [Unpublished]. 
64 Former Armed Forces Minister Archie Hamilton challenged the viability of the whole 
UNPROFOR operation, one of Britain's main pillars of policy in Bosnia, pointing out that ' ... 
throughout the conflict we have been feeding the warring factions in Bosnia. UN commentators are 
rather reluctant to accept that massive stores of UN foodstuffs in Bosnia are held by the militia. 
Therefore, we have moved from the people who want to do the fighting in Bosnia the boring logistic 
problem of feeding their troops because that has been done with UN food. The aid that we have 
given to Bosnia may have prolonged the conflict and more people may have died than would have 
done so if we had had nothing whatever to do with it.' Statement on the Defence Estimates. 
Hansard. Vo1.230, c.S7. David Owen also later stated that the whole strategy of protecting and 
delivering aid might need to be fundamentally reviewed, due to more potential hostage-taking, 
security of UN personnel on the ground, and lack of cooperation. Geneya Talks on Union. COREU 
93102A.PAR, September 2, 1993. 
65 UN Information Notes. April 1993. 
66 A Daily Telegraph Gallup poll conducted across Britain between April 1 and 6 revealed 
widespread support (61 %) across the political spectrum for military intervention in Bosnia to 
enforce a peace settlement, with British troop participation. 47% believed it would be desirable even 
if the force were likely to suffer heavy casualties. 68% were clear that a substantial force would be 
needed. 32% sympathised more with the Muslims, and only 10% with the Serbs. Significantly, 
however, 29% did not know whom to support. Daily Telegraph, April 1 5, 1993. 
67 New York Times International..March 4,1993, p.A6. 
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On April 8, the International Court of Justice, the UN's main judicial 
body to settle disputes between states, ordered Serbia to prevent acts of 
genocide in Bosnia Hercegovina. The 14-judge court ruled that: 
The government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [Serbia 
and Montenegro] should immediately, in the pursuance of its 
undertaking in the [1948 Genocide] Convention, take all measures 
within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide ... 
[and that Serbia should ensure that] any military, paramilitary or 
irregular armed units which may be directed or supported by it ... 
do not commit any acts of genocide ... whether directed against the 
Muslim popUlation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or against any other 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group. 
On Apri114, the US special envoy to peace negotiations on the former 
Yugoslavia, Reginald Bartholomew, declared that the US would support 
lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia if the Serbs did not sign up to 
the Plan.68 As the mass evacuation from Srebrenica dominated world 
headlines, the British government was virtually alone amongst western 
powers in being resolutely opposed both to military intervention to break 
the siege of the enclave, and to lifting the arms embargo. An unnamed 
Whitehall official expanded on government tactics at such times: 
We've been here before. People are clearly bewildered in front of their 
television sets, but if the siege of Srebrenica now moves away from the 
headlines, the pro-intervention mood will probably recede again. We 
were here when Vukovar fell in November 1991, before the London 
Conference in August last year, and when Sarajevo appeared to be 
falling ... The tactic of this government has been to sweat it out. The 
effect of the various stages of the war has not proved to be cumulative. 
It's a bit like Northern Ireland.69 
Meanwhile, the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia Herzegovina, introduced the 
previous October, was yet to be enforced, due to British and Russian 
opposition, despite pressure from the US and France. Douglas Hurd 
68 New York Times, April IS, 1993. 
69 Quoted in Independent, April 7, 1993, p.1 O. 
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cited the safety of British troops, insisting that Britain could not for 
domestic reasons support any measures directed primarily against the 
Serbs.70 International disagreement over the wording of the resolution 
meant that the vote was postponed several times, the delays crucially 
affecting the situation in Srebrenica, as UN officials announced that the 
enclave was being shelled from the Serbian side of the border.71 On 
April 1, Britain finally agreed to enforcement, and to contribute 12 
tornado F3 jets to the NATO operation, although the departure of the 
aircraft was postponed due to a dispute over the rules of engagement 
and the degree of enforcement, Britain and Russia favouring a more 
'graduated' response. As Britain argued with its western allies, Karadzic, 
exploiting the rifts on Bosnia, visited Russia to lobby for support, while 
Russian right-wing journalists and military figures made frequent visits 
to Belgrade. 
On April 17, with VRS forces in sight of Srebrenica town centre, UN 
Security Council Resolution 819 declared Srebrenica a 'safe area', and 
150 Canadian UN troops were drafted in. Two days later, the Foreign 
Secretary made a statement in the House of Commons which was, both 
by omission and emphasis, misleading. Without referring to the wide-
scale ethnic cleansing which had swept across eastern Bosnia, Douglas 
Hurd laid emphasis on the ceasefire achieved in Srebrenica and its new 
status as a 'safe area'. He also commented at some length on the part 
played by the British troops, the aDA and the RAF in delivering aid in 
Bosnia, and the fmanciaI contribution of the British government to the 
70 The troops did not necessarily agree with this view, however. The Times, March 31, 1993. On 
troop security, Rosalyn Higgins had this to say: 'The need to provide security to one's peacekeeping 
forces on the ground cannot, for example, as has been recently suggested, be a reason for deciding 
that enforcement is inappropriate. If enforcement is needed there is definitely no concurrent role for 
peacekeeping'. Memorandum submitted by Professor Rosalyn Hiaains. QC to the Foreian Affairs 
Committee. The Relationship between Peacekeeping and Sanctions. February 17, 1993, I. 
71 Western intelligence reports suggested that up to 200 tanks and heavy artillery crossed the border 
to join the Srebrenica offensive, despite denials from Belgrade. The Times, April 24, 1993, p.12 and 
Guardiana March 18, 1993, & March 29, 1993, p.8. NATO sources estimated at least 20,000 regular 
Serbian army troops were fighting in Bosnia, including the Valjevo and Uzice Corps. 
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relief agencies. He did not inform the House that the UN troops were not 
there to protect the civilian population, nor even to ensure that aid got 
through, other than that permitted by the VRS forces at the checkpoints. 
The deployment of Canadian UN troops in Srebrenica was orchestrated 
from Britain, and misunderstood by many commentators at the time.72 
The Foreign Secretary's warning - that injury to Canadian troops would 
be met by force from Britain - was not, as might be surmised, a change 
of British policy to a more combative posture. Britain was merely 
drawing a 'line in the sand'. Force was reserved to protect UN troops, 
and did not extend to the civilian popUlation the troops had purportedly 
entered the enclave to protect. The 'safe area' concept, in other words, 
was simply a gesture to preempt US military action, and assuage public 
opinion. 73 
In order to preempt a large-scale US initiative, sources close to Douglas 
Hurd stressed that any air strike against Serb positions would be 
British-led, and narrowly confined to rescuing the UN Canadian troops 
in Srebrenica.74 At a meeting of EC foreign ministers during the weekend 
of April 24-25 in Hindsgavi castle in Denmark, ministers agreed to 
'sweeping' sanctions against Serbia, and backed the British initiative to 
use limited air power to assist the Canadian troopS.7S In this way, 
British ministers engaged their EC colleagues' support for limited air 
power for a narrowly-defmed, specific purpose, namely, the rescuing of 
72 The mandate may also have been misunderstood by the Canadians themselves. Canada had been 
asked to supply troops to stabilize the situation around Srebrenica, under the impression that their 
mandate would be strictly humanitarian. After their arrival, Canadian Foreign Minister Barbara 
McDougal phoned Douglas Hurd warning him that the Canadians did not have sufficient resources 
to prevent a breakdown of the ceasefrre. See HONIGIBOTH, op.cit. p.l07. 
73 A Mori poll, taken in April 1993, revealed that only 20% of British people were satisfied with 
British goverrrrnent policy on Bosnia, 64% supported military intervention, and 32% the lifting of 
the arms embargo. BBe Panorama, April 19, 1993. 
74 Sunday Telegraph, April 25, 1993, p.l. 
75 Guardian, Apri126, 1993, p.l O. 
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UN troops in Sre brenica, at the same time deflecting the US call for more 
extensive air strikes in the days leading up to the US Secretary of State's 
visit to European capitals. 
Conflict in Central Bosnia: Ahmici 
Wide-scale hostilities between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities 
broke out in Central Bosnia in the immediate aftermath of the Ahmici 
massacre, which took place a few miles from the British UNPROFOR 
headquarters in Vitez. The discovery of a massacre perpetrated by 
Bosnian Croat forces on Muslim civilians within a hitherto relatively 
peaceful area, at a time when world attention was focused on the 
Srebrenica crisis, brought a new dimension to the Bosnian war and, in 
international terms, proved to be a major watershed.76 The Ahmici 
massacre later led to the indictment, and subsequent sentencing, of 
several Bosnian Croats. The massacre occurred on Apri116, but was not 
brought to public attention until six days later by the British UN 
commander, Col. Bob Stewart, who claimed he had no prior knowledge 
of the massacre. Within hours of its discovery, however, the massacre 
received world-wide publicity,77 impacting significantly on public 
perception of the Bosnian war at a time when the United States was 
contemplating air strikes against Serb positions and threatening to lift 
the arms embargo. 
The war which ensued in Central Bosnia raged until March 1994, when 
a US-brokered agreement led to the establishment of the Bosnian 
76 'Ahmici was one of the turning points ... for the world's perceptions of the Bosnian war. Overnight 
it became more complex, harder to reckon on a moral compass, and somehow shaded in grey. For it 
was by now a three-way struggle'. BELL, Martin. In Harm's Way, Hamish Hamilton, 1995, p.151. 
Simon Jenkins wrote 'I have no doubt of the turning point. It came on April 16, when Croat guns 
opened up on Muslim villages near Vitez ... ' The Times, June 9, 1993. 
77 TV crews from the BBC and ITN who accompanied Col. Stewart at the time of the discovery of 
the massacre, filmed the event which made headline news. The same evening, Col. Stewart gave an 
extended interview to CNN. STEWART, op.cit. p.298. 
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Federation, and an uneasy peace between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, 
for the remainder of the war. The war raised many issues, however, 
both at the time, particularly in relation to the Vance-Owen Plan, and 
later, following the publication of personal memoirs, and the submission 
of evidence by British UNPROFOR troops at the Blaskic, Kupreskic and 
Kordic trials at the ICTY. 
The seeds of mistrust had already been sown following an alleged 
agreement between the Serbian and Croatian Presidents, Milosevic and 
Tudjman, in March 1991 at Karadjordjevo to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina 
between their respective states. Tensions on the Croatian side arose in 
1991, with the perception that Bosnia's Muslims had played either a 
neutral role in the Croatian war, or fought with the JNA against Croatia, 
and were militarily unprepared for the Serb offensive in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.78 The Bosnian government forces observed that Croats 
were unwilling to fight on equal terms against the common enemy 
following the split within the HDZ in Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 1992, 
when Mate Boban, an appointee of Croatian President Tudjman, took 
over the HDZ leadership in Bosnia. On January 15, Boban sent an 
ultimatum to the Muslims ordering them to surrender their arms. When 
they refused, the Croat forces (HVO) arrested hundreds of Muslims. 79 
The considerable influx of (mainly Muslim) refugees into Central Bosnia 
as a result of ethnic cleansing by Serbs in Northern Bosnia and Jajce 
further shifted the ethnic balance in an area still besieged by the 
Bosnian Serb Army. 
78 As Stjepan Kljuic, Bosnian Croat leader till February 1992, explained, however, 'The presidency 
ofBosnia-Herzegovina ... was aware of its impotence, and the only thing it could do was to mobilise 
the reserve police force.' According to Kljuic, 10,000 Bosnian Muslims took part in the defence of 
Croatia. Kordic trial, 1999.1CTY, p.8748. 
79 'Many were beaten, even killed, or made to dig trenches exposed to enemy fire'. Trial Chamber 
Statement. The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic. [Crr, March 3, 2000, 2/41. 
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According to a wide range of international observers on the ground, the 
Vance-Owen Peace Plan played a major role in forging ethnic division in 
Central Bosnia, through an inequitable, and at times provocative, 
allocation of territory. The 'ethnic cleansing' by Croat forces of Bosniacs 
from Prozor in Autumn 1992, occurring just weeks before the VOPP was 
presented, appeared to be ratified by the VOPP. According to British 
UNPROFOR Commander Bob Stewart, the Plan had exacerbated 
hostilities in Central Bosnia which, he claimed, complicated his efforts, 
made the ethnic partition of Bosnia inevitable, and directly triggered 
'ethnic cleansing' in his area. 80 One senior officer serving with the 
Cheshire Regiment, commented: 
it was quite obvious that the Croats were looking at the way in 
which the Serbs appeared to get away with what they got away with 
through force of arms. The Serbs take a piece of ground, the 
political community, the Vance-Owen Plan seemed to acquiesce and 
almost be seen to reward the efforts of the Serbs ... a great deal of the 
effort of the Croat forces was to try to secure routes ... within Central 
Bosnia, to link up the main Croat centres of population. 81 
Another British officer observed that the Vance-Owen Plan 
cut across existing lines of demarcation of responsibility. It changed 
the emphasis in particular areas, throughout Bosnia ... the result of 
which was that the balance of power was going to change from the 
status quo that had existed at the time. And this was causing concern 
to all parties. Wherever I went and spoke, no one had a good word to 
say about the implications of implementing this particular plan ... "82 
A Danish army officer working as an ECMM monitor in Central Bosnia, 
commented that 'there were a lot of individuals that didn't like this plan 
because we were afraid that [it] would increase the problems in the 
80 Guardian, April 24, 1993, p.23. 
81 Bryan Watters, Blaskic trial, 1997.ICTY, p.3369-71. 
82 Philip Jennings, Kordic trial, 1999.ICTY, p.8987. 
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area'.83 Payam Akhavan of the UN Centre for Human Rights observed 
that 'there was a sense, because of the tremendous gains which the 
Bosnian Serbs had made, and the fact that the Vance-Owen Peace Plan 
ratified those gains in many respects by recognising it as a fait accompli, 
that the other parties may wish to do the same in order to achieve the 
same result'. 84 The UN Commander in Bosnia, General Cot, also 
considered that the war in central Bosnia was a direct consequence of 
the VOPP.85 
Croat nationalism, initially confined mainly to Mostar and Eastern 
Herzegovina, grew more widespread with the transfer of Dario Kordic, a 
nationalist hardline leader, to Central Bosnia, demonstrating the Croat 
intent to create ethnically 'pure' areas within a hitherto ethnically-mixed 
region. The hostilities in January 1993 around Gomji Vakuf, within 
days of the presentation of the Vance-Owen Plan, were a further 
indication that unrest could become widespread in Central Bosnia.86 
According to UN Human Rights Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki, 
the lack of an effective international response to counter the policy of 
ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Serb forces from the beginning of the 
war created the precedent of impunity which has allowed them to 
continue, and which has encouraged Croat forces to adopt the same 
li 87 po cy ... 
83 Lars Baggesen, Kordic trial, 1999. ICTY, p.7467. 
84 Blaskic trial, 1997, [CTY, p.5396. Other international observers made similar observations. See 
also Col. Bob Stewart's view of the Vance-Owen Plan. STEWART, op.cit. p.283. 
85 COT, ed., op.cit. p.127. Jean Cot was UN Force Commander in Former Yugoslavia from June 
1993 till March 1994. 
86 See testimony of Andrew Williams on Croat plans to take over Gornji Vakuf, a Croat-designated 
area under the Vance-Owen Plan, in January 1993. Kordic trial, 1999, [CTY, p.6006-601S. Trial 
Chamber Statement, March 3, 2000, op.cit. also noted attempts by Croat forces to 'Croatise' some 
territories by force, to accord with the Vance-Owen Plan. 
87 As quoted by Payam Akhavan at the Kordic trial, 1999, ICTY. 5944. 
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The events of Apri115-16, including the kidnapping of the Croat general 
Totic, and the murder of his four bodyguards in broad daylight in 
Zenica, and the attacks on Vitez, Ahmici, Santici and other villages, 
made no sense politically or militarily to most inhabitants, or to foreign 
observers.88 Some believed they had been instigated from outside. 89 In 
the preceding days Croat leaders, preempting implementation of the 
Vance-Owen Plan, had attempted to take control of overwhelmingly 
Bosniac areas, including Travnik where Mate Boban made an 
inflammatory speech, insisting that Croatian flags be flown on public 
buildings in 'Croat designated' cantons.90 The official language became 
'Croatian', children's schoolbooks were printed in Zagreb in the 
'Croatian' language,91 and salaries were paid in Croatian currency. 
A further factor which may have contributed to the tensions in Central 
Bosnia was the handling of an already delicate situation by senior 
British UNPROFOR (BritBat) officers of the Cheshire Regiment. Some of 
the conflicting evidence referring to the discovery of the massacre is 
examined below, together with an assessment of the British response, 
both with regard to the pUblicity which ensued from its discovery, and 
its investigation. 
According to testimony given to the ICTY, British UNPROFOR 
headquarters was in possession of clear evidence of a massacre at 
88 "The main area within the Lasva Valley was generally peaceful... and other than occasional 
disagreements at the lower tactical level in the village, between the different ethnic groups ... the 
alliance against the Serbs was generally in place. Bryan Watters, Kordic trial 1999, [CrY, p.5674-5. 
Both Bosnian Croats and Muslims testified to peaceful relations before the outbreak of war. See 
Kupreskic trial, 1998, [Cry. p.5206-7, 1893-4,640-1,1150-1,1015,2340,2538,2877-9,3180-1, 
8224,8332,5442. 
89 A member of the CheshireRegiment serving in Gomji Vakuftestified that British mercenaries 
were fighting with the Bruno Busic and Ludvig Pavlovic Brigades, 'shock' troops forming the 
nucleus of the future 'Herceg Bosna' army, whose appearance in an area signalled potential unrest. 
The Ludvig Pavlovic Brigade was stationed in Vitez. Andrew Curnrning, Kordic trial, 1999, [Cry. 
p.6006-6035. 
90 Blaskic trial, November 10, 1997, [Cry' p.3380. 
91 BRINGA, Tone. Being Muslim the Bosnian Way, Princeton University Press, 1995, xviii. 
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Ahmici on April 16 itself, within hours of its occurrence, from a number 
of BritBat soldiers who had been present at Ahmici that day. Matthew 
Woolley, one of the first British soldiers to enter Ahmici on April 16, 
concluded that 'a slaughter' had taken place there. 92 Sergeant Woolley 
testified in some detail as to the conditions he found in Ahmici on April 
16, including 20% of houses burning, HVO soldiers in the woods around 
the village, 'up to 30 people in the cellar ... 5 with significant injuries, 
including elderly people, women and small children'.93 He also confirmed 
that some houses were destroyed whilst BritBat soldiers were present in 
Ahmici.94 
Platoon Commander Dooley, the operations officer on April 16, testified 
that he heard fighting in Ahmici reported over his radio that morning, 
and at lunchtime took four Warriors to Ahmici on a reconnaissance trip, 
reporting back to his commanding officer, Major Martin Thomas, at 
BritBat HQ that 
there was a lot of dead people on the sides of the road near the 
houses ... a number of dead bodies ... we could see them through the 
doors and beside the housing ... we took the dead ... around 6 in number 
because that's all we could get in the ambulance ... with the number of 
bodies seen we could have gone all day ... 9s 
Similarly, Colour Sergeant Andre Kujawinski testified that on the 
afternoon of April 16, driving through Ahmici, he had discovered 
lots of houses on fire ... destroyed .. .lots of bodies, women and children 
strewn about the fields ... we noticed ... on a doorstep there was a man 
and a child ... the man had his left arm around his son, both were 
92 Kupreskic trial, 1998, ICTY, p.3554. 
93 Ibid. p.3497-3536. 
94 Ibid. p.3539. 
95 Kupreskic trial, 1998. ICTY, p.2470-2478. 
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dead .. .! continued out to point 6, which is a large turnaround 
area ... and as we looked back at point 5, which we commonly referred 
to as the Swiss chalet, I noticed a large amount of soldiers in dark 
uniforms ... 96 
Colour Sergeant Ian Parrott offered similar testimony.97 These details 
were a1llogged in the Milinfosum, the daily summary of information 
produced at BritBat HQ, in several entries dated April 16, each with grid 
references. 98 
Evidence offered by senior British officers was curiously in conflict with 
this, however. British UNPROFOR Commanding Officer Bob Stewart, 
testifying as a 'trial chamber witness', did not initially admit to any 
knowledge of large-scale atrocities at Ahmici. Neither, initially, did Brian 
Watters, his Second in Command, nor Major Thomas, the Operations 
Room officer that day. According to his memoirs, Bob Stewart was 
unaware of atrocities in Ahmici (or even of the village's existence) before 
he was directed there by Bosnian government fighters on Apri122. 99 
Although spending part of April 16 in Zenica, Stewart had returned to 
BritBat headquarters at least twice that day. 100 On questioning at the 
Blaskic trial, Stewart placed blame on the Dutch transport battalion 
stationed in the village next to Ahmici, who 'to their shame did nothing 
about it'.IOI This conflicted, however, with Bryan Watters' testimony that 
96 Blaskic trial, 1997, [Crr. p.4112. The Swiss chalet, also known as the bungalow, was at the top 
end of Ahmici. 
97 Ibid. p.5020-1. 
98 Ibid. pp.22062-3. 
99 The Bosnian soldiers gave the atrocities at Ahmici as their reason for not adhering to the UN-
brokered ceasefire. STEWART, op.cit, p.294. 
100 Ibid. pp.294 and 283. 
101 Blaskic trial, 1999, [CTY. p.23836. 
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the Dutch battalion had indeed reported fighting in Ahmici on the 
morning of April 16.102 
Major Thomas, the Operations officer at Vitez HQ that day, was also 
vague in his testimony. When cross-examined as to whether he had 
heard from BritBat forces in Ahmici on Apri116, he replied 
I would have done, because it was my company that were the Ops 
Company at the time. This is where I am unclear on the chronology 
of this ... the exact period when Lieu tenant Dooley discovered the 
massacre in Ahmici. 103 
Major Thomas visited the village for the first time on April 17, but took 
what he termed as 'only a very cursory look at Ahmici' ,104 While 
admitting that 'there had been terrific violence used against the 
occupants of the village ... It was quite clear that people were murdered 
in their homes ... "lOS Thomas made no formal report of his visit. 106 Nor, 
apparently, did he inform his commanding officer of the level of atrocity 
there. 107 
The testimony of Bryan Watters, Second in Command to Bob Stewart, 
who in Stewart's absence was in charge on the morning of April 16, is of 
particular note. When asked at the Blaskic trial whether he was aware of 
the level of atrocities in Ahmici at the time, Watters replied 
102 Kordic trial, 1999, ICTY, p.5840. 
103 Blaskic Trial, 1997,/CTY, p.2645. Initially Thomas claimed Dooley had discovered the 
massacre in Ahmici after his own visit, but later retracted this under questioning. The Milinfosum 
record would anyway have clarified the chronology. According to Bryan Watters' testimony, Major 
Thomas had directed tanks and ambulances into Ahmici at around 11 am on April 16. Kordic trial, 
1999, ICTY, p.S764-S. 
104 Blaskic trial, 1997, [CTY, p.2585. 
lOS Ibid. p.2587-8. 
106 Ibid. p.2646. 
107 See Stewart's evidence at the Kordic trial, ICTY, p.12411. 
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No, we were not. We were aware of the level of destruction ... each time 
we went into the village of Ahmici, the vehicles literally had snipers' 
bullets pinging off them, so it was not very safe to dismount ... all [the 
soldiers] had seen was dead animals and destroyed houses .. . 
there was no reason on the 16th to specifically focus on Ahmici. 108 
Watters' account, however, not only contradicted the testimony of 
Dooley, Kujawinski, other BritBat soldiers in Ahmici that day, and the 
BritBat Milinfosum of April 16, but was at variance with his own later 
testimony at the Kupreskic and Kordic trials, where he stated that, on 
patrol down the Lasva valley around 8 am on April 16, he had seen 
bodies of 'men and women and children ... all civilians .. .lying in the 
fields' in the Ahmici area.109 
Watters also gave conflicting evidence about the level of overall fighting 
in the area on the morning of April 16, commenting at one point that 
the morning of the 16th was a very, very confusing situation, as we 
were getting dozens of reports from the UN, the UNHCR, the HVO, 
and the BiH and our own reconnaissance forces, of fighting up and 
down the valley north Kiseljak, Jelinak, Kruscica, Novi Travnik, and 
so on.110 
Afterwards, however, in possible explanation for his vagueness on the 
details of his meeting with the Croat and Muslim commanders on April 
16, Watters spoke of the conflict being 'confmed largely on the morning 
of the 16th to Vitez and was just a major fallout in Vitez and a little bit of 
Kruscica ... '111 
Col. Stewart was at times no less vague than his Second in Command, 
particularly in relation to his own movements and observations on April 
108 Blaskic trial, op.cit.ICTY. p.3439 and 3549. 
109 Kupreskic trial,ICTY. August 18, 1998. 
110 Ibid. p.5705-6. 
III Ibid. p.5708. 
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16. Summonsed as a Trial Chamber witness at the Blaskic trial, and 
later testifying at the Kordic trial, Stewart's evidence was also somewhat 
at variance with that of other witnesses. Denying having been informed 
that his soldiers had discovered a large number of bodies in Ahmici on 
April 16, Stewart commented 
They wouldn't have bothered mentioning it .. .it was irrelevant ... to what 
we were doing. We were just flat out. So they didn't tell me, no ... 112 
Questioned on whether the soldiers had informed him that they had 
stacked up a number of dead bodies by the cemetery, he replied: 
I recall that they were operating in the area; I don't recall exactly 
what they told me about bodies ... " 113 
When asked to confirm that he had in fact passed by Ahmici on the 
morning of the massacre, when his soldiers would have been there, 
Stewart stressed that they were 'not in the main part of it, just on the 
edge'.1l4 This conflicted with the evidence of Woolley and Kujawinski 
whose units had driven through the village at different times, Woolley's 
unit spending some four hours there. 
The local ECMM monitors and others were also aware of atrocities in 
Ahmici before Apri122. Hendrik Morsink, a colonel in the Dutch army, 
who began work as an ECMM monitor in Central Bosnia on April 16, 
testified that 
112 Kordic trial,JeTf. p.12411. Stewart volunteered the fact that he did not necessarily read the 
Milinfosums, where such information could have been found. Kordic trial, 2000, Ibid. p.1232S. 
Interestingly, many accounts of the Ahmici massacre, including from otherwise competent analysts, 
were confused as to when the event had occurred. SILBERlLIlTLE, op.cit. p.329, put the discovery 
as being on 19 April, while TANNER, op.cit. p.289, quotes Stewart as concluding that the attack 
took place on 22 April. In fact, Stewart in his book wrote that it was 'after 5 o'clock one morning'. 
1\3 Kordic trial, 2000, JeTf. p.l2410. 
114 Kordic trial, 2000, JeTf. p.l2410. 
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members of the local commission mentioned the name of the village 
several times. I was only in theatre for one day then, so I might have 
not realised the importance of Ahmici, but after mentioning the name 
that often, we decided on the 20th to visit it, and we finally did on the 
21st because it was too busy on the 20th .. .! heard somebody speaking 
about Ahmici on the 17th of April, and we drove by Ahmici ourselves 
when I came from Zenica to Vitez, and there were dead bodies on the 
road that very morning. IIS 
A report of Morsink's visit was sent to the ECMM headquarters. 116 In the 
confusion of Apri116 where hostilities erupted suddenly along the Lasva 
valley, amidst efforts to minimise the backlash from the Totic 
kidnapping in Zenica the previous day, it was perhaps understandable 
that the degree of atrocity at Ahmici should escape the immediate notice 
of the BritBat commander and his senior officers. No explanation has to 
date emerged, however, for the six day delay in discovering a massacre 
already known to locals and other international officials. Interestingly, in 
the subsequent reporting of the Ahmici massacre, despite its graphic 
exposure, this anomaly was not discussed. On the other hand, there was 
evidence of tight media control, as the consistent misnaming of the 
village demonstrated. 117 
115 Blaskic trial, 1999, leTY, p.24415-6. 
116 Morsink visited Ahmici on April 21 as part of his duties on the Busovaca Joint Commission, 
together with a British liaison officer and others, and walked around Ahmici for 20-30 minutes, but 
was warned by the British soldiers not to enter any of the houses due to possible mines. Blaskic trial, 
1999, Ibid. p.24397. Commander Stewart, on the other hand, visiting Ahmici on April 22, noted in 
his memoirs that he judged the danger from mines and booby-traps 'probably negligible'. 
STEWART, op.cit. p.295. 
117 The village was referred to as 'Ahinici' instead of'Ahmici' in the following newspapers: 
Guardian, Apri123, 1993, Independent, Apri124, 1993, p.l3, Sunday Times, April 25, 1993, p.2 & 
17, The Times, April 26, 1993, p.10, Apri127, p.12 & April 28, p.l1, European, Apri129-May 2, 
1993, p.2, Scotsman, April 28, 1993, p.1, Evening Standard, June 8, 1993, p.9, Guardian, June 17, 
1993. For an outside view of the British role in these events, see interview with Giorgio Rossetti, 
Member of the European Parliament, in Danas, July 30,1993, p.44-46. Many British news reports 
on the Bosnian war came from Vitez. BBC journalist Martin Bell records 'I think we probably spent 
too much time rolling along in the dust or mud ... behind British armoured vehicles in Central 
Bosnia. They had little impact on the principal conflict between Bosnian government forces ... and 
the Serbs ... BELL, Martin. In Harm's Way. Hamish Hamilton, 1995, p.ISI. 
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The discovery of the Ahmici massacre changed the international 
perception of the Bosnian war almost overnight. The world-wide 
pUblicity generated by the massacre's exposure seemed to confirm the 
thesis of an equivalence of guilt between Serbs and Croats, and was 
further compounded by Stewart's personal reaction, in condemning "the 
bloody HVO" before BBC and lTV cameras, and in later interviews. liS To 
blame the Croats publicly before the world media at that stage, without 
a full investigation into the atrocity, would normally have been 
considered a violation of the UN impartiality rules. On this occasion, 
however, Stewart was depicted in the media as a highly-proficient 
commander whose heart had momentarily ruled his head, but in 
extenuating circumstances. 119 
Before leaving for Bosnia, Stewart had received a briefing from the Chief 
of the General Staff, General Sir Peter lnge, to the effect that 
'the hatred generated between the opposing factions was almost 
impossible to believe .. .' and that 'historically, relations between Serbs, 
Croats and Muslims had been appalling for centuries ... the place had 
always been considered a powder keg. '120 While some historical enmity 
had existed in Bosnia, the erroneous view that it was responsible for the 
current conflict gradually seeped into the mindset of the Cheshire 
Regiment which had, reportedly, become virulently anti-Croat. 121 
\18 'I don't think it was Muslims and I don't think it was Serbs'. Bob Stewart, quoted in Scotsman, 
April 28, 1993, p.l. 
119 The 'dedication and commitment' of Col. Stewart and his soldiers were acknowledged by the 
Foreign Secretary the following week at the House of Commons. Bosnia. Hansard. April 29, 1993, 
Hansard. Vol.223, c.1169, and The Times. May 12, 1993, p.10. 
120 Quoted by Col. Stewart in the Kordic trial, 20oo,lcry, p.12322-3. 
121 Kent.Payne, a commissioned officer in The Prince of Wales's Own Regiment which had arrived 
in Bosnia just days earlier, noted that the Cheshires' 'hatred of the Croats was vehement. . .1 
wondered whether we would get like this and they simply appeared to be following the lead of their 
CO [commanding officer].' KENT·PA ¥NE, Major Vaughan. Bosnia Warriors. Hale, 1998, p.63. 
Yet, as Martin Bell commented, 'Most British soldiers, like most British journalists, never actually 
met a Serb from start to finish.' BELL. op.cit. p.151. 
169 
A further associated consequence of the episode was that the Cheshire 
Regiment received an unexpected boost in a reprieve from its scheduled 
extinction, an outcome Col. Stewart had reportedly worked for 
resolutely.122 Stewart published his memoirs immediately after his tour 
at the request of the Ministry of Defence public relations office, his 
conclusions towards the end of the book for the most part echoing the 
British government position. 123 Stewart admitted he was given little 
guidance in his mandate, but portrayed this as a positive factor,124 In 
the week after the massacre, considerable time was devoted during the 
BritBat daily briefmgs to discussion on securing extensive media 
coverage for the Cheshire Regiment in the removal to a zoo in Split of a 
local bear the troops had been looking after, a story no doubt aimed at 
capturing the imagination of the British public, and engendering 
support for the British troops in Central Bosnia at a time of pressure 
worldwide for international intervention against the Serbs. The story 
reportedly took precedence over a briefIng on the situation in the 
Po savina corridor, an area where Croats and Bosnian government forces 
still presented a united front against the Bosnian Serb army.125 
There was no full investigation into the Ahmici massacre, such as was 
carried out by NordBat after the Stupni Do killings. 126 The investigation 
122 See~, Apri129, 1993, Hansard, Vo1.223, c.1170, and KENT-PAYNE, Ibid. 
123 'Bosnia is undergoing a classic civil war fought by civilians against civilians', and 'Hunger and 
cold were the enemies we went into Bosnia to tackle, and I think we succeeded'. STEWART, op.cit. 
pp.319 & 323-4. 
124 Stewart reportedly told Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind on his visit to Bosnia that he had no 
problem with the mandate. STEWART, Ibid. p.317. Major Vaughan Kent-Payne had a different 
view. 'We did what we could but were constantly hampered by the mandate and the lack ofa clear 
statement of exactly what we were there to do. We did not have the backing, or teeth, to peacekeep 
... Most of the time, we were powerless to stop the killing and the standing of the UN fell to an all-
time low'. KENT-PAYNE, op.cit. p.352-3. 
125 Major Kent-Payne, present at the briefmg, describes how, when the sergeant showed persistence 
in wishing to appraise those present, including their successors from the Prince of Wales Regiment, 
on the situation in Po savina, Col. Stewart pulled a gun on him. KENT -PAYNE, Ibid. p.68-9. 
126 Kordic trial, 2000, ICTY, p.13603. 
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by a two-person team despatched by the UN Centre for Human Rights 
'because of the tremendous media attention being given to the events in 
the Lasva Valley region .. .' was confined to Ahmici and Miletici, due to 
limited time and funding, and the narrow remit of the mission. 127 The 
team also worked closely with BritBat. One team member, Payam 
Akhavam, testified that 'our methodology was largely to try and speak 
as often as possible with members of the British battalion.'128 Another 
brief investigation was carried out by the EC Monitoring Mission, headed 
by Charles McLeod, who testified to a number of briefings from 
BritBat.129 He had not, however, been informed of the kidnapping of the 
Croat military commander Totic, and the murder of his four bodyguards 
the day before the Ahmici massacre, a curious omission in light of 
Stewart's view that 'the cause of the violence was probably Totic's 
kidnapping' .130 
The Ahmici massacre occurred in the final month of the first BritBat 
UNPROFOR mission to Bosnia. The Vitez area, at peace when the 
mission arrived, became the centre of hostilities. The delivery of aid, the 
main declared aim of the mandate, was becoming increasingly 
difficult.131 The UN presence in Bosnia had not prevented ethnic 
cleansing and slaughter, as BritBat troops not infrequently found 
127 Payam Akhavan, Blaskic trial, [CTY, p.5276. Only two officers were available to investigate 
human rights abuses throughout Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. p.5294. 
128 The UN team flew by UNPROFOR air transport to the base at Kiseljak where they were met by 
members of the British battalion, and taken to the British base at Vitez. 'We would spend a lot of 
time during lunch, during dinner in informal discussions with soldiers as well as commanders to get 
a better idea of what the overall situation was in the Lasva Valley region .... Payam Akhavan, 
Blaskic trial, ICTY, p.5278. 
129 Blaskic trial, 1998,/CTY, p.6403. 
130 STEWART, op.cit. p.282, and Kordic trial, 1999, ICTY, p.4687-8. 
131 Brian Watters of the Cheshire Regiment opined 'we no longer really could effectively distribute 
aid ... the distribution ofaid was less and less relevant'. Blaskic trial, August 17, 1998, p.146. 
According to Major Kent-Payne of the Prince of Wales Regiment, 'the fact that few, if any, people 
actually starved to death in Bosnia was only partially due to the UN. Aid reached the country from 
other sources ... ' KENT-PAYNE, op.cit. p.353. See also MENDILUCE, op.cit. for the compromising 
position in which UNHCR was placed in face of the ethnic cleansing process. 
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themselves forced with the stark choice between 'assisting' in the ethnic 
cleansing process and bearing witness to massacre. Increasing numbers 
of soldiers now felt that the arms embargo should be lifted to allow the 
Bosnian government forces to defend themselves, or that the UN 
mandate should include a combat role, for which the British troops were 
well equipped. 132 
The extension of full-scale war to Central Bosnia following the massacre 
appeared to vindicate those who insisted it was a civil war, involving all 
three communities,133 and attributed the break-up of Yugoslavia to 
'centuries of ethnic hatred', and to validate the UNPROFOR 
humanitarian mandate. Indeed, shortly afterwards, the US 'lift-arId-
strike' proposal was put on indefinite hold, as Britain's non-
interventionist policy became more widely regarded as the most prudent 
option in a theatre where all the 'warring factions' were perceived to be 
locked into senseless internecine conflict. 
The massacre both epitomized arid compounded the failure of the 
UNPROFOR mission in Central Bosnia. The fact that senior British 
officers, despite having access to information about large-scale atrocities 
at Ahmici within hours of their occurrence, failed to uncover the 
massacre for six days, underlined starkly the inefficacy of the mission. 
Government ministers, however, maximized the horror of the event itself, 
and focused on the role of British forces in 'bringing relief from the 
suffering' . 134 
132 The Cheshire regiment had 51 Warriors (a 30-ton armoured fighting vehicle), and a substantial 
number of Scimitars. Brian Watters, Kordic trial, 1999.ICTY. p.S782-3. 
133 Douglas Hurd, ~, April 19, 1993, op.cit. c.30, and Dennis Skinner, Ibid. c.31. 
134 Douglas Hurd, Bosnia. April 29, 1993, op.cit. c.1170. 
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The extensive publicity which ensued from Ahmici encouraged many 
observers to draw a symmetry of guilt between the parties. 135 Yet Croat 
ultra-nationalism, like its Serb counterpart, was sustained and nurtured 
by international policy, and particularly the Vance-Owen Plan. The 
deliberate appeasement of Bosnian Croat nationalists through 
inequitable territorial division under the Vance-Owen Plan may have 
secured their unconditional acceptance, but it also exacerbated tensions 
between the Bosniac and Croat communities already under pressure 
from a burgeoning refugee population, and encouraged Croat leaders, 
acting on the strength of the provisions of the VOP?, to pursue policies 
akin to those of their Serb counterparts. 136 British UNPROFOR leaders, 
too, in interpreting the mandate in its narrowest sense, in failing to act 
earlier despite a number of warnings,137 and in their handling of the 
Ahmici atrocity, confirmed to Croat nationalists that aggression, as with 
the Serbs, would be met with impunity. This led to reprisals on the 
Bosniac side and, soon afterwards, full-scale war between erstwhile 
allies. Ironically, the Ahmici incident brought few dividends to the 
Croats. The British Foreign Secretary led the call for sanctions to be 
imposed on Croatia, and a subsequent Bosnian Army counter-offensive 
resulted in significant loss of territory in Central Bosnia for the Croats. 
The British UNPROFOR mission did not, in its presence, help to allay 
local antagonisms. On the contrary, during its six-month tour, the 
Cheshire Regiment witnessed a sharp escalation of hostilities in their 
135 This included many MPs. Harold Elletson, Written Answers, Hansard. May 17 & 20, 1993, 
Robert Wareing, Written Answers, June 16, 1993, and David Faber, Written Answers, May 21, 
1995. All had visited Serb-held areas of Bosnia at the Serb expense. Register of Members' Interests, 
1993. Douglas Hurd, B.a.sni.a. April 29, 1993, op.cit. c.1169. Guardian._Letter to the Editor, from 
Fred Eckhard, Lord Owen's Spokesperson at the ICFY. June 14, 1993 
136 Even so, both Bosniac and Croat commanders in Travnik, Lt. Col. Meho Alagic and Col. Filip 
Filipovic, despite their differences, argued for a joint army to oppose the Serbs who had, until early 
1993, regularly shelled Travnik. The Times, April 29, 1993. p.l3. 
137 On Apri115, following the Totic episode in Zenica, Captain Dundas-Whatley warned the British 
UN Command that hostilities were also likely to erupt in Vitez if precautionary measures, such as 
placing Warriors in the town centre, were not taken. According to Dundas-Whatley. the warning 
was not heeded. Blaskic trial, 1998,/CTY. p.14070. 
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area of deployment, resulting in an eleven-month full-scale war between 
HVO forces and the Bosnian army, which ended only through a US-
brokered agreement in March 1994, in which Britain played no 
discernible role. There was little if any evidence of long-standing ethnic 
hatred between the communities in Central Bosnia when the Cheshire 
Regiment arrived. Indeed, a substantial number of Bosniacs had fought 
in support of Croatian troops in the 1991 war against the Serbs and, in 
1995, the Bosnian Army and the HVO joined forces in the Krajina 
region, successfully lifting the siege of Bihac and other areas of Northern 
Bosnia. Yet the briefmg given to the British commander by the Chief of 
Staffs became virtually a self-fulfllling prophecy during the first BritBat 
mission in central Bosnia, and may have contributed to the mutual lack 
of trust and respect between the British soldiers and the communities 
they were mandated to assist. 
The declared mandate of the UNPROFOR mission, to escort 
humanitarian aid and save lives, became increasingly difficult to fulfill 
after mid April 1993. The Ahmici massacre spurred the Bosnian Army to 
retaliate against the HVO along the Lasva Valley, resulting in huge loss 
of life on both sides, bringing aid convoys to Tuzla to a complete halt, 
with the result that one of Bosnia's most industrialized cities, which had 
managed to maintain its multi-ethnic character, was left for nearly a 
year with very limited food and medical supplies, as the HVO and Croat 
irregulars blocked the aid routes. 138 British UNPROFOR commanders, 
for the most part, chose to interpret their mandate narrowly, even to the 
point of refusing shelter to Bosnian refugees shelled outside the British 
base and, on occasion, assisting in the ethnic cleansing process from 
Serb-held areas. 139 
138 By January 1994, out of an estimated monthly food requirement of7,425 MT, only 1,837 MT 
was delivered to Tuzla. UN Information Notes, February 1994, p.17. 
139 In May 1993, the Institute of Strategic Studies issued a damning indictment ofintemational 
handling of the Bosnian conflict, particularly the deployment of UN peacekeepers, which was 
described as 'a costly mistake', undermining the credibility of the UN, and incapable of ending the 
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It was vital to the British government that the UNPROFOR mission 
continue since, if the main purpose of the mission, namely, to ensure 
the safe delivery of humanitarian aid, was no longer possible to fulfill, 
then the question of UN withdrawal would arise, with the concomitant 
obligation (especially on the part of Britain and France, the main 
supporters of the UNPROFOR mission) to consider the alternatives. With 
the safety of UN troops no longer an issue, and in the absence of a viable 
alternative, there would have been no valid reason to maintain the arms 
embargo, or to oppose strategic air strikes targeted at Serb positions. 
The wisdom of deploying UN troops on a mission which rapidly proved 
unviable would also bring the whole British-led policy of 'escorted aid' 
into question and, perhaps, British policy in Bosnia overall. 
The Bosniac-Croat conflict was a tragedy for moderates on all sides, but 
a triumph for the forces of nationalism, both in military and propaganda 
terms as, from Spring 1993 onwards, the whole ethos of the war became 
increasingly confused in the public perception. The proponents of the 
'civil war' theory were, for the time being, vindicated and, henceforth, the 
international political circus moved towards a more overt containment 
policy. 
House of Commons Adjournment Debate: Bosnia 
On April 29, the first extended debate on Bosnia was held at the behest 
of the Labour Party, lasting over five hours. Opening the debate, the 
Foreign Secretary described what he called the 'swirl of violence [which] 
is sometimes hard for us to piece together'. 140 Defending British 
Bosnian war. Strategic Survey, 1992-93. International InstituteJorStrategic Studies, quoted in 
Guardian, May 20, 1993, p.10. 
140 Douglas Hurd, ~ April 29, 1993, Hansard, Vo1.223, c.1169. 
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government opposition to the US air strikes proposals, Douglas Hurd 
stated 
We should not pretend that, from outside, we can ensure a solution. 
Even a prolonged military commitment by the international community 
could not guarantee that. 141 
Other than a passing mention of the 'outrageous Serb attacks on the 
Muslim enclave of Srebrenica', the Foreign Secretary did not condemn 
the offensive, nor propose a punitive response, beyond tighter sanctions. 
Referring to the recent Bosniac/Croat clashes in Central Bosnia, Hurd 
drew a symmetry of guilt, opining that "no side has the monopoly on 
evil,"142 and advocating persuasion backed by sanctions pressure. 143 For 
the first time Hurd admitted the fragility of the Vance/Owen plan, which 
he now referred to as a 'process' stating, with some unintended irony, 
that 'the worst of all worlds would be half-measures in Bosnia which 
salved consciences without saving lives'. 144 Misleadingly, he suggested 
that the international community was united in its Bosnia policy, and 
stressed that UN forces should not, and could not, 'fight their way into 
designated areas'. 145 
Labour Foreign Mfairs spokesperson John Cunningham broadly 
endorsed the government position, also suggesting moral equivalence: 
141 Ibid. c.1170. However, as an expert witness to the Foreign Affairs Committee pointed out: 'At the 
moment we have the phenomenon of the key Security Council powers insisting on the one hand that 
they cannot alone do everything and on the other hand refusing to proceed to those intended Charter 
provisions which would ensure that others too have a role to play in collective security under 
Chapter VII ... For one or two states to carry nearly all the burden guarantees that they retain control. 
But it also guarantees that collective security can only be patchily provided." HIGGINS, Professor 
Rosalyn, QC. Memorandum submitted to The Foreil:D Affairs Committee. February 17 1993, p.17S. 
142 Ibid. c.1169. 
143 Ibid. c.II72. 
144 Ibid. c.1l76. 
14' Ibid. c.1174-6. This comment ignored the Bosnian insistence that foreign ground troops were 
unnecessary since the removal of the arms embargo would enable them to defend themselves. See 
comment by Bosnian Foreign Minister in a visit to London, quoted by John Cunningham. Ibid. 
c.1182. 
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The reality is that among the political leaders as well as among the 
military leaders in Bosnia there are no innocents. They all bear a 
grave responsibility for continuing the slaughter in the way they do,146 
Questioned on the air strikes option, Cunningham quoted a call two 
weeks earlier by Labour leader John Smith for an ultimatum to Serbia 
that 'unless a ceasefire is made effective, the United Nations will 
authorise air strikes against Serbian lines of communication in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.'147 Quoting the Labour leader's words verbatim, and then 
only on questioning, demonstrated Cunningham's own lack of 
confidence in that position, and possibly a degree of disarray at that 
point on the Labour front bench. 
Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown viewed the problem as 
Europe's failure ... [and] a particular failure of Britain. We had 
the duty of leadership through our presidency, in the key 
months of the campaign.148 
In his own alternative proposals, however, Ashdown demonstrated some 
confused thinking, thereby rendering himself the butt of government 
ridicule whenever he spoke on Bosnia. 
I believe that we can go in for protective intervention ... we can 
establish the safe havens for which many of us have been calling 
for so long ... 149 
If the Vance Owen plan fails ... Muslim enclaves could be declared 
a UN protectorate and the UN, on behalf of the Muslims, could 
negotiate with all the authority of the international community 
behind it, with the Serbs and Croats to establish safe, just and 
146 Ibid. c.1180. 
147 Ibid. c.1183. 
148 Paddy Ashdown, Ibid. c.1193. 
149 Ibid. c.1197. 
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secure borders. Mter that, it would be for the UN to support 
that state until, in due course, it would achieve self-determination 
and the capacity for self defence. ISO 
Ashdown did not explain, however, how a virtual ghetto, inhabited by 
sick, undernourished and war-wounded captives could achieve 'self 
determination and the capacity for self defence', given the UN track 
record thus far. His proposal was summarily dismissed by the Defence 
Secretary: 
... the 150 troops in Srebrenica are there only by the consent of 
the Serbian forces, who allow them to enter the city ... [W]ithout 
a vast increase in the number of forces on the ground, and without 
a commitment of the kind that would last many years and risk 
massive casualties, [the Liberal leader] is setting out a proposal 
that is impractical and unrealistic,1S1 
Malcolm Rifkind had, perhaps unwittingly, exposed the unworkable 
nature of safe havens in the Bosnian context, at least in terms of 
protecting the inhabitants. Nonetheless, some three weeks later the 'safe 
areas' policy was endorsed through the Joint Action Programme, with 
British approval. 
The misleading information conveyed to the House by the Foreign 
Secretary, and the weak performances of the two main opposition party 
leaders, was compounded by tendentious and inaccurate contributions 
from MPs such as Robert Wareing, then regarded as an expert on the 
Balkans due to his frequent visits to the area, who stated that 'the 
Muslims are Serbs', 'Bosnia .. .is not a state but a province', and 'more 
than 60 per cent of the land in Bosnia-Herzegovina was owned by 
Serbian people when the conflict started', 152 a line adopted by Serb 
ISO Ibid. c.l201. 
lSI Malcolm Ritkind, Ibid. c.1249-S0. The Liberal Leader's position was also later criticised by 
Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg as being 'unsustainable and that it varies: it is difficult to identify'. 
YUioslayja. July 26, 1993, Hansard, Vo1.229, c.873. 
1S2 Robert Wareing, B.Qmia, April 29, 1993, Ibid. c.1233, and Yuioslayja, July 26, 1993, Ibid. c.868. 
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leader Radovan Karadzic, and later by David Owen. On the other hand, 
approximately two thirds of the speakers from all sides of the House 
disagreed strongly with some or all of the government's Bosnia policy,IS3 
a fact which the Foreign Secretary who, despite his assertion that 'the 
views of the House must weigh heavily with us as we continue to consult 
with our allies',IS4 apparently ignored since, in reference to the debate 
two weeks later, he declared 
I carried away with me the very strong feeling from all parts of the 
House, although not from all individuals, that hon. Members were in 
favour of the pressures that we are building up and of the line that we 
are taking and that they were also in favour of substantial prudence 
before going into further types of involvement without calculating the 
consequences. lSS 
Since there was not the opportunity to vote on the issue, the Foreign 
Secretary's statement went unchallenged. 
The Joint Action Programme 
At a Foreign Ministers' meeting in Washington on May 22, the US, 
Russia, Britain, France and Spain agreed to a joint strategy to 'contain' 
the Bosnian conflict and guard the UN 'safe areas' under siege by Serb 
forces. Known as the Joint Action Programme (JAP), or the Washington 
Agreement, it was a minimalist approach to bridge the divergent 
positions of major world powers, following the Serb rejection of the 
Vance Owen Peace Plan. Most Western analysts considered it a defacto 
153 This included senior Conservative MPs. Former Defence Secretary Tom King called the failure 
to back up UN resolutions with a military threat, while giving advance warning of the intention not 
to do so, 'profoundly unwise', and the chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, David Howell, 
admitted to a change of view on Bosnia, pointing out that denying one of the combatants access to 
heavy arms already constituted direct intervention, and that further action would be needed to 
prevent greater involvement at a later stage. Ibid. c.1203-4 and 1207-1210. 
154 Douglas Hurd, Ibid. c.1169. 
ISS Douglas Hurd, Oral Questions, 12 May 1993, Hansard, Vo1.224. 
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recognition of the status quo in Bosnia, freezing the territorial outcome 
of 14 months of war, since it offered no real protection to the 
communities under siege in eastern Bosnia, and emboldened Serb and 
Croat nationalists in their objective of partitioning Bosnia at the expense 
of its Muslim citizens. The JAP was, not surprisingly, accepted by the 
Serbs as representing 'a more realistic approach' by the West, and 
interpreted as justifying Serb opposition to the VOPP. It came under 
severe criticism, however, from many in Europe, including the Germans, 
Dutch and Italians, the Danish EC Presidency, the president of the 
European Commission, Jacques De1ors, European Commissioner for 
External Affairs, Hans Van den Broek, and UN Human Rights 
Rapporteur, Tadeusz Mazowiecki. I56 The non-aligned countries and the 
Organisation of Islamic States also opposed the JAP, as well as Owen 
himself who had been omitted from the negotiations preceding it. IS7 
This section focuses on UN Security Council, parliamentary and public 
reaction to the Joint Action Programme, and Britain's role in its 
ratification. 
The rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan by the self-styled Bosnian Serb 
Assembly on May 6 had signaled, for most international leaders, the 
need for a new political initiative in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 158 Lord Owen 
himself had been endeavouring for some weeks to begin implementation 
of the VOPP 'where possible', as he put it, which given the Serb 
referendum result and the imbalance of weaponry on the ground 
156 See OWEN, op.cit. p.175 and Independent, May 26, 1993, p.11. 
157 OWEN, p.172-3. 
1S8 A referendum was held by the Bosnian Serbs on May 15-16, where 96% of voters were 
reportedly in favour of rejecting the VOPP and establishing a Serb state. Keesings Record o/World 
Events, May 1993, p.39470. 
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implicitly excluded Serb-held areas. 159 In a memorandum to the Foreign 
Office Political Director on May 13, Owen advised that the Bosnian Serb 
referendum should be downplayed internationally, with emphasis 
shifted to UN sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, as opposed to Serbia 
itself. 16o Owen blamed the failure of the VOPP on the Clinton 
administration for not fully endorsing it through the Security Council, 
and for supposedly authorizing a New York Times report, which 
announced that the VOPP had been laid aside. 161 
The concept of 'safe areas' for Bosnia-Herzegovina had first been 
introduced at the 1992 London Conference by the President of the 
International Red Cross, Dr Cornelio Sommaruga, and supported by 
Austria, then a non-permanent member of the Security Council, but was 
considered impossible to implement without the consent of all the 
parties. The Serbs were unlikely to agree to any initiative which limited 
their objectives, while the Bosnian government would oppose any 
proposal which did not guarantee the protection of the civilian 
population within the enclaves. The UN Force Commander considered 
that protecting the 'safe areas' was a job for a 'combat-capable, peace-
enforcement operation', incompatible with peacekeeping. 162 
Developments on the ground, however, demanded an immediate 
response. 163 
Following lengthy debate within the Security Council, members of the 
Non-Aligned Caucus, led by Venezuela, proposed action to reverse the 
159 See OWEN, op.cit. Chapter 4. 
160 Memorandum from Lord Owen in New York to Political Director, UK FCO. COREU 
CD93EI3.PAR, May 13, 1993. Interestingly, Owen's approach was to Britain rather than the EC 
Presidency in Denmark, to whom he was officially responsible. 
161 OWEN, op.cit. p.170. 
162 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p. 1 SIS 1. 
163 In acknowledgement of this, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, wrote to 
the Secretary-General on April 2 that either the UN should protect Srebrenica with 'life-sustaining 
assistance' on a scale much greater than hitherto permitted, or the population should be evacuated. 
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Serb aggression, and lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian government. 
A mission to Srebrenica on Apri12S, led by Diego Arria the Venezuelan 
representative to assess the situation there, concluded that the 'safe 
area' needed to be greatly expanded, and that other towns should also 
be declared safe areas, requiring an extended UNPROFOR presence, a 
revised mandate and different rules of engagement, with military 
enforcement measures, in the case of non-compliance by the Serbs. 
On May 15, at a new round of Security Council negotiations, three 
separate responses emerged. A memorandum by the Non-Aligned 
Caucus argued that the 'safe areas' concept would fail unless the 
security of those areas was guaranteed and protected by UNPROFOR: 
The failure of the international community to use enforcement 
measures, or to use the threat of such enforcement measures, 
would inevitably lead to a much more substantial use of force 
in the future ... We have all learned the most important lesson 
in this conflict: that the international community will not be 
respected until it decides to take effective actions. 164 
The memorandum also stated that, despite being established under 
Chapter VII, the UNPROFOR mandate had been narrowly interpreted, its 
focus limited to the provision of aid, and only then with the consent of 
the perpetrators of the aggression. That, and the denial of Bosnia's 
inherent right to invoke Article 51 of the Charter, concluded the Non-
Aligned Caucus, had encouraged the Serbs to pursue their 
aggression. 165 
France also wrote a memorandum to the Secretary-General on May 19, 
outlining changes necessary to the UNPROFOR mandate 
to give it, more clearly than in resolution 824, the task of ensuring 
the security of the safe areas. To this end a new resolution should 
provide explicitly for the possibility of recourse to the [use of] force, 
by all necessary means. 166 
164 Ibid. p.19171. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid. p.19/72. 
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The French ambassador outlined three options for consideration: 
(a) a light option without formed units; 
(b) a light option with formed units; and 
(c) a heavy option. 
While France expressed preference for the second option, Britain and 
Russia insisted on the light option which required few more troops than 
were already on the ground. 167 Option (a), the light option, was later 
adopted on May 22 by the Security Council by representatives of the 
governments of France, Britain, Russia, Spain and the United States in 
Washington, in a IJoint Action Programme', later to become a highly 
controversial policy. The Programme was strongly opposed by the two 
Security Council members representing the Non-Aligned Caucus, and 
subsequently came under heavy censure from the House of Commons, 
the media and the general public, as well as from other EC member 
states, omitted from the decision-making process. 
The JAP was ratified in Security Council resolution 836, adopted on 
June 4, with 13 votes in favour and 2 abstentions (Venezuela and 
Pakistan). The voting pattern, however, was not a clear reflection of the 
positions of the various Security Council members, a number of whom 
pointed out the fundamental shortcomings of the JAP, and the difficulty 
of implementing it without significant further resources. Others took a 
wider interpretation of UNseR 836, supporting it on the understanding 
that force in the form of air strikes would be used in the case of 
continued Serb aggression in and around the safe areas. 168 The 
Hungarian representative considered it addressed the symptoms rather 
than Cfue key issue .. .in the Bosnian conflict: reversing the results of the 
167 Le Monde, May 21,1993, p.3. 
168 Srebrenica Report, p.2l/ 81. 
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aggression which has been carried out with impunity ... '169 The United 
States, too, despite being one of the co-sponsors of the Resolution, made 
it clear that it had endorsed the JAP merely as an interim measure to 
save lives, while keeping options open for 'new and tougher measures', 
adding 'my Government's view of what those tougher measures should 
be has not changed'. 170 The United Kingdom representative spoke 
positively about the Joint Action Programme and, while not ruling out 
'other, stronger measures as the situation develops', described the safe 
area policy as 'an essential step in the immediate agenda' of the 
Programme, and pledged to assist the Security Council to fInd more 
troops, including from Islamic States.l71 
Owen argues in his memoirs that Britain was an unwilling partner in 
the JAP, succumbing to pressure from Russia and, particularly, the 
United States. This is not borne out by news reporting at the time, 
however. 172 As the JAP was being agreed in Washington, President 
Clinton expressed doubts about what he termed as the 'Russian/ 
European' plan to 'stabilise' the military situation. 173 The United States 
also rejected the Russian/British proposal for the 'progressive' 
implementation of the Vance Owen Plan, judging it to be 'totally 
unrealistic' .174 
Differences also arose as to the wording of the requisite resolution 
confirming the 'safe areas' policy, the number of troops needed to 
169 lbid.p.23/90. 
170 lbid.p.23/88. 
171 Ibid. p.23/91. 
172 See, for instance, The Times, May 21,1993. 
173 Le Monde, May 23-24, 1993, pp.l & 3. 
174 Ibid. Following agreement on the Joint Action Programme, the Russian newspapers 
Komsomolskaia Pravda and Izvestia, which had hitherto carried little coverage of the Bosnian war, 
declared the JAP a victory of Russian diplomacy. Le Monde. May 26,1993, p.4. 
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implement it, and the mandate. Shortly after its adoption, the UN 
Secretariat stated that approximately 32,000 additional ground troops 
would be required to implement the 'safe areas'. This drew strong 
opposition, particularly from the United Kingdom representative who 
favoured the minimalist option, insisting that no more than 5,000 troops 
would be needed, basing his argument on the 'positive' example of 
Srebrenica, where a small Canadian contingent was based. 175 Douglas 
Hurd noted in his memoirs that he had instructed David Hannay, the 
British Ambassador to the UN, to 'water down the phrasing of the 
motion so that it carried less of an unrealistic commitment.'176 This 
decision was to have crucial consequences two years later in Srebrenica. 
The Non-Aligned Caucus then tabled a draft resolution to exempt the 
Bosnian government from the arms embargo, linking it to what they 
perceived as the flawed concept underlying UNSC Resolution 836. The 
Caucus argued that, since the Security Council was unable to take 
action to protect the civilian population, or to halt the conflict, the 
Bosnian government should have the means of self defence. The 
resolution was rejected by six votes in favour to none against, and nine 
abstentions. The United States was amongst those who supported the 
resolution. The UK representative led the opposition to the draft 
resolution. 177 
After the fall of Srebrenica in 1995, the 'safe areas' policy was 
acknowledged by many leading players, including British government 
m Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.241 95. Douglas Hurd later claimed that Britain had encouraged other 
countries, including Iranians to contribute to the UN force. HURD, Douglas. Memoirs. Little, 
Brown, 2003, p.464. The Islamic countries, including Iran, had in fact offered 18,000 troops for the 
'safe areas' but were rejected by the Secretary-General. French UN troops were already present in 
large numbers in the 'safe areas' of Sarajevo and Bihac. British troops would not consider any 
deployment for its troops other than Central Bosnia. NIOD, op.cit. Chapter II, No.12. 
176 HURD, 2003, op.cit. p.463. 
177 Srebrenica Report. op.cit. p.24-25/99 and 102. In late June, 1993, the UN General Assembly 
voted to lift the arms embargo from the Bosnian government by 109 votes to 57. NJOD, op.cit. Part 
1, Chapter 12, No.2. 
185 
ministers, as one of the main errors in the international community's 
policy on Bosnia.178 Only in retrospect did Douglas Hurd acknowledge 
that substantially more troops would have been required, commenting 
that 'in the absence of extra troops the safe areas resolution ... was a bluff 
which ... could easily be called'.179 At the time, it was argued that 
insufficient troops were on offer. Later, Hurd claimed that the Iranians 
had been encouraged to contribute troops.180 
The Joint Action Programme also included an agreement on sealing the 
border between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, to ensure Bosnian Serb 
compliance with the peace process. With the demise of the Vance-Owen 
Peace Plan, Lord Owen sought a new raison d'etre for the ICFY (and a 
new role for himself) in assisting with the border monitoring. However, 
since Milosevic would not at the time agree to international monitors, 181 
the initiative proved little more than a sop to public opinion, and was 
abandoned, and only resuscitated in late 1994. 182 
Following the announcement of the Joint Action Programme, opposition 
to the new government policy orientation on Bosnia was self-evident in 
the House of Commons. Labour European affairs spokesperson, George 
Robertson summed up the mood of the House: 
178 HURD, op.cit. p.463. Owen's view was that the 'safe areas' concept failed mainly because 'the 
UN Security Council was allowing the Muslims to evade any demilitarization provision'. OWEN, 
op.cit. p.200. 
179 'I should have backed my own scepticism at the time and held back the French from letting 
rhetoric outrun reality'. HURD, op.cit. p.464. 
180 HURD,lbid. p,464. Islamic countries in fact offered to send 17,000 soldiers to join the UN 
peacekeeping force in Bosnia. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic rejected the offer, however, in 
a letter to the UN Secretary-General. Since the British government had consistently reiterated it 
would only introduce measures acceptable to all parties, Douglas Hurd's retrospective claim that the 
Iranians had been encouraged to contribute is dubious. 
181 Le Monde, May 20, 1993, p.4. 
182 The border monitoring concept was again considered by Milosevic in late 1994, when the Serbs 
were under renewed pressure, following their rejection of the Contact Group plan. 
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... such a radical and fundamental new policy shift on Bosnia should 
have merited a full government statement and not just a reply to a 
private notice question ... Will it not simply be seen as a cleverly 
constructed and diplomatically phrased climbdown in the fact of the 
Bosnian Serb rejection of their leader's signature on the Vance Owen 
plan three weeks ago in Athens? .. .Is this the end of that plan, which 
was for a multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina? ... Will the Minister tell us 
about the new proposed safe areas? For whom are they to be safe? It 
appears that civilians in those areas will be disarmed and any air cover 
supplied or offered by the United States will be restricted to the UN 
troops in the areas .. .is not the proposal just a recipe for creating five 
or more new permanent refugee camps? What is meant by 'sealing the 
borders of Bosnia' when all it seems to amount to is what the 
communique says: 'We are watching to see if the border closure is 
effective?' How does that stand, especially in the light of Mr Milosevic's 
apparent statement that there will be a veto on all foreign observers 
and monitors on the border? ... 183 
This raised fundamental issues relating to the government's Balkans 
policy. The Foreign Minister retorted that 
it is important to keep in mind the fact that those on [the Labour] 
Front Bench and those on this one agree on one thing - that it would 
be wrong to deploy UK or any other ground troops in a combat role. 
Certain consequences flow from that, and they are set out in the 
Washington agreement ... 184 
The statement defined the British government position. If Britain and 
its allies rejected the use of force to compel the Serbs to give up territory 
gained by force, and if the arms embargo remained in place, the logical 
consequence was that the Serbs were free to continue, with virtual 
impunity, to secure more territory by force. The Foreign Minister' rested 
his case against military intervention mainly on the 'civil war' thesis, 
which he used repeatedly to parry criticism from Members. 
What is going on in Bosnia is, in its principal characteristics, 
a civil war; and we did not think it right - nor did any other 
country of which I am aware - to deploy ground troops in a 
combat role because this war was and is a civil war. Civil wars 
183 George Robertson, ~ Hansard, 24 May 1993, Hansard, Vo1.22S, c.S71. 
184 Douglas Hogg, Ibid. 
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cannot be resolved by the application of external force ... "185 
We must ask ourselves what we are prepared to do in the context 
of a civil war. Unless we - all nations - are prepared to deploy 
ground troops in a combat role, perhaps we should not embark 
on too much bluster ... 186 
It is virtually impossible, by the application of external force, to 
put an end to a civil war ... l87 
We are talking about a civil war and the question [to] contemplate 
is the extent to which British military assets, or any other country's 
military assets, people, troops and airmen should be used to prevent 
fighting in a civil war. There is no will in the House for that ... l88 
it is primarily a civil war. I do not dispute for one moment that 
Serbia plays a prominent part in supplying fuel, arms, money and 
men but it is nevertheless in its essential characteristics a civil 
war ... when one is considering the cost in terms of human lives of 
trying to make peace by force, one must come to the conclusion 
that it would take about half a million men.l89 
There were over twenty speakers in this brief debate, twelve of whom 
condemned government policy outright. Only three voiced muted 
support for the government position. 
The Joint Action Programme was one of the landmarks of the 
international policy in Bosnia. It was now tacitly acknowledged that 
there was no provision either for the protection of the Bosnian Muslim 
population, or for a reversal of territorial gains acquired through 'ethnic 
18S Douglas Hogg, Ibid. c.573, in reply to Patrick Cormack. 
186 Douglas Hogg, Ibid. c.S74, in reply to Max Madden. 
187 Douglas Hogg, Ibid. c.576, in reply to David Winnick. 
188 Douglas Hogg, Ibid. c. 576-7, in reply to Dale Campbell-Savours. 
189 Douglas Hogg, Ibid. c.577, in reply to Sir Terence Higgins. See HAMPSON, Francoise, op.cit. 
for a legal view on the 'civil war' claim. 
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cleansing', due to lack of international consensus for the use of force. 
The Joint Action Programme did not contribute to stabilising the 
situation either. That same week, VRS forces opened a new front at 
Maglaj.190 
Britain had taken a leading role within the UN Security Council in 
shaping the Joint Action Programme, endorsing the 'safe areas' policy, 
and confining the use of air strikes to UN troop protection. 191 It had also 
led in opposing a draft resolution by the Non-Aligned Caucus exempting 
the Bosnian government from the arms embargo, and argued forcefully 
for a minimum number of troops to implement the policy, against the 
advice of the UN Secretariat. 
The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan 
This section examines the role of Britain, in particular through the work 
of ICFY co-chair David Owen, in promoting a Serb-inspired ethnic 
partition plan which, if accepted in its entirety, threatened the survival 
of the UN sovereign state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
At the Geneva Conference on June 16, under the chairmanship of Lord 
Owen and Thorwald Stoltenberg, the Serbian and Croatian Presidents 
announced an agreement on the establishment of a new Bosnian state, 
comprising three ethnically-based republics. It was essentially a Serb 
proposal, produced after consultation with Croat leaders, and viewed by 
Serbian President Milosevic as a 'really huge advance'.192 Evidently 
encouraged by international appeasement of their respective offensives 
in eastern and central Bosnia, by the impunity which met the Bosnian 
190 Le Monde, May 28, 1993, p.3. 
191 Keesing's Record o/World Events, May 1993, p.39470. Other European NATO states, with the 
exception of France, believed air strikes should also protect civilians trapped in the 'safe areas'. 
192 OWEN, op.cit. p.191. 
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Serb rejection of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and, not least, by the 
international retreat signaled in the Joint Action Programme, the 
Serbian and Croatian presidents, along with Bosnian Serb and Croat 
leaders, now pressed for a settlement which, if fully implemented, was 
likely to lead to the eventual dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the 
shorter-term, the new proposals involved further large-scale population 
movements and the creation of three more or less ethnically 
homogeneous republics, with a considerable reduction in central 
government powers. 193 Bosnia's Muslims would be confined mainly to 
Central Bosnia and the Bihac enclave in the north-west. 
The Serb-Croat proposals laid the foundations for the Owen-Stoltenberg 
Plan (also referred to as the Union of Three Republics), 194 the EU Action 
Plan and the Contact Group Plan on which the Dayton Peace Agreement 
was eventually based. According to the map proposed by Serbs and 
Croats, Serb-claimed territory would be contiguous with Serbia, and 
Croat-claimed territory with Croatia, while the three territorial blocks 
proposed for Bosnia's Muslims would be fractionated. Lord Owen saw 
his role as helping to evolve the new Serb-Croat plan in a way that 
would make it acceptable to the Bosnian President. 195 'We would just 
cajole and pressurize all the parties until we reached the percentage 
figures that all could agree on'.196 Since, however, both Serb and Croat 
leaders were already acquiescent in principle, having produced the plan, 
it was Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic on whom all the pressure was 
brought to bear. Izetbegovic considered Owen's role as 
193 Ibid. p.203. 
194 See map 3, p.351. 
195 Ibid. p.191. 
196 Owen also admitted, however, that 'we were going to need the United States to pressurize 
Izetbegovic to accept the map', despite having previously stated that he envisaged the ICFY co-
chairs' task as seeing if the map 'could evolve in a way that would make it acceptable to President 
Izetbegovic'.lbid. p.l91. 
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a case study in real-poUtik. .. He began to exert strong and systematic 
pressure on our government to accept the partition of the country, 
even the possible partition of Sarajevo, and then opposed the bombing 
of Serb positions because of their continued aggression, stated that 
the Serbs owned 65% of the land in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Karadzic's data) and fmally tried to break up the existing Presidency 
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, proposing that instead of 
the legal Presidency a nine-member coordinating body be formed on 
the principle of parity, with three members each from the Serb, Croat 
and Bosniac peoples ... ln everything he proposed and did this time, 
Lord Owen had the support of Milosevic and Tudjman. 197 
Owen played a vital role in influencing members of the Bosnian 
Presidency, as it became increasingly divided. Having resurrected the 
multi-ethnic collective Bosnian Presidency, defunct since the onset of 
war, Owen met Fikret Abdic in December 1992, and encouraged Abdic to 
take a more active part in the Presidency.198 Izetbegovic and his deputy 
found themselves isolated in their rejection of the new Serb-Croat plan, 
as Abdic, the sole Muslim representative amongst the remaining seven 
members, sided with the Serbs and Croats,199 Owen, now backed by a 
two-pronged Serb-Croat offensive and a compliant Abdic, exerted 
pressure on lzetbegovic to participate in the partition talks in Geneva, 
accusing him of lacking the will 'to make the necessary compromise to 
save people'.20o In the early part of the war, Croat and Muslim members 
197 IZETBEGOVIC, Alija. Inescapable Questions. The Islamic Foundation, 2003, p.255-6. By 
introducing an equal 3-way split within the Bosnian Presidency, Owen was once again favouring the 
Croats, who comprised only 17% of the population, at the expense of the Bosniacs. 
198 OWEN, op.cit. p.83. Fikret Abdic had been jailed for fmancia1 fraud in 1987, and was currently 
brokering deals with Karadzic's Serbs. See BURG/SHOUP, op.cit. p.44. Perhaps the most telling 
example of Abdic's closeness to the Bosnian Serb hierarchy was General Ratko Mladic's comment 
to refugees after the fall of Srebrenica: 'Why did you follow Alija? You should have followed Fikret 
Abdic'. Quoted in ROHDE, David. op.cit. p.223. 
199 Guardian, June 28, 1993, p.10, & Sunday Times, June 27, 1993, p.20. In a joint declaration, 
Karadzic recognized the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, which Abdic set up in the Bihac 
pocket after the Bosnian Assembly rejected an international peace conference to end the war. 
Reuters, October 22, 1993. 
200 The UN Commander in Former Yugoslavia, General Jean Cot, asserted that if the Geneva 
Conference archives had all been preserved (although he believed they had not) they would reveal 
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of the Presidency had cooperated closely. The Bosnian Prime Minister 
Mile Akmadzic (a Croat) had made an effort to revive the collective 
leadership of the Presidency, returning to live in Sarajevo and 
attempting to reinforce the Muslim-Croat coalition which won the 
independence referendum in March 1992. With the introduction of the 
Vance-Owen Plan in January 1993, however, friction arose between the 
Croat and Muslim members of the Presidency, due to the clear Croat 
bias of the plan. 
Lord Owen was, at the outset, anxious to distance himself from the new 
Serb-Croat plan, arguing that it was 'agreed by the parties, negotiated ... 
in Geneva'.201 Nevertheless, he soon assumed a major role, without the 
support of the United States, and with little from the EC whom he was 
allegedly representing, with the exception of Britain and France. 202 The 
EC Foreign Affairs Commissioner insisted that the international 
community should either defend the Bosnians or acknowledge Bosnia's 
right to self-defence. The European Parliament (EP) was also highly 
critical of Owen. Owen dismissed EP debating as 'an unedifying mixture 
of cant and humbug', however.203 Even Cyrus Vance implicitly criticized 
his former ICFY colleague, describing the partition scheme as a 'tragic 
mistake' which would result in continuing bloodshed, and reward the 
perpetrators of 'ethnic c1eansing'.204 Following threats from Muslim 
communities outside Bosnia over his perceived pro-Serb policies, Owen 
the direct responsibility of Owen and Stoltenberg in the intra-Muslim conflict in Bihac in September 
1993, when Fikret Abdic allied with the Bosnian Serb and Croat leaderships. COT, ed. op.cit. p.127 
201 OWEN, op.cit. pp. 191 & 212. 
202 Owen was omitted from briefmgs by US envoy Reginald Bartholomew and his successor, 
Charles Redman. OWEN, Ibid. p.207. On August 8, Germany, supported by the Netherlands, went 
as far as distributing a COREU expressing doubts over the Geneva negotiations. OWEN, p.210. See 
also OWEN, pp.192, 202 & 208. 
203 OWEN, Ibid. p.198. 
204 Guardian, July 2, 1993 
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looked to Britain for security protection.205 Owen's continuing central 
role in the peace negotiations after the abandonment of the VOPP was 
due mainly to strong UK support.206 
Britain dominated the debate on Bosnia at the EC Summit in 
Copenhagen on June 22, where splits within the Community became 
more evident. Germany pressed for the arms embargo to be lifted, 
backed by several other EC governments. Even President Mitterand 
appeared to waver. 207 The British Prime Minister won over the meeting, 
however, warning that lifting the embargo would lead to a bloodier war. 
At his end of summit speech, Major declared that European leaders had 
not changed policy, and reaffirmed confidence in the peace efforts led by 
Lord Owen.208 The final communique pledged troops and money as an 
"indispensable contribution" to an overall settlement but made no 
mention of the arms embargo. 
Throughout July, fighting intensified in Bosnia and, on July 17, 
Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman backtracked on their previous 
commitment to guarantee the Bosnian government 30% of Bosnian 
territory.209 Karadzic, meanwhile, was playing for time. In late July, he 
wrote to Owen with the suggestion of a summit on the Union in mid 
20S Owen records that the British government insisted he had a bomb-proof car in Beirut. OWEN, 
op.cit. p.207. 
206 Owen records that his main reason for continuing as EC envoy after the rejection of the VOPP 
was due to pressure from Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg and Foreign Office official Jeremy 
Greenstock, who travelled to Geneva at the Foreign Secretary's insistence to persuade Owen to stay. 
OWEN, Ibid. p.17S. 
207 The Times, June 23, 1993. 
208 OWEN, op.cit. p.17S Years later, Douglas Hurd commented that one of John Major's main 
talents was the management of difficult meetings, citing Bosnia as a particular example. Speech by 
Douglas Hurd, The Traverse, Edinburgh, October 13, 2003. 
209 ICFY Memorandum, July 17,1993. CD93GI7.PAR. Owen notes that 'the Co-Chairmen stressed 
the importance of reaching this figure, and the significance it now had in the eyes of the 
international community'. 
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Autumn,210 a delay which would have enabled VRS forces to acquire 
further territory in eastern Bosnia and around the Brcko corridor. Owen 
warned the Bosnian Serb leader that 'the pressure to use NATO 
airpower ... is growing by the day, and the capability now exists[with) the 
potential for a far more serious intervention involving the full weight of 
the United States'. He pressed Karadzic to reach a negotiated settlement 
on the basis of a map with '26.1% of the total area of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina being assigned to a predominantly muslim [sic) republic',211 
proposing, however, that that figure be increased to 30%. 
The main objections to the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan were set out in a 
letter from Bosnian President lzetbegovic to the US Ambassador (who 
that month was also Security Council President) on August 11, referring 
specifically to a report dated August 6, from Owen and Stoltenberg to 
the UN Security Council.212 The Bosnian President wrote inter alia that 
The report does not give a true picture of the cause and nature of 
the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina ... The complex ethnic structure and 
the historical background are not the essential causes of the war ... 
the cause of the war is the aggression from the outside ... 
The report does not identify, nor does it raise the issue of the 
responsibility of those who are violating the Security Council 
resolutions and the provisions of international war laws and 
human rights ... The proposals as made by the sides are not 
respectively fairly interpreted. The proposals of the Bosnian 
delegation, that were submitted also in writing, have not been 
quoted or attached in the Appendices. 213 
Izetbegovic's letter also focused on the detail of the proposals at some 
length. However, at the core of his criticism was the fact that he was 
210 Letter from ICFY Co-Chairs to Dr Karadzic on negotiations for Union of Three Republics, July 
23,1993. ref. CD93G23.PAR. Karadzic from Belgrade declared 'Why should we negotiate with the 
Muslims at all? They are militarily defeated ... ' Ibid. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Co-Chairmen's report S/26260, August 6,1993. 
213 Letter to Ms Madeleine Albright, President of the UN Security Council, August II, 1993, 
challenging Co-Chairmen's Report S/26260 of August 6, 1993. Ref.CD93H06.PAR. 
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being required to negotiate and reach agreement on details of the map 
while the aggression continued. Owen and Stoltenberg argued, however, 
without offering evidence for their view, that lzetbegovic was now seeking 
a Muslim republic. Owen stated he had, in principle, no objection to 
thiS.214 The allegation was not true, however, and had the effect of 
radicalising the Bosnian government in international eyes at a time 
when the United States was considering air strikes to prevent the VRS 
forces from closing off the only route into Sarajevo. On the day the 
report to the Security Council was published, Owen wrote to Belgian 
Foreign Minister Willi Claes, advising him that 
now is the time for a political strategy in relation to the negotiations, 
with the military strategy taking second place. I remain very concerned 
about the pressures still mounting for wide use of air strikes ... 
My instinct is that the United States and the Community could 
pressurise Izetbegovic to accept the map envisaged by the 
Serb/Croat proposal in Brcko, Eastern Bosnia, the Bihac pocket, 
and Central Bosnia. Indeed I think it is absolutely essential that 
this is agreed if we are to get any rethinking by the Serbs on their 
approach to Sarajevo ... 215 
This approach somewhat conflicted with Owen's earlier assertion that he 
was merely a mediator between the parties, and had no intention of 
pressurizing the Bosnian government. Owen also proposed to the EC 
Presidency that Sarajevo should fall under the auspices of the UN, 
advising Belgian Foreign Minister Willi Claes to liaise with 'those of our 
colleagues who are most involved, such as Douglas [Hurd] and Alain 
[Juppe]'.216 Once again, Owen was using his influence in persuading 
successive EC Presidencies of the rectitude of policies mostly originating 
in London. Acknowledging that the Serbs were unlikely to give up any 
214 The concept of a purely Muslim state was strongly opposed by the Bosnian (Muslim) Prime 
Minister, however. OWEN, op.cit. p.216. 
lIS Letter from Lord Owen to Foreign Minister Claes, August 6,1993. Ref. CD93H06A.PAR. 
Belgium held the EC Presidency from July 1, 1993. 
216 Letter from Lord Owen to Willi Claes, August 6, 1993, op.cit. 
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areas they currently occupied, Owen, in proposing a UN takeover of the 
capital, clearly had in mind the Croatian Krajina situation where the UN 
presence merely froze Serb territorial gains.217 
Under the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, the territory proposed to be allocated 
to the Bosnian government would be virtually landlocked. There was no 
guarantee that the Serbs would lift siege of Sarajevo or withdraw from 
occupied territory since, as before, enforcement provisions were omitted. 
The currency issue was also crucial. The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan did not 
refer to a central bank, which would imply a single currency, the 
Bosnian government preference. Owen, however, endorsed the 
Serb / Croat proposal for the Serbian dinar and Croatian kuna, 
respectively. In a letter to EC foreign ministers, Owen explained that 
'because the economies of the three republics were likely to be very 
different, the best solution seemed three currencies' .218 This option 
presaged full-scale partition, and facilitated eventual secession. By late 
August, even Owen admitted that 'EC unity was fraying at the edges',219 
attributing the reluctance of Germany and the Netherlands to accept the 
plan as due to hostile public opinion in those countries. EC 
Commissioner Van den Broek went further, accusing the co-chairs 
publicly of a strategy of capitulation' before the Serbs and 'legitimized 
aggression'.22o 
A deadline for signature of the Owen/ Stoltenberg Plan was set for 
August 30 in Geneva, with no evidence of international readiness to 
supply the thousands of extra troops needed to secure the three-way 
217 "The advantage is that the Serbs, after their experience in the UNPAs, will realise they can 
control their own areas." Lord Owen, Ibid. 
218 COREU from Lord Owen Personal for Foreign Ministers. Geneva Plenary Talks on Union of 
Three Republics, 29 July, 8. Ref. C093G30.PAR, and OWEN, op.cit. p.203. On the banking 
system, Owen consulted with representatives of the Bank of England. Ref.CD93G20.PAR. 
219 OWEN, Ibid. p.213. 
220 Ibid. 
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ethnic division. The Bosnian Croat leadership accepted partition, but the 
Croat communities outside the proposed new Croat statelet opposed 
it,221 as did most Bosniacs. As the Geneva talks again stalled, Owen 
suggested to the EC foreign ministers a timetable for lifting sanctions on 
Serbia, in order to encourage Milosevic's cooperation.222 
On September 8, at a UN Security Council meeting, President 
Izetbegovic appealed to Representatives to 'defend us, or let us defend 
ourselves'. The Council reportedly responded with 'a rare, heavy 
silence' ... leaving the US Ambassador 'visibly shaken'.223 The 
Ambassador then responded herself, stating the US view that the arms 
embargo should be lifted.224 Following the closed Council meeting, 
British and US officials clashed publicly.225 The British view was that no 
diplomatic niceties were required because Izetbegovic had been 
emotional rather than specific about his requirements. 226 
According to a leaked internal UNHCR report, while peace talks carried 
on through September, the systematic persecution of Bosniacs in Banja 
Luka and elsewhere in Northern Bosnia continued unabated,227 On 
September 20, the Royal Navy hosted the three parties, including the 
Serbian, Croatian and Montenegrin Presidents, on HMS Invincible in the 
Adriatic, where the map and other details of the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan 
221 Sunday Times, August, 29, 1993, p.l4. 
222 COREU 93111.PAR, September II, 1993, Background Note from Lord Owen for EC Foreign 
Ministers' Meeting. 
223 Washington Post, September 8, 1993, p.A23. 
224 Independent. September 9, 1993. 
225 The US Ambassador reportedly approached British Ambassador David Hannay saying 'I'm 
stunned, stunned. Why didn't you say anything? ... (Izetbegovic) spoke eloquently that the 
international community had let him down ... nobody spoke'. Ibid. 
226 Ibid. The Bosnian President's requirements had, however, been explicit. He had come to request 
the reversal of ethnic cleansing and an end to the siege of Sarajevo. 
227 Independent. September 9, 1993. 
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were finalised in an 8-hour session, for presentation to the Bosnian 
Assembly the following week. Despite Owen's indication after the 
Invincible meeting that all three parties were likely to accept, the 
Bosnian government rejected the Owen/Stoltenberg Plan and it 
foundered, like its predecessors, as did the so-called EC Action Plan 
later that year which allocated slightly more territory to the Bosnian 
government, but proposed little else new and, like the earlier plans, 
contained no enforcement provisions. 
The M t Igman Crisis 
Parellel with the promotion of the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, a new crisis 
arose within Bosnia as, on July 17, VRS forces launched a major 
offensive in the region of the Igman mountains overlooking Sarajevo 
airport. 
This section examines divergences between British and US policy in 
addressing the Mt. Igman crisis, and the establishment of the 'dual key' 
arrangement between NATO and the UN which was to provoke clashes 
between those two institutions and amongst major world powers over 
the following two years. 
Mt. Igman controlled the government's only supply route into the capital 
as, reportedly, more than 2,000 shells were frred on Bosnian positions in 
the fiercest onslaught on Sarajevo since its declaration as a UN 'safe 
area' .228 This, together with the mortaring of Sarajevo residents in a 
water queue by Serb artillery the previous week, and with only minimal 
supplies of water, gas, electricity and food reaching Sarajevo's 
citizens,229 moved Bosnian President lzetbegovic to withdraw from the 
228 Agence France Presse, July 17, 1993, quoted in IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, July 1993. 
229 Ibid. July 16, 1993. 
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Geneva talks, pending the withdrawal of the VRS forces from Igman. 23o 
Clinton had already attributed the failure of the peace negotiations to 
European opposition to his proposal to lift the UN arms embargo against 
the Bosnian govemment231 and, as VRS forces attacked the French 
UNPROFOR base in Sarajevo within hours of a UN-brokered ceasefire, 
Clinton again examined the various options on breaking the Sarajevo 
siege, not excluding unilateral military action. 232 It was decided first, 
however, to seek allied endorsement for the threat of air strikes, firstly to 
force the Serbs back from around Sarajevo and, secondly, to promote an 
agreement, while being prepared to act unilaterally. 233 On July 24, Lake 
and Bartholomew, the Administration's Bosnia envoy, left for Europe, 
meeting first with the British in London who were reported as positive,234 
and then with the French. On the basis of these meetings, Clinton 
decided there was enough consensus to take the matter to a meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council on August 2. Accordingly, Administration 
officials announced that air action was imminent.235 NATO members 
agreed that immediate preparations for stronger measures in Bosnia 
would be made if the strangulation of Sarajevo and other safe areas 
continued.236 As a condition for their agreement, however, Britain and 
France insisted that NATO commanders secure UN agreement before 
acting. 
230 Reuters, July 18, 1993, Ibid. 
231 "Larry King Live" CNN, July 20, 1993, quoted in Chicago Tribune. July 22,1993. 
232 Warren Christopher, since his abortive European tour in May, was, however, less enthusiastic 
about further initiatives which clashed with the British and French position. According to one senior 
US official, 'After his European trip, Christopher put Bosnia in the 'too hard' box, and it stayed there 
for a long time'. DREW. op.cit. p.274. 
233 Ibid. p.275. 
234 John Major in his memoirs quoted one US delegate as saying 'it is the only chance to make 
lemonade out oflemons', MAJOR, op.cit. pp.542-3. 
235 Differences within the Clinton Administration remained, however. While Air Force Chief of 
Staff Merrill McPeak was optimistic about air action, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin 
Powell, argued that Serb artillery could easily be moved out of sight. 
236 DREW, op.cit. p.278. 
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The decision to present the plan to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was 
made at a meeting on July 31, attended by President Clinton, Secretary 
of State Christopher, Defense Secretary Aspin, National Security Advisor 
Lake and General Powell, the armed forces Chief of General Staff.237 On 
the eve of the NATO ambassadors' meeting, the White House announced 
that air strikes "could begin within the next few days" to end the siege of 
Sarajevo.238 Support for selective air strikes was also forthcoming from 
Spain, which had a substantial UN force on the ground.239 Also, French 
Defence Minister Francois Leotard, after an hour-long meeting with US 
Defence Secretary Les Aspin told reporters at the Pentagon that the 
western allies would not tolerate further attacks on UN troops in Bosnia, 
and were prepared to launch air strikes if they continued.240 
Before the scheduled NAC meeting, Owen wrote to Douglas Hurd: 
We are grateful for the calming influence that you are trying to exert 
but the fact is that Washington seems intent on continuing down this 
path, and very quickly. The UN is coming under fierce pressure from 
the highest quarters to give a carte blanche for widespread use of air 
strikes. So far this is being resisted by Stoltenberg and the UN 
Secretary General, and I believe we have bought time for a day or so ... 
We have asked Briquemont to submit a report on the situation which 
will be drafted by Brigadier Hayes.241 We expect this will paint a fairly 
positive picture, and we believe it should be presented in Washington ... 
I believe that all available channels should be used to persuade the 
Americans that air strikes at this stage can only be damaging. I have 
237 Agence France Presse, August 1, 1993, quoted in IHRLl. Sarajevo Source File, August 1993. 
238 New York Times. August 2, 1993, p.A14. 
239 In an interview with the state news agency Efe, Spanish Defence Minister Julian Garcia Vargas 
commented: «the international community has acted so far with caution and what is now needed is 
fIrm action». Reuters, August 1, 1993, quoted in IHRLI, op.cit. 
240 Reuters, July 29, 1993, quoted in IHRLI, op.cit. 
241 Brigadier Vere Hayes was the British Chief of Staff of UN forces in Bosnia. Former Adviser to 
the US Ambassador to the UN James Rubin recalled that Vere Hayes was 'clearly offering the 'all 
sides are guilty' thesis .. .in the 'you Americans are naIve and we know better' mode'. Quoted in 
SIMMS, op.cit. p.196. 
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spoken to Churkin ... and asked him to get Kozyrev to contact 
Christopher and tell him that in the light of the considerable progress 
that has been made it would be wrong to go ahead with the air strike 
policy. My French Deputy, Ambassador Masset, has passed a similar 
message to Juppe ... 
The French want to keep [the NAC meeting on 2 August] very low key, 
with no dramatic announcements. I would far prefer no NAC meeting 
because I do not believe it will be played low key by the US ... 242 
Owen also wrote to the NATO Secretary-General Manfred Womer, 
requesting that ICFY deputy Jean-Pierre Masset brief the NAC before the 
US presented their own case; he also cabled EC Foreign Ministers 
advising them that "talk of wide use of air strikes at the present juncture 
were unhelpful", and that emphasis should be laid on NATO's role in 
implementing a peace settlement on the basis of three republics. 243 The 
fact that the Bosnian side had withdrawn from the talks at this point 
appeared irrelevant. Owen had also briefed Ottawa closely on ICFY 
views, attributing this to the active role Canada assumed at the NAC 
meeting in forestalling immediate NATO action. 244 Instead, NATO 
planners were instructed to draw up operational options in preparation 
for a final decision the following week. The NATO communique, issued 
after a 12-hour debate on August 2 in Brussels, read: 
The Alliance has now decided to make immediate preparations for 
undertaking, in the event that the strangulation of Sarajevo and other 
areas continues ... stronger measures including air strikes against those 
responsible. Bosnian Serbs and others, in Bosnia-Herzegovina.245 
Several high-ranking members of the mainly European UN force 
stationed in Sarajevo also voiced opposition,246 in particular UN Chief of 
242 'Air Strikes letter to Hurd', July 31, 1993. CD93G31.PAR. 
243 OWEN, op.cit. p.205. 
244 Ibid. p.206. 
24S Keesing's Record of World Events, August 1993, p.39603. 
246 UPl, August 2,1993, quoted in lHRLl, op.cit. 
201 
Staff Brigadier General Hayes. Hayes informed reporters that the 
Bosnian army bore the main blame for blocking relief supplies to 
Sarajevo, and that the current Serb assault on Mt. Igman was strangling 
only the Bosnian military supply line into Sarajevo.247 The following 
week, Hayes declared that 'there is no humanitarian siege of Sarajevo'. 
UNPROFOR spokesperson Barry Frewer added that the Bosnian Serb 
army was 'in a tactically advantageous position around the city. I don't 
want to portray it as a siege ... I see it as an encirclement'.248 The 
following day at the UN Security Council, US Ambassador Albright, with 
support from other Security Council members, publicly criticised 
comments made by Brigadier Hayes. According to Albright, the UN 
Secretary-General accepted the complaint that the two UN peace-
keeping officers had made inappropriate remarks. Reportedly, the 
Bosnian government declared Frewer persona non grata in Sarajevo and 
called for his removal. No action was taken by UNPROFOR, however. 249 
As the pressure for air strikes mounted, Douglas Hurd rang Lord Owen, 
allegedly concerned that the Conference might adjoum.250 Also at this 
time, Shadow Defence Secretary David Clark and senior Labour MP 
John Reid travelled to Geneva at the Serbs' expense to meet Karadzic.251 
According to Clark, the visit helped persuade Karadzic to move his 
troops from Igman, thus saving many thousands of lives.252 In the same 
week, the Sunday Times carried an article by Jonathan Eyal, Director of 
the Royal United Services Institute in London, arguing against the use of 
247 Reuters, August 5, 1993, quoted in IHRLI, Ibid. See also OWEN, op.cit. p.208. 
248 UPI, 16 August 1993, Ibid. 
249 UPI, August 18, 1993, Ibid. and OWEN, op.cit. p.211. According to Owen, the brigadier's 
comment was 'What does Clinton think he is doing?' 
2S0 OWEN, op.cit. p.209. Adjournment of the Geneva Conference would, of course, have made air 
strikes more probable. 
2S1 The visit later aroused media interest when it was discovered that it had not been recorded in the 
MPs Record oflnterests. Sunday Times, June 29, 1997. See also HODGE, The Serb Lobby, op.cit. 
p.14, for details of that visit. 
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air strikes as 'wrong at every level', and concluding that the Serbs had 
won the war.253 Meanwhile, on August 9, in a government PR exercise 
organised by the Foreign Office, five-year-old Irma Hadzimuratovic, 
wounded in a Serb mortar attack on July 30, was air-lifted out of 
Sarajevo by an RAF Hercules to Britain for treatment. 254 The Irma story, 
commanding British press headlines for several days, proved a 
distraction from the events on the ground, as well as from European 
attempts to dilute the US threat. 255 
The pressure for air strikes abated following a meeting between UN 
commanders and General Mladic at the Bosnian Serb headquarters in 
Pale. Afterwards, it was announced by the ICFY co-chairs that the Serbs 
would cede Mt. Igman to UN troops.256 According to anonymous UN 
sources, the Serbs, in deliberating on whether to withdraw from the 
mountains around Sarajevo, had closely followed the negotiations 
between the US and its NATO allies on terms concerning air strikes.257 
As a protracted Serb withdrawal from Igman commenced,2S1 General 
m Sunday Times, August 8, 1993. 
2S4 On July 16, UNHCR Commissioner Sadako Ogata had appealed to 43 governments, including 
Britain, for help in removing specific victims from Sarajevo, without receiving a single response. 
Scotland on Sunday, August 15, 1993, p.8. 
25S Patrick Peillod, the French head of the UN medical evacuation committee, criticised Britain for 
its 'supermarket attitude', turning the evacuation issue into a PR exercise, and treating Bosnian 
children 'like animals in a zoo'. Agence France Presse, 15 August 1993, quoted from IHRLI, op.cit. 
An open letter from Dr. Faruk Kulenovic, head of Kosevo hospital's plastic surgery department, 
published August 16, stated "It would he much better if you sent the tools to do our jobs properly 
than for you to make a hig show of a few token evacuations, chief of surgery at Kosevo hospital, 
said, 'the West is making self-promotion out of this. But it's too little and too late to clear their 
consciences'. UP!, August 15, 1993, Ibid. 
256 Agence France Press, August 5, 1993, Ibid. Owen records that it was Milosevic who had advised 
that the meeting should take place at Pale. OWEN. op.cit. p.207-8. 
251 New York Times, August 11, 1993. 
258 UP], August 7, 1993, quoted from IHRLI, Ibid. Days later, despite the reported consolidation of 
the Serbian strongholds, including columns of self-propelled field guns and military trucks moving 
along the main access routes to the mountains, backed up by at least 600 newly arrived soldiers, 
Bosnian Serb spokesman Jovan Zametica told reporters in Geneva that Serb troops on Mount Igman 
had withdrawn to the lines of July 30. Reuters, August 12, 1993, quoted from IHRLI, op.cit. 
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Mladic announced that the Serbs would surrender positions one by one, 
contingent on their replacement by UN forces. This would tie up UN 
troops, of course, without actually lifting the siege. There was also 
speculation that the demand on UN resources to oversee the ceded 
territory could cause delays in the pullback, since the 9,OOO-strong UN 
overall force allowed for little more than monitoring of the areas the Serb 
forces had vacated. 259 
Meanwhile, a device which became known as the 'dual key' arrangement 
was established, whereby any military action would be determined 
jointly by NATO and the UN.260 When NATO met on August 9, its 
original declaration was toned down in the tacit acknowledgement that 
the political will for air strikes did not exist.261 On August 13, the US 
Secretary of State conceded publicly that the Clinton Administration 
would be satisfied with a partial Serb withdrawal from Mts. Bjelasnica 
and Igman.262 UN Commander General Briquemont, meanwhile, 
confirmed that the Serbs still threatened the city with their firepower. 263 
David Owen had used the pretext of the peace negotiations to persuade 
EC foreign ministers to oppose the US air strike initiative, and the North 
Atlantic Council to defer its decision. In this, he was supported by the 
British government, British Chief of Staff Brigadier Vere Hayes, senior 
Labour MPs and other prominent British personalities. 
The peace talks collapsed the following month, and Sarajevo remained 
under siege, but the threat of air strikes had again been averted, and the 
259 New York Times, August 9, 1993. 
260 UP!, August 9, 1993, quoted from IHRLI, op.cit. 
261 Guardian, August 10, 1993. 
262 Yet, according to Bosnian Vice President Ejup Ganic, the Serb troops had tightened their 
strategic noose around Sarajevo by deploying 2,000 fresh troops in less visible lowlands closer to 
front lines after pulling them off Mounts Igrnan and Bje\asnica, rendering the siege even stronger 
than previouslY.llfl & Agence France Presse, August 13, 1993, quoted from IHRLI, op.cit. 
263 Reuters, 16 August 1993, quoted fromIHRLI, Ibid. 
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VRS shelling of Sarajevo subsided temporarily.264 The 'dual key' 
arrangement was controversial from the outset, and later caused a 
fundamental rift to develop between Europe and the US over the 
command of air operations in Bosnia, most crucially in Gorazde and 
Bihac in April and October 1994, and Srebrenica in July 1995. 
House of Commons. July 1993 
As the Igman crisis was developing, a significant parliamentary debate 
on Bosnia took place in the House of Commons, challenging many of the 
precepts on which the British government's Bosnia policy had been 
built. The debate opened at 9.30 p.m. on July 26 and included 
contributions by MPs from across the political spectrum. Labour MP 
Calum Macdonald, who had called the debate, set the terms of reference, 
alleging that the government had misled parliament on advice from 
military heads and aid workers, and that it had misjudged the national 
political will; he challenged the government's performance at UN 
Security Council level, accusing the government of playing for time, and 
called into question the 'civil war' argument. 
The Minister often claims that there is no political or domestic will 
in the House or the country. I genuinely think he is utterly wrong to 
make that claim. I think there is a huge groundswell of opinion 
among ordinary people in the country that the United Kingdom 
should be doing much more than it has over the past two years. 265 
41 [UN Security Council] resolutions ... have been passed during the 
past 23 months ... but never fully implemented and, in essence, have 
changed nothing in former Yugoslavia ... The Government ... have put 
their signatures to all the resolutions. They have helped to draft all 
the resolutions, including the resolution on safe areas. 266 
264 Sarajevo's Kosevo hospital reported the lowest toll in war wounds for months on the day after the 
NATO summit New York Times, August 4, 1993. 
265 Calum Macdonald, Yul:oslavia.luly 26, 1993, Hansard, Vo1.229, c.838. 
266 Ibid. c.839. 
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The Government often give the impression that they are playing for 
time ... that, if they can stretch out the endless series of resolutions 
and play out the endless sequence of conferences and negotiations 
for long enough, the public will eventually become disinterested. 267 
When Ministers search for an excuse for non-intervention, they often 
say that there is a civil war in former Yugoslavia and Bosnia and that 
we cannot become involved in a civil war. Of course, communities 
and civilians are caught up in the war. In that sense, it is civil... 
However, it is not a civil war in the sense that its primary source and 
inspiration is internal and domestic - absolutely not. 268 
the Government's claims that all the expert advice from humanitarian 
workers, the military and the diplomatic corps is against intervention 
are being shown to be grossly and gravely misleading. A group of us 
visited the NATO headquarters recently. We left there with the clear 
impression that most senior officials in NATO were satisfied that 
intervention was not only feasible and advisable but urgently required. 
We received a clear impression that there was intense frustration at 
the failure at the political level to take the steps necessary to resolve 
the crisis. 269 
Macdonald reiterated his allegation on two occasions later that year in 
the House of Commons: 
I have it on reliable authority that two successive chairmen of the 
military committee of NATO have recommended and urged a military 
intervention by NATO in Bosnia. General Eyde [sic], who was chairman 
of NATO's military committee, before the present incumbent, General 
Vincent, recommended early last year that 40,000 troops be put into 
Bosnia to prevent the situation from exploding. 270 
I do not believe that it has been the failure to impose military will that 
has held western Governments back from intervening in the Balkans 
on a grand scale. My conversations with General Vincent and his 
267Ibid.c.839. 
268 Ibid. 839-840. Macdonald pointed out that at the European Council Summit in Edinburgh in 
December 1992, it was plainly stated in a communique by the Heads of State that although there 
were civil aspects to what was happening in former Yugoslavia, the primary responsibility lay with 
the Serbian Government in Belgrade. Ibid. c.840. 
269 Ibid. c.839. 
270 Calum Macdonald, Statement of the Defence Estimates. October IS, 1993, Hansard, Vo1.264, 
c.S6. 
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predecessor General Eide, have convinced me that a lack of political 
will has been the key to the failure of the West to intervene more 
aggressively in the Balkans.271 
Macdonald's allegations were supported by other MPs. Labour MP Clare 
Short confirmed that 
when we visited NATO we were told that all it took to enforce the safe 
areas strategy was the commitment of 8,000 troops and a change in 
the rules of engagement...NATO ... felt that this was a European 
responsibility and that European troops, at that very small level, 
should be committed.272 
Patrick Cormack, the only Conservative MP consistently to challenge 
government policy on former Yugoslavia, added: 
I have talked to soldiers, diplomats and journalists. I do not want to 
break confidences or embarrass people, but suffice it to say that I am 
not persuaded - how shall I word this carefully - that what has been 
said in the House entirely reflects the advice that I am told has been 
given at a lower level. Perhaps that advice has not permeated to the top 
and, if that is the case, there is something wrong with the system. 
There is an appreciation among diplomats and those responsible in 
NATO and elsewhere that there is something that should and could be 
done.273 
Cormack also quoted BBC journalist Martin Bell as saying at a meeting 
in the House two weeks previously 'that he was convinced that the Serb 
gun positions could easily have been taken out. They were not as mobile 
as some would have had us believe' .274 The mobility of the Serb gun 
positions around Sarajevo was one of the main reasons proffered in 
arguing against the viability of air strikes to lift the siege. 
Labour backbencher Chris Mullin was more explicit: 
271 Calum Macdonald, Peaceke«pina Operations. December 13, 1993, Hansard. Vo1.234, c.717. 
272 Ibid. c.841. 
273 Ibid. c.845. 
274 Ibid. 
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The House and the country have been badly misled. From the outset, 
we have been told that nothing can be done about anything in Bosnia. 
We have been told that the terrain is impossible, that the people are 
impossible and that the experts are against doing anything. No doubt 
those same arguments were rehearsed in the 1930s. However, I think 
that we have been misled and that the experts, of all persuasions, have 
been saying something different.275 
Liberal Democrat Sir Russell Johnston referred to a briefing from the 
Action Rapide headquarters in Paris the previous year: 
During the briefing, the general was asked specifically what he thought 
about the military implications of lifting the siege of Sarajevo and he 
more or less said, 'if you give me proper notice and 36 hours, I will do 
it.276 
The Foreign Minister in his response ignored many of the most 
provocative points raised, including the allegation that the government 
had misled the House,277 merely reiterating that he did not believe the 
national will existed for military intervention. 
When people talk about public support for military intervention, I 
believe that they are wrong .. .1 have made it my business to try to 
determine where political views lie and I do not believe that they lie in 
deepening military engagement. 278 
The House of Commons adjourned for the Summer recess shortly 
thereafter. During an official visit to Malaysia that Summer, John Major 
was forced to depart from his prepared text as the Malaysian Prime 
m Ibid. c.861. 
276 Ibid. c.848. 
277 SNP leader Alex Salmond's intervention was pertinent: 'I have noted the almost studied 
indifference of Ministers. Would it hurt Ministers to listen to the speeches on this important 
subject?' Ibid. c.86S. 
278 Ibid. c.873. 
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Minister Mahatir delivered an open direct attack on British policy 
towards Bosnia.279 
In the first week of August, Channel 4 presented Bloody Bosnia Week, 
covering various aspects of the Bosnian war, while The Independent 
launched a public campaign to lift the siege of Sarajevo. In early 
September, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd delivered a speech at the 
Travellers' Club, decrying media intervention and what he called 'the 
something-must-be-done brigade'. In the following months, reporting of 
the Bosnia war moved to the inside pages of the British broadsheet 
press.280 Equally, there was little further debate on the Bosnian war 
that year in the House of Commons.281 Secret talks initiated by the ICFY 
in Norway in late October also collapsed. By the Autumn, NATO military 
staffs had completed a detailed plan to deploy a 50,000 strong 
peacekeeping force in Bosnia. Their defence ministers, meeting in mid-
October, however, had to concede that there was no political will to 
act.282 On the other hand, the Foreign Secretary led the House of 
Commons to believe that progress on the peace front was being 
achieved. 'There is now revived discussion - I cannot say conclusions - of 
a sort that there has not been for some time'. 283 This served the purpose 
of biding time,284 and helped to deflect questioning from MPs critical of 
British policy. It was not until the massacre of 68 civilians at the 
279 Mirza Hajric, Oslobodjenje, October l-S, 1993. 
280 As the Commons Deputy Speaker commented: there has been a tendency for media attention [on 
Bosnia] to drop away, in that rather sad way that we see when somehow it becomes yesterday's 
news. Michael Marshall (Deputy Speaker), Peacekecpinl: Operations. December 13,1993, Hansard. 
Vo1.234, c.711. 
281 In the Debate on the Address, Former Yugoslavia was relegated to fourth place after Cyprus. 
Debate on the Address: Foreil:n Affairs and Defence. November 19, 1993, Hansard. Vo1.233, c.1IS. 
282 Guardian, October IS, 1993. 
283 Ibid. c.51S. 
284 See Yuioslayia. July 26, 1993, op.cit. c.839. 
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Markale market place in Sarajevo in February 1994 that world leaders 
were forced once again to focus their efforts on ending the siege. 
Conclusion 
International attempts to end the war in Bosnia in 1993 were dominated 
by a series of abortive peace plans, in which former British foreign 
secretary Lord Owen assumed a leading role. Owen adopted a strategy 
through the Vance-Owen Peace Plan which accepted the principle of 
territorial and political division on primarily ethnic grounds, while using 
terminology which indicated eschewal of the heterogeneity still prevailing 
in much of Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly some major towns. The 
Geneva Conference, which emerged from the London Conference the 
previous summer, accepted in principle the sovereignty of Bosnia-
Herzegovina which underpinned the Vance-Owen plan. Yet, in practice, 
the VOPP enshrined the principles of ethnic partition in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, introduced through the Cutileiro Plan in 1992, and 
vindicated the 'percentages' approach which depended on agreement 
being reached between aggressor and victim on the territorial carve-up 
of the Bosnian state. 
Like the Cutileiro Plan, the VOPP was based on the ethnic division of an 
intrinsically ethnically-mixed state, awarding 43% of Bosnian territory to 
the Serbs who had constituted under 33% of the population prior to the 
war, and 27% to the Croats who formed 17% of the pre-war population, 
allotting Bosniacs approximately 30% of fragmented, indefensible land, 
mainly in central Bosnia. Lord Owen justified this anomaly through an 
argument which had originated in Pale, namely, that the Serbs, 
traditionally more rurally based, had previously occupied 60% of the 
land. In this, he was supported by Members of Parliament who had 
visited the region on Serb-fmanced trips organised by Serb lobbyists in 
London. The argument was a spurious one, not least due to the ethnic 
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diversity which had characterised Bosnia prior to the war, but also 
because, under the Tito administration, land had been 'socially', rather 
than individually, owned. 
The Bosnian Serb leadership nonetheless rejected the VOPP against the 
advice of Milosevic, in the expectation that more territory could be 
gained, and therefore extra leverage in peace negotiations, by 
maintaining the offensive. This tactic did in fact work since, just weeks 
later, Owen endorsed a Serb-Croat initiative which effectively split 
Bosnia-Herzegovina between the two groups, with an option to secede, 
leaving Bosniacs (and other Bosnian government supporters) with non-
contiguous indefensible territory. The Contact Group Plan the following 
year offered a larger percentage of Bosnian territory to the Serbs along 
with their own republic, within a weak, de centralised Bosnian state, 
thereby fulfilling most of the short-term war objectives of the Bosnian 
Serb leadership. 
Although not the sole source of unrest in Central Bosnia, the Vance-
Owen Peace Plan gave Bosnian Croats the incentive and encouragement 
to fight for Croat-allocated territory in traditionally Muslim areas. The 
conflict between the Bosnian Army and HVO forces erupted at a time 
when world attention was focused on Srebrenica, and the US was 
preparing to endorse a policy which included lifting the arms embargo 
from the Bosnian government, while conducting strategic air strikes on 
Serb positions. British UNPROFOR failed to prevent a massacre just two 
miles from its base in Vitez, an area till then enjoying relative peace, and 
did not act sufficiently swiftly or effectively to forestall, or lessen, the 
retaliation which, within days, led to hostilities throughout the Lasva 
Valley. Neither did senior British army officers act on information of 
large-scale atrocities provided by British troops under their command 
who had made several patrols of Ahmici on the day of the massacre, or 
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provide a consistent account of BritBat activities that day in evidence at 
the UN International Tribunal at the Hague. After the discovery of the 
massacre, wide scale publicity ensured an equivalence of guilt between 
Croats and Serbs, overshadowing the Serb onslaught on Srebrenica. It 
also assisted the proponents of the 'civil war' theory which was 
thereafter used in defence of the Joint Action Programme, essentially a 
policy of appeasement, of which Britain was a co-sponsor. In short, the 
new outbreak of hostilities in Central Bosnia facilitated the international 
retreat from military action against the Serb forces. 
The validity of the UNPROFOR mission to escort humanitarian aid was 
also in question. According to British officers and others, it was no 
longer possible to implement the aid programme effectively in most of 
Central Bosnia, due to the obstruction of supply routes by Croat forces. 
Indeed, throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, in areas where aid was most 
needed there were, according to UNHCR records, increasingly few 
deliveries, despite the UNPROFOR presence. To ensure delivery to the 
eastern enclaves and other remote areas, a large percentage of the aid 
was surrendered to forces at the road blocks, leading many, including a 
former British minister, to observe that UNPROFOR was effectively 
prolonging the war. This practice also resulted in the army controlling 
most of the supply routes, namely the VRS, obtaining most of the UN 
aid. The 'escorted aid' mission was a British initiative, however, and 
Britain, a leading troop contributor, had considerable influence in the 
regulations governing aid distribution. 
The Vance-Owen Plan provided a temporary hiatus for EC leaders, 
papering over some of the divisions within the European Community 
with regard to its Bosnia policy. It failed primarily due to rejection by the 
Bosnian Serb Assembly, but was anyway unworkable since it lacked the 
enforcement measures required for implementation, with the result that 
its success rested on the 'goodwill' of Serb leaders to withdraw from 27% 
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of territory held. Both Milosevic and Bosnian Serb leaders knew this 
would not be insisted on, hence their acquiescence in the Plan. 
British government ministers had emphasized frequently that combat 
forces would on no account be used to implement the VOPP. Lord Owen, 
Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind and others blamed the United States 
for the VOPP failure, as well as for inconsistency in their Bosnia policy, 
and reluctance to offer ground troops. It is true that the VOPP was never 
fully endorsed by the UN Security Council, due to lack of support from 
the United States, the main US objections being that it was unfeasible 
and unenforceable, as well as appeasing ethnic cleansing. America was 
unwilling to get bogged down in a potential ground war, both for 
historical reasons (Vietnam) and because there was no clear 
implementation strategy. The appearance of inconsistency in US policy, 
however, arose mainly from the discrepancy between its preferred 'lift-
and-strike' policy and the necessary accommodation of British and 
French concerns regarding danger to their troops. This led to a series of 
policy initiatives on the part of the US, followed by retreat, as America's 
major NATO allies, and Britain in particular, opposed any policy 
involving war with the Serbs. 
Yet the US threat of force at various junctures was clearly instrumental 
in Serb compliance, although often temporary, to international 
demands. Radovan Karadzic's signature to the VOPP in Athens in early 
May and the VRS withdrawal from Mt Igman in August were two 
instances that year which illustrated the potential merit of a coherent 
and resolute (albeit not united) response to the Serb onslaught. 
Accommodating Serb and Croat territorial aspirations, on the contrary, 
particularly in the Joint Action Programme, emboldened both parties to 
press for the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. During extensive 
negotiations, ICFY Co-chair David Owen moved from ostensible 
sympathy for the 'Muslim' position to a hard-line stance which required 
placing substantial pressure on the Bosnian President to accept an 
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emasculated 'Muslim' state, while presenting this, despite evidence to 
the contrary, as the desired outcome of Bosnian Muslim leaders. 
Lord Owen's activities, in fact, extended well beyond his official role in 
the peace negotiations. As well as nurturing nationalist forces on the 
Croat side, and Fikret Abdic, a corrupt businessman of Muslim ethnic 
origin who colluded with Serb forces in the Bosnian and Croatian 
Krajinas against the Bosnian government, Owen promoted Serbian 
President Milosevic before the EC as an essential player in any peace 
agreement. In late August 1993, when the Owen-Stoltenberg plan 
seemed doomed to the same fate as the VOPP, this time due to Bosnian 
government rejection, Owen proposed lifting sanctions from Serbia. The 
EC envoy's strategy, ignoring and even alienating multi-ethnic forces, 
encouraged leaders in Pale, Belgrade and Zagreb in pursuing racist 
objectives, which contributed to radicalising Muslim elements in the 
Bosnian government. 
The Joint Action Programme, which extended the 'safe areas' concept on 
paper, while not guaranteeing their security, was portrayed by Owen as 
a US initiative. The Srebrenica Report records, however, that, while 
Britain, and to a lesser extent France, fully supported the JAP, the 
British ambassador argued strenuously to limit the number of UN 
troops considered necessary to implement it. The Report also revealed 
that United States was a reluctant co-signatory, regarding the JAP as no 
more than a temporary, stop-gap measure, intended to reaffirm a united 
international front. Russia, in fact, was the instigator of the JAP, the 
first major Russian contribution to the international policy in the 
Balkans since the war began, an initiative applauded in the Russian 
press as a major diplomatic victory. 
In order to preempt US military intervention, British government 
ministers used a number of ploys, including (to the US) the claim that 
British public and parliamentary opinion was against the military 
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option. So far as the public was concerned, national opinion polls had 
indicated the contrary and, in the House of Commons, no vote took 
place, and there was only infrequent debating on Bosnia, insufficient to 
assess fully Members' positions although, in the one extensive debate 
held, the vast majority of speakers were critical of government policy on 
Bosnia. Conversely, in justifying government policy in the House of 
Commons and through the media, ministers defended their rejection of 
military intervention by citing expert military opinion, and positions held 
by other major world powers. However, as noted by several MPs, the 
expert opinion was somewhat at odds with that alleged by ministers. The 
Srebrenica Report also revealed that the United States, with some other 
Security Council members, including the Non-Aligned Caucus, opposed 
the British position. 
During the Igman crisis, British military and diplomatic officials were 
active in seeking to allay NATO action. This succeeded, with the 
assistance of Canada, in eroding NATO's resolve, as demonstrated in the 
diluted communique issued after the NAC meeting, causing an impasse 
which, in turn, led to the 'dual key' arrangement, effectively blocking 
NATO from other than token air strikes throughout the rest of the war. 
The British Chief of Staff in Sarajevo also acted to undermine the US 
position through public statements, as did the visit of two Labour MPs 
who travelled to Geneva as guests of Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, 
while later concealing the trip from the Register of Members' Interests. 
The unrecorded trip at such a sensitive juncture could have been 
misinterpreted as indicating official Labour Party support for the Serbs, 
in contrast with most opposition parties in other major western states. 
While promoting peace plans which were essentially unviable, and which 
served to block other potentially more effective initiatives, Britain argued 
strenuously in support of maintaining the blanket arms embargo, 
thereby reaffirming the imbalance of weaponry. While other EC states in 
varying degrees also broadly supported both the peace process and the 
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arms embargo, Britain often led the consensus, and was alone in 
consistently opposing military intervention, and strenuously arguing for 
the minimal peacekeeping option in Bosnia, policies which, separately 
and collectively, helped to prolong the war and further consolidate Serb 
territorial gains in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By the end of 1993, there was 
an almost total fragmentation of institutional decision-making and 
action in relation to peace and security which, in turn, affected relations 
between the United Nations and NATO, and challenged the role of NATO 
in the new post-Cold War order. 
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CHAPTER 4 
1994. 'SAFE AREAS' : THE ROLE OF MICHAEL ROSE 
Introduction 
In 1994, the flaws inherent in the UN 'safe areas' policy incorporated in 
UN Security Council resolution 836 in June 1993 became increasingly 
exposed, UNPROFOR being neither sufficiently equipped nor mandated 
to implement the resolution. 1 The friction between NATO and the United 
Nations resulting from divergent approaches to resolving the crisis was, 
in great part, a reflection of the conflicting Bosnian policies of the United 
States on the one hand, and major European powers, on the other. 
This chapter analyses some of the implications of the 'safe areas' policy 
through the international response to its violation by Serb forces in 
three areas: Sarajevo, Gorazde and Bihac. It also discusses the Contact 
Group plan which, to some extent, was a by-product of the Gorazde 
crisis, and formed the basis for the eventual peace settlement at Dayton 
the following year. The role of General Sir Michael Rose, the British UN 
Commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina from January 1994, and Lord Owen, 
Co-Chair of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICFY), are examined, as well as British ministerial statements. Close 
reference is made to NATO and UN documentation, in particular the 
Srebrenica Report, parliamentary records, memoirs of key players, 
I See, for instance, the views of the departing UNPROFOR Commander Jean Cot: 'I have asked 
for numerous reforms of the UN structure in Yugoslavia [sic], especially in the use of 
information, the capacity to analyse and reflect and the use of supporting force'. Cot said his 
disagreement with the UN Secretary-General over air support for troops in Bosnia was only the 
tip of the iceberg. 'In the case of a massive attack on a safe area, or anywhere else, the only 
means of immediate response is the policy of close air support, on the condition that we can react 
immediately ... [which] means three minutes ... certainly not three hours'. General Francis 
Briquemont, General Rose's predecessor, also left his post early, reportedly due to frustration at 
UN failure in Bosnia. Guardian, January 25,1994, p.9. 
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including the CD-ROM COREUs2 reproduced by David Owen, academic 
analyses, and local and international media coverage. 
It concludes that Britain, through its politicians, and military and 
diplomatic representatives, played a major role in blocking effective 
military action by NATO to preempt or halt Serb attacks on the UN 'safe 
areas' in Bosnia-Herzegovina, thereby facilitating the territorial and 
political objectives of the Serb leadership in Pale and Belgrade, and 
contributing to the consolidation of Serb-held territory in Bosnia. The 
relative impunity with which international actors, led by Britain, met the 
VRS incursions into the 'safe areas' also inspired confidence amongst 
Serb leaders to pursue their mission, especially in the eastern enclaves 
resulting, the following year, in the worst atrocity in Europe since 1945. 
Markale Massacre. Sarajevo, February 1994 
On February 5, a mortar bomb exploded on the Markale market place in 
Sarajevo, killing 68 people and wounding over 200.3 The international 
response to this incident is assessed here at diplomatic, military and 
political level, with particular reference to the part played by the newly-
appointed British UN Commander, Gen-Lt. Sir Michael Rose, in co-
ordination with other UN officials, including the UN Special 
Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG), Yasushi Akashi, and 
the ICFY Co-Chairs, David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg. The 
conclusion drawn is that Britain's response to the massacre diverged 
substantially from that of other major western countries and most NATO 
member states, and contributed to undermining NATO authority. 
2 Official telegrams between ECIEU capitals, available on line on the University of Liverpool 
website. 
3 The incident followed a Serb mortar attack the previous day which had killed ten civilians in the 
Dobrinja district of Sarajevo. 
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Lt. General Sir Michael Rose arrived in Bosnia on January 25, assuming 
the UN Command in Bosnia from the Belgian General, Francis 
Briquemont.4 Having spent the previous year as Deputy Force 
Commander overseeing the UK contribution to the UN mission in former 
Yugoslavia, and visiting Bosnia on several occasions, General Rose was 
familiar with the situation there.s 
On February 6, the day after the Markale massacre, the UN Secretary-
General wrote to the Secretary-General of NATO requesting: 
at the earliest possible date, a decision by the North Atlantic 
Council to authorize the Commander-in-Chief of NATO's Southern 
Command to launch air strikes, at the request of the United Nations, 
against artillery or mortar positions in or around Sarajevo which are 
determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against 
civilian targets in that city.6 
On February 9, the North Atlantic Council met and formally agreed to 
issue a lO-day ultimatum, with a 20km exclusion zone around Sarajevo 
which required the withdrawal, or regrouping and placing under 
UNPROFOR control, of all heavy weaponry (including that of the Bosnian 
government forces) within the area, cautioning that heavy weapons 
found within the exclusion zone after that date, along with their military 
support facilities, would be subject to air strikes.7 
4 In an interview with a Sarajevo newspaper on the eve of his departure, General Briquemont 
declared that 'if the existing logic of war is not stopped, it will be catastrophic for Europe ... it is 
absolutely incredible that politicians, particularly those on the international scene, give 
themselves the right to determine military and non-military objectives and then are not willing to 
secure the necessary conditions so that we may fulfill these objectives'. Oslobodjenje, European 
edition, February It, 1994, p.9. 
s Fiahtim: for Peace, General Sir Michael Rose, Harvill, 1998, p.ll. 
6 S/1994/131, quoted from the Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.2S/lt7. 
7 A 'Declaration the previous month by Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic 
Council' had already reaffirmed NATO's readiness 'to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the 
strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina'. 
Ibid. p.29/126. 
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In the prelude to the announcement of the NATO ultimatum General 
Rose, assisted by Lord Owen, undertook a number of initiatives which, 
both separately and jointly, acted to dilute the impact of that ultimatum. 
Firstly, on the day after the Markale massacre, General Rose travelled to 
Belgrade with Yasushi Akashi to meet Serbian President Milosevic and 
Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic for the purpose of securing Karadzic's 
agreement to the removal of Serb heavy weaponry to a 20-km distance 
from Sarajevo,S which was intended, however, as part of a general 
demilitarisation programme.9 Since the demilitarisation of Sarajevo, 
without the firm guarantee of UN protection, could produce a counter-
productive effect by exposing the 'safe areas' and their population to 
greater danger, and since it did not form part of the NATO ultimatum, 
such a proposal was unlikely to have been acceptable to the Bosnian 
government. The reason General Rose later offered for his unilateral-
and apparently unsolicited - approach was that 
because of lack of agreement about what ought to be done, it was 
left to the beleaguered UN to continue with the peacekeeping mission 
as best it could, using the traditional weapons of persuasion, patience 
and persistence ... The decision by the international community not to 
take military action in Bosnia allowed propagandists around the world 
to condemn the West for letting the wicked go unpunished. 10 
This statement not only contradicted the UN Secretary-General's letter of 
February 6, but also ignored the majority view within NATO and the 
Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), which supported NATO air strikes)l In 
short, the British UN Commander in Bosnia, just two weeks in office, 
8 Karadzic had already been briefed by Lord Owen on February 6 in Zvomik, where his 
agreement was sought on the general demilitarisation of Sarajevo, which included the full 
removal of all Bosnian Army units. OWEN, op.cit. p.2S6. 
9 Ibid. 
10 ROSE, op.cit. p.4S. 
II Owen records the FAC debate on air strikes. OWEN, op.cit. p.257-260. 
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had assumed an active role in international diplomacy which diverged 
from the position of (a) the UN Secretary-General, 12 (b) the vast majority 
at the North Atlantic Council,13 and (c) the EC Foreign Mfairs Council. 
Rose also publicly opposed NATO intervention on the grounds that it 
might 'drag the UN into war', expressing this view through his 
spokesperson and in personal interviews on British television. 14 
Secondly, on General Rose's orders, a so-called 'UK eyes only' paper was 
compiled by the UN office in Sarajevo, in order to persuade the British 
Defence Secretary against "abandoning peacekeeping for war-fighting. II 15 
This was done on the advice of the Ministry of Defence, having informed 
Rose's office in Sarajevo that Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind on his 
return from Bosnia, was bowing to US and NATO pressure for the wider 
use of NATO air power. 16 According to Rose, this paper convinced 
Rifkind to stand firm against the Americans. 17 
A third initiative on the part of General Rose, following on from the 
understanding reached with Karadzic on February 6, was to set up 
parallel agreements with Bosnian Serb and Government leaders for (i) a 
ceasefire, (ii) a withdrawal of all heavy weapons from a 20-km circle 
12 SRSG Yasushi Akashi, who consulted closely with a policy advisory team in Zagreb, however, 
liaised with General Rose to resolve the crisis without resort to air strikes. Srebrenica Report, 
op.cit. p.32/139. For discussion ofBoutros Boutros-Ghali's somewhat ambiguous stance, 
displayed in letters written to the Security Council and to the NATO Secretary-General, see Le 
Monde, February 8,1994, p.5. 
13 The only NATO member to abstain from the final vote in favour of air strikes was Greece. 
14 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.28/11S. Rose commented that 'this continual discussion of air 
strikes is not addressing the main issue'. BBC Newsnight, February 9, 1994. Three days later, 
Rose's spokesman, Lt. Col. Bill Aikman, provoked some consternation amongst western leaders 
through remarking that the NATO deadline was not General Rose's personal deadline. BBC 
Newsnight, February 12, 1994. 
15 ROSE, op.cit. p.46. 
16 Ibid. 
"Ibid. 
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around Sarajevo, (iii) the positioning of UN troops between the lines of 
conflict and, (iv) the establishment of a joint commission to oversee the 
withdrawal of heavy weapons. These were terms already agreed in 
principle with the Bosnian Serb leader but, since they did not include 
punitive measures for non-compliance, undercut the NATO initiative. 
The draft agreement was presented to Jovan Divjak, the Deputy Bosnian 
Army Commander (himself a Serb), on February 9, the same day as the 
NATO summit. Divjak, not surprisingly, was reluctant to sign, both 
because of the anticipated NATO ultimatum, and on the grounds that 
the UN proposal, since it was not linked to the threat of force, was not 
(in view of the VRS past track record) likely to be adhered to, whereupon 
Rose threatened Divjak that failure to sign would lead to the media being 
informed that the mortar had come from the Bosnian side. 18 The 
procedure Rose adopted to force the Bosnian government into signing 
the agreement involved, on his own admission, a degree of physical 
man-handling, in addition to coercion. 19 
The source of the mortar shell, especially in light of the fact that it 
prompted a review of international policy in Bosnia, has since been the 
subject of much controversy. While the western media and, indeed, 
international institutions, were quick to attribute it to Serb forces, both 
because the Dobrinja mortar the previous day had indisputably come 
from the Serb side, and because the victims were mainly Muslim, there 
remained nonetheless some doubt as to its origins. Two on-the-spot 
investigations were carried out, one immediately after the incident, with 
a subsequent investigation ordered by UN envoy Akashi. Both reached 
the same conclusion, namely, that it was impossible to assess from 
where the mortar had been fired. The UN Secretary-General later wrote 
to the Security Council that, on the evidence submitted by the 
18 Ibid. p.48 
19 'Seizing Divjak's arm .. .! shouted at him ... [n]ot even allowing him to get his coat, I bundled 
him into the Range Rover ... ' Ibid. p.49-S0. 
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UNPROFOR investigation 'the mortar bomb in question could ... have 
been fired by either side'.20 In fact, in evidence at the trial of Stanislav 
Galic, Serb Commander of the Romania district, General Rose admitted 
under questioning that the mortar had probably come from the north-
east (Le. Serb-held territory).21 
When meeting with Bosnian General Divjak, and the following day with 
Bosnian President Izetbegovic, however, General Rose offered a different 
version of the incident, not corroborated by evidence in his possession at 
the time or, indeed, after the second investigation. 22 Despite this, 
according to Owen's memoirs, some UNPROFOR documents stating that 
the mortar had been fired "some 1-1.5km inside the territory under 
Moslem control" were leaked by "highly reliable and confidential sources 
within UNPROFOR's HQ who wished to remain anonymous" to the 
Serbian news agency, Tanjug, which carried the story on February 8. 23 
Although the story was without basis, the leaked documents may well 
have been a contributing factor in persuading the Bosnian government 
to agree to General Rose's terms. Undoubtedly, a press conference 
announcement, alleging that the responsibility for the mortar lay with 
the Bosnians who proposed to reject the UN peace proposals, would 
have severely compromised the Bosnian government position. Under 
pressure, the Bosnian President signed the agreement. A comment by 
Russian UN officer Viktor Andreev, on the way to the airport to clinch 
the deal, was prescient: 
20 S/1994.182, February 16,1994. 
21 The Bosnian Serb Army held territory North North-East at Spicasta Stijena and Mrkovici. 
Evidence by General Sir Michael Rose at the trial of General Stanislav Galic, Case Number IT-
98-29-T, page 10196, fCTY, June 20, 2002. See also excerpt from TODOROVIC, Dragoljub. 
Burden of Crime: National Courts and Justice, quoted on Helsinki Committee for Human Rights 
in Serbia website. 
22 More recently, it has emerged that the Bosnian Serb military, through a nominee, were involved 
in the second mortar investigation. Galic trial, fCTY, op.cit. pages 10266-8. 
23 COREU ref. C094B12B.PAR. Owen himself maintained that the mortar had come from 
Bosnian government positions. 
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I like this British form of diplomacy; it reminds me of the way we 
used to do things in the Soviet Union. 24 
General Rose described the airport agreement as marking the beginning 
of the end of the 'civil' war in Bosnia. Yet the war continued for a further 
18 months. What the airport agreement succeeded in doing was to 
compromise the NATO ultimatum by demonstrating to the Serbs that at 
least one Permanent Member of Security Council was not behind it. Serb 
leaders thereafter used the doubts arising from the conflicting 
information over responsibility for the massacre as an excuse to ignore 
the NATO ultimatum. 
According to General Rose, it was Lt. Gen. Rupert Smith (later to 
succeed Rose as UN Commander in Bosnia) who managed, on Rose's 
request, to align the timetable of NATO's proposal with that of the UN,25 
the main difference being that in the latter the threat of military action 
was omitted. The fact that General Smith, who then worked in the 
operations branch of the Ministry of Defence, was successful in 
introducing the necessary clauses into the NATO document, gave some 
indication of the degree of influence Britain wielded within the higher 
echelons of NATO. The short-term outcome of the parallel UN-
negotiated agreement, and indeed its purpose, was 'not to allow the UN 
peace process in Bosnia to be hijacked by NATO'.26 
Lord Owen played a pivotal part in General Rose's bid to secure a 
separate UN agreement for Sarajevo. On February 6, at the request of 
the Foreign Secretary, the RAF made a plane available to fly Owen and 
Thorwald Stoltenberg to Belgrade where they met for five hours with 
24 ROSE. p.Sl. 
25 Ibid. p.S1-2. 
26 ROSE, op.cit. p.S1. 
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Bosnian Serb leaders Karadzic, Krajisnik and Koljevic, and with 
Milosevic the following day. According to Owen, the Bosnian Serbs were 
ready to negotiate for UN administration and the demilitarization of 
Sarajevo prior to a final settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. 27 On 
February 7, Owen and Stoltenberg presented a 6-point plan to the 
Foreign Mfairs Council in Brussels, which included the demilitarisation 
of Sarajevo. This was strongly opposed by French Foreign Minister Alain 
Juppe who, supported by the several other EU states, and EC Foreign 
Mfairs Commissioner Vande Broek, pressed for the immediate 
announcement of a NATO ultimatum, and the imposition of a 30km 
exclusion zone around Sarajevo.28 Juppe's proposal was accepted, 
although the exclusion zone was later reduced to 20 km, following an 
intervention by Lord Owen.29 Owen, meanwhile, as he put it, won 'two 
more crucial days' negotiating time for the UN, which General Rose 
proceeded to use to great effect'. 30 
On February 9, Owen and Stoltenberg met with the foreign ministers of 
neighbouring states: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Romania 
and Hungary.31 According to Owen, the ministers present discussed how 
regional countries could influence a settlement, in particular through 
offering economic, political and security perspectives to the Bosnian 
government. Owen's main purpose at that meeting appeared to be to 
secure support from the neighbouring countries for the removal of 
27 Ref.C094B07.PAR. 
28 OWEN, op.cit. p.257-9. The purpose of the air strikes, according to French Defence Minister 
Leotard and French Foreign Minister Juppe, was to end the siege of Sarajevo. See Le Monde, 
February 8, 1994, p.l. 
29 'On ... 8 February I wrote to Douglas Hurd querying the US objection to demilitarization and 
arguing for an exclusion zone smaller than the 30 Ian radius advocated by the French .. .' OWEN, 
op.cit. p.260. 
30, ••• it looked as if we might get what the UN desperately wanted - a negotiated agreement before 
the NAC met'. Ibid. p.259-60. 
31 Turkish Foreign Minister Cetin remained in Ankara to monitor developments at the NATO 
summit. Ibid. 
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sanctions from Serbia,32 as well as for 'regional disarmament',33 
indirectly facilitating General Rose's negotiations for the general 
disarmament of Sarajevo. 
The day after General Rose insinuated that the mortar responsible for 
the Markale market massacre had come from the Bosnian government 
side, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, during talks with both 
sides led by the ICFY in Geneva, pressed for a special commission to 
investigate the origin of the mortar. Karadzic meanwhile used this 
uncertainty as a pretext for not complying with the NATO ultimatum, 
alleging it was imposed on erroneous assumptions.34 Meanwhile, as 
Rose had anticipated, Bosnian Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic insisted 
that demilitarisation could only be addressed once the Serb withdrawal 
was complete, and in the context of an overall agreement. 35 
British ministers publicly endorsed the NATO initiative,36 while privately 
encouraging the parallel peace negotiations through the UN, thereby 
adulterating the impact of the NATO deadline. 37 The first ministerial 
statement in the House of Commons on February 7, just two days after 
the mortar attack, was by a junior foreign minister, Alastair Goodlad. On 
February 8, in the House of Commons, Defence Secretary Malcolm 
32 Owen stressed the support of regional countries in agreeing that 'the EU sanctions policy can be 
further refined'. COREU from Lord Owen. 'Bosnia: to-Day Immovable Deadline'. 
Ref.C094BIOB.PAR. 
33 Owen's conclusions that regional disarmament should be 'a high priority' were linked to 
ministers' 'worries of a regional arms race'. COREU, February 9, 1994, from the Office of the Co-
Chairmen. Ref.C094B09.PAR. 
34 NATO leaders had been careful, however, not to link the ultimatum to the Markale incident. 
JS COREU, February 10,1994. Bosnia Talks, Geneva. Ref.C094BI0.PAR. 
36 Douglas Hurd, however, advised 'extreme prudence' at the first NATO meeting. Le Monde, 
February 8, 1994, p.4. Later, he attempted to have the word 'ultimatum' omitted from the NATO 
declaration. Le Monde, February 10, 1994, p.3. 
37 Douglas Hurd arranged for an RAF plane to fly Owen and Stoltenberg to Belgrade to negotiate 
with Milosevic, and reportedly 'felt that nothing [the Security Council or North Atlantic Council] 
were contemplating conflicted with our strategy'. OWEN, op.cit. p.256. 
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Rifkind pointed to the danger of threatening air strikes against the 
Serbs: 
I hope that the whole House will agree that it would be unwise to follow 
any initiative which would put in jeopardy [the continuation of aid and 
British forces' safety).38 
General Rose's paper, written the previous night on MOD advice, had 
apparently succeeded in its objectives. The Prime Minister held a similar 
view, expressing a preference for tactical, rather than strategic, air 
support, and making no reference to lifting the Sarajevo siege: 
If we use air power, we must be clear about the objectives of that 
action. The aim must be to reinforce pressure to end the bombardment 
of Sarajevo.39 
On February 10, the Foreign Secretary made a statement on Sarajevo, 
commending the work of Lord Owen and Thorwald Stoltenberg, while 
also confirming British support for the NATO ultimatum. He explained 
his reasons: 
There is a strong British interest in maintaining the strength and 
solidarity of NATO ... We judge that these interests ... are best sustained 
by supporting the NATO decision and working for its success.'~O 
Explaining why such action had not been supported eighteen months 
earlier, Douglas Hurd stated that only now did 
the benefit of proceeding [outweigh) the risk of proceeding ... If we 
had frustrated yesterday's decision, I do not doubt that we would 
have administered to ourselves - to our own defence policy - a severe 
shock.41 
38 Qral Answers. Hansard, Vo1.237, February S, 1994, c.12S. 
39 Qral Answers, Ibid. c.13S . 
.4() Air Strikes (Bosnia), Hansard, Vo1.237, February 10, 1994, c.447-S. 
41 Ibid. c,449-450, and c,453. 
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A more serious consideration in this instance which the Foreign 
Secretary, interestingly, omitted to mention was the position of France 
which had unexpectedly taken a firm lead in the call for a robust 
response by NATO.42 French support had been crucial to Britain's policy 
in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from the outset, and Britain could 
not now risk semi-isolation on the Security Council, with Russia the 
only 'PS' Member likely to offer support. 43 Also, as a major power within 
the Alliance, Britain could not afford to be side-lined within NATO.44 
Russia at this time was seeking to reaffirm its major power role in 
international affairs. President Yeltsin endeavoured to strike a balance 
with the 'moderates' who sought accommodation with the West, while 
not alienating nationalists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky who now had 
considerable influence in the Duma following the December elections. As 
anticipated, responses from the Russian leadership to the NATO 
ultimatum were mixed. While Russia's Ambassador to the UN, Yuri 
Vorontsev, appeared to support the decision, others vocally opposed it. 45 
The Prime Minister, together with the Foreign Secretary, visited Moscow 
between February 14-16.46 On February 16, Russia agreed to redeploy 
400 of its UN troops stationed in Croatia to Sarajevo, apparently without 
informing the United States, where the reaction was reserved. 47 The next 
42 A major French concern would have been the security situation in Sarajevo, where 75% of the 
UN troops deployed were French. Le Monde, February 8, 1994, p.4. 
43 China still continued to maintain a neutral position at this time. 
44 Greece was the only NATO member to withhold consent for the NATO ultimatum. 
4' 'Who says we're stopping anything?' - Vorontsev, Channel 4 News, February 8,1994. See also 
Le Monde, February 12, 1994, p.3, and 'Bombing Serb positions with NATO planes ... could deal 
a psychological blow to [the Partnership for Peace]'. Vyacheslav Kostikov,lnterfax. 
46 There was an agreement to detarget by Mayall British and Russian nuclear weapons away 
from each other's country, and have joint military exercises in Russia and UK by 1995. 
47 OWEN, op.cit. p.267. 
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day, as the decision was publicly announced, the troops arrived in the 
Bosnian Serb headquarters at Pale, brandishing the Serb three-fmger 
salute. It was not clarified to what degree the Prime Minister's visit 
influenced the Russians to reverse their decision,48 although Defence 
Secretary Malcolm Rifkind indicated that John Major had been informed 
of the anticipated move whilst in Moscow.49 The new situation was a 
major diplomatic and political scoop for Russia. It also boosted the 
Bosnian Serb leader's disregard of NATO,50 and assisted the British bid 
to avert air strikes. Russia now played a pivotal role in the UNPROFOR 
operation around Sarajevo and, by the very presence of its troops, 
virtually precluded NATO intervention, regardless of whether the terms 
of the NATO ultimatum had been met. 51 As Vyacheslav Kostikov, 
Yeltsin's spokesman stated, 
not only has Russia returned to its roots in its historical policy and role 
in the Balkans and defended the Serbs, its fellows in faith, culture and 
national spirit, but it firmly defined the parameters of its influence in 
Europe and the world. 52 
The Bosnian government was not reassured by the arrival of Russian 
troops since they had pre-empted the NATO ultimatum and, even on 
arrival, displayed partisanship towards the Serbs, in Bosnian eyes 
rendering their mission suspect. 53 According to Bosnia's ambassador at 
48 According to John Reid, then opposition defence spokesperson, who broke the news of the 
Russian decision to the House of Commons, the Russians had made arrangements directly with 
the Serbs. Royal Nayy .. Hansard. Vol.237, February 17, 1994, c.l150. 
49 Interview with Malcolm Ritkind, BBC Newsnight. February 17, 1994. 
so Radovan Karadzic declared the following day that 'we take no notice of NATO. We work with 
the UN'. Channel 4 News, February 18, 1994. 
51 Jonathan Eyal commented on the importance of the Russian move which, he considered, 
demonstrated that Russia had refused to accept NATO was the only actor in their own sphere of 
interest. 'Either they drop bombs and risk a much wider rift between Russia and the West, or they 
desist from it, probably for ever'. Jonathan Eyal, Channel 4 News, Ibid. 
52 Guardian, February 23, 1994. 
53 Interviews with Bosnian Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubjankic, and Bosnian Army General Arif 
Pasalic, Channel 4 News, February 18, 1994, and Independent. February 21, 1994. 
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the UN, Mohamed Sacirbey, the Russian troops would merely freeze the 
status quO.54 
In the event, the NATO ultimatum was not fulfilled as required. Akashi 
at the time attributed this to delays caused by snowstorms. Even before 
the NATO deadline expired, General Rose announced that NATO air 
strikes would not be necessary since the heavy weaponry of both parties 
was effectively under UN control. This was not so, however, as confirmed 
a few weeks later when General Mladic's forces were able, without 
difficulty, to remove much of their equipment in preparation for a new 
offensive on Gorazde.55 On February 26, UNPROFOR spokesperson Bill 
Aikman reported at least six tanks being removed by Bosnian Serbs 
from the exclusion zone around Sarajevo in violation of the NATO 
ultimatum. 56 Aikman conceded that at least eight weapons sites had not 
yet been checked one week after the expiry of the NATO deadline, and 
that at other sites Bosnian Serbs were refusing to hand over heavy 
armoury to UNPROFOR.57 
Since relative peace prevailed in Sarajevo for some months following that 
episode, the fact that the NATO ultimatum had been foiled was not 
immediately apparent to many observers. The combined efforts of the 
UN Command in Sarajevo, the co-chairs of the ICFY, the Bosnian Serb 
leadership in Pale and President Milosevic in Belgrade, however, with the 
full endorsement of the British and Russian governments, had managed 
to create a status quo in Sarajevo which effectively precluded NATO air 
strikes there for over a year, while the city remained under siege. 
54 Le Monde, February 19, 1994. p.3. 
55 Lord Owen's observation is instructive here. He comments that on the second day of the 
Geneva peace talks (February 11) the Serbs 'seem happy to tie UN down to patrolling 
confrontation line and controlling unwanted heavy weapons while removing the best of the 
equipment out of the exclusion zone'. COREU, February 12, 1994. Ref. C094BI2.PAR. 
56 Reuters report, February 28, 1994. IHRL Sarajevo Source File. February 1994. 
57 Ibid. 
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Meanwhile, the lax UN monitoring of the exclusion zone around Sarajevo 
allowed Serb heavy weaponry to be withdrawn for use in other 'safe 
areas'. Gorazde and Bihac subsequently endured major Serb offensives 
with, as on previous occasions, relative impunity. 
The assault on Gorazde 
Gorazde was one of six Bosnian towns designated as a 'safe area' which, 
according to UN Security Council Resolution 824 (May 6, 1993) "should 
be free from armed attacks or any other hostile act." On March 31, a 
joint major three-pronged assault by Serbs from Bosnia and Serbia was 
launched on Gorazde lasting several weeks. 58 During that time over 700, 
mainly civilians, died and nearly 2,000 were wounded. 59 Apart from 
eight unarmed military observers, there was no UN presence in the 
enclave.6o The events of Gorazde during April 1994 illustrate the power 
vacuum created by conflicting policies at intemationallevel,61 giving rise 
to friction between NATO and the UN, and amongst major world powers, 
which facilitated the Bosnian Serb endeavour to secure international 
S8 The attack came from Ustipraca in the East, Foca in the South and Cajnica in the South East. 
Evidence suggests that the whole operation was planned in Belgrade. From early April 1994 till 
the NATO ultimatum of 22 April, heavy artillery troops disguised as 'volunteers', demolition 
squads and armed police from Serbia were involved in the assault. The Yugoslav Army (VI) 
despatched special squads of its 63rd Paratroop Brigade based in Nis to the Bosnian Serbs, 
provided helicopters to enable the special forces' squads to reach Gorazde, and sent a tank 
battalion and a mixed artillery battalion from the 37th Army Corps in Uzice, Serbia. which 
crossed into Bosnia in mid-March and took up positions at the eastern and south eastern edge of 
the town. The silence on the Belgrade role, maintained by the UN and western governments, 
particularly Britain and France was, according to independent sources, to protect the international 
peace negotiations. where Serbian President Milosevic was a key player. See GUTMAN, Roy, 
'West Keeps Serb Secret'. Newsday, July 3,1994. 
59 • 'Some 700 people were killed during the offensive and some 1.970 wounded. During this and 
previous offensives, the town suffered damage to 80% of its buildings.' Annual Report o/the 
International Helsinki Federation, Vienna 1995, pJ4. 
60 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.30/127. See also SIMMS, op.cit. pp.l89-195, for General Rose's 
role in Gorazde. 
61 See Le Monde, April 7, pJ, and April 8, 1994, p.5. 
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acceptance of its encroachment into the UN 'safe area'.62 The episode 
also exposed anomalies inherent in both the 'safe areas' policy and the 
entire UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia and Croatia. 
This section traces the specific role of the British government and its 
proxies in neutralising NATO, advancing Serb strategic interests around 
Gorazde and prolonging the siege, and seeks to cut through some of the 
half-truths, omissions and distortions which have permeated much of 
the reporting and later analysis of that crisis. 
Although a relatively small town, Gorazde was of considerable 
importance to the Serbs. Its strategic position on the Drina river made it 
important for trade and manufacturing, and before the war its 
munitions factory Pobjeda produced most of the explosive caps for the 
Yugoslav armaments industry.63 Gorazde is also a thoroughfare between 
the previously Muslim majority towns of Visegrad and Foca, and links 
Belgrade with Dubrovnik on the Adriatic coast. In early 1994, the Serbs 
began building a road by-passing Gorazde, which the Bosnians 
attempted to block, viewing it as further threatening the survival of non-
Serbs in Eastern Bosnia. Gorazde depended for its defence entirely on 
the Bosnian army. No goods or people entered the enclave without the 
express permission of the Serb forces, resulting in a steady erosion of 
basic necessities over a period of more than two years."64 
62 As the French Foreign Minister, Alain luppe, commented at the time: 'As long as there is no 
common position between the US, the UN, the EC and Russia, we allow the Serbs to play their 
double game'. Independent, April 19, 1994, p.9. 
63 Milos Vasic, Vreme, April 18, 1994. 
64 UN Information Notes, March, 1994. One UNHCR field officer reported: 'I have seen people 
gather wheatflour [a mixture of mud and flour] from airdrops with spoons from the mud ... Out of 
four families in a certain area of the enclave, three were completely out of food'. Ibid. February, 
1994. 
232 
General Rose played down the Serb offensive on Gorazde from the 
outset. Dismissing it as an isolated military manoeuvre, he opined that 
'nobody has the strength to make major changes in the strategic 
situation', and attempted to halt the offensive through brokering a 
cease-fire.65 This approach took no account of reports from UNHCR, UN 
military observers (UNMOs] and the Medicins sans Frontieres team in the 
enclave, or even to declarations by Serbian army officers.66 In fact, a 
document leaked on April 7 revealed that accounts from UNMOs in the 
enclave, transmitted to the UN Command at Sarajevo, differed markedly 
from the information General Rose was giving the press: 
From the BBC World Service news of 5 April, we heard an UNPROFOR 
assessment that the attack into Gorazde was a minor affair into a 
limited area. We do not concur with that position. It is a grave 
situation ... Saying it is a minor attack into a limited area is a bad 
assessment, incorrect and shows absolutely no understanding 
of what is going on here.67 
Although he acknowledged that the Serbs had used the negotiations as a 
cover for their offensive,68 Rose refuted the UNMO report, arguing that 
'no serious attempt had been made by the Serbs to overrun [the enclave] 
or to capture the town. Nor did the Serbs ever try to achieve these 
goals'.69 In his memoirs, Rose also sought to discredit the UNMOs 
themselves: 'I had suspected from the emotional tone of their reporting 
that they had ceased to function as a disciplined military unit'. 70 
6S In his memoirs, Rose comments that the cease-fire proposals produced by General Mladic were 
'surprisingly coherent and not too far removed from our own'. ROSE, op.cit. p.l 05, and The 
Times, April 16, 1994, p.l. 
66 Col. Novica Gusic stated in early April, 'we are starting a counter attack with the idea of 
recapturing Serb land in the region of Gorazde', and in a statement to Radio Montenegro on April 
8, General Valdo Spremo declared 'we will soon capture the whole area around Gorazde and so 
set up control on both sides of the Drina River'. Vreme, April 18, 1994, Ibid. 
67 Cited in ROSE, op.cit. p.103. 
68 Independent, Apri120, 1994, p.10. 
69 ROSE, op.cit. p.103. 
70 Ibid. p.120. 
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Later, it was generally acknowledged that the UN Commander in 
Sarajevo had misjudged the situation in Gorazde. The UN Secretary-
General later recorded that 
The United Nations military observers, supported by UNHCR, believed 
that the Bosniacswere defeated and that the Serbs, taking advantage 
of their military superiority, were subjecting the civilian population of 
Gorazde to heavy bombardment. The UNPROFOR Commander, 
supported by a small team of British observers then present in the 
enclave, believed, as he has since written in his memoirs, that "the 
Bosnian Army had probably retreated in order to embroil the United 
Nations and NATO in the war .. .In the narrow passes and ravines 
anyone could have stopped the [Serb] tanks with a crowbar ... the 
Bosnians had turned and run,leaving the United Nations to pick up 
the pieces" .71 
Many British commentators, however, perhaps with Rose's 'success' in 
Sarajevo still uppermost in their minds, tended to regard his failure to 
act promptly to deter the assault on Gorazde simply as a reflection of the 
general's concern to prevent UNPROFOR being drawn from a 
'peacekeeping' role to one of peace enforcement. 72 While this was clearly 
a consideration,73 the misleading signals conveyed by General Rose's 
erroneous assessment provoked contradictory reactions to the crisis 
from senior US politicians, with serious implications for international 
policy, as discussed further on. 
71 Srebrenica Report, Ibid. p.311137. Gorazde was defended by about 4,000 Bosnians, against an 
estimated 12-15,000 Serbs with tanks and heavy artillery. In response to General Rose's remark, 
one of the town's defenders, a 20-year old evacuee from Gorazde with a bullet lodged in his hip, 
commented: 'We may as well have been dolls for all the defence we could have put up against a 
tank ... [with] one Kalashnikov between four men on the front line'. The town's last defence had 
been petrol bombs made from bottles filled with benzene, oil, sand and ash which, to have any 
effect, would have needed to be thrown within 10 feet of an oncoming tank. Guardian, April 29, 
1994. 
72 See, for instance, Ian Traynor in Guardian, and John Keegan in Daily Telegraph. April 12, 
1994. 
73 Rose wrote to the UN headquarters on April 8, 1994, stating that 'by choosing the "light option" 
with respect to force levels, the international community had accepted that the safe areas would 
be established by agreement as opposed to force. This choice, he maintained, was a clear rejection 
of a policy of peace-making or peace enforcement. . .' Srebrenica Report. op.cit. p.311132. 
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By Apri110, Serbs were attacking into the enclave in large numbers and, 
on General Rose's orders, two token NATO air attacks were launched, 
hitting a Serb artillery bunker on the first day, and a Serb tank and an 
armoured personnel carrier on the next. 74 Rose made it clear that the 
NATO action was to deter further attacks on UN positions, not to protect 
the civilians of Gorazde, which he never saw as his mission. Over the 
days following, a pattern emerged, with the Serb forces pausing after 
each NATO strike, and resuming their offensive once the NATO military 
threat appeared to subside. The limited NATO 'close air support' did not, 
as has been claimed, act as a warning signal to the Serbs, but rather 
demonstrated the limits of NATO intervention. 
On April 14, the Serbs took over 200 UN personnel hostages, including a 
53-strong complement of UN military observers (most of whom had been 
guarding Serb heavy weapons' collection points over Sarajevo), while 
simultaneously ordering an artillery and mortar attack on another 'safe' 
area, Tuzla. Molotov cocktails exploded outside the UNHCR building in 
Belgrade, a number of foreign journalists had their accreditation 
withdrawn, and the movements of UN staff in Pale and Banja Luka 
became strictly curtailed. On the same day, the Bosnian defence line 
broke and the Serb forces approached a built-up area of Gorazde, at 
which point the divisions within the UN, in interpreting the situation on 
the ground, intensified. In a demonstration of disdain for the UN and 
NATO, Karadzic and Mladic set up a chess game on the frontline, where 
they were filmed laughing in relaxed fashion as they played on an 
improvised table before the world media. 75 Divisions amongst the 
various international players were now also surfacing. The British used 
the Serb defiance to argue against the use of air power, while the US 
74 The strikes were classified by the UN as "close air support" strictly to protect UN staff 
endangered by Serb forces, justified by even a narrow interpretation of UNSC resolution 836. 
75 New York Times, April 17, 1994. 
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State Department and the NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Woerner, 
favoured more intensive NATO action. 
The Serb tank assault on Bosnian army forces on April 16 resulted in 
two British SAS officers in Gorazde being wounded, one of them fatally. 
General Rose, having sought permission from the Special Representative 
of the Secretary General Yasushi Akashi, ordered close air support, but 
a British Sea Harrier jet involved in the operation was struck by a Serb 
surface-to-air missile. The plane crashed and the pilot ejected. A senior 
military officer commented: 'In an ideal situation I wouldn't even think of 
using a Sea Harrier for this sort of operation. It's primarily a fighter, and 
doesn't have the best precision bombing capability'.76 
The deep splits amongst western powers now intensified. American 
policy once more came under attack in Britain, in particular the US 
refusal to commit ground troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina. General Rose 
ruled out further air strikes commenting that 
clearly we are not about to change the balance of forces between 
the warring parties by the use of strategic air power'. 77 
Within the US, the Pentagon was the most consistently opposed to 
military intervention. Statements by US Defense Secretary William Perry 
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili, possibly 
influenced by General Rose's optimistic view of the situation, also 
virtually foreclosing the use of force ,78 were quickly rebutted by the State 
76 NATO officials expressed concern that General Rose had asked the pilot to make several 
passes over the target to confirm that the targeted tank was indeed attacking, thereby exposing the 
aircraft to danger. NATO's Southern Command then informed General Rose that, due to the risk 
to the aircraft, he would approve only strategic-level, not tactical, strikes. Srebrenica Report, 
op.cit. pp.31-2/138. 
77 The animus between General Rose and NATO was evident from his memoirs: 'Given NATO's 
apparent wish to find an excuse to bomb the Serbs, [1 did not] altogether trust the organisation'. 
ROSE, op.cit. p.123. 
78 Shalikashvili commented that 'it is our judgement that heavy weapons are not the principal 
cause of the death and destruction around Gorazde, it is more small-unit actions, and air power in 
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Department, however. US National Security Chief Tony Lake affirmed 
that neither the President nor any of his close collaborators excluded the 
use of force to end the offensive on Gorazde. 79 President Clinton 
expressed a personal preference for an end to the arms embargo, but 
confirmed that the US would not act unilaterally in the face of 
disapproval from France and Britain.8o In response to the allegation 
that America was failing to provide leadership, Clinton commented: 
I've always thought that the arms embargo operated in an 
entirely one-sided fashion and it still does. That's the reason 
we're in this fix today.81 
France, as most European countries with troops on the ground in 
Bosnia, continued to oppose the removal of the arms embargo. 
Characteristically, French policy on Bosnia varied according to the 
situation on the ground, and its perceived national interests. The fierce 
polemics at the National Assembly during 1992 over military 
intervention subsided once the no-fly-zone was implemented the 
following April, and French policy was now mainly geared to the safety of 
its own troops on the ground. Hence the ready support and, indeed, 
initiation of the NATO ultimatum in Sarajevo where French troops were 
deployed, and the lesser degree of willingness to endorse NATO action in 
Gorazde, which risked rebounding on French troops elsewhere in 
Bosnia.82 Once the Serb offensive intensified, however, France did 
that ... case would not be nearly as effective', a view expressed earlier by General Rose. New York 
Times, AprilS, 1994, p.A1. On the day prior to Perry's statement, General Rose had expressed 
confidence that neither the Bosnian Serbs nor the Bosnian government would seek to make 'any 
major strategic changes' in the Gorazde area. Keesing's Record of World Events. April 1994, 
p.39966. 
79 Le Monde, April 9, 1994, p.4, New York Times, April S, 1994, p.Al, Apri120, 1994, p.Al, and 
Wall Street Journal, April 21, 1994, p.AI8. 
80 Independent, April 19, 1994, p.9. 
8\ Daily Telegraph, April 19, 1994, p.11. 
82 See report on the French National Assembly debate on Gorazde in Le Monde, April 13, 1994, 
p.8. 
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express limited support for the use of force in Gorazde. 83 In Brussels, 
EC External Affairs Commissioner Hans Van den Broek described the 
Bosnian Serb actions around Gorazde as 'absolutely unacceptable' and 
urged 'a firm response ... by the EU and the UN', adding that easing 
sanctions on Serbia was 'out of the question'.84 
Russia, since establishing its new role in Bosnia in February, had taken 
a more active role in the region, and Russian UN Civil Adviser in 
Sarajevo, Viktor Andreev, worked closely with General Rose on the 
Gorazde crisis.8s In an attempt to pre-empt NATO action, the Russian 
Balkans envoy, Vitali Churkin, secured three promises from the Serbs: 
to stop the shelling, to pU1l3km back from the town, and to release all 
UN personnel. When the Serbs reneged on all three, Churkin concluded 
that 'the time has come for Russia to stop all discussion with the 
Bosnian Serbs. The time for talking is past'.86 On Apri119, Churkin 
indicated he would advise Yeltsin to authorise the use of force against 
the Serbs, and Yeltsin himself insisted that the Serbs 'had to stop 
attacking Gorazde and leave the town'.87 Despite a statement by the 
Duma on Apri113, denouncing the strikes as 'unilateral and 
unauthorised',88 and a general preference amongst Russian leaders for a 
negotiated settlement, it is unlikely that Russia would have raised more 
than verbal protest, had the Western powers resolved to authorise more 
extensive NATO air power at that point. As Sevodnya, the Moscow paper 
83 Corriere della Sera, April II, 1994, p.S, and Independent, April 21, 1994. 
84 Guardian, April 19. 1994, p.IO. 
85 ROSE, op.cit. p.1 02. 
86 Independent, April 19, 1994, p.9. 
87 Keesing, op.cit. p.39967. 
88 The nationalists who dominated the Russian Duma after the December elections, consistently 
supported a stronger anti-NATO line. European, 22-28 April, 1994, p.l. 
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stated: 'Russia ... has neither the strength, the money nor the opportunity 
for decisive military support of the Serbs' .89 
In Britain, there was relatively little opposition in either the press or 
parliament to government policy on the Gorazde issue. The press had 
attributed much of the recent success in Bosnia to General Rose's 
efforts, including the peace agreement forged between Bosniacs and 
Croats, the 'demilitarisation' of Sarajevo, and the opening of Tuzla 
airport. It only later became evident that Sarajevo had not been 
demilitarised, and Tuzla airport still remained closed to civilian traffic, 
Neither had Britain contributed significantly to the US-brokered 
Bosniac/Croat peace agreement.90 
In the House of Commons, there were three ministerial statements 
during the Gorazde crisis, the first by the Foreign Secretary on April 12 
who confirmed that close air support had been requested by General 
Rose to protect UN personnel. While acknowledging the responsibility of 
the Bosnian Serbs, Douglas Hurd did not condemn the aggression, 
stating merely that '[UNPROFORJ does not intend to be drawn into open-
ended intervention for or against any of the parties',91 Asked by a Labour 
backbencher to conflftn 'that UN Security Council resolutions already 
authorised the use of force to protect the safe areas themselves, and not 
just the UN forces in those areas', the Foreign Secretary declined to be 
drawn, merely commenting that Security Council resolution 836 offered 
'considerable scope'.92 A Conservative MP seeking the Foreign Secretary's 
agreement that 'it is inconceivable that the United Nations, having 
89 Ibid. 
90 US-led negotiations between the Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat leaders led to the end 
of the Muslim-Croat war and the establishment of a Federation in March 1994. 
91 Douglas Hurd, Gorazde, Hansard, Vo1.241, April 12, 1994, c.21-22. Defence Secretary 
Malcolm Rifkind on the same day confirmed that it was "crucial to the authority of the UN and its 
forces ... to remain bipartisan". Oral Answers. Hansard, Vo1.241, April 12, 1994, c.12. 
92 Ibid. c.2S-26. 
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declared a safe area, could allow it to be overrun' was similarly referred 
to the resolution.93 But, as Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind later 
remarked, 'even the very wording of resolution 836 is ambiguous'.94 
On April 18, Malcolm Rifkind read a statement to the House of 
Commons, informing Members of developments. 95 The statement 
followed the downing of a British Sea Harrier Jet, the killing of an SAS 
officer, and the hostage-taking of over 150 UN personnel. Despite the 
interim developments, the Defence Secretary avoided censuring the 
Bosnian Serbs.96 Instead, he produced a misleading picture of the 
situation on the ground, focusing on an account of an unrelated incident 
in which another British soldier had been shot dead by Bosnian 
government staff in Sarajevo on the same day, using the incident to 
demonstrate that there were 'still a number of warring factions in 
Bosnia', and that 'a vicious civil war is taking place in Bosnia with a 
total of almost 200,000 heavily armed Bosnian Serb, Croat, and Muslim 
forces'. 97 The ploy of writing off the Serb offensive on the enclave as just 
one episode in a 'civil war', was used to justify the Serbs not being 
singled out as the offending party, and punished, and to stress the 
93 UNSC resolution 836 'Authorizes UNPROFOR ... acting in self-defence, to take the necessary 
measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of 
the parties or to armed incursion into them'. The crucial words 'acting in self-defence' (in other 
words, not to defend the inhabitants of the enclaves) were inserted into the resolution at the 
insistence of Britain, France and Spain. See HONIG, op.cit. p.114. 
94 Malcolm Rifkind, B2miL Hansard, Vo1.241, April 18, 1994, c.649. 
95 Bosnia. April 18, Ibid. c.641. The defence lines of the Bosnian anny had also broken, the Serb 
forces reaching the edge ofa built-up area. Srebrenica Report, Ibid. p.31/137. 
96 Throughout the world, the press condemned the capitulation of the UN and NATO before the 
Bosnian Serbs, Yet, in Britain which, of the outside powers, had suffered the greatest losses 
during that catastrophic week under the command of a British general, criticism was more muted, 
and substantially directed towards the 'international' (i.e. American) failure to provide more 
troops to protect the enclave. 
97 Bslmiil. Hansard, op.cit. c.642, 651and 656. Although Rifkind pointed out that the second 
British soldier was 'off duty and wearing plain clothes at the time', he did not infonn the House 
that the soldier had been out during a curfew and that when asked to identify himself at the 
Bosnian checkpoint he ran off, which was the point at which he had been shot. Daily Telegraph, 
April 18, 1994. 
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difficult circumstances under which General Rose was working. At the 
same time, it forestalled any speculation on General Rose's judgment. 
Minutes later, the Defence Secretary, in apparent contradiction, pointed 
out that '[m]uch has been achieved, not only in the Sarajevo area, but 
elsewhere in central Bosnia where there has been no fighting between 
Croat and Muslim forces for some considerable period'.98 The views of 
members who challenged government policy in Bosnia were dismissed as 
'respectable' but not tenable,99 misguidedly sincere,lOO or 'the words of a 
windbag' .101 The frustration felt by Members of Parliament on both sides 
of the House at the lack of opportunity for full debate on Gorazde, - and 
Bosnia generally - was voiced by two MPs through a Point of Order. 102 
The Shadow Defence Secretary, Dr David Clark, confirmed his party's 
solidarity with the government's position, choosing to focus on the US 
failure to meet General Rose's request for more troops to be sent. 103 The 
criticism of the Clinton Administration for refusing to deploy US troops 
on the ground before a peace settlement had been signed, indicated 
confused thinking, however. For, unless they were equipped and 
mandated to act in a combat role (and Malcolm Rifkind had reiterated on 
several occasions that they were not), the troops in the so-called 'safe 
98 Ibid. c.648. The return to peace in Central Bosnia, and the establishment of a Bosnian/Croat 
Federation, was often to be evoked by British ministers as an example of international success in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, while not always acknowledging the US central role. 
99 Ibid. c.653. 
100 Ibid. c.649. 
101 Ibid. c.648. 
102 Points of Order. Hansard. Vo1.241, April 18, 1994. 
103 David Clark was one of several British MPs who visited Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia and 
Serbia at the Serbs' expense. Reaister of Members' Interests, Hansard, 1993. Following a visit to 
Gorazde in late 1993, he wrote an article in The Times, extolling 'the successful side of 
peacekeeping'. The Times, September 10,1993, p.13, and announced in the House of Commons 
that 'the threat of bombing had a major effect on the Serbs', advocating a more evenhanded 
approach. Statement on Defence Estimates. Hansard, Vo1.230, October 18,1993, c.56. Clark's 
understanding of conditions in Gorazde contradicted UNHCR findings that 'access to Eastern 
Bosnian enclaves ... remains effectively blocked'. UN Information Notes, October, 1993. 
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areas' would be implicit hostages of the Bosnian Serb forces. The 
insistence on maintaining UN troops on the ground in a non-combat role 
in Bosnia was, in the circumstances, one of the main anomalies of the 
British policy. The Foreign Secretary was evidently aware of this, since 
he studiously avoided direct criticism of the US reluctance to contribute 
troops (unlike the Defence Secretary who frequently fell into self-
contradiction on this point). 
On April 18, at an EC Foreign Ministers meeting. a British/French-led 
consensus opted for a fresh round of diplomacy, ruling out military 
action to save Gorazde, with Britain in partiCUlar urging the necessity of 
a common front with Russia. Lord Owen was charged with coordinating 
efforts between the four international players, the US, the EU, Russia 
and the UN, to work out a diplomatic strategy to secure a ceasefire. 
On April 20, President Clinton announced a new 3-point initiative which 
included the threat of more air strikes and tighter sanctions on Serbia. 
Clinton favoured extending the use of NATO air power to other 'safe' 
areas and, since France was now also persuaded of the need for 
increased air power, Britain was forced into verbally agreeing, in the 
interests of unity. On April 22, NATO threatened the Serbs with massive 
air strikes if the offensive on Gorazde continued, ordering Serb forces to 
withdraw two miles from the town centre by 0001 GMT on 24 April, from 
which time aid convoys and medical assistance teams should be free to 
enter and leave Gorazde unimpeded. Failing this, the commander of 
NATO's Southern European forces was authorised to conduct air strikes 
against Bosnian Serb heavy weapons and other military targets within a 
12-mile radius military exclusion zone of the centre of Gorazde, from 
which all heavy weapons had to be removed by 0001 on Wednesday 
April 27. It was also unanimously agreed by NATO ambassadors in 
Brussels that this exclusion zone should be extended to the 'safe areas' 
of Bihac, Tuzla, Zepa and Srebrenica. 
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UN representatives, however, now sought to secure a parallel UN 
agreement, adopting a similar strategy to that followed in Sarajevo in 
February. On the same day as the NATO threat was issued, a UN team 
headed by SRSG Akashi negotiated a ceasefire for Gorazde with Serb 
leaders in Belgrade. The fmal draft of the Belgrade agreement, while 
containing some of the wording of the NATO ultimatum, differed in that 
the date for removal of heavy weaponry was two days later than that 
stipulated by NATO and (as in February) contained no threat of force, 
implicitly contradicting the NATO ultimatum. Rose later commented that 
NATO had seriously underestimated the complicated arrangements 
needed to separate the Serb and Bosnian forces in the aftermath of 
the battle that had been raging round Gorazde ... Neither army would 
break contact until UN troops arrived in Gorazde ... From our 
perspective in Sarajevo, this intervention by Brussels seemed to be a 
tactic by the hawks in NATO to push the peacekeeping operation 
towards war ... Everyone, including Adm. Leighton Smith in Naples, 
simply ignored the NATO ultimatum and stuck with the Belgrade 
agreement ... the lasting impression given was that the international 
community could not get its act together. 104 
Once again, the UN on the ground, led by General Rose and Yasushi 
Akashi, had foiled, and publicly embarrassed, NATO. 
On the same day, UN Security Council Resolution 913, supported by all 
15 members, was passed, demanding an immediate ceasefire agreement 
covering Gorazde and the rest of Bosnia, and the release of UN 
personnel, with unimpeded freedom of movement for UN peacekeepers. 
The following day, an agreement was reached between UN envoy Yasushi 
Akashi and the Bosnian Serb authorities, with an UNPROFOR battalion 
deployed to Gorazde to monitor the ceasefire. Before midnight that day, 
a company of Ukranians and a Nordic medical team, despatched by 
General Rose, entered Gorazde. A further UNPROFOR convoy including 
a British company from the l at Duke of Wellington's Regiment followed 
the next morning. With UN forces in the enclave before the expiry of the 
104 ROSE, op.cit. p.IIS. 
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NATO deadline, full-scale NATO action was effectively ruled out. A 
French company which had also been due to go to Gorazde to command 
the operation, however, was at the last minute turned back on orders 
direct from the Elysee in Paris. In view of the circumstances in which the 
UN troops were being deployed, the French decision was not surprising. 
Unlike Britain, France was not prepared to place its troops in de facto 
hostage positions without adequate means of defending themselves, in a 
remote enclave which they could not leave without Serb consent. 
General Rose's timing was adroit, and the threat of the deterrent had 
been removed. Also, with the introduction of a UN buffer force between 
the two armies, and no restriction on the removal of the Serb heavy 
weaponry, the Serbs were free to conduct a new offensive elsewhere. 
In the third ministerial statement to the House on Gorazde, the Foreign 
Secretary informed the House of the resolutions passed by the UN and 
NATO the previous week, and received unequivocal support from his 
Labour opposite number, who had apparently failed to understand the 
significance of the arrangement. IDS John Cunningham referred to the 
'considerable confusion' between NATO and the UN, but appeared to 
view it merely in terms of 'indecision' and 'prevarication'. There was 
more anger than confusion within the NATO headquarters, and no 
indecision. NATO had been neatly foiled by the UN commander, with the 
support of the Foreign Office. 
A number of MPs expressed concern as to whether General Rose had 
requested air strikes in the previous 48 hours and been refused by UN 
civilian head, Yasushi Akashi. I06 The Foreign Secretary's reply left little 
105 'Is the Secretary of State aware that there will be a broad welcome for the measures that he has 
set out in his important statement? I welcome the fact that...there seems to be a clear political 
strategy agreed between the United Nations and NATO, set out in specific terms'. Jack 
Cunningham, Bosnia. Ibid. c.22. 
106 Akashi had formed a close relationship with Bosnian Serb leaders during his months in office, 
and was widely criticised by the United States and the Bosnian government who later refused to 
cooperate with him, and called for his resignation. Bosnian Serb leaders, on the other hand, 
defended Akashi, claiming he was a neutral representative and, in turn, Akashi was quoted as 
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doubt that the British General had not, despite the worsening situation 
in Gorazde and the demands by NATO leaders for more extensive use of 
air power, made any such request. 107 To remove any doubts as to the 
British position on Gorazde, Mr Hurd reiterated 
we will not be involved in fighting on one side of the conflict or 
the other ... that has been made clear time and again. We have 
specific objectives which we believe are necessary and justified 
for the international community. The conflict will not be brought 
to an end by military intervention from outside. lOB 
Like the Defence Secretary the previous week, Mr Hurd was careful to 
share out the blame: 
All those concerned, whether they are Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian 
Croats, or adherents to the Bosnian Government, need to 
understand ... that at the end of the day, this horror can be 
brought to an end only by a negotiated settlement ... 109 
The implication behind the Foreign Secretary's words was clear, and was 
indeed backed by two British battalions in Gorazde as a tacit guarantee 
that the enclave would be safe from NATO military attack. 110 
describing Radovan Karadzic as 'a man of peace and my personal friend'. The British UN 
Ambassador, Sir David Hannay, made a point of publicly endorsing Akashi and, in fact, Akashi's 
comment that 'of course peacemakers can't do much until the people in the war are fairly 
exhausted' echoed similar remarks made by Lord Carrington and British ministers throughout the 
war. New York Times, April 26, 1994. 
107 General Rose later confirmed this. 'I was not about to allow the fate of the UN mission in 
Bosnia to be determined by hawks in NATO'. ROSE, op.cit. p.124. 
108 Bosnia. April 25, 1994, op.cit. c.25. 
109 Ibid. 
110 The government had little public support for its policy, however. At the height of the Gorazde 
offensive, The Independent opened the debate to the general public with three options, to pull out 
the troops, take on the Serbs, or stay and seek peace. The second option -taking on the Serbs -
was expressed in unequivocal terms: 'The UN could ask NATO for more air strikes against 
Bosnian Serb targets and perhaps increase its ground force presence. It would take sides in the 
war on the grounds that the Serbs are the gUilty party. Those in favour argue that to permit the 
Serbian war gains is to send a dangerous signal that the use of force can bring territorial rewards. 
They say the UN wi1llose all credibility unless it enforces its own resolutions, such as those 
protecting Muslim "safe areas". They say the Serbs' military prowess is exaggerated and 
245 
General Rose was not the only British official to influence policy on the 
ground. Nearly a year after the final rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan, 
Lord Owen still lingered on as EC co-chair of the ICFY, although his 
position was becoming increasingly tenuous. The European Parliament 
had, in January 1994, called for his dismissal as EC mediator in the 
peace process, and it had taken direct intervention from Downing Street 
to ensure Owen's continued presence on the Balkans' negotiating 
scene. I 11 On March 27, as Serb forces were planning the Gorazde 
campaign, Lord Owen and his wife flew by helicopter from Belgrade to 
lunch with Milosevic and his wife, Mira Markovic, where, according to 
Owen, they had 'many hours ... of fascinating conversation' .112 On the 
day after the first NATO air strike, Owen met with Bosnian Serb deputies 
Momcilo Krajisnik and Nikola Koljevic in Paris where he tried "to keep 
the Serbs within some form of negotiating framework." 113 Owen's 
diplomatic success rate might best be measured, however, by the 
sequence of events following his and Stoltenberg's overnight stay in Pale 
as guests of the Bosnian Serb leadership on Apri113/14 where, 
according to Owen, they sought to reassure Karadzic of the UN's 
neutrality. This was the day before Tuzla, another 'safe' area, was 
heavily shelled by Serbs, and two days before the fatal shooting of the 
British SAS officer in Gorazde, and the downing of the British harrier jet. 
As in the past, the Serbs reacted to perceived international pusillanimity 
by stepping up their offensive. 
their conquests could be easily reversed.' In an overwhelming response, this was the option 
supported by more than two thirds of Independent readers. Independent, April 20, 1994. An 
opinion poll conducted in Belgium and France also reportedly showed that 70% of the public 
supported 'some type of radical military solution' in Bosnia. Oslobodjenje, European edition, 
February 11, 1994. 
III In his memoirs, Owen admits the charge made by a number of European officials and others 
that he is too pro-Serb, but explains that this impression had been gained due to the 
disproportionate amount of time required to spend with the Serbs 'negotiating more territory from 
the Serbs for the Muslims'. OWEN, op.cit. p.252. 
112 Ibid. p.271. 
113 lbid.p.273. 
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The following week, Lord Owen submitted a 'detailed chronology of 
events from 10-16 April' to EU Ministers. This chronology was prepared 
by General Rose's staff, however, and it would appear that the main 
information on Gorazde available to the EU Ministers at this time 
emanated from British officials. At the EU Foreign Ministers' meeting on 
April 18, the emphasis, according to a Commons Statement by Douglas 
Hurd, had apparently moved away from air strikes. 114 Lord Owen's 
epitaph on the Gorazde events, 'for me the main thing about Gorazde 
was the total perfidy of the Bosnian Serbs toward Churkin and 
Milosevic. I believe that relations between Karadzic and Milosevic were 
never the same after Gorazde'llS strikes an incongruous note. It also 
leaves unexplained the role of the 63rd Paratroop Brigade from Nis, and 
the 37th Army Corps from Uzice, despatched to Gorazde at the time of 
the crisis. 
In the space of one month, VRS forces took control of significant parts of 
the Gorazde 'safe area', the UN and NATO had both been seriously 
discredited, UN staff had been held hostage throughout Serb-held 
territory in Bosnia, and aid convoys had to be suspended. The 'peace' 
proclaimed just weeks previously in Sarajevo was unraveling, while the 
Serb militia freely withdrew heavy weapons from compounds ostensibly 
under UN guard in Sarajevo. Nor was the Serb assault on Gorazde an 
isolated incident in Bosnia that month. Another 'safe area', Bihac, was 
also being heavily shelled by Serb forces, and Bosnian Muslims and 
Croats were expelled in large numbers from Banja Luka, Prijedor, and 
other northern Bosnian townS. 116 
114 At the Luxembourg summit, Hurd and Alain Juppe in particular emphasized the need to avoid 
escalation and the limitations of air strikes. British officials also stressed the need to preserve a 
common front with the Russians. 
115 SILBERILIITLE, op.cit. p.371. 
116 Le Monde, AprilS, 1994, p.4, and April 7, p.1 & 3. 
247 
When General Rose visited Gorazde after the crisis, he commented that 
'the situation was a lot better than I had been led to believe. There was 
obviously damage to the town; you can't fight a battle around a town 
without there being damage .. .' He also questioned the UNHCR estimate 
of casualties, namely, that 715 had been killed and 1,900 wounded, 117 
quoting a Gorazde hospital doctor as stating they were exaggerated. 
Rose claimed that among the wounded were 'young men who hopped off 
the stretcher and went into town', and suggested that the Bosnian army 
had abandoned their positions to the Serbs, looking to the West to fight 
on their behalf.1lS In a BBC Panorama documentary broadcast the 
following January,119 Rose claimed that 'practically every house in 
Gorazde has been damaged, but most of the damage to Gorazde was 
done in the fighting that had taken place here two years before, when 
the Bosnian Government Forces drove the Serbs from this town, and 
there were twelve and a half thousand Serbs at that time living there 
and they were all driven Off.'120 Yet, according to the 1991 census, there 
were only 9,840 Serbs in the whole administrative district of Gorazde, 
and only 5,584 in Gorazde itself. 121 The only mass movement of Serbs 
117 The Annual Report of the International Helsinki Federation states: 'Some 700 people were 
killed during the offensive and some 1,970 wounded. During this and previous offensives, the 
town suffered damage to 80% of its buildings.' International Helsinki Federation Annual Report 
1995, Vienna 1995, p.34. 
118 Independent, April 29, 1994, p.12, & The Times, April 29, 1994, p.13. 
119 BBC Panorama, January 23,1995. 
120 BBC transcript quoted from MALCOLM, Noel. 'Gorazde, the British Government and the 
Serbs'. See also MACDONALD, Calum. "Rose-Tinted Spectacles', Bosnia Report, No.9. 
Malcolm claims that the allegation was not only made by General Rose on the BBC, but was 
'repeated in a special briefmg given to politicians and visiting dignitaries at the MoD, the main 
purpose of which was to show that the 'Muslims' were more to blame for the situation in Bosnia 
than the rebel Serbs'. MALCOLM, Ibid. Malcolm also alleges in an earlier article that 
UNPROFOR and the British Ministry of Defence were acting as conduits for Serb propaganda. 
'The Whole Lot of them are Serbs'. The Spectator, June 10, 1994. 
121 Stanovnistvo Bosne I Hercegovine. Narodni sastav po naseljima, Zagreb, 1995, p.119. See 
Prejudice and Plum Brandy: Tales of a Balkan Stringer. Alec Russell, London 1993, p.279, for a 
fIrst-hand, and contrasting, account of the bombardment of Gorazde in 1992, which he testifIes 
was caused by Serb artillery bombardment. 
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recorded from the Gorazde area was in late August 1992, ordered by 
Bosnian Serb politicians. 122 
The Gorazde crisis prompted criticism that General Rose's call for more 
UN troops to uphold UN resolutions had been ignored, particularly by 
the US which had failed to contribute any troops on the ground and was 
in arrears with its UN contributions, jeopardising the success of 
peacekeeping operations. But this argument was specious. The Serbs 
refused to allow UN troops into Gorazde before late April 1994 (and then 
only as a quid pro quo for the abandonment of NATO air strikes). Even 
when they did manage to enter the enclave, the troops were unable to 
offer protection to Gorazde civilians against Serb shellfire, and only 
limited assistance (as much as permitted by the VRS forces) in getting 
food and medical supplies to the area. The very presence of UN troops in 
the enclave, moreover, thwarted international military action to break 
the siege of the enclave. 
The British were not the only international players with responsibility for 
the Serb capture of much of Gorazde. But, while the position of other 
major powers, even Russia, fluctuated, British policy remained 
consistent throughout the Gorazde crisis in seeking to preempt 
significant military action (namely, air strikes as opposed to close air 
support) to halt the offensive and force Mladic's troops to withdraw, and 
was, therefore, pivotal to the success of the Serb campaign. When the 
crisis intensified, Britain sought through diplomatic and other channels 
to prevent NATO air strikes, and was the only western power to place its 
own troops at direct risk by sending them into Gorazde, then judged one 
of the world's hottest war zones, surrounded by hostile Serb forces, with 
no exit strategy or adequate means of self-defence, a decision taken in 
some haste, and in an atmosphere of acute international discord, 
without consulting Parliament. The display of international disunity gave 
122 The Times, September 3, 1992, and International Herald Tribune, September 19, 1992. 
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the Serbs manoeuvring space to exploit the situation, and pursue their 
objective of establishing an ethnically homogeneous Serb republic. 
Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg, speaking at the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs the following month was, as usual, more outspoken 
than many of his colleagues in summarizing the Bosnian government's 
position. 
I acknowledge this is extraordinarily unpalatable ... they have to 
recognise military defeat when it stares them in the face, and that land 
has been seized by force, and there is going to have to be a degree of 
acquiescence in that [and] the other thing they've got to accept is that 
the military option has to be abandoned. 123 
In the weeks after the Gorazde crisis, the Bosnian Serb response to the 
international climb-down followed a familiar pattern, demonstrating 
their ascendancy by flouting the UN agreement, and further obstructing 
the UNPROFOR and UNHCR missions. Initially, British light tanks, 
forming part of a multinational force to reconnoitre Gorazde, were 
turned back by Serbs as being 'too heavily armed',124 and, on April 29, a 
further 168 British soldiers en route from Sarajevo to Gorazde were held 
up at Rogatica for over a week by Bosnian Serb forces. A strong protest 
lodged with Karadzic had no effect and, on May 4, the Bosnian Serb 
leader set new conditions for British troops to continue their journey to 
Gorazde. Ammunition and personal cameras were to be surrendered, 
and Serb tanks permitted through the Sarajevo exclusion zone, under 
UN escort. This request was granted, despite the fact that it constituted 
a breach of the NATO ultimatum, and assisted the Serbs in setting up a 
new front. 125 On May 12, six British UN soldiers from the Royal 
123 SHARP, Jane M O. 'Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion?', Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1997, p.4S, quoted from Independent, May 19, 1994. 
124 Independent, April 21, 1994, p.l O. 
125 On May 7, a Bosnian Serb tank disappeared from UN surveillance between Pale and Lukavica. 
UN military observers following the tank were obstructed by Serb forces and lost it. Several more 
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Engineers were forced at gunpoint to hand over their weapons to Serbs 
en route to Gorazde, and their commander forced to read out a prepared 
statement. 126 The UN were said to be playing down the incident, saying it 
was the work of an isolated group. In Gorazde itself, neither the terms of 
the UN nor the NATO agreements were adhered to by the Serbs. On May 
13, Serb forces agreed to withdraw from Gorazde in 24 hours, yet two 
weeks later 150 Serb forces in police uniforms still remained in the 
Gorazde exclusion zone. General Rose's response was to pressurize 
Bosnian President Izetbegovic to withdraw his army 3 kIn from the East 
bank of the Drina, after which the Serb 'police' would withdraw and the 
UN take control. According to the UNHCR, however, Bosnian Serb armed 
militia had not withdrawn from the 3 kIn total exclusion zone around 
Gorazde by the end of May, while areas of the confrontation line 
remained unstable and UNPROFOR troops, including UNMOs, 
periodically experienced security problems and obstructed movement. 127 
The Serbs had gained a major military, political and diplomatic victory in 
Gorazde which was to have consequences extending well beyond that 
enclave. 
The Contact Group 
One of the outcomes of the Gorazde debacle was the formation of the so-
called 'contact group' which, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd claimed, 
heralded a new era in international mediation on former Yugoslavia. 
tanks were believed to be on the move within the Sarajevo exclusion zone in breach of the NATO 
ultimatum. 
\26 Labour backbencher Chris Mullin brought up both these episodes in the House of Commons. 
The minister merely replied 'The hon. Gentleman points to two instances that we greatly regret' 
and assured Mullin that the situation had 'dramatically' improved since that time. Oral Answers. 
Hansard, Vo1.245, June 21, 1994, c.IIS. 
127 UN Information Notes, June, 1994, iv. 
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A number of factors contributed to the establishment of the Contact 
Group. The peace forged between Bosniacs and Croats through US 
diplomacy in March 1994128 had resulted in the ICFY being 
marginalized, since direct negotiations with the Americans were viewed 
by both parties as more beneficial. This, together with the aclmowledged 
failure of all previous peace plans, and the persistent Serb shelling of the 
UN 'safe areas', led to a call for a more structured international 
approach to crisis management in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The peace plan produced by the Contact Group is examined, both with 
regard to the implications of the plan itself, and the Group's handling of 
its rejection by the Bosnian Serbs. It is concluded that, as with the ICFY 
and its predecessor, the Hague Conference, the Contact Group inhibited 
an effective international response to the war, not only in its 
appeasement of the Bosnian Serbs and the continued reliance on 
Serbian President Milosevic as the principle interlocutor in peace 
negotiations, but by its very existence as the accepted international 
diplomatic forum for addressing the crisis, thereby effectively blocking 
other, potentially more viable, approaches to ending the war. 
The formation of the Contact Group was the result of a compromise 
amongst the major world powers, in which Britain played a major 
part. 129 Britain's preference was for a merger of Russian and US 
diplomacy within the Owen/Stoltenberg-chaired Geneva Conference, but 
this met with US opposition, America having refused to work with David 
Owen within the framework of the ICFY.130 Its advantage from the 
128 For a comparison of hostilities in Central Bosnia before and after the US-brokered Bosniac-
Croat Federation, see UNHCR maps 7 and 8, showing conflict zones on February 1 and March 31, 
1994, respectively, pp.354-5. 
129 For the Contact Group, see also BURG/SHOUP, op.cit. pp.298-307. 
130 OWEN, op.cit. p.277 & 312. 
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British viewpoint, however, was that it provided a platform which could 
rein in the Clinton administration's propensity for the use of air power, 
and resist US Congress pressure to lift the arms embargo on the 
Bosnian government forces, while at the same time offering Russia a 
more prominent role in the international decision-making process. 
According to one unnamed British source, 'it aims to concentrate on the 
nitty-gritty of an overall cease-fire and get to grips with the map. So far 
everyone has been doing their own thing. This is meant to pull things 
together' .131 
The five members were, nonetheless, divided in their political interests 
and perception of the situation from the outset. The Russians, British 
and French insisted on the necessity for modifying the peace plan in 
favour of the Serbs and playing the Milosevic card, viewing the Serbian 
President as indispensable to the peace negotiations, while the US and 
Germany aimed at the progressive isolation of the Bosnian Serbs, and 
the political and military reinforcement of the Bosniacs and Croats. 132 
A further difficulty arose within the European Union, as many EU 
countries, now excluded from participation in decision-making, objected. 
The Contact Group also tended to be regarded as a competitor to the EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. Other European states, such as 
the Netherlands and Spain, both significant contributors to UNPROFOR 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Greece and Italy with their specific regional 
interests, objected to being excluded when the Contact Group was 
formed, arguing that it contradicted the European Union Treaty. David 
Owen anticipated these difficulties, later commenting that only a fait 
accompli would win reluctant overall European acceptance of the 
Contact Group. 133 
131 Quoted in Guardian, April 26, 1994. 
132 For discussion of Contact Group, see STARK, Hans in COT, cd. op.cit. p.44. 
133 Owen records that a number of EU countries questioned the legitimacy of the representation at 
the Contact Group, including the Netherlands and Spain. According to Owen, "[t]he Contact 
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The group met on a relatively informal ad hoc basis in different capitals, 
with the host state chairing the sessions as primus inter pares. The first 
Group meeting was held in London on Apri125, with representatives 
from the United States, France, Britain, Germany and Russia. 134 The 
following month in Geneva the Contact Group plan, emanating mainly 
from the ideas of the Europeans and Russians, was presented, based on 
the separation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into largely autonomous entities, 
with 51 % of territory ceded to the Croat-Bosniac Federation, and 49% of 
territory to the Serbs. 135 In July, the parties were presented with the 
final map and a working paper sketching five elements for a future 
constitution: (1) the commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
(2) the existence of two entities, (3) the 51 :49 formula for territorial 
division, open to further changes of territory on a consensual basis, (4) 
permission for the Bosnian Serbs to keep 'ethnically cleansed territory' 
and (5) the option to maintain close relations with Serbia and Croatia. 
On July 5, foreign ministers in Geneva agreed that if the Serbs failed to 
accept the Contact Group plan, the arms embargo would eventually be 
lifted. Although Clinton and Christopher stressed that this was a last 
resort, there was a considerable lobby supporting it within the United 
States from both Congress and Senate. The plan was presented on a 
'take-it-or-Ieave-it' basis, with massive penalties for non-compliance. The 
Bosnian government and Croats immediately accepted the plan in its 
entirety, on the understanding that the arms embargo would be lifted if 
Group would report in a fairly bland way to the EU from time to time." OWEN, op.cit. p.278. 
This is also discussed in GOW, James. Triumph of the Lack of Will. International Diplomacy and 
the Yugoslav War. Hurst, 1997, p. 261. 
134 Italy joined the Contact Group in 1996. For the principles and the structure of the meetings, 
see, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia, Bertrand de Rossanet, Den Haag: Kluwer, 
1996. 
135 For Contact Group plan, see map 4, p.352. 
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they accepted and the Serbs rejected the plan. 136 In the event, the Serbs, 
who still held over 70% of Bosnian territory, did reject the plan. 137 
Deep divisions within the Contact Group then ensued as the United 
States leaned towards the Group's declared option in the case of 
rejection, namely, lifting the embargo, albeit with caution since Britain, 
France and Russia threatened to withdraw their UN contingents should 
the embargo be lifted, thereby placing considerable responsibility on 
America for what transpired thereafter. 138 In the event, the Contact 
Group did not impose any of the coercive measures previously 
announced against the Bosnian Serbs, reverting instead, as on previous 
occasions, to diplomacy. Mter weeks of failure to secure the Bosnian 
Serb signature to the Plan and continued divisions within the Contact 
Group, some of its members, following a meeting with Milosevic in 
Belgrade on September 21, floated a revised plan to permit the Bosnian 
Serbs to link up with neighbouring Serbia, a concession not, however, 
supported by the US Administration. 139 In early October, French 
Foreign Minister Alain Juppe went further, calling on Europe, Russia 
and the US to 'confirm' the right of the Serbs to confederate with a 
136 Bosnian President Izetbegovic, in a speech to the Bosniac Congress on July 18, declared that the 
plan was 'unjust', but should be accepted, in the absence of international support for alternatives, for 
the sake of preserving the Bosnian state, which could be strengthened with peace. Radio Bosnia-
Herzegovina, July 18, 1994. 
137 The confidence of the Bosnian Serb leaders was demonstrated by the manner in which they 
rejected the plan. 'Karadzic handed over a sealed pink envelope containing the response. In a 
typically theatrical performance, he claimed it was the sole copy, and indeed asked for a photocopy 
to keep himself. OWEN, op.cit. p.286. 
138 See OWEN, op.cit. p.295. The Clinton administration was coming under considerable domestic 
pressure as the US Senate had voted for both unilateral and multilateral lifting of the arms embargo 
on May 12, followed by the House of Representatives the following month which voted for 
unilateral action. In reaction to the Senate vote, the Russian Duma called for sanctions against 
Serbia and Montenegro to be lifted. OWEN, Ibid. pp. 279 and 283. 
139 Washington Post, National Weekly Edition, October 31-November 6, 1994, p.16. 
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neighbouring state. State Department and White House officials insisted 
that there was no backing for such a plan, either publicly or privately. 140 
Nonetheless, the Contact Group plan reaffirmed international 
endorsement of the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the right of the 
Serbs (but not the Bosniacs or Croats) to their own entity. 
In October, UN sanctions were partially lifted from Serbia and 
Montenegro, mainly due to pressure from Britain, France and Russia, 
and the efforts of David Owen. Previously, US officials had stipulated 
that sanctions could only be lifted after a peace agreement was signed, 
and in force. Following the alleged sealing of the Bosnian/ Serbian 
borders, however, and Milosevic's verbal pledge to withhold assistance to 
the Bosnian Serbs, Washington agreed to a UN decision for the partial 
lifting of sanctions. David Owen assumed the task of securing an 
agreement on border monitoring. Since the Contact Group formation, 
Owen had a substantially diminished role in Bosnia,141 but towards the 
end of the summer, following talks with Milosevic, the idea of 
internationally monitoring the Serbian/Bosnian border re-emerged. 
Since neither the UN nor the ICRC were prepared to get involved, the 
ICFY took over the supervisory role, appealing mostly to Scandinavian 
NGOs to contribute monitors. The fact that these were few in number 
(135) and unarmed (on Milosevic's insistence), and that the operation 
was being run on a shoestring budget, rendered the mission, as one UN 
official put it, 'simplistic and impracticable',142 Owen was fully aware of 
the shortcomings of the mission, noting, however, that 'splitting the 
Serbs was far more important than holding out for a totally sealed 
140 Ibid. US Administration officials did concede, however, that the Serbs could open up the issue 
of 'constitutional arrangements' once they accepted the peace plan. 
141 'We, as Co-Chairmen, participated only in the latter part of the [Contact Group] meeting, after the 
conununique had been virtually finalized; this was on the insistence of the US, perhaps to underline 
that the ICFY was not a formal decision-maker, but we had been able to feed in our views through 
our representatives on the Contact Group. It was a rather frustrating procedure but we decided to 
grin and bear it'. OWEN, Ibid. p.279. See also Ibid. p.297. 
142 For the UN Under-Secretary's view of the mission, see GOULDING, op.cit. p.327. 
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border - which was never going to happen'. 143 It provided a continuing 
role for Owen and the ICFY, and reinforced the illusion that progress 
was being made on the political/diplomatic front. It also placed Milosevic 
in a favourable international light, distancing Serbia in the eyes of 
external observers from the Bosnian Serb leadership. In October 1994, 
the co-chairs of the ICFY wrote to the UN Secretary-General that Serbia 
and Montenegro had cut off all non-humanitarian shipments to the 
Bosnian Serbs which, in turn, triggered a partial lifting of sanctions 
against those states. 144 
A speech by Milosevic on September 7 in the Serbian nationalist 
stronghold of Vranje shortly before the international easing of sanctions 
on Serbia and Montenegro referred to Serbia's future as a leading state 
in a Balkans federation. 145 Milosevic referred to the contribution by the 
Vranje citizens to the development of Yugoserbia sic, and urged support 
for the '50-50' agreement between Serbs and non Serbs in Bosnia, 
declaring that Serbia was the deciding factor for peace in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Even allowing for a degree of bombast, given his large 
supportive audience, the whole tenor of Milosevic's speech reflected 
confidence in his ability to secure sufficient international support for his 
purposes. 
A paper written at this time by a British diplomat who had previously 
served in Belgrade stressed the 'urgent need for an agreed Western 
agenda for handling Serbia which will wean Milosevic and the Serbian 
people off their current path of confusion and instability towards one 
that is more democratic and acceptable' .146 While the paper ostensibly 
143 OWEN, op.cit. p.298. 
144 BURG/SHOUP, op.cit. pp309-31 O. 
14S 'We are the largest and most important force in the Balkans'. Slobodan Milosevic, RTS Serbia, 
September 7,1994. 
146 ROBINSON, Michael. Managing Milosevic's Serbia. Royal Institute oflntemational Affairs, 
January 1995. 
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presented a pragmatic approach towards the reestablishment of peace, 
and had wide currency in international negotiating circles, it also 
implicitly acknowledged Milosevic as a key player in the peace 
negotiations, rather than as a continuing threat to peace in the region. 147 
The Bihac crisis 
This section examines the British role in frustrating NATO air strikes 
against VRS positions around Bihac, in response to a violation of UN 
Security Council resolutions by VRS forces, and the international crisis 
which ensued from the Serb offensive, as the United Nations and NATO 
fell into dispute over the 'dual key' arrangement. 148 
Bihac was one of six declared 'safe areas' through UN Security Council 
Resolution 836 in June 1993. The enclave was patrolled by a French 
battalion until October 18, 1994, when it was replaced by Bangladeshi 
forces. The enclave had been under Serb siege for two and a half years 
and, from May 1994, had received minimal humanitarian aid, largely 
due to obstruction by the Krajina Serbs of the passage of UN convoys. 149 
The crisis was triggered, in August 1994, by the launch of a successful 
offensive on the part of the Bosnian government Fifth Corps under the 
command of General Atif Dudakovic against the forces of renegade 
Muslim leader Fikret Abdic, driving them to withdraw to Serb-held 
territory in Croatia. On October 25, with the humanitarian crisis in 
147 For the British position on Milosevic at this time, see the Foreign Secretary's statement in 
Debate on the Address: ForeiKn Affairs and Defence. Hansard, Vo1.250, November 17, 1994, 
c.134. 
148 UNSCR 770 included the delivery of humanitarian aid using 'all necessary means'; UNSCR 
824 called for the 'withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb military or paramilitary units from the safe 
areas to a distance where they cease to constitute a menace to their security'. 
149 "Disaster looms for the 180,000 persons in the Bihac region, where UNHCR has only been 
able to meet 8% of the food aid target in the past six months." UN Information Notes, November 
and December, 1994. 
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Bihac now acute,150 Dudakovic led a further offensive south of the river 
Una, overrunning a Serb barracks on the Grabez plateau, and taking 
some 200sqkm of territory, in an attempt to break through the Serb 
siege, and acquire Serb-held territory. This constituted the first major 
Bosnian Army victory (albeit short-lived) since the beginning of the war. 
The superior weaponry of the VRS, reportedly with the assistance of 
troops and supplies from Serbia itself,151 enabled Mladic's forces to 
retake the territory the following month and, in late November, the VRS 
had entered the 'safe area' itself. The crisis which ensued was, in terms 
of British/US, and UN/NATO, relations, the most serious to date. 
In October 1994, the United States had announced a partial easing of 
the arms embargo in the Adriatic, which caused consternation within 
Europe, as reflected in the Foreign Secretary's speech on the opening of 
parliament the following month. 
We must not allow the strains created by Bosnia to disrupt the 
transatlantic partnership .. .It remains true - as it has always been 
true - that the international community will not impose a solution 
by force. It follows that the fighting will stop when, and not before, 
the parties fighting are persuaded to stop ... [the operation] must now 
adjust to the change in the American role announced last week. But 
it should remain effective ... we should avoid giving the problem a 
political weight that it does not deserve .. .it has been made entirely 
clear that Admiral Smith will continue to conduct the NATO operation 
in exactly the same way as before ... 
An arms embargo applies to all parties in the former Yugoslavia ... if 
member states, and particularly permanent members of the Security 
Council were to ignore or contravene those mandatory resolutions, 
others would quickly follow suit. The authority of the Security Council 
would unravel and our hope for a more orderly world would begin to 
ISO According to UNHCR, "the denial of humanitarian aid as a weapon of war is being practiced 
more systematically today than at any time during the conflict. The continuing refusal of the 
Krajina Serb authorities to allow the passage ofUNHCR food convoys into Bihac is a sad 
example of this'. UN Information Notes, December, 1994, update (i) & p.13. 
IS I According to a classified UN report, armed men were spotted crossing the border into Bosnia 
in vehicles with Belgrade licence plates. The Times, December 3, 1994, p.l 5 and Independent, 
December 2,1994, p.lO. 
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dissolve. 152 
The Foreign Secretary's reference to the necessity to maintain the arms 
embargo, a warning to America, was consistent with British policy in 
Bosnia since the onset of hostilities. It was, however, inconsistent with 
Britain's overall approach to the sale of arms to what many regarded as 
unsavoury regimes. What was remarkable here was Mr Hurd's 
uncharacteristic contradiction in regard to the overall principles of self-
defence within the same speech for, minutes later, he declared apropos 
a different issue: 
We recognise, as the United Nations charter recognises, that countries 
have a right to self defence. If a country wishes to defend itself it needs 
good equipment. A great many British companies supply high-quality 
defence products. That is the chain of reasoning and it is hard to 
resist. We need to ensure that when those products are exported, they 
are sold responsibly ... 
We will not put unnecessary barriers in the way of British companies 
which responsibly earn revenue and sustain the jobs of the 400,000 
people in this country who work in the defence industry, or the 
approximately 90,000 of those whose jobs depend upon defence sales 
overseas. We are highly competitive in this field. It comprises only 2.1 
per cent of our total exports. But we are not prepared to dull the 
competitive edge of that part of our industry to satisfy people who are 
well-meaning but ill-informed ... 
As I have tried to show, our outlook on foreign policy is worldwide. 
That is because the interests that we promote and protect stretch 
across the world. We rely on exports to supply a quarter of our gross 
domestic product - more than twice as much proportionately as Japan 
or the United States ... We are a European power with interests that 
reach far beyond Europe. 153 
The Foreign Secretary's stress on the importance of arms sales to the 
British economy underlines the significance of the decision to suspend 
arms sales to Yugoslavia's successor states, where political interests 
152 Douglas Hurd, Debate on the Address: Foreian Affairs and Defence. Hansard, November 17, 
1994, op.cit. c.134-6. 
IS31bid. c.144-S. 
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were clearly perceived to outweigh the loss of potential revenue. 
Protecting those political interests included, as Hurd put it, 
taking the world as we fmd it, identifying British assets and those 
things that we are strong at and setting them to work as effectively as 
we can, in the interests of the prosperity and security of our people. 154 
Britain's insistence on maintaining a blanket arms embargo over all 
former Yugoslav states, regardless of the stark imbalance of weaponry 
on the ground155 and, perhaps more significantly in realpolitik terms, a 
widening rift with its US ally on the issue, suggested a strong British 
interest in securing a Serb victory. 
On Bosnia, the Foreign Secretary referred to the current situation as 'a 
setback', drawing a symmetry of aggression in narrow terms which 
partly accounted for the activities around Bihac, but did not reflect the 
overall status quO. 156 He drew an optimistic picture of the situation in 
Sarajevo, omitting to mention that, although '90% of aid convoys now 
get through [and] the people in Sarajevo have known days on end when 
there have been no shells and no sniper casualties', 157 the siege of the 
city had in fact never been lifted, and the relative calm which prevailed 
in Sarajevo was also due to the Pale regime's decision to concentrate its 
energies in other areas of Bosnia, such as Gorazde and Bihac. Hurd 
also referred to 'the new relationship that we are building with 
Russia ... our British relationship with Russia exhibits a new breadth, 
IS4 Ibid. c.145-6. 
ISS In October 1994, according to one source, Bosnian Serb forces had significantly more tanks, 
APCs, heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missile launchers than the entire Bosnian, Bosnian Croat and 
Croatian armies combined. Pecat, Zagreb, October 25,1994, quoted in Bosnia Report, Issue 7, 
November 1994. 
IS6 'The Bosnian Government have attacked, Bosnian Serbs have counter-attacked, villages have 
changed hands and been destroyed'. Douglas Hurd, Ibid. c.134. 
IS' Ibid. 
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openness and warmth ... ' 158 while stating that 'Russia's interests will 
[not] always coincide with ours'. He did not mention Chechnya in the 
latter respect, however, where a major assault was then underway, or 
Bosnia. 
The situation in Bihac, from the NATO viewpoint, was further 
complicated by the fact that the Bosnian Serbs had recently acquired 
new medium and high-level air defence systems, backed by 
sophisticated target-acquisition radar equipment. 159 The missiles were 
believed to have been made in Russia, and supplied to the Bosnian Serb 
army via Serbia. 16o NATO was thereafter forced to deploy larger 
formations of aircraft, prompting NATO Commander Admiral Leighton-
Smith to argue for strategic air strikes to destroy the entire Serb air 
defence system. The Serb forces took immediate advantage of the 
reduced NATO surveillance, by dropping napalm and cluster bombs on 
Cazin, near Bihac, with many fatalities. On November 21, NATO, with 
the consent of French UN Force Commander for former Yugoslavia, Lt. 
Gen. Bertrand de Lapresle, and the authorisation of UNSC resolution 
958, launched an attack on Udbina airfield in Serb-held territory in 
Croatia, from where the bombing raid had emanated. The initiative had 
full international (including Russian) endorsement, although General 
Rose stipulated that NATO action be confined to Croatian space. 161 
On the same day, Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind made a statement 
to the House of Commons. Rifkind did not condemn the use of napalm 
and cluster bombs. 162 Instead, he presented the Serb offensive as a 
IS8 Ibid. c.136. 
IS9 ROSE, Ibid. p.200, and The Times, December 3, 1994, p.lS. Until then, the Serb forces had 
only deployed SA 7 low-level ground-to-air missiles. 
160 The Times, Ibid. 
161 ROSE, op.cit. p.201. The Times editorial, and Independent, November 21,1994. On the use of 
napalm and cluster bombs, see The Times, November 19, 1994, and statement by Defence 
Secretary Malcolm Rifkind. B.2mia. Hansard, Vo1.2S0, November 21,1994, c.34 1. 
162 Concern at the use of napalm was raised by MPs, who enquired as to the source of the supply 
and the possible possession by Serbs of other 'unacceptable weaponry, such as chemical 
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'vigorous counter-attack' in response to 'recent attacks by Bosnian 
Muslim forces in capturing large areas of Bosnian Serb-held territory'. 163 
The reference to 'Muslim' forces, as opposed to 'Bosnian government 
forces', misrepresented the ethnic makeup of the Bosnian army of which 
the deputy head was a Serb. Also, the omission to mention the main 
reason for the Bosnian army offensive, namely, an attempt to break the 
30-month siege, and the six-month blockade of aid deliveries to the 
enclave, distorted the facts. 164 The Defence Secretary also exaggerated 
the effect of the NATO attack, claiming that the damage to the runway 
'will have profound consequences for denying the use of the airfield in 
future to Krajina Serb aircraft'.165 The general tenor of Mr Rifkind's 
speech was defensive, and twice during his statement he sought to shift 
responsibility for decision-making in regard to NATO air strikes entirely 
to the UN on the ground. 166 
The NATO action over Udbina was widely acclaimed at the time as the 
first such operation in NATO's history; the Serbs, however, were 
forewarned and had removed most of their aircraft from the airfield. 167 
More significantly, perhaps, the second Udbina runway, over 3.5 km 
long, was not targeted by the 80 NATO bombs used in the air raid. The 
flight control equipment was also left intact, with the result that the 
airfield was operational again within hours, and Serb forces, undeterred, 
resumed raids over Bihac. 168 NATO had wanted to neutralize the airfield 
weapons'. The Defence Secretary admitted ignorance on both counts, merely commenting that 'we 
must constantly monitor the position'. Bosnia. Ibid, c,347 
163 Ibid. c.341. 
164 For this, see UN Information Notes, December 1994, i & ii. 
165 BQmia, Hansard, Vo1.250, op.cit. c.343. 
166 Ibid. c.345 & 348. 
167 See the account of the Udbina raid by a member of the EC monitoring mission. 
O'SHEA, Brendan, Crisis at Bihac, Sutton Publishing, 1998 p.108-9. 
168 Ibid. 
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and associated facilities altogether, but UNPROFOR had insisted that 
the airstrip only should be struck, not the aircraft operating from it. 169 
As Serb forces moved into Bihac itself, a number UN member states, 
including some Security Council members, favoured extensive air strikes 
throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.170 General Rose rejected this, arguing 
that the conflict could best be resolved by negotiation, a position which 
received the full support of British ministers.l7l On the same day, two 
British Sea Harrier jets on reconnaissance over Bihac were locked onto 
by Serb SA2 missiles, which the pilots, acting in self-defence, 
destroyed. 172 With the authority of the overall UN Commander in former 
Yugoslavia, General De Lapresle, NATO launched two further attacks on 
Serb SAM missiles. 173General Rose, however, was reportedly 'fuming' 
after the NATO raids. 174 In his memoirs, he noted that he had persuaded 
General Lapresle to call off further air strikes since they risked 
collapsing the entire UN mission. 175 Rose wrote to General De Lapresle 
at this time, outlining UNPROFOR's increasingly unviable situation, and 
that it could withdraw safely without the assistance of NATO combat 
troops on the ground. 176 Significantly, General Peter Inge, the British 
Chief of Defence Staff, who had obtained a copy of the letter, then 
169 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.36/159. 
170 Ibid. p,36/160. 
171 The Times, November 23,1994. p.l, The Foreign and Defence Secretaries were quoted as 
opining that air power was no substitute for peace negotiations. Borba, November 23, 1994, p.3. 
172 During that week, three British aircraft were targeted by SAM-2 missiles.ITN Report, 
November 25, 1994. 
173 Daily Sitrep HQ BH Forward Command Sarajevo, 23/11194, quoted in O'SHEA, op.cit. p.ll1. 
174 The Times, November 24, 1994, p.l. 
m ROSE, op.cit. p.203. 
176 Ibid. 
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phoned Rose to advise him to restrict its circulation. l77 The letter had 
exposed not only the extreme vulnerability of the UNPROFOR mission, 
but the fact that there was no safe exit strategy in placel Also, the 
British government, for political reasons, did not propose to withdraw 
their UN troops. 
On November 23, Serb leaders in Pale, through their spokesman Jovan 
Zametica, a former British lecturer in security studies, threatened 'all 
out war' if NATO retaliated against their advance on Bihac. l78 General 
Rose, who liaised closely with Zametica and the Bosnian Serb 
authorities through Mike Stanley (also known as Milos Stankovic, a 
British army interpreter of Serb origin), informed Zametica that the UN 
had little manoeuvring space if Serb forces penetrated the enclave. 
Zametica, clearly attuned to Britain's position, retorted that Rose should 
use his influence to make London understand what was at stake. l79 
As NATO continued targeting Serb missile systems from a high level, a 
clash between General Rose and US Admiral Leighton Smith ensued, 
Smith having informed Rose that NATO would respond to every Serb 
offensive with a greater use of force, also that NATO intended to clear all 
the Serb missile systems from Bosnia before responding to any further 
UN requests for close air support. De Lapresle declined to intervene to 
stop NATO, and even the Russian embassy in New York supported NATO 
air power to end the war. l80 Rose later commented that 'there seemed to 
be nothing I could do to prevent this escalation .. .It looked as though we 
177 Rose notes that General Inge 'sounded nervous over the telephone, but assured the UN 
Commander that he 'had the confidence of everyone back in London'. Ibid. 
178 'Ako nas napadnete, to znaci opsti rat', Borba, November 24, 1994, p.3. 
179 Borba, November 24,1994, p.3. 
180 ROSE, op.cit. p.204-5. 
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were on our own'.181 Since the United Nations was also divided on the 
issue, 'we' presumably referred to Britain. 
The Serbs responded to the NATO action by closing all checkpoints to 
UN and civilian traffic, suspending flights to Sarajevo, and taking 
French, Canadian and Ukranian soldiers hostage around the weapon 
collection sites in Sarajevo, as well as a British convoy en route to 
Gorazde. 182 
At a NATO ambassadors' meeting on November 24, the NATO Secretary-
General criticised Members for their reluctance in backing a US plan 
aimed at ending the siege of Bihac. In Sarajevo, meanwhile, the Bosnian 
government singled out Britain as the western power most responsible 
for opposing intervention to save the enclave. At a press briefing, 
General Rose played down the crisis, despite the fact that several 
hundred UN personnel were held hostage by the Serbs, listing instead a 
number of 'encouraging' signS.183 
A public argument between the UN and NATO ensued as General Rose, 
backed by the British government, pressed for NATO close air support 
while opposing the strategic air strikes which NATO, the United States 
and France, as well as many other UN member states, favoured. 184 The 
US also proposed an extended air exclusion zone around Bihac, backed 
by NATO air power,185 which the French Foreign Ministry confirmed 
181 Ibid. p.205. See also O'SHEA, op.cit.. p.111-112. 
182 ROSE, op.cit. p.205. 
183 The Times, November 26, 1994, p.l3. 
184 After the entry ofVRS forces into Bihac, both the United States and France pressed for 
tougher military action, whilst the UN Commander continued to recommend 'prudence'. See The 
Independent, November 24,1994, p.l & 14, and Le Monde, November 25, 1994, p.3. Rose noted 
in his memoirs, 'I was simply not prepared to allow an air campaign to be mounted by NATO'. 
ROSE, op.cit. p.209. 
185 Le Monde, November 26, 1994, p.3, Independent, November 24, 1994, p.l4, and New York 
Times, November 25,1994, p.Al. 
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France would support. The Pentagon's Director for Strategy, Plans and 
Policy, General Wesley Clark contacted Rose, informing him that 'the US 
administration regarded UNPROFOR as a hostage group', and that the 
dual key had effectively been taken out of Rose's hands. Meanwhile, 
Admiral Leighton-Smith warned Rose that the Alliance would no longer 
allow NATO planes to be attacked without responding. 186 Rose's tactic 
was not to reject the air strike option wholesale, but to insist that NATO 
act only in UN defence. 187 An FCO official backed this up, commenting 
that 'we're against making pronouncements that we can't fulm. It may 
sound impressive, but when you're asked how you're actually going to 
do it then all you can do is mumble'.188 
The NATO aircraft returned after two hours to their base in Italy, 
without having located any targets. The credibility of both the UN and 
NATO was now at stake, as the Serbs pursued their assault on the UN 
'safe area' where 1,200 poorly-armed UN Bangladeshi troops were at 
risk. Admiral Leighton-Smith announced that the alliance had offered to 
conduct strikes but that the UN, which had the final authority, was 
undecided. 189 Arguing the difficulties in locating the Serb air defence 
radar system, Rose declared that it was 'controlled from an HQ outside 
Bosnia and could not be attacked' .190 It later emerged through US 
intelligence that the UN command had been engaged in neutralising 
NATO air strikes against the Serbs. The CIA's Pentagon branch, the DIA, 
had been engaged within Bosnia's war since its inception, and amongst 
its surveillance targets were top-secret communications between the UN 
186 Ibid. p.21 O. 
187 Rose comments 'By couching my request in these terms I prevented [the NATO commander] 
from rejecting it outright on the grounds that NATO would accede only to requests for strategic 
air strikes'. Ibid. p.209. 
188 Guardian, November 24,1994, p.14. 
189 Guardian, Ibid. p.l. 
190 Ibid. 
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military command in Sarajevo and the British special forces. The 
Americans had become increasingly exasperated by what they saw as 
the thwarting of a robust stand against the Serbs, stemming from the 
reluctance of the European Union, and Britain in particular. 191 A 
communication line was established so that undercover SAS teams, 
assigned to the UN as forward air controllers, could identify Serb 
artillery positions and relay the co-ordinates to headquarters and NATO 
pilots. But General Rose's office sent a secret order to the SAS not to 
identify targets, thereby neutralising the air strike. 192 
The breakdown in relations between NATO and General Rose was raised 
in the House of Commons some weeks later. Responding to Defence 
Minister Nicholas Soames' claim that General Rose 'displayed 
throughout a remarkable resolve and determination in steadfastly 
continuing UNPROFOR's mission in support of the international 
community's efforts to secure a peaceful solution to the war'. 193 Labour 
backbencher Calum Macdonald requested a statement on 'the apparent 
breakdown of relations between NATO and the general towards the end 
of his tour? NATO threatened to withhold details of flight plans from 
him, fearing that he would disclose them to the Serbians and thereby 
put the NATO aircrew at risk', Soames, reiterating his support for 
General Rose, merely retorted 'I will not explain the background to any 
such events, because they did not happen',194 
Following a public accusation by Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, 
who alleged that General Rose was personally responsible for NATO's 
decision to call off strategic air strikes, as well as criticism from a 
191 See VULLIAMY, Ed: 'How the CIA intercepted SAS Signals', for a fuller explanation of the 
procedure of neutralising NATO air strikes. Guardian, January 29, 1996. 
192 Prior to publication of the article, the author attempted to contact General Rose, but he was 
unavailable for comment. Ibid. 
193 Anm:, Hansard, Vo1.255, February 23,1995, c.500. 
194 Ibid. 
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number of national leaders that UNPROFOR had failed to deter attacks 
on the safe area of Bihac, the UN Secretariat convened, on 28 November, 
a meeting of troop-contributing countries to raise the issue of whether 
they wished to have their forces participate in more robust enforcement 
action from the air. 
The Secretariat explained that NATO was reluctant to conduct air 
attacks against the Bosnian Serbs without first suppressing Serb air 
defense assets in the area, and that the UNPROFOR commanders 
had been unable to agree to such a widespread use of air power, 
"which would be tantamount to going to war with the Serbs" ... 
Seventeen Permanent Representatives then took the floor, nine of 
them, including three permanent members of the Security Council, 
in support of UNPROFOR's relatively restrictive interpretation of the 
mandate, while eight expressed their inability to understand why 
more robust action was not taken. No firm decision was taken. 195 
At a press conference on November 28, Kofi Annan, then in charge of UN 
peacekeeping operations, stated: 
The great powers do not want to take risks in Bosnia, and accuse 
the UN for their own lack of political will. The UN is judged on 
unrealistic criteria. If the international community wants to 
impose peace in Bosnia it must take the political decision to do so 
and give us 3-500,000 soldiers. 196 
Annan estimated that if UN evacuation was to take place, it would 
require 165 days. According to diplomats, troop contributing countries 
were divided on the question of military engagement, with the Muslim 
countries and the Netherlands in favour, and Russia and most of Europe 
against. 197 
195 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.36/161 & 163. 
196 Le Monde, November 30,1994, p.3. [Author'S translation] 
197 Ibid. General Rose in his memoirs, however, claims he had Annan's support. 'He assured me 
that our refusal to be drawn into a war was the only rational approach ... ' ROSE, op.cit. p.207. 
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The French position during the Bihac crisis was somewhat complex, 
with a number of senior French politicians and military heads, including 
foreign minister Alain Juppe who had led the initiative for a NATO 
ultimatum against the Serbs in February, pressing for a similar initiative 
in Bihac. President Mitterand characteristically opposed any move which 
confronted the Serbs, however. At a meeting at the Hotel Matignon on 
Sunday November 27 between Juppe, Defence Minister Leotard, Chief of 
Staff Admiral Lanxade and Elysee Secretary General Hubert Vedrine, 
there was an attempt to redefine the French position. 198 Yet the following 
day the initiative was dropped, due to lack of support from the French 
president. 199 
In the meantime, the impasse between NATO and the UN Command in 
Sarajevo over Bihac gradually led to a reassessment of policy options by 
the United States. On November 27, US Defense Secretary William Perry 
recognised the Serb military superiority on the ground.20o The following 
day, the United States, at a meeting of policymakers at the White House, 
decided to abandon NATO action in favour of a diplomatic solution 
through the Contact Group.201 This was promptly supported by Russian 
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who agreed that 'diplomacy, not a 
military solution, is the only option'. As Serb forces approached Bihac 
town centre, Perry conceded the Serbs had won the war and saw 'no 
prospect' of the Bosnian government winning back any of the territory 
held by Serbs.202 NATO Secretary-General Willi Claes merely pointed out 
198 'Les dirigeants francais divises sur la position a adopter', Le Monde, November 29, 1994, p.4. 
199 Ibid. Juppe confirmed Mitterand's lack of support for this initiative at the French enquiry on 
Srebrenica. See interview with Alain Juppe. Rapport d'ln/ormation, op.cit. January 24, 2001. 
200 Le Monde, November 29, 1994, p.3. 
201 The Times, November 30, 1994, p.2l. 
202 Independent, November 28, 1994, p.l. 
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that 'we are not in a leading position. It is not up to us to defme policy or 
the strategy. It is for the UN'.203 
British politicians and diplomats then acted to promote the view that a 
Bosnian Serb victory was inevitable, and that peace could only be 
achieved through accommodating Milosevic on the issue of sanctions, 
and offering the Bosnian Serbs confederation with Serbia. In this, they 
were assisted by Russia, and by the caution of high-ranking US 
politicians, especially Perry and Christopher, while President Clinton 
remained silent on the issue. Senator Dole was depicted as relatively 
isolated, and foolhardy.204 Meanwhile, the Contact Group plan was 
revived and, with some adjustments, presented again to the parties. On 
BBC Newsnight, Malcolm Rifkind, questioned on the failure of the UN 
and NATO to save Bihac, replied 'I think there is always a danger of 
rhetoric on these occasions, bring too grandiose to be justified by what 
is possible ... Those who voice strong and unqualified views should visit 
Bosnia' .205 UN Ambassador David Hannay commented that 'five years 
into the post-Cold War era, we've alilearned ... that it's the UN with all its 
warts or it's the law of the jungle'.206 Sections of the British media 
sought to place the blame on the United States for the international 
debacle. According to one commentator, 'America seems to be driven by 
a series of often repeated resentments after three years of war in former 
Yugoslavia, not reality. Americans are driving a wedge into NATO unity 
just at the point where unity may achieve results'.207 Newspaper 
203 BBC News, November 29, 1994. 
204 Dole publicly singled out Britain: 'The biggest stumbling block is the British. They are the 
ones who want to do absolutely nothing'. He also alleged that Akashi and Rose had 'helped the 
Serb aggressors'. 'Meet the Press', NBC. November 29,1994. 
20S BBC Newsnight, November 28, 1994. Mr Ritkind, however, had limited his Bosnian trips to 
the UN British HQ which was in an area where peace had been re-established by a US-brokered 
agreement! 
206 'Bosnia Mustn't Be V.N.'s Death Knell', Los Angeles Times, December 6, 1994. 
207 Nick Gowing, Channel 4 News, November 25,1994. 
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headlines, such as 'Plight of Muslims moves blunt Dole'208 suggested a 
misguided emotional response on the part of the US Senator who 
challenged British policy. And the BBC commented, 'after three missile 
attacks on British planes in less than a week, the NATO planned air-
strike has been called off. NATO and UN planners fear excessive use of 
air strikes could push the Serbs into fulfilling their threat and declaring 
all-out war on the UN'.209 The BBC had thus portrayed NATO and UN 
withdrawal as a wise option, rather than an act of appeasement, 
reflecting policy failure. 
On November 28, at a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels, 
Douglas Hurd reiterated that congressional hopes of forcing a military 
solu tion could only have been met 
by the provision of a large army, including contributions from all the 
allies ... Everyone knows that such an army was not forthcoming. It has 
always been foolish to suppose that from the outside one can achieve 
peace with justice in former Yugoslavia .. .It was a cruel illusion to think 
that peace could be achieved by air power. Air power cannot impose a 
solution and air power cannot save a town from infantry attack,210 
He reiterated the government view that the conflict would only end with 
a negotiated settlement similar to the one already being pursued. He 
added that it was 'reasonable to consider' how the peace plan could be 
amended to suit the Bosnian Serbs better. 
On November 30, in evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Douglas Hurd reiterated the British position that military intervention 
on the ground 'was never a solution', that it required 'a very big 
army ... to include ground forces from all the main allies including the 
United States'; lifting the arms embargo would have been 'ring fencing a 
208 The Times, November 29, 1994, p.12. 
209 BBC TV, November 29, 1994. 
210 Guardian, November 29, 1994, p.l. 
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massacre'; the policy adopted, 'doing what we can ... trying to bring the 
parties together in a negotiated settlement and applying pressures on 
those who are resistant to that' was, according to the Foreign Secretary, 
the right one. 'I do not hold to the pretence that we could have imposed 
a solution by force'.211 Mr Hurd's main defence for continuing what was 
increasingly regarded as a fundamentally flawed policy was the 
improvement of life in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia. He argued that the 
position of Senator Dole (whom he was to meet the same afternoon) 
differed from that of the British government and 'from the huge majority 
of the House of Commons'. Questioned on the possible withdrawal of 
troops, Hurd demurred, declaring that the imminent EU Council of 
Ministers' meeting at Essen was 'not the right place to decide this', and 
that the position of Gorazde, Srebrenica and Sarajevo would be 
threatened by such action. 'There could come a time when we conclude 
collectively that the honourable task for which the UN despatched these 
troops to Bosnia could no longer be fulfIlled, the risk on balance 
outweighed the good being done. As I say, we are not at that point'.212 
As on earlier occasions in the war the Serbs, observing the international 
retreat, pressed their advantage. In the following weeks, a noticeable 
'hardening of Serb behaviour toward UNPROFOR' which experienced 
amongst the worst weeks of its mission in Bosnia.213 The Serbs also 
installed additional anti-aircraft missiles around Bihac and Sarajevo and 
continued to hold UN personnel hostage, and to obstruct aid convoys to 
the 'safe areas'.214 The Bosnian Fifth Corps, meanwhile, barricaded itself 
211 Foreign Affairs Select Committee, November 30, 1994, 10. 
212 Ibid. 11. 
213 As one UN official commented, 'the Bosnian Serbs are ... targeting UNPROFOR; detaining its 
personnel and denying others essential supplies. This is a deliberately designed, carefully 
calculated insult against the United Nations'. Thant Myint-U, quoted from New York Times, 
December 6, 1994, p.A3. in BURG/SHOUP, op.cit. p.159. 
214 The Times, November 30, 1994, p.21. In Bihac, in December 1994, a total of 318 MT of aid 
was delivered against a target of 1,936 MT. In the other enclaves, food deliveries were also well 
below target. VRS forces also took British UN troops hostage. See also ROSE, op.cit. pp.215-6. 
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behind makeshift roadblocks in Bihac.215 According to UNHCR, 'in their 
advance from the south and west of Bihac, the combined Bosnian Serb 
and Krajina Serb forces have burned entire hamlets and villages forcing 
more than 8,000 people to flee their homes in panic'.216 
The Serbs had called NATO's bluff in Bihac, which essentially left 
international powers with three options. The first was to deploy strategic 
air strikes to destroy the new Serb anti-aircraft missile system, to effect 
the withdrawal of Serb forces from the enclave, and secure access for the 
delivery of humanitarian aid. This was the preferred NATO and US 
option, as well as that of the French foreign and defence ministers, and 
the French Chief of Staff. It was opposed by President Mitterand, Russia, 
the British government, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General, Yasushi Akashi, and the UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia, 
General Sir Michael Rose. The second option was UNPROFOR 
withdrawal from Bosnia. This was threatened by both British and 
French ministers who had secured a pledge of assistance from the 
United States.217 Ostensibly, this seemed the most obvious course, 
given that the UN was in a hostage situation, and was largely 
unsuccessful in effecting aid delivery to the enclaves where it was most 
needed, and much was syphoned off to feed the armies. This option was 
not seriously considered by any of the international players, however 
since, with no fall-back policy, withdrawal would be lengthy, bloody, 
expensive, give rise to bad publicity, and constitute a clear admission of 
UN defeat. Equally crucial, it would mean a loss of international control 
over the area. The third option, favoured by Britain from the start, and 
215 Guardian, November 29, 1994, p.ll. Reporting from the ground, BBC correspondent Martin 
Bell estimated that, as the VRS troops converged on Bihac, the balance of forces was 15,000 
against 500 defending. On Serbian television, hundreds of Bosnian Muslim prisoners were 
shown, being forced by their captors to chant: 'To whom does Bosnia belong? It belongs to the 
Serbs, as much as Moscow belongs to the Russians'. BBe TV, December 2,1994, and RTS Serbia, 
Ibid. 
216 UN Information Notes, December 1994. 
217 In early December, President Clinton offered to send 25,000 US troops to extract UNPROFOR 
from Bosnia. Time, No.51, December 19, 1994, p.32. 
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later adopted by the international community as a whole, was to 
concede a partial Serb victory in Bihac, while making further 
concessions to Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs through the Contact Group 
peace plan, to prevent the enclave from falling to the Serbs, since this 
would provoke a massive flood of refugees, further de stabilising the 
region, as well as the entry of Croatia into the war. This strategy rested 
on the co-operation of Milosevic. 
In December 1994, Douglas Hurd and Alain Juppe, representing the 
Contact Group, flew to Belgrade to meet Milosevic, where an uneasy 
truce was reached. 218 At the same time, the US Ambassador to 
Germany, Charles Redman who had negotiated an end to the Bosniac-
Croat war in March, travelled to Pale, in a clear signal that international 
ostracism of the Bosnian Serb leadership was at an end. 219 Later that 
month, a 4-month ceasefire was brokered with the assistance of a 
former US president Jimmy Carter, brought into the negotiations by an 
associate of Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic. 
Meanwhile, as five hundred UN personnel were still held hostage, 
strained relations between the UN and NATO persisted, along with some 
confusion as to whether NATO was still patrolling the no-fly-zone. UN 
spokesman, Wing Commander Tim Hewlett, stated in Sarajevo that 
NATO jets had stopped flying earlier in the week, because of the danger 
of NATO planes being shot down by Serb SAMs: 'We've agreed a cooling 
218 For a cynical view of this meeting from Belgrade, see JANJIC, Dragan: 'Karadzic's triumphant 
return to negotiations', AIM, Belgrade, December 8, 1994. Janjic takes particular note of the 
American change of stance, represented by US Contact Group representative Charles Thomas, who 
reportedly stated that the Bosnian Serbs 'need not sign anything for the time being'. Janjic observes 
that the change of attitude reflected in Thomas's statement shows that the united forces of Belgrade 
and the world did not manage to organize a sufficiently great pressure on [Karadzic] and his 
copatriots', and that the only one satisfied was Karadzic himself. 
219 As Mirko Pejanovic commented, however, 'The Contact Group plan .. .is now being modified in a 
way that would abrogate the sovereignty and integrity of a member state of the United Nations'. The 
Tablet, 'The Battle of Bosnia', December 3, 1994. Mirko Pejanovic, a Bosnian Serb, was a founding 
member of the Serb Civic Forum, and a supporter of the Bosnian government. 
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off period. NATO has stood down at our request'.220 This statement was 
promptly (and forcefully) refuted by a NATO spokesman in Naples, 
however, as well as by NATO Secretary General Willi Claes himself.221 
The UN Secretariat in New York and Zagreb were reportedly equally 
unaware of the alleged development. The confusion had originated with 
the UN Command in Sarajevo, suggesting NATO powerlessness in face of 
the Serbs. Televised across the world, the clash served neither 
organisation, but would have given succour to Serb leaders in Pale and 
Belgrade. 
At the OSCE Conference in Budapest on December 5, Bosnian President 
Izetbegovic stated his view as to where the blame for international failure 
to break the siege of Bihac lay: 
Paris and London have from the very start spoken out as patrons and 
defenders of the Serbs, blocked the Security Council and NATO, and 
thereby prevented every step that could have been taken to halt the 
Serb offensives and the war as a whole. This is not my assertion - it 
appears in a recent statement by the Society for Endangered Peoples 
from Goettingen.222 
On December 7, on his return from Belgrade, the Foreign Secretary 
made a statement to the House of Commons, recapitulating the previous 
month's events in Bihac. At that time, several hundred UN personnel 
were still being held hostage by Serb forces, the offensive on Bihac 
continued, and the Serbs were obstructing aid convoys to the enclaves. 
Hurd stressed the British government even-handedness with regard to 
the UN: 'we must be clear about [the UN role]. It is not there to impose 
solutions on unwilling parties, it cannot fight on one side, and it does 
not defend one army's territories against the attacks of another', 223 In 
220 Hewlett was the RAF officer commanding the NATO air cell in Sarajevo. ROSE, op.cit. p.234. 
221 The Guardian, December 3, 1994, p.l. 
222 IZETBEGOVIC, op.cit. p.193. 
223 BQ.mia. Hansard, Vo1.251, December 7,1994, c.312. 
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response to a Conservative MP's proposal that 'massive retaliatory action 
from the air' should be used to prevent the Serb forces encroaching 
further on the 'safe area', Mr Hurd stipulated the limits of NATO action, 
in other words, denying that NATO air power could be used as a 
deterrent in Bosnia: 
My hon. Friend ... exaggerates ... the possible role of air power ... The 
idea ... that one can use air power to alter the policy of a Government or 
to bring recalcitrant people to the conference table is misguided ... only 
the UN can assess the impact on the ground of any particular action. 
That sometimes causes impatience among observers who especially 
favour stronger NATO action, but it is a reality which has to be 
accepted.224 
The 'observers' the Foreign Secretary mentioned as favouring a stronger 
NATO role encompassed several members of the Security Council, 
including the United States, the non-aligned movement and the Islamic 
states. The general picture conveyed by Douglas Hurd to the House of 
Commons was of a retaliatory action on the part of the Serbs (rather 
than a fullscale offensive) which then extended to the 'safe area' and, in 
more general terms, of a civil war with the sides fairly evenly weighted. 
Hurd suggested that Britain deserved credit for the restoration of peace 
in Central Bosnia, without acknowledging the central US role in 
brokering the Bosniac-Croat agreement.225 He also misled the House by 
denying that the Contact Group had introduced new concessions to the 
Bosnian Serbs, and revised the plan to encourage Serb acceptance. 226 
'I do not know what [Calum Macdonald) means by introducing new 
concessions to the Bosnian Serbs. We have not done that',227 Minutes 
224 Ibid. c.316. 
m ' .. .in central Bosnia, where most of our troops are ... the situation has improved considerably' 
Douglas Hurd. Ibid. c.314. 
226Ibid.c.318. 
227 Ibid. 
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later, however, Hurd conceded that '[Milosevic] has had a bit of relief 
... Belgrade airport is open and certain events which were prevented are 
now possible' .228 
In view of the significant concessions to the Serbs conceded by the 
Contact Group in Belgrade the Foreign Secretary was anxious to 
reassure the House that the Western allies were united, and that the 
United States, like Britain, sought a negotiated solution: 'It does not 
believe in a military victory and that is why it belongs with us ... Senator 
Dole has a different analysis of this situation from ourselves and from 
the huge majority of the House of Commons' .229 Summing up the 
alternatives, Mr Hurd outlined three possible courses of action, (a) to 
despatch a huge army to impose a solution, (2) to ring fence a massacre 
by lifting the arms embargo and withdrawing the UN, and (3) to seek a 
negotiated settlement backed by humanitarian aid.23o Presented in that 
manner, the third course appeared the only feasible one. These were not 
the only options, however. The effective use of NATO air power had been 
excluded and, by implication, eliminated as a feasible option. 
Throughout the Bosnian war, the British government position had 
remained resolute in its resistance to NATO intervention, other than in a 
close air support role, to protect UN troops on the ground, but the 
dichotomy between the British and American positions on the question 
of air strikes only became fully apparent in the Bihac crisis. In Bihac, in 
November 1994, the 'dual key' arrangement was used by the UN 
Commander on the ground, Michael Rose, together with the SRSG, 
Yasushi Akashi, to prevent NATO from acting (i) to protect the civilian 
population in Bihac who were being targeted in a three-pronged attack, 
(ti) to protect the UN Bangladeshi troops, who had been deployed in 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid. See pp.56-7. 
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Bihac without the necessary equipment for self-defence and, (iii) to 
destroy the new Serb surface-to-air missile system, imported from 
Russia via Serbia, which was being used to target NATO aircraft 
overseeing the UN-imposed no-fly-zone. 
The different roles of the UN and NATO were demonstrated to be 
incompatible in the Bihac impasse. The UN was deployed in a war zone 
in a peacekeeping role, by definition blocking any NATO action which did 
not accord with UNPROFOR and Serb-defined 'impartiality'. The UN role 
was interpreted by General Rose in its narrowest sense, since UNSeR 
836 and other resolutions were carefully worded, and could have been 
interpreted to permit military action to protect the civilian population, 
not just the UN troops. But the Serbs had two major advantages which 
they were able to use to foil the 'dual key' arrangement, and expose the 
flimsiness of the NATO/UN alliance on Bosnia. One was the newly-
acquired long-range SAM missile system which General Rose argued 
could not be successfully targeted since it was controlled externally. Yet 
this statement in itself exposed the anomalies of a peace process which 
relied on the co-operation of the Serbian president who had in all 
probability supplied the Bosnian Serbs with the equipment which forced 
NATO to abandon its tactical approach. Under considerable British and 
Russian pressure, and a powerful media campaign, NATO withdrew. 
The second advantage to the Serbs was the presence of UN ground 
troops, especially those deployed in the remote 'safe areas' where their 
every movement required Serb consent. This combination of factors 
forced the US into a decision between support for the Bosnian 
government, on the one hand, and the maintenance, and implicitly the 
survival, of the Atlantic Alliance, on the other. 231 In public, America 
chose the Alliance, also in the knowledge that, if the crisis grew more 
231 The World Press Review Opinion Index suggests that global editorial opinion had concluded 
with near unanimity that the UN and NATO peacekeeping efforts were such a total failure that 
the future of both international bodies was in danger. Editorials of SO leading overseas dailies 
sampled between 1-15 December 1994. 46 of the 50 agreed that the UN-NATO mission was not 
just a failure but a debacle. World Press Review, February 1995. 
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acute, the US would anyway be involved in assisting a costly, and 
probably hazardous, UN withdrawal from Bosnia. Meanwhile, however, a 
new strategy for Bosnia was being developed, overseen by the US 
Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, which also involved a Virginia-
based military consultancy, which was retraining the Croatian army.232 
The Federation forces were now rapidly becoming more professional, and 
liaising with the expanding Croatian army so that, by late November, 
Croatia was sufficiently confident to threaten to enter the war if Bihac 
fell to the Serbs. The strategic importance of Bihac to Croatia, the 
potential refugee situation, and question of Croatia's reintegration, had 
prompted the Croatian government to put its army on general alert. 233 
The VRS forces, in comparison, were now severely over-stretched, having 
to man an extensive front line, while contending with a shortage of 
manpower. The British-led move to neutralise NATO in Bihac had, 
therefore, proved a significant boost to the Bosnian Serb mission. 
232 An MPRI executive, Ed Soyster, who was also a former DIA director, oversaw a contract with 
Croatia which began in November 1994 with Croatian Defence Minister, Gojko Susak, writing to 
the US deputy defence secretary John Deutsch, asking for direct US aid to the Croatian army. Mr 
Deutsch replied that the arms embargo prevented direct involvement, but it could be organised 
through a private consultancy. Consequently, US intelligency organised air drops of weapons and 
military equipment to the Bosnian army, including radar equipment and anti-tank missiles. 
Guardian, op.cit. January 26, 1996. (The Guardian claimed it had sight of correspondence 
containing this information). 
233 Le Monde, November 29,1994, p.3. 
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Conclusion 
In 1994, the UN 'safe areas' policy was challenged by the Bosnian Serbs 
in three areas. On each occasion, NATO held back from decisive 
intervention. In this, as UN Commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in 
the context of the 'dual key' arrangement, Lt. General Sir Michael Rose 
played a major role. 
During his mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, General Rose did not confine 
his energies to soldiering, but also assumed the role of political 
emissary /negotiator in his endeavours to influence policy at crucial 
junctures in the war. This placed him at odds with the Bosnian 
government, much of the international media and the US establishment. 
On the other hand, Rose had the clear support of the British Prime 
Minister, as well as the Foreign Secretary and the Ministry of Defence. 
Despite later acknowledging that genocide did not form part of official 
Bosnian government policy 'in the way that it so clearly did with the 
Serbs', there were many occasions where Rose managed to convey the 
impression that it was the Bosnian Muslims who were chiefly 
responsible for the war, and for blocking peace initiatives, while 
managing to ignore the fact that they, and not the Serbs, had signed up 
to both the Vance/Owen and Contact Group plans. 
Three major events were to test the acumen of the British general: the 
Sarajevo market massacre and the two Serb offensives on the UN 'safe' 
areas of Gorazde and Bihac. The negotiated settlement following the 
Markale tragedy was heralded by General Rose, as well as by the British 
government, as a major breakthrough, and a 'window of opportunity' for 
peace throughout Bosnia, claiming credit for the fact that the UN was 
able now to travel freely across central Bosnia. Yet the new freedom of 
movement was due almost entirely to the US-brokered Washington 
Agreement between Bosnian Muslims and Croats which laid the 
foundations for a truce. Meanwhile, in Sarajevo the siege continued and 
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within weeks the heavy weapons were again under the control of the 
Pale regime. 
Two months later, during a major Serb assault on the Gorazde enclave, 
a further NATO ultimatum was issued and Rose applied the same tactic. 
The UN-brokered agreement, with a different deadline from that of NATO 
for the withdrawal of Serb heavy weapons, both weakened the earlier 
NATO ultimatum, and forged a serious rift between the two institutions. 
General Rose's initiative to introduce UN troops into the area before the 
NATO ultimatum expired, moreover, rendered the ultimatum virtually 
meaningless, exposing NATO's impotence under the 'dual key' 
arrangement. Few countries were willing to render their troops potential 
hostages to the Serb forces. Indeed, as the Duke of Wellington's 
Regiment entered the enclave, the French battalion was turned back on 
instructions from Paris, on grounds of danger to French troops. During 
the Serb attack on Gorazde, 700 people were killed, and nearly 2,000 
injured. Rose denied, however, that there were extensive civilian 
casualties. The harmony between the position of General Rose in 
Sarajevo and British ministers in London was evident, not least in their 
mutual, and remarkable, lack of response to the VRS liquidation of a 
British officer, and the shooting down of a British Sea Harrier Jet. 234 
The third episode, the Serb attack on the Bihac enclave was, in 
international terms, the most serious. The Serbs had recently acquired 
medium and high-level air defence systems, which they began deploying 
into the town in early November. This new danger to NATO planes led to 
a US demand for air strikes to destroy the whole Serb air defence 
system. Rose successfully resisted this and, as a result, it was decided 
that NATO aircraft fly in larger formations, but with reduced coverage. 
The Serbs were quick to take advantage, launching a major attack on 
the town of Cazin with many civilian casualties. Again, Rose's blame 
234 Ibid. p.154. 
282 
was mainly reserved for the Bosnian Muslims for attacking out of the 
area, and provoking the Serbs into counter attack. 
General Rose regarded his mission as a success. He had succeeded in 
staving off major NATO air strikes while the new sophisticated Serb air 
defence system remained intact, and he had deterred significant punitive 
action against the Serbs, even when British troops and aircraft came 
under Serb fire. What the British UN Commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
also did, however was, by default, to encourage the Serb leaders to 
believe that they could continue with impunity to pursue practices 
diametrically opposed to the principles which governed the organisation 
General Rose was meant to be representing, namely, the United Nations. 
Meanwhile, on the political front, the establishment of a new initiative in 
the form of a 'Contact Group', necessitated by the US refusal to continue 
working with Lord Owen through the ICFY, conveyed the impression 
that the negotiating process was still effective, whilst also bringing the 
Russians politically into the international decision-making process. 
Owen, meanwhile, found a new niche in setting up a border monitoring 
mission which, in the event, served as little more than a veneer in 
demonstrating the much-publicised, but not clean, break between the 
Bosnian Serb leadership and Milosevic, while Serbia continued as 
paymaster for the VRS commanders. 
In estimating the success of the Bosnian Serb mission during 1994, 
there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the UN Commander for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, General Sir Michael Rose, in his term in office, was 
a crucial player. Acting through United Nations channels and in 
conjunction with the SRSG Yasushi Akashi, and with the assistance of 
ICFY co-chairs, David Owen and Thorwald Stoltenberg, Rose was able to 
limit NATO's response to major Serb violations of UN Security Council 
resolutions in three declared 'safe areas' in Bosnia. This was effected 
with the endorsement of British government ministers and, in at least 
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one instance, in liaison with the Ministry of Defence. On the other 
hand, it damaged relations between the United Nations and NATO, and 
between Britain and the United States, and contributed to the American 
decision to focus on strengthening the Bosnian government and Croat 
forces on the ground, while apparently acquiescing in the British-led 
policy. This led to the gradual reversal of military power on the ground 
and to the strategic NATO air strikes which combined to bring a halt to 
the aggression the following year. 
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CHAPTERS 
1995: THE BRITISH POSITION UNDER CHALLENGE 
Introduction 
A number of new factors in early 1995 coalesced to present a challenge 
to some of the precepts on which international policy in former 
Yugoslavia had hitherto been based. These included the partial 
unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by the United States, the arrival of 
a new British UN commander in Bosnia, Croatia's reluctance to renew 
the UN mandate, and a change in the French presidency. The relaxing of 
the arms embargo on the Adriatic enabled larger quantities of arms to 
reach Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the (uneasy) alliance 
between Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian government facilitated the 
cooperation necessary to retake some of the territory captured by VRS 
forces three or more years previously. 
These factors are assessed, with emphasis on divergences which 
emerged between British government policy in London and UNPROFOR 
policy in Sarajevo, under the new British commander, Lt. General Sir 
Rupert Smith, and the implications for Britain of a more militant French 
policy under President Jacques Chirac. The response of the British 
government to the fall of the UN 'safe area' of Srebrenica is also 
assessed, including the London Conference, and the circumstances 
which led to NATO action in Bosnia in late August 1995, effectively 
ending the war in Bosnia. 
Reference is made to parliamentary documentation, the UN Srebrenica 
Report, the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation report on 
Srebrenica, the French National Assembly enquiry into Srebrenica, ICTY 
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evidence, relevant publications, including personal memoirs, and local 
and international media coverage. 
The four-month cessation of hostilities agreement brokered by a former 
US president, Jimmy Carter, commenced on January 1 and prevailed, 
with some infringements, till the beginning of May, when Croatia 
launched a two-day offensive, retaking the UNPA zone in Western 
Slavonia. 1 
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman had informed the UN Secretary-
General on January 13 that his government did not wish the 
UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia to be renewed beyond March 31, 1995.2 
A modified UN mandate was subsequently agreed on, establishing the 
United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO). 
Ratified through UN Resolution 981, it called for implementation of the 
major provisions of the Vance Plan.3 
During the same week, ostensibly in anticipation of an emergency UN 
withdrawal, Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind announced a further UK 
contribution to the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia, to include 3 RAF 
Chinook helicopters with a further 3 on standby, 12 British Army 
helicopters for air reconnaissance and transport, plus 19 extra UN 
Military Officers to supplement the 18 already in theatre. By May 1995, 
I For ceasefire violations up to this time, see Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.3S-39/177-1S4. 
2 Britain alleged that this put at risk the search for a regional peace settlement. Written Answers, 
Hansard, Vo1.252, January 20, 1995, c.742. Foreign Minister Hogg had already discussed the 
issue with Deputy Croatian Foreign Minister Ivo Sanader on January 11. A subsequent UN 
Security Council statement, issued on January 17, with the support of Britain, urged Croatia to 
reconsider. Written Answers, Hansard, Vo1.253, January 24, 1995, c.137-S. The UN track record 
in the Croatian UNPA zones had been generally poor and, at times, even counterproductive. In 
one instance, the Ukranian battalion in Glina, in the lead-up to the Bihac crisis, sold $500,000 of 
fuel to the Serbs. According to Western military intelligence sources, 'every time a key is turned 
at UNHQ in Zagreb, Bosnian Serb intelligence knows about it'. Observer, July 16, p.14. 
3 UN Information Notes, April 1995. 
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only four of the helicopters had been delivered. 4 By July 1995, however, 
Britain had become the largest UNPROFOR contributor to Bosnia, with 
8,000 troops on the ground, guaranteeing a leading role in the rules of 
engagement and other increasingly contentious issues. 5 
House of Commons, May 9, 1995 
The UNPROFOR mission had been one of the lynchpins cementing 
British policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, providing a legitimate 
pretext for resisting both military intervention and the removal of the 
arms embargo and, for the most part, freezing the status quo on the 
ground. Yet, a number of factors combined in early May to challenge the 
basis on which the mission had been established. The Croatian action in 
Western Slavonia demonstrated the new strength and resolve of the 
Croatian army (HV), and the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR, and 
threatened the UN survival in the rest of Croatia. Moreover, the new UN 
Commander, Lt. General Rupert Smith, indicated his readiness to 
respond to the mounting VRS offensive in Bosnia. The Bosnian and 
Croat armies were meanwhile acquiring more weaponry, and cooperating 
on the ground. 
Shortly after the HV offensive on Western Slavonia, the British 
government called a full debate on former Yugoslavia to reaffirm the 
validity of the UNPROFOR mission and mandate.6 Although British 
ministers had, from time to time, intimated that the UN troops might in 
certain circumstances be withdrawn, those warnings were directed 
4 Written Answers, January 20, 1995,op.cit. c.749. David Clark, FOnner YUios!ayja, Hansard, 
Vo1.259, May 9,1995, c.643. 
5 Statement of Defence Estimates 1996. Chapter 2, No.2. HMSO, 1996. 
6 IfUNPROFOR were forced to leave Croatia, which provided its headquarters, its mission in 
Bosnia would be unsustainable. See International Herald Tribune, Opinion. November 15, 1994. 
Article by Adam Roberts, John Chipman, Philip H. Gordon and Mats Berda!. 
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mainly at the Serb leadership in whose interest it was that the UN 
remain,7 as well as towards the United States, to preempt any further 
US unilateral action on the arms embargo. The Bosnian government had 
long regarded UNPROFOR as a mixed blessing, not least since it was 
often not able to fulml its basic mandate, namely, to assist in the safe 
delivery of humanitarian aid.s Indeed, Bosnian leaders had on various 
occasions expressed the view that, if UNPROFOR was unable to protect 
the civilian population it should leave, and the arms embargo be 
removed. On the other hand, withdrawal was not a simple matter. In late 
December 1994, President Clinton had offered US assistance, including 
up to 25,000 ground troops, for an eventual UNPROFOR withdrawal 
which, according to US Defense Secretary William Perry, would require 
several weeks to organise and months to effect, and could involve many 
casualties.9 It would also represent an ignominious defeat for the UN 
and the contributing nations and, in the absence of NATO intervention, 
leave the area vulnerable to extremists from all quarters, risking a wider 
regional war. 
In the House of Commons debate on former Yugoslavia on May 9, the 
Foreign Secretary sought support for the continuation of the UNPROFOR 
mission, arguing that withdrawal could exacerbate the crisis, and lead to 
an escalation of the war. The four-month ceasefire had broken down in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and, more ominously, Croatia where it required only 
7 According to the UN civil affairs head, Phillip Corwin, this was the view of the Bosnian Serb 
Vice President, Nikola Koljevic. See CORWIN, Phillip, Dubious Mandate: A Memoir o/the UN 
in Bosnia, Summer J 995. Duke University Press, 1999, p.184. 
8 Despite government ministers' promotion of Britain's role in aid distribution, both through the 
Overseas Development Agency and UNPROFOR, the previous month's UNHCR records 
indicated that the only areas to receive their full allocation of aid were Serb-held, and 
unobstructed by siege. In March 1995, of eight regions in Bosnia-Herzegovina recorded by 
UNHCR as receiving aid, only in Banja Luka was the monthly food target reached. Bihac, having 
endured three years' siege, received just a quarter of its food target. UN In/ormation Notes, April 
1995, p.l2. 
9 Perry estimated an emergency withdrawal could be effected much sooner, but this would imply 
an ignominious withdrawal, leaving equipment behind. William Perry, CNN News, July 12, 
1995. 
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two days for the Croatian army (HV) to take control of the UNPA zone in 
Western Slavonia and expel the Krajina Serb forces. These, in turn, 
retaliated with rocket attacks on Zagreb and further expUlsions of non-
Serbs in Banja Luka, reportedly to 'make room' for displaced Serbs. 10 In 
Bosnia, shelling had resumed in Sarajevo, Bihac and Tuzla, violating the 
UN resolutions on 'safe areas' and the air exclusion zone. 
Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd began by defming the purpose of the 
debate. 
We are not yet at the point at which, in our judgment, it is right to 
abandon the [UNPROFOR mission) .. .! should like to explain to the 
House the balance of our judgment and we shall listen carefully 
to what the House says about that balance. I I 
This approach, in focusing on the bare issue of whether UNPROFOR 
should stay or leave, by implication marginalised other options. Also, as 
in previous debates, government ministers made a number of misleading 
observations. Douglas Hurd, for instance, asserted that government 
policy on Bosnia was representative of public and parliamentary 
opinion, in occupying the middle ground between 'two sets of criticism of 
our policy: that we should be doing a good deal more than we are, or 
that we should be doing a good dealless'.12 This was somewhat 
ambiguous, since a considerable number of those who advocated 'doing 
less' also recommended that UN withdrawal be accompanied by the 
removal of the arms embargo. 13 In other words, the 'two sets of criticism' 
were not entirely polarised but had some common ground, since each 
10 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.391183. 
\I Douglas Hurd, Fonner Yuaoslavja. Hansard, May 9, 1995, Hansard, Vo1.259, c.S83. Hurd's 
diary entry two days after the Commons debate, however, records his misgivings on the survival 
of the UNPROFOR mission: 'The whole concept ofUNPROFOR, for long fragile in the absence 
of agreement, was breaking down'. HURD, 2003, op.cit. p.473. 
12 Ibid. c.583. 
13 The Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Conservative MP David Howell, was amongst 
these. 
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would result, unwittingly or otherwise, in shifting the balance of power 
in favour of the Bosnian government. 
On the issue of military intervention in Bosnia, the Foreign Secretary 
once again employed the familiar refrain that 'we were not willing - not 
Britain, not Europe and certainly not the United States - to impose a 
settlement from outside by force',14 suggesting that this was tantamount 
to 'an international system based on the imperial principle of the 
international community imposing from outside a particular solution 
and form of government - as we did with the slave trade ... '15 The 
comparison with the slave trade rendered the proposal of a form of 
international protectorate in Bosnia both archaic and abhorrent. Also, 
the Foreign Secretary's claim that there was a lack of international will 
was not quite accurate, since the United States had proposed the use of 
force for the purpose of facilitating (rather than 'imposing') a settlement 
as had, at different stages of the war, various European leaders. Hurd 
also suggested an equivalence of culpability between the parties, 
characterising all the people of former Yugoslavia as wanton: 'We could 
not start to build something new from the ruins of Yugoslavia while its 
peoples continued to tear down the building and fight over the rubble' .16 
The lift-and-strike policy was described by the Foreign Secretary as a 
'halfway' measure, destined to failure, and unsupported by the military: 
There has been a second, more common delusion: that somehow we 
should have gone in halfway. We might, say, help one side with our 
aircraft and bombs while they fight it out on the ground. I know of no 
Government whose military experts think that the use of air power 
could swing the balance of advantage in the mountains of Bosnia. 17 
14 Ibid. c.S83. 
IS Ibid. c.S89. 
16 Douglas Hurd, Ibid. 
17 Douglas Hurd, Ibid. 
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The statement was carefully worded. A considerable number of military 
experts had supported the use of air power in Bosnia but, since there 
was no unanimity on this point within governments, the comment may 
have been technically correct. IS Also, the reference to the 'mountains of 
Bosnia', as opposed to simply 'Bosnia', suggested a sense of 
recklessness in the use of air power. 19 
Challenged on conditions in the 'safe areas', Douglas Hurd sidestepped 
the issue of the more controversial eastern enclaves, and focused on 
Sarajevo as a relative success.20 He also stated that 'the Royal Welch 
Fusiliers are helping to protect the people in the isolated enclave of 
Gorazde', which was hardly the case. Conditions in Gorazde at that 
point were such that the troops had difficulty protecting themselves. 21 
The Foreign Secretary also referred to Milosevic's 'earlier part in the 
crisis' and 'the rupture between the Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade',2:2 
which implied that the Serbia was no longer involved in the war, when 
VRS officers continued to receive both salaries and supplies from 
Belgrade. He also insinuated misleadingly that the economic agreement 
and ceasefire brokered in Croatia in 1994 was 'largely the work of Lord 
Owen, who has played an indispensable and - I must say - usually 
18 See the Foreign Secretary's statement the previous week: 'We cannot have NATO intervening 
from the air on some sort of report which is not validated by the British general on the ground, 
when it is the safety of the UN forces which the whole exercise is designed to promote. That is 
the case for the dual key'. Douglas Hurd, B.ns.nlil. Hansard. Vo1.259, May 3,1995, c.336. See 
also the House of Commons debate of July 26,1993, for discussion of military expert advice on 
the issue of air power in Bosnia. 
19 A novelist in his spare time, Douglas Hurd perhaps chose his words with more care than some 
of his colleagues. 
20 'Sarajevo has changed substantially'. Douglas Hurd, Former YUi:0slayia, op.cit. c.584. This was 
notwithstanding the Serb mortar which had killed eleven people in Sarajevo the previous day. 
Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.40/185. 
21 Douglas Hurd, Former YUI:0slayia, May 9, 1995, op.cit. c.586. See intervention by Labour MP 
Frank Cook whose son served in Gorazde, for conditions under which British troops served. 
BQmia, July 12, 1995. Hansard, Vo1.263, c.959. 
22 Former YUI:0slayia, op.cit. c.586. 
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thankless part in the progress that has been made', 23 and declared that 
'In Bosnia, we have suggested a loose union of the Muslim-Croat 
Federation and the Serb regions' .24 This was an early indication of the 
British role in an arrangement for Bosnia-Herzegovina - namely a 'loose 
union' - which was to jeopardise its longer-term viability as an 
independent state. 25 
Robin Cook, the new Labour spokesperson for Foreign Affairs, stressed 
the loss of UN authority in not upholding resolutions and carrying out 
threats issued, but on the issue of military intervention went no further 
than to urge 'the use of limited airpower in response to local 
violations' ,26 thus broadly reflecting the position held by the late Labour 
leader, John Smith. Cook did, however, attack 'cartographic diplomacy', 
an approach based on 'drawing lines on a map'27 which, he claimed, 
risked legitimising gains achieved through military conquest, making his 
speech the most comprehensive and penetrating of any Labour 
frontbencher since the war began. The contribution by Labour Defence 
spokesperson David Clark would have sent a more reassuring message 
to Serb lobbyists, however: 
Opposition Members have tried to support the Government's policy 
in Bosnia. At times we have been ahead of them, but we believe that, 
by and large, they have followed the correct line ... Hon. Members have 
described the policy as containment...1 do not think that that is bad.28 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. c.588. 
25 The 'loose union' formed the basis for the Dayton Agreement which continues, at the time of 
writing, to threaten the longer-term viability of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state. See 
analysis of Dayton by LOVRENOVIC, Ivan. Dani, October 10,2003. 
26 Robin Cook, Ibid. c.591. 
27 Ibid. c.595. 
28 David Clark, Ibid. c.641-2. 
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Labour critics of government policy were, as previously, from the back 
benches, and carried little weight. Their case was put most explicitly by 
Malcolm Wicks, who pinpointed British government responsibility in the 
continuing Serb aggression: 
I believe that the British Government in particular, have placed the 
break on the use of air strikes. At different times when the United 
States Government clearly wished to take a firmer approach to the 
conflict in Bosnia and to stand up to the aggression by the Serbian 
regime of Dr Karadzic, British Ministers said no, and urged caution ... 
The history books will show that the west's overall response has been 
poor, but the role of the British Government will stand to be especially 
condemned ... every time Ministers from the Ministry of Defence or 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have stood up in the House 
to comment on the situation, when the speeches have been analysed 
they have served as a green light for further Serbian aggression."29 
The Defence Secretary, closing the debate, did not refer to the 
allegations raised by Wicks, instead falling back on the 'civil war' 
argument: 'There are no foreign armies in Bosnia, and Bosnia has not 
been invaded by another state ... 95% of those doing the fighting in 
Bosnia are Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims'3o 
citing, as other MPs on earlier occasions, Fitzroy Maclean's memoirs as 
evidence of the internecine hatred between the Bosnian communities. 31 
Ritkind also conveyed an unequivocal message with regard to 
international intentions in Bosnia: 
I freely acknowledge ... that one of the great factors in this issue is the 
tendency of international organisations and politicians of all 
persuasions and from all parts of the world to declare that certain 
things are unacceptable and that certain matters will not be tolerated 
when it is clear that none of the Governments concerned, nor the 
29 Malcolm Wicks, Ibid. c.636-7. 
30 Malcolm Rifkind, Ibid. c.646. 
31 Ibid. 
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international community as a whole, intends doing the minimum 
necessary to give credence to those threats. I accept that there must 
be a link between the language we use and the action that we are 
prepared to take. 32 
This was an important statement. Firstly, Malcolm Rifkind was sending 
a clear signal on behalf of the international community that aggression 
in Bosnia would be met with virtual impunity. This suggested that the 
Defence Secretary felt empowered to speak for the international 
community concerning Bosnian policy. It was also (presumably 
unwittingly) a declaration of abnegation on the part of Britain of its 
responsibility as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to act 
to restore peace where international security was at threat. 33 He closed 
the debate by echoing the Foreign Secretary's statement in endorsement 
of the UNPROFOR operation: 
The conclusion of the Government - and I suspect of the whole House -
at this moment is that the United Nations presence in Bosnia 
continues to be justified.34 
This was little more than clutching at straws, however. The UNPROFOR 
mission was no longer sustainable within its declared mandate. 
Moreover, the desired outcome from the point of view of the British 
government (and of Milosevic), namely, a peace agreement signed by the 
Bosnian Serbs, in which they were allocated approximately half the 
territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with provision for linkage with Serbia, 
looked increasingly unlikely. The Bosnian Serbs were neither willing to 
sign the peace plan, nor able to achieve an outright victory. The 80-
called 'twin pillars' of British policy - the UNPROFOR operation and the 
32 Ibid. c.647. 
33 The legal advice contradicted the Foreign Secretary's position: '".there clearly is [in Bosnia], 
without any doubt, a violation of international peace and security so one is already within 
the parameters of permissible intervention. It is simply a question of political judgment as to 
whether one wishes to'. Professor Rosalyn Higgins, QC, FQrej~n Affairs Select Committee, 
February 17, 1993, No.390. 
34 Ibid. c.650. 
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peace process - were both in ruins, as Hurd himself was later to 
acknowledge.35 
The government contention, that the UNPROFOR presence was in some 
way a deterrent to Serb forces, and that the Serb leadership wanted it to 
leave was later refuted by General Smith who stated that, on the 
contrary, 
They ... needed to keep the UN, because the UN was something of 
a protection against them being bombed by NATO .. '! then deduced 
from that that ... they would squeeze and bring pressure on the 
eastern enclaves ... while keeping the UN in there so that ... there 
was a hostage, as it were, to protect them from NATO bombing. 36 
Another military expert pointed out that 
Not only do the Serbs get relief aid, but if UNPROFOR shields the 
Bosnians, it provides at the same time a fIxing force for the BSA 
against certain Bosnian-held areas, allowing the BSA to deploy its 
own stretched forces elsewhere, as well as acting as a human-shield 
guarantee against foreign air strikes.37 
The usefulness of UNPROFOR to the Serbs was also later confirmed by 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan: 
Nor was it sufficiently appreciated that a systematic and ruthless 
campaign such as the one conducted by the Serbs would view a 
United Nations humanitarian operation, not as an obstacle, but as 
an instrument of its aims.38 
35 Just two days after the Commons debate, Douglas Hurd noted in his diary: 'Bosnia as usual 
unsettled. MODIUNSG [Ministry of DefencelUN Secretary-General] block air power. PM blocks 
withdrawal, so we don't have much of a policy except Pauline [Neville-Jones] toiling away in 
contact group'. HURD, 2003, op.cit. p.473. The note may have been a retrospective attempt on 
the part of Hurd to distance himself from the policy, however, since there had been no indication 
at the time of any significant policy divergences within the Cabinet on Bosnia. 
36 General Rupert Smith, Milosevic Trial, JCTY, October 9,2003, p.27301-2. 
37 CIGAR, The Right to Defence. op.cit. p.34. 
38 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.95/493. 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina. January/June 1995 
During the first half of 1995, significant restructuring and reinforcement 
took place within the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(ARBiH). While the ARBiH had long enjoyed an advantage in manpower, 
the VRS advantages in heavy weaponry, logistics and communications, 
as well as command and control, were far superior until early 1995, 
when the balance slowly began to be redressed. 
Table 2 
Estimated Order of Battle 
VRS ARBiH HVO Serbia/ 
MontenegrQ 
Tanks 400 50 40 950 
400 30 25 1000 
APes 
1600 450 260 6800 
Artillery 
Fixed-wing 50 0 4 615 
combat aircraft 
80 120 40 140 
Personnel (0005) (50 full-time) (400 
reserves) 
SOURCES: Vladimir Jovanovic, "Umrijeti za koridor" (To die for the corridor), 
Monitor, Podgorica, Montenegro, May 13, 1994, p.8; Emil Vidusic, "Nece Pale na 
Beograd" (Pale will not attack Belgrade), Nedjeljina Dalmaeija, Split, Croatia, 
August IS, 1944, p.15; Milan Vego, "The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina" Jane's 
Intelligence Review. February 1993, p.65; Fran Visnar, "Srbi gube bitku za bitkom" 
(The Serbs are losing battle after battle), Nedjeljna Da/maeija. November 4, 1994, 
p.21; General Ivan Gorinsek, Peeat, Zagreb, October 25, 1994; Interview with 
Brigadier General Jovan Divjak by Darko Vukov Colic, Globus, Zagreb, January 20, 
~ . 
1995, pp,44-45. 
The Bosnian government had announced on a number of occasions that 
Sarajevo would not undergo another winter of siege and, in mid June, 
the ARBiH began a series of attacks to break out of Sarajevo, in order to 
39 Quoted from CIGAR, 'The Right to Defence', op.cit. p.13. 
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connect the capital with government-held territory in the north. Initial 
gains were quickly lost, however, as VRS forces retaliated, and prevented 
almost all movement in and out of Sarajevo.40 Throughout May, the 
pressure on UNPROFOR either to withdraw or to change its mandate 
mounted. On May 10, Bosnian President Izetbegovic wrote to UN 
Security Council President Jean Bernard Merimee, with a message 'to all 
countries who have threatened withdrawal, we say simply "we will not 
impede yoU"'.41 Izetbegovic requested that the UNPROFOR role in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina be reviewed by the Security Council. Days later, the 
commander of the Bosnian army, Rasim Delic, declared that, in the 
absence of a peace accord, the Bosnian army would liberate Bosnia.42 
In the east Bosnian enclaves, however, the new developments within the 
Bosnian army were barely felt. On January 18, Dutchbat-3 took over 
from Dutchbat-2 and, in the process, VRS forces encroached into the 
enclave and established new positions. Pleas by the Bosnian government 
to UNPROFOR to re-establish the status quo ante, met with no success. 43 
In early February 1995, VRS forces began to further restrict 
international convoy access to the eastern enclaves, particularly 
Srebrenica. Access was also restricted for UNPROFOR supplies to the 
enclaves resulting in a degradation of UNPROFOR military capability, 
and a worsening in living conditions for the local population.44 General 
Smith's proposal, that the enclaves be supplied by helicopter, with the 
assistance of NATO air power if VRS forces attempted interception, was 
referred by the UN Force Commander in Zagreb, General Janvier, to the 
40 In response to this, General Smith activated a plan to bring aid to the Bosnian capital without 
Serb consent. Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p44/21O-212. 
41 Le Monde, May 12, 1995, p.3. 
42 Ibid. May 19, 1995, p.5. 
43 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.38/178. 
44 'The situation in the eastern enclaves, where only 17% of the overall monthly aid delivery 
target was met in June [1995], is ... very serious'. UN Information Notes, July 1995. 
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Member States whose troops or air assets would be required to conduct 
the operation, but met with an unfavourable response. 45 On March 7 
General Mladic, meeting at Vlasenica with General Smith, indicated that 
he might take action against the eastern enclaves.46 Smith's response 
was that such action would 'almost certainly lead to international 
military intervention against the Serbs'.47 Mladic was reportedly 
dismissive.48 
On May 12, at a meeting with the UN Secretary-General, the differences 
between the UN leaders on the ground were manifest, as General Janvier 
in Zagreb, backed by SRSG Yasushi Akashi, proposed to withdraw 
UNPROFOR from the eastern enclaves, as well as ceasing the monitoring 
of Heavy Weapons Collection Points (WCPs) in the Total Exclusion Zone 
(TEZ) around Sarajevo, established in February 1994. This proposal 
was opposed by several UN Security Council Members on the grounds 
that the withdrawal of UNPROFOR would expose the enclaves to greater 
danger.49 
On May 22, VRS forces removed several heavy weapons from the WCPs, 
followed by a similar withdrawal by Bosnian government forces. Two 
days later, General Smith issued a warning to both sides either to 
withdraw all heavy weapons from the TEZ, or to replace them in the 
WCPs. When the Serbs failed to comply, the SRSG authorized NATO air 
strikes on two ammunition bunkers near the Serb headquarters at Pale. 
When VRS forces continued attacking Sarajevo and the other 'safe 
areas', however, including Tuzla, where 71 civilians were killed, and over 
45 Ibid. p.40/184. 
46 Srrebrenica Report, op.cit p.39/180. Mladic assured the UN Commander, however, that the 
safety of civilians in the enclave would be guaranteed. 
47 Ibid. 
48 This was not surprising. The international retreat in Bihac the previous November had 
presumably set a precedent in the VRS commander's perception. 
49 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.40/187. 
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200 injured,50 NATO targeted Serb bunkers a second time. In retaliation, 
several hundred UN personnel were taken hostage by the Serbs, with a 
number used as human shields to deter further attacks. At this point 
the SRSG instructed General Smith that 'the execution of the mandate 
was to be secondary to the security of UN personnel'.51 When, however, 
VRS forces disguised in French uniforms and using French UN 
equipment overran an UNPROFOR checkpoint controlling the strategic 
Vrbanja bridge in central Sarajevo, French UNPROFOR troops 
counterattacked on direct instructions from the Elysee, with the 
approval of General Smith, killing two Serb soldiers and arresting four 
others.52 The new French president, Jacques Chirac responded with an 
ultimatum to the UN Secretary General, that either the UNPROFOR 
mandate should be changed and reinforcements brought in, both to 
protect the UN forces and to enable them to 'play their role', or the 
French UN force would withdraw. 53 Chirac had already launched an 
initiative to make UNPROFOR less of an obstacle to a more 'energetic' 
approach to ending the siege of Sarajevo,54 a significant departure from 
the Franco-British understanding on UN troop deployment prevailing 
through Mitterand's presidency. General Smith, meanwhile, ordered the 
consolidation of UNPROFOR positions in defensible locations, which 
implicitly meant withdrawal from the eastern enclaves a proposal which, 
so Ibid. p.40/188-9. 
51 Ibid. p.411193-4. This was confirmed in an UNPROFOR directive on May 29. See Brigade-
General O. van der Wind, Rapport gebaseerd op de Debriefing Srebrenica (Report based on the 
Srebrenica Debriefmg), p.16, quoted in HONIG, Jan Willem and BOTH, Norbert, Srebrenica: 
Record of a War Crime. Penguin, 1996, pp.8 & 27. Janvier's instruction to Smith deprived the 
latter of the right to request NATO air strikes, the decision having been referred to the UN 
Secretary-General in person. HARTMANN, op.cit. p.333. 
52 According to former French Defence Minister, Charles Millon, this was authorised by Chirac 
personally, bypassing the UN central chain of command. See Rapport D'Informatjon, op.cit. 
Millon interview, April 26, 2001. 
53 Le Mande. May 28-29,1995, p.3. 
54 Ibid. May 17, 1995, p.2. 
299 
according to the Foreign Secretary, emanated from Britain.55 While 
General Smith may have held a different position from the British 
government and the UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb on how to 
address the Serb aggression, he did not have the authority, beyond a 
certain point, to exercise his preferred options. 56 
The following day, the UN Secretary-General presented a major report to 
the Security Council, addressing the broad themes of 'the mandate, the 
attitudes of the parties and the security and safety of UNPROFOR'. 57 In 
the report, the UNSG raised the issue of the nature of the UNPROFOR 
mission: 
Nothing is more dangerous for a peacekeeping operation than to ask it 
to use force when its existing composition, armament, logistic support 
and deployment deny it the capacity to do so ... Peacekeeping and the 
use of force (other than in self-defence) should be seen as alternative 
techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting 
easy transition from one to the other. 58 
This exposed the anomaly of the UNPROFOR mandate. In the first 
place, the UNPROFOR mission was not, strictly speaking, a 
peacekeeping operation since, in much of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was 
no peace to keep.59 Secondly, according to the terms of UN Security 
55 'It was appropriate to propose to our friends and allies some concentration of UN forces within 
Bosnia'. Malcolm Rifkind,~, May 31,1995, Hansard. Vo1.260, c.llOO. For General 
Janvier's position, see also HARTMANN, op.cit. p.332-3. 
56 In the French enquiry, it was pointed out that most of the interlocutors infonned the enquiry 
that the military found themselves in two circuits, or chains of command, that of the UN and their 
own national chain of command. In the case of General Smith, this would have imposed a dual 
restriction, the UN in Zagreb and the British government largely sharing the same position. 
Rapport d'lnformation op.cit. Interview with General Jean Cot, February 8, 2001. See also 
General Cot's description of how a Scandinavian government overruled General Briquemont's 
order to the Nordic battalion to send a detachment to Srebrenica. Ibid. 
57 S/1995/444, para.3, quoted in Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.42/201-8. 
58 Ibid. p,42/202. 
59 This was strenuously refuted by Malcolm Rifkind, who insisted that peace prevailed in much of 
Bosnia.~, May 31, 1995, op.cit. c.1100, French UN Commander Gobilliard, responsible 
for 5,000 UN troops in the Sarajevo area, on the other hand, called for a new tougher 
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Council Resolution 836, UNPROFOR was permitted to use force, if 
required, to fulfill its mandate, namely, to escort UN humanitarian aid.60 
The UNSG had not, on the other hand, expressed opposition to peace 
enforcement per se, but merely where UNPROFOR had not the necessary 
'armament, logistic support and deployment' required to lend credibility 
to a threat of force. 61 The UN Secretary-General concluded that, until a 
political solution was achieved, the way forward was 'to define a regime 
acceptable to both parties'62 which was tantamount to appeasement of 
the Bosnian Serb regime. Divided on how to respond to the report, the 
Security Council made no response. 
House of Commons. May 31, 1995 
The Prime Minister, John Major, recalled parliament in order to set out 
the government's response to what he termed a 'tense and dangerous 
situation'. With the captivity of Royal Welch Fusiliers in Gorazde, the 
situation had qualitatively changed. Both the Prime Minister and the 
Defence Secretary, although expressing qualified support for General 
Smith's decisions up to that point, made it clear during their respective 
speeches that the British government was of the same mind as UN Force 
Commander General Janvier and SRSG Yasushi Akashi, in rejecting 
UNPROFOR mandate. "We have reached the limitations of our current mandate". Le Monde, 
June I, 1995, p.2. 
60 Paragraph 9 ofUNSCR 836, however, defined the parameters for the use of force as being 'in 
self defence', a view apparently at variance with earlier directives to UNPROFOR from the 
Secretariat that air power could also be used in response to shelling of ' safe areas', and to 
neutralize attempts to obstruct UN freedom of movement. Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.27/l11 
and p.43/204. 
61 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.43/203. The UN troop shortage dated back to June 1993 when the 
UK. Permanent Representative led a Security Council decision to the effect that only 5,000 extra 
UN troops were required to protect the 'safe areas', although the UN Secretariat had 
recommended 32,000 troops. See Srebrenica Report, Ibid. p.24/94. 
62 Ibid. p.43/208. 
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further NATO action.63 The government response to the changed 
circumstances was to reinforce the British UNPROFOR personnel on the 
ground. John Major stressed, however, that 'that does not mean that we 
are taking sides in the conflict. The protection force remains neutral, 
and it remains impartial'.64 
The first several minutes of the Prime Minister's statement were spent 
recapping the 'humanitarian' and 'strategic' reasons for despatching 
British troops to the region in the first place. In describing the situation 
in Bosnia in 1992, John Major managed to paint a picture of a vicious 
civil war in which all sides were equally responsible for 'cold-blooded 
and racial-based [sic) murders'.65 Apart from the inaccuracy of Major's 
portrayal of the early days of the war, the circuitous approach to 
expanding on the capture of British troops acted to deflect from the Serb 
action. Major also equalised between the Serbs and Bosnian government 
in referring (incorrectly) to UN soldiers being 'deliberately targeted and 
killed by both sides', and linking the Serb hostage-taking to the Bosnian 
army's 'capture' of Ukranian troops.66 He also stated that the Serb 
hostage-taking had been part of a 'chain reaction of attack and counter-
attack by Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serb forces. 'Both parties 
have violated the Sarajevo exclusion zone'.67 This interpretation of the 
63 The Prime Minister stipulated that General Smith, if taking action required 'in justifiable self-
defence' would have the 'unqualified backing of the British Government'. B.2mlll, Hansard, 
Vo1.260, May 31,1995. Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind opined that the events of that week 
proved the limitations of air power when combined with UN ground forces without either the 
mandate or equipment to wage war, suggesting that UN commanders, including General Smith, 
agreed with that position. c.l095-6. 
64 Ibid. c.l003. 
65 Ibid. c.999. 
66 Ibid. c.999. Rifkind was presumably referring to the incident in January 1995 where the 
Bosnian government lost control of part of the enclave to Serb forces during the handover to the 
new Dutch battalion in January 1995. The Bosniacs urged UNPROFOR to restablish the status 
quo ante, which they were unable to do. In return the Bosnian commanders restricted 
UNPROFOR access to the area. When UNPROFOR troops entered the area despite the Bosniac 
warning, 100 of them were taken hostage for four days. Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.38-39/178. 
67 Ibid. c.IOOO. 
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events of that week exposed the different positions of the British 
government and the British commander in Sarajevo who had seen fit to 
call for air strikes against the Serbs only. 
The Labour leader, Tony Blair, offered full support for government 
policy: 
From the beginning, we have ruled out a role as combatants, taking 
sides to fight the war. I believe that that is right .... simply in military 
terms, if we compare it with Kuwait, the war there was relatively easy 
to fight on what was effectively a sand table in the desert. Here, the 
terrain is unremittingly hostile to outside involvement .. .It is natural 
guerilla territory. The fighting forces needed would be vast. 68 
Blair also eschewed calls to lift the arms embargo on Bosnian 
government forces. 69 Misguidedly, he described as 'a central weakness 
until now' the failure to disarm the 'safe areas', 70 and referred to the 
impact on Bosnia of 'the early recognition of Croatia' . 
Two backbench MPs were better informed. John Home Robertson, who 
had visited Bosnia several times on parliamentary and humanitarian 
duties, informed the House that UNPROFOR was cooperating with the 
Bosnian Serb army to enforce the siege of Sarajevo, with the UN 
manoeuvred into a position where it merely applied decisions made by 
the VRS liaison officer over who and what entered or left Sarajevo. 71 The 
UN also channelled aid convoys into Sarajevo through Serb-controlled 
checkpoints, with the VRS routinely stealing up to 50% of the loads, and 
were not able to return fire when the VRS targeted, with machine guns 
68 Tony Blair, Ibid. c.lOlO. 
69 Ibid. c.l009. 
70 Ibid. c.l 0 11. 
71 An example was given where 40 pallets of material urgently required by Medicins sans 
Frontieres were impounded by the UN on Serb instructions at Sarajevo airport for 3 months. 
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and mortars, vehicles with official UNHCR number plates.72 
Conservative MP Patrick Cormack referred to the Serb Civic Council 
which gave unequivocal support to the concept of a multi-ethnic Bosnia, 
repudiating the use of force of Karadzic and his followers. The Council 
claimed the support of 200,000 Serbs in Bosnia.73 
Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind declined to comment on this 
information. Outlining the role of the new force, he was anxious to 
reassure the House of Commons (and others listening)74 that 
becoming a combatant is not and will not be our policy ... the events of 
the last week ... should have shown all but the most stubborn the 
limitations of air power when combined with United Nations ground 
forces who do not have either the mandate or the equipment with which 
to wage war. 75 
Yet Britain had taken a leading role in the Security Council in 
establishing the UN mandate and rules of engagement. This comment, 
and the later lament of John Major, that 'too often - through lack of 
troops - the UN was obliged not to act in horrific circumstances it either 
could not see, had to ignore, was miles away from or was powerless to 
stop' ,76 were, therefore, somewhat disingenuous. 
Expanding on the purpose of the reinforcements, Rifkind explained that 
they provide essential capabilities to enhance the protection of 
UNPROFOR and increase the range of options open to UN 
commanders to respond robustly against the possibility of 
72 John Home Robertson,lbid. c.l028-9. 
73 Patrick Connack, Ibid. c.1045. Connack stated that this figure had not been convincingly 
challenged. 
74 At least one close associate of the Bosnian Serb leadership, Srdja Trifkovic, was present in the 
Visitors' Gallery during the debate. [This author also attended that debate.] 
75 Malcolm Rifkind, ~, May 31, 1995, op.cit. c.1095. 
76 MAJOR, op.cit. p.549. 
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UN troops having to defend themselves when trying to carry 
out UNPROFOR's mission in a more hostile environment.77 
... the S,OOO-strong force comprising 24 Air Mobile ... will be there 
primarily to protect United Kingdom forces. Consistent with that, 
however, we are willing to see it available for the protection of 
UNPROFOR as a whole .. .its members will wear blue berets and 
blue helmets.78 
This represented a fundamentally different approach to the RRF from 
that of France whose forces were equipped with combat gear and dark-
painted vehicles making up, with a small Dutch contribution, the total 
proposed reinforcements. This was perhaps the first tangible evidence of 
divisions which were to intensify between Britain and France on their 
Bosnian policy, both leading up to, and in response to, the fall of 
Srebrenica.79 
Malcolm Rifkind also confirmed the British lead in proposing to 
withdraw UN troops from the eastern enclaves, without any concomitant 
measures to ensure their safety: 
it was appropriate to propose to our friends and allies some 
concentration of UN forces within Bosnia ... We certainly believe 
that it is appropriate to examine [the] three safe havens [Gorazde, 
Zepa and Srebrenica] to see whether the policy is tenable and to 
assess the implications of a possible change of policy. so 
Although the Defence Secretary emphasized no decision had been 
reached on this, the implication that UN forces might withdraw from 
those areas, without any alternative provision for their safety, would 
77 BQsnia. QP.cit. c.l097. 
78 Ibid. c.l098. The Defence and Foreign Secretaries wrote a joint memo to the Prime Minister, 
stressing that 'we must not raise too high expectations about the effect of our reinforcements, that 
our troops would still need some degree of local consent if they were to do their job'. HURD, 
2003, op.cit. p.474. 
79 The British RRF troops were still using white-painted vehicles after the fall of Srebrenica. 
The Times. Editorial, July 27, 1995. 
80 ~, op.cit. c.II 00-0 1. 
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have sent a clear message to General Mladic who had already informed 
General Smith of his probable intention to take military action against 
the eastern enclaves. 81 
The Rapid Reaction Force 
In the wake of the hostage crisis, the British and French governments 
announced the intention of contributing to an international theatre 
reserve force to enable UNPROFOR to protect its troops more effectively. 
Meeting in Paris on June 3, European and NATO defence ministers 
agreed that the force would consist of two heavily armed brigades, drawn 
principally from France and Britain, with a contribution from the 
Netherlands. 
Soon afterwards, a dispute arose as to the purpose of the new force. 
ICFY co-chair Thorwald Stoltenberg, SRSG Yasushi Akashi and General 
Bernard Janvier all insisted, as did the British government, that the 
force should operate under peacekeeping rules of engagement, a view 
also shared by the UN Secretariat. 82 Akashi even objected to the name 
'Rapid Reaction Force' (RRF), preferring instead the term 'theatre reserve' 
(the term also used by Malcolm Rifkind in the House of Commons) as 
being less confrontational. The UN Commander, Lt. General Rupert 
Smith, on the other hand, took a similar view to the French, namely, 
that the RRF should be used to implement the UNPROFOR mandate and 
open corridors to Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves.83 In the absence of 
political backing for that, he preferred no reinforcements at al1. 84 
81 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.39/180. The intentions of General Mladic in this regard were 
familiar to many on the ground at the time. See, for instance, the interview with General Nicolai, 
April 19, 2001. Rapport d'Injormation, op.cit. 
82 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.44/214. 
83 The Director of Strategic Affairs at the French Ministry of Defence, Jean-Claude Mallet, later 
recounted that, with his British counterpart, David Omand, he went to the UN New York 
headquarters on June 7, to present the RRF concept approved by NATO and EU defence 
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There are serious problems of command and control with the RRF. 
Where are its orders coming from? UNPF headquarters in Zagreb? 
London? Paris? NATO headquarters in Brussels? Where is it going 
to be stationed?85 
The extent of friction at international level was evident when a letter 
from Akashi to Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic on June 19, 
assuring Karadzic that the 'theatre reserve forces' would operate under 
existing UN peacekeeping rules of engagement, was denounced by US 
Ambassador Madeleine Albright, who issued a statement that 'the 
method, timing and substance of this letter are highly inappropriate' . 86 
On July 6, as the VRS forces began the final onslaught on Srebrenica, 
the UN Secretariat reiterated that the RRF would not be used for peace 
enforcement, but solely 'to assist UNPROFOR forces to carry out their 
peacekeeping mandate. The Force will not have any function outside of 
this role'.87 
On June 21, Malcolm Ritkind condemned the US Congress for blocking 
funding of the Rapid Reaction Force, arguing that there was an 'ethical 
obligation as well as a practical need' for the force. s8 Majority Republican 
leader in the Senate, Robert Dole challenged the 'ethical obligation' 
ministers, confirming that the 'FFR must be in national uniform with different rules of 
engagement from those prevailing under the UN'. Rapport d'information" op.cit. Mallet 
interview, April 5, 2002. 
84 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.44-5/215-7. General Smith maintained that UNPROFOR would 
have to be prepared to fight or always be 'stared down by the Serbs'. 
85 General Rupert Smith, quoted in CORWIN, op.cit. p.122. Diary entry, June 25, 1995. Corwin 
noted that Smith was 'clearly frustrated by what he sees as the disarray in political capitals about 
the mission of the RRF ... Smith wants to use the RRF principally against the BSA [Bosnian Serb 
Army] and sees himself blocked by bureaucrats distant to the daily struggle oflife in Sarajevo'. 
Ibid. p.123. 
86 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.45/219. 
87 Ibid. p.45/220, 
88 'It would be quite wrong and quite improper to allow the difficulties in one particular country to 
so distort the international effort to save lives .. .' Malcolm Rifkind, quoted in The Times, June 22, 
1995, p.13. 
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however, insisting that further funds for operations in Bosnia would not 
be approved unless it could be assured that the UN would carry out its 
mandate to deliver aid and protect the designated 'safe areas'.89 
Time was running out for the Pale regime. Smith estimated that the 
Serbs now needed to shore up their defensive positions, and would 
therefore fight to conclude the war that year, which would require the 
eastern enclaves to be neutralised. 90 Smith sought clear guidance for 
the use of air power from the UN Secretariat in New York, but this was 
not forthcoming since it would allegedly infringe on the role of the 
Security Council. The Council, in turn, was unprepared to elaborate on 
resolutions which were often ambiguous and drawn up after much 
compromise amongst Council members. Besides, ambiguity, especially 
in relation to the 'safe areas' had, on occasion, proved useful. 
In early July, the French Armed Forces Chief, Admiral Jacques Lanxade, 
announced that the multinational brigade (forming part of the RRF) 
would be ready to open a supply road to Sarajevo on July 15. The Times 
Defence Correspondent, Michael Evans was amongst those who sought 
to discredit the French initiative. Evans pointed out that UN 
commanders in Sarajevo had 'more realistic expectations' and that, 
'according to UN military sources, Lt. General Rupert Smith ... [was] 
expecting to be asked to use the new force with considerable constraint'. 
He also noted that 'Yasushi Akashi.. [was] reluctant to sanction any use 
of force that might inflame the situation in Bosnia'.91 He emphasized 
that the UN draft 'concept paper' concerning the RRF focused mainly on 
protection for UN troops and facilitating the freedom of movement, with 
89 Ibid. 
90 See Rupert Smith, Milosevic trial, ICTY. October 9, 2003, pp.27301-2. Bosnian Serb Deputy 
Nikola Koljevic also expressed the wish that UPROFOR stay in Bosnia to the UN Civil Affairs 
Chief. See CORWIN, op.cit. p.l84. 
91 The Times, July 6, 1995, p.11. 
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no mention of peace enforcement.92 The size of the British contribution 
to the RRF had now been reduced, with 1,000 troops from the brigade to 
remain in Britain on 7 days' notice, and the remaining 4,000 from the 
24 Airmobile Brigade would not be ready to operate before the end of 
August.93 This, added to the earlier declared intention to withdraw UN 
troops deployed in the eastern enclaves, sent a clear signal that, at least 
on the part of Britain, the new RRF would present little threat to Serb 
forces. 
The fall of Srebrenica 
With mounting international tensions, and a rapidly deteriorating 
situation on the ground, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and EU envoy 
David Owen, both resigned.94 Just six days before the fall of Srebrenica, 
Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind was officially appointed to replace 
Douglas Hurd as foreign secretary, on the latter's firm 
recommendation.95 David Owen was replaced by the former Swedish 
premier, Carl Bildt, also on the recommendation of the British 
government, who briefed Bildt before his appointment. 96 Bildt's own view 
of his British sponsors is instructive: 
92 Ibid. 
93 The number of Chinook and Puma helicopters destined for Bosnia was to be cut from 18 to 6, 
and the Gazelles and Lynxes reduced by half, from 72 to 36, with all helicopters painted white. 
Ibid. 
94 Owen had intimated for some months that he had intended to resign as, on occasion, had Hurd. 
The precise timing of their resignations, however, just weeks before the Srebrenica crisis, with 
Britain's Bosnian policy on the verge of collapse, was fortuitous. For one view of the Foreign 
Secretary's resignation, see HODGE, C. 'Slimy Limeys'. The New Republic, August 6, 1995. 
95 See HURD, 2003. op.cit. p.513. 
96 'I reviewed the situation at Chevening on 5 June with Carl Bildt, the former Swedish Prime 
Minister, who was about to be appointed at our suggestion to succeed David Owen as the EU 
representative in Bosnia'. HURD, 2003, op.cit. p.474. For Douglas Hurd's personal approach to 
Bildt on the issue of Owen's replacement, see BILDT, Carl. Misija mir. Zid, Sarajevo, 1998, pJO. 
See also Bildt's briefing in Chevening, See BILDT, C. Peace Journey. Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 
1997, p.1S. 
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John Major was by now the most experienced of the leaders of the 
Contact Group on this particular issue. When he took the lead in 
sending soldiers to Bosnia to protect the humanitarian aid deliveries, 
thus starting the most extensive United Nations military operation 
even, Bill Clinton was a little known Governor of Arkansas and 
Jacques Chirac a certainly better known Mayor of Paris. 97 
Bildt, together with Thorwald Stoltenberg, visited Milosevic in Belgrade 
on July 1, and again on July 7, in an attempt to secure an agreement on 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, including mutual recognition. These 
sessions, held in the prelude to the final Srebrenica assault, of which 
Milosevic was almost certainly aware and probably colluded in,98 lasted 
nine and ten hours, respectively, with Milosevic hosting the EU and UN 
envoys over lavish meals. The second session was also attended by 
General Mladic, commander of the Serb assault on Srebrenica days 
later.99 Bildt's account of these encounters indicates the Serbian 
leader's confidence, and his control over the situation, and possibly the 
naivete of the new EU envoy.l°o Srebrenica was apparently not 
mentioned during either visit. Despite the unproductive outcome of 
those meetings, the Bildt mission was offered by some European powers 
as reason for withholding NATO air power. 101 
97 BILDT, 1997, op.cit. p.23. 
98 See evidence by Budimir Babovic at the Milosevic trial, where a document showing members 
of Serbia's police (MUP) operating outside Sarajevo being transferred to Srebrenica under the 
command of Bosnian Serb police colonel Ljubomir Borovcanin. IWPR Tribunal Update, No.317, 
June 17,2003. Also, there were VJ officers at the VRS headquarters at Han Pijesak. The Dutch 
Military Intelligence Service concluded some months later that the decision to attack Srebrenica 
was coordinated with Serbian General Perisic and President Mitosevic. NIOD, op.cit. Part III, 
Chapter 7, No.7. There was also evidence at the time of Serbian T84 tanks being used in the 
Srebrenica assault. Guardian, July 15, 1995, p.l. 
99 Ibid. pp,41-54. 
100 Bildt seemed bemused over their encounter and (not surprisingly, as it later transpired) unsure 
of what had been achieved. 'The mystery of Milosevic remained'. Ibid. p.52. 
101 CORWIN, op.cit. p.193, and Rapport d'in[ormation, op.cit. Interview with General Nicolai, 
April 19, 2001. 
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On the eve of the fall of Srebrenica, UN Civil Affairs Chief Phillip Corwin 
estimated that 
The situation in Srebrenica has deteriorated drastically ... As the reports 
about Srebrenica filter in, it is clear that our intelligence has been 
faulty, our defensive capacities are inadquate, and our resolve is 
divided. We expected an action with limited objectives; we were dead 
wrong. Three hundred lightly armed peacekeepers facing approximately 
five thousand Serb soldiers, fifty artillery pieces, and fifteen tanks. A 
credible defense is inconceivable without air strikes. l02 
By July 1995, Dutchbat had only 16% of its operational ammunition 
requirement, and much of this, after 18 months deployment, was in 
need of repair, most of the Dutch ammunition stocks having been 
blocked by Serb forces at the Lukavac depot. l03 Lack of fuel supplies 
meant that the Dutch were forced to patrol the enclave on foot. 
In the days preceding the fall of Srebrenica, General Brigadier Cees 
Nicolai turned down two requests from the Dutch battalion commander 
in Srebrenica, Lt. Col. Ton Karremans, for NATO close air support,later 
arguing that this accorded with the new guidelines on NATO action 
issued by UNPROFOR commanders on May 29. 104 
When the news of the Serb takeover of Srebrenica was announced on 
July 11, the international response was mixed. In Strasburg, a Franco-
German summit on defence and security was in progress and President 
Chirac, on hearing that NATO was unable to employ air power to protect 
the UN 'safe area', adjourned the meeting to focus on averting the fall of 
the enclave. lOS A four-point agreement between Chirac and the German 
102 CORWIN, op.cit. p.203. 
103 HONIGIBOTH, op.cit. p.128. 
104 Quoted from an interview with General Nicolai in ROHDE, David. A Safe Area. Srebrenica: 
Europe's Worst Massacre Since the Second World War. Pocket Books, 1997, p.23. See also 
HONIGIBOTH, op.cit. p.8. 
lOS As one prominent commentator noted: 'Chirac is not hostage to previous Anglo-French 
policy ... it demolishes the murderous and absurd notion, sustained for nearly four years by UN 
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President, Helmut Kohl, was produced declaring the support of France 
and Germany for Dutchbat efforts to restore the enclave to UN 
contro1. 106 Admiral Lanxade accordingly requested that US helicopters 
be made available to fly in 600-800 troops.I07 Chirac pressed for the 
Security Council to ask the RRF, now deployed in Bosnia, to 'restore the 
integrity of the Srebrenica zone'. lOS In Italy, President Oscar Luigi 
Scalfaro offered 2,000 soldiers to save the other enclaves. 109 
The United States, meanwhile, deferred to the Netherlands Ministerial 
Council which, fearing for the safety of its troops in Srebrenica, and 
especially Bratunac where a number had been detained by VRS forces 
considered the time for air strikes had passed. 110 President Clinton then 
offered helicopters for the transportation of troops to Gorazde. 111 
and western leaders than one can disarm the victims of genocidal slaughter and protect them 
without taking their side against he slaughterer'. Professor Albert Wohlstetter. 'Chirac's Challenge 
on Bosnia', Wall Street Journal, July 20, 1995. 
106 NIOD, Part 1. Chapter 11, 'Bankruptcy of the International Community'. Interview Jean David 
Levitte, political adviser to Jacques Chirac. 
107 President Chirac's military adviser, General Quesnot was, according to Bildt, the frrst to 
suggest the military recapture of Srebrenica: 'Give me two parachute regiments. I'll jump and 
retake Srebrenica'. Bildt, however, put the French proposal 'into perspective' and publicly rejected 
it, arguing that it was not feasible, also (incorrectly) that the Bosnian government had not asked 
for the enclave to be retaken. See NIOD, op.cit. Part II, Chapter 8. 
108 'I call on the large western democracies to get a grip on themselves and to impose respect for 
human rights and international law'. Jacques Chirac, quoted in Guardian, July 13, 1995. Chirac 
compared Major's response to Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler. The Times, July 15, 
1995. The heralded cooperation between Britain and France, with the establishment of the 
rapid reaction force, had already collapsed. For an analysis of the expected military cooperation 
between France and Britain in former Yugoslavia, see 'Une nouvelle "fratemite d'armes" franco-
britannique' . Le Mande, June 10, 1995 
109 La Stampa, July 15, 1995. A poll taken that week in Italy showed 53% of Italians supported 
military intervention in Bosnia against the Serbs. A number of prominent Italian politicians, 
including Foreign Minister Dini, opposed intervention, however. See La Stampa, July 19, 1995. 
however. 
110 Ibid. Dutch Foreign Minister Hans Van Mierlo contacted French Foreign Minister Charette, 
insisting that no air power be used. Rapport d'in!ormation, op.cit. Interview with former Dutch 
Foreign Minister Hans Van Mierlo, April 12, 1995. 
III La Stampa, July 18, 1995. Clinton's reticence in contributing air power was reportedly due in 
great part to the policy differences between France and Britain. See also Rapport d'in!ormation, 
Ibid. Interview with former French Prime Minister Alain Juppe, January 24, 2001. 
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Srebrenica: The British response 
Britain responded to the fall of Srebrenica in a number of ways. The 
Foreign Secretary promptly and publicly repudiated the French 
initiative. At the Security Council, both Britain and Russia sought to 
have the Serb action in Srebrenica placed in the context of a violation of 
the demilitarisation agreement of April 18, 1993, as a departure point 
for condemnation of the situation in the enclave. The UK Ambassador to 
the UN, David Hannay, pressed for this to be included in the UN 
resolution, arguing also that there should be no mention of the Rapid 
Reaction Force in the resolution, on the grounds that it was not feasible 
to expel the Serbs from Srebrenica. 1l2 Also, at a Contact Group meeting 
on July 12 Carl Bildt, supported by the British delegate, dismissed the 
French initiative as 'unrealistic' and 'absurd'. The US and German 
representatives, while expressing a preference for a more forceful 
approach, were nonetheless somewhat muted as neither country was 
prepared at that point to offer the requisite manpower for the task. 113 
On July 12, the day after Srebrenica fell to VRS forces, the newly-
appointed Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, made a statement in the 
House of Commons. In view of the introduction of a Rapid Reaction 
Force and the considerably more robust French stance, and the then 
undefined position of the Clinton administration, the British government 
response to the fall of a UN-declared 'safe area' would have been closely 
monitored by the Serb leadership in Pale, and the Milosevic regime in 
Belgrade. Rifkind noted the failure of other UN member states to 
112 Academic apologists of the British position argued that Srebrenica could not be saved, and 
that a large combat force would be required to save the other enclaves. See, for instance, 
'Riprendere Srebrenica? Follia'. Susan Woodward in La Stampa, July IS, 1995. 
113 There was, however, considerable support for the French initiative within the European 
Parliament. See The Times, Letter to the Editor, July 17, 1995. 
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contribute troops to Bosnia, and emphasized the shared responsibility of 
Serb and Bosnian government forces for the fall of Srebrenica. 
In June 1993, the UN suggested that up to 36,000 troops could be 
necessary to implement the safe areas concept. The UK, France and 
the Netherlands responded well, but many others did not. The total 
committed amounted to only 7,500, a considerable shortfall. This 
has had substantial implications for the safe areas policy. 114 
This was misleading. In June 1993, it was the UK Ambassador who had 
argued strenuously at the Security Council for the minimalist approach, 
i.e. a 'light option without formed units', with only a symbolic UN 
presence in each 'safe area', as opposed to France which had proposed 
the second option, a 'light option with formed units', 115 and the United 
States and several other Security Council Members who had declared 
preference for more effective options, which did not include the creation 
of 'safe areas', Also, Britain did not offer troops for the 'safe areas' until 
nearly a year later, when they were required to preempt extensive NATO 
air strikes against Serb positions in Gorazde. 
Mr Rifkind attributed the fall of the enclave to the failure to 
demilitarise.1l6 
The reality is that neither side properly observed the provisions on 
demilitarisation. It is this that lies at the root of events over the past 
few days. For three months, there have been sporadic attacks by each 
side against the other ... fighting escalated over last weekend. During 
that fighting, one Dutch soldier was killed by Bosnian Government 
forces. 117 
\14 Malcolm Rifkind,~, Hansard. Vo1.263, July 12, 1995, c.947. 
lIS This required a brigade (5,000 troops) in Sarajevo, a battalion (900 troops) each in Bihac and 
Tuzla, a battalion divided between Srebrenica and Zepa, and a further battalion divided between 
Gorazde and Foca. See Srebrenica Report. op.cit. p.20174, and p.24/94. 
116 The UK Ambassador to the UN at an emergency Security Council meeting the same day, also 
gave the failure to demilitarize as the main reason for the fall of the enclave: 'It is through 
demilitarization of [Srebrenica] that the civilian population who wish to do so will be able to 
remain without fear'. Srebrenica Report. op.cit. p.66/336. 
117 Malcolm Rifkind, ~, op.cit. c.947. 
314 
The UN Srebrenica Report totally rebuts this argument. On the issue of 
demilitarisation, it states that 
... while it is true that the Bosniac fighters in Srebrenica did not fully 
demilitarize, they demilitarized enough for UNPROFOR to issue a press 
release, on 21 April 1993, saying that the process had been a success. 
Specific instructions from United Nations Headquarters in New York 
stated that UNPROFOR should not be too zealous in searching for 
Bosniac weapons and, later, that the Serbs should withdraw their 
heavy weapons before the Bosniacs gave up their weapons. The Serbs 
never did withdraw their heavy weapons. 118 
On the Foreign Secretary's allegation of 'sporadic attacks by each side', 
the Srebrenica Report states that 
the few 'raids' the Bosniacs mounted out of Srebrenica were of little or 
no military significance. These raids were often organized in order to 
gather food, as the Serbs had refused access for humanitarian convoys 
into the enclave. Even Serb sources ... acknowledged that the Bosniac 
forces in Srebrenica posed no significant military threat to them. The 
biggest attack the Bosniacs launched out of Srebrenica during over two 
years during which it was designated as a safe area appears to have 
been the raid on the village of Visnjica, on 26 June 1995, in which 
several houses were burned, up to four Serbs were killed and 
approximately 100 sheep were stolen. In contrast, the Serbs overran 
the enclave two weeks later, driving tens of thousands from their 
homes, and summarily executing thousands of men and boys. The 
Serbs repeatedly exaggerated the extent of the 'raids' out of Srebrenica 
as a pretext for the prosecution of a central war aim: to create a 
geographically contiguous and ethnically pure territory along the 
Drina, while freeing up troops to fight in other parts of the country .119 
The killing of the Dutch soldier, referred to by the Foreign Secretary, 
occurred on July 8 as Bosnian government forces opened fire on a 
Dutch armoured personnel carrier in an attempt to prevent the Dutch 
forces withdrawing from an observation post at the southern tip of the 
118 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.92/475. 
119lbid. p.93/479. Significantly, Milosevic, at a meeting with Carl Bildt on July 14, also took the 
position that 'the whole incident had been provoked by escalating Muslim attacks from the 
enclave, in violation of the 1993 demilitarization agreement'. Quoted in Ibid. p.73/372. 
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Srebrenica enclave, which they had decided to abandon following a Serb 
offensive. 120 Rifkind's reference to the episode at the beginning of his 
statement suggested an equivalence of guilt, which he emphasized on 
several occasions during his speech.121 
Mr Rifkind did not condemn the Serb aggression directly, but referred, 
half-way through his statement, to a draft UN resolution: 
At the United Nations, we, the United States, France, Germany and 
Italy are co-sponsoring a draft resolution ... This condemns the Bosnian 
Serb offensive, demands that the Bosnian Serb forces withdraw 
immediately from the Srebrenica area, that the Bosnian Serbs 
immediately release all detained UNPROFOR personnel and that all 
parties allow unimpeded access for the [UNHCRI and other 
humanitarian agencies to the safe area to alleviate the plight of the 
civilian operation; and requests the Secretary General to use the 
resources available to him to restore the safe area status of 
Srebrenica. 122 
Crucially, neither the draft resolution nor the Foreign Secretary's 
statement included any measures to deter further attacks on UN 'safe 
areas'. Nor did they reflect the more forceful French position. Asked 
whether a time-scale had been set in the event of the Serbs not 
complying, Mr Rifkind replied that the questioner 'must ... recognise the 
120 According to the Bosnian commander, Ramiz Becirovic, there was an informal agreement 
between the Dutch commander, Colonel Karremans, and himself in early June that the Dutch 
would warn the Bosnian forces in the event of their withdrawal from an OP in order that they 
could defend the strategic positions themselves. No warning came from the Dutch, however. See 
ROHDE, op.cit. pp.29-41 for a full account of the episode. 
121 ' ••• the Prime Minister told the House yesterday ... that the warring parties had to indicate soon 
that they were prepared to return to the negotiating table to reach a political solution. That 
remains the position'. Malcolm Rifkind, J3.Qsnia, op.cit. c.948. A misleading statement since the 
Bosnian government had agreed to the Contact Group plan the previous year. When Rifkind had 
the opportunity to confirm that the Bosnian government had 'consistently shown its willingness to 
reach a negotiated settlement, whereas the Serbs [had] not', he sidestepped the question. Ibid 
c.962-3. 
122 Ibid. c.948. Humanitarian aid was despatched by the UN to the enclave. However, the Serbs 
waited till the refugees had departed before allowing in two UN convoys July 14, with 30,000 
litres of fuel, several tons of food, and several weeks' supply of medical goods! ROHDE, op.cit, 
p.293. 
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limits of what he can expect the UN to be able to deliver', 123 Questioned 
whether the arms embargo might be removed in the event that the 
Bosnian government requested UNPROFOR to leave, the Foreign 
Secretary stated that 'the Bosnian Government have said that they 
would rather that the UN remained in Bosnia than that the embargo 
should be raised and the UN withdraw' ,124 Again, this contradicted 
statements by Bosnian ministers. 125 Rifkind also stated that 'the US 
Administration, including President Clinton, have come to the 
unequivocal view that the lifting of the embargo and the withdrawal of 
UNPROFOR would be an extremely foolish initiative, and should not be 
supported'.126 It was true that the US was anxious to avoid UNPROFOR 
withdrawal since this would involve large numbers of its own troops. The 
arms embargo, on the other hand, had already been partly lifted by the 
US. 
On the French proposal to reverse the situation in Srebrenica, the 
Foreign Secretary equivocated, stating 'we need to hear the precise 
details of what they have in mind and whether that is perceived to be a 
militarily realistic solution to this matter' ,127 Mr Rifkind also stated 
unequivocally that 
it is no part of the purpose of a rapid reaction force to become a 
combatant in the conflict. Its purpose will be to assist the force 
123 Rifkind, in reply to Tony Banks, Ibid. c.964. 
124 Rifkind, Ibid. c.965. See also c.952. 
125 The following week, Foreign Minister Nicholas Bonsor con finned that the Bosnian Foreign 
Minister had indicated he wanted UNPROFOR to withdraw. See B.Q.snia. July 19. 1995, 
Hansard, Vo1.263, c.l782. The Bosnian government ordered UNPROFOR to leave by 
November. European, July 21-27.1995, p.3. 
126 Bosnia. July 12, 1995, op.cit. c.966. 
127 Ibid. c.9S1. 
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commander in the protection of UNPROFOR and to assist with the 
delivery of UN humanitarian supplies to those who require them. 128 
The unequivocal message conveyed by Britain on the day after 
Srebrenica fell, both in the House of Commons and at the UN Security 
Council, was that neither punitive measures against the Bosnian Serbs 
for their action in Srebrenica, nor deterrent measures to prevent VRS 
forces from taking Zepa and possibly other enclaves, were contemplated. 
The following day, July 13, the slaughter of unarmed men and boys 
began. 129 
Britain's involvement in the international policy shift which led to the 
end of the war in Bosnia has since been cast by some analysts in a more 
positive light than the facts suggest. It has been claimed, for instance, 
that the introduction of a Rapid Reaction Force at the end of May 1995 
was (a) a British initiative, and (b) a joint French-British attempt to 
'display resolve and operate robustly. 130 It has also been argued that the 
British government was entirely supportive of General Smith's stance on 
the issue of air strikes throughout. 131 Yet, in the acrimony which grew 
between Smith, on the one side, and Akashi and Janvier, on the other, 
128 Ibid. c.958. The following week, Defence Minister Nicholas Soames informed the House that 
the deployment of the 4,000 personnel would not be completed till mid August. Written Answers, 
July 19,1995. Hansard. Vo1.263, c.1357. 
129 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.68/346. British journalists in Ljubovija in Serbia, directly across 
the Drina from Bratunac, reported accounts by Serbs visiting Bosnia of mass executions of 3-
4,000 people in Bratunac and other east Bosnian towns. Independent, July 21, 1995, p.1, and 
Sunday Times, July 23,1995, p.13. Similarly, John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Human Rights heard credible eyewitness accounts of mass executions of men and boys. Channel 
4 News, July 24,1995. As of November 1999,7,336 individuals from Srebrenica still remained 
unaccounted for Srebrenica Report, Ibid. p.80/409. 
130 See GOW, J. Triumph. op.cit. pp.266-9. Gow, interestingly, describes the RRF as a 'combat-
capable' reaction force, which modifies the intended combat aspect of the force without altogether 
rejecting it, which conflicts with the Foreign Secretary's statement in the House of Commons, as 
well as the statement the following week by the Defence Secretary. On the original impetus for 
the RRF, former French ministers claimed that it was a French initiative. Rapport d'information, 
op.cit. Interview with former French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette, May 10,2001. 
131 GOW, Ibid. p.270. 
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British ministers were unequivocally supportive of the position adopted 
by the latter two officials. 
British media coverage surrounding the fall of Srebrenica was mixed 
and, to that extent, may arguably be considered as balanced. While the 
graphic plight of the civilians fleeing from the enclave dominated most of 
the press coverage and electronic media, there were a number of 
programmes and reports which, either directly or tangentially, suggested 
an equiValence of guilt, reflecting ministerial statements. 
One example was an interview by David Frost with Bosnian Serb leader 
Radovan Karadzic on July 16, just days after the massacres. 132 In the 
interview, Karadzic was given the opportunity to discuss his proposals 
for a solution in Bosnia. A map was produced to assist Karadzic to 
indicate where territorial changes in Contact Group plan should be 
made. Moreover, his assertion, that 65% of land in Bosnia was owned by 
Serbs, and that more Serbs had been expelled from their homes than 
Muslims or Croats, went unchallenged. 
In a televised debate, chaired by Jeremy Paxman, the audience was 
invited to discuss and vote on (with voting extended to viewers) whether 
UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia or leave. 133 There was no provision 
made, however, for the suggestion made by a number of participants 
that the UN should stay, but only on condition that the mandate was 
revised to permit the use of force. Consequently, the result of the poll 
showed a large percentage in favour of UNPROFOR remaining in Bosnia 
(the government position), but did not reflect the conditions attached by 
many participants who were clearly critical of current British policy on 
the issue. 
132 The David Frost Show, BBCI, July 16, 1995. The BBC had granted Karadzic an interview 
in early June 1995 on the 9 O'Clock News, at the height of the hostage crisis. 
133 BBC 2, July 15, 1995. 
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A prominently-placed article by a leading Times correspondent, Eve-Ann 
Prentice, offered a relativist analysis of the situation, opining that 'what 
are perceived as ethically correct solutions would paradoxically probably 
lead to even more killing'.134 Presumably, this referred to the French 
initiative. The Times defence correspondent, Michael Evans, took up 
another theme. In an article entitled 'Muslim soldiers failed to defend 
town from Serbs' .135 Evans claimed that the Bosnians 
only put up a brief fight against the Serbs ... The abandonment of 
Srebrenica to a relatively small Serb advancing force caused surprise 
in the West, especially after the largely Muslim government army had 
demonstrated considerable infantry skills in recent 
attacks .. .Intelligence sources estimated the main attack was carried 
out by a [Serb] force of about 200, with five tanks .. .It was a pretty low-
level operation, but for some reason which we can't understand the 
BiH [government[ soldiers didn't put up much of a fight ... The BiH just 
melted away from Srebrenica and the senior officers left the night 
before ... the Muslim defenders were adequately armed for street-
fighting. It could be seen by the Serbs as an invitation to move on to 
the next Muslim enclaves,136 
The argument was not dissimilar to that of General Michael Rose the 
previous year when he upbraided the Bosnians for not putting up a 
stronger fight in defence of Gorazde, and it was equally inaccurate, 
particularly in view of the scale of the VRS offensive. 137 Also, the 
correspondent's assessment of the Bosnian defence in Srebrenica at the 
time differed markedly from that of General Smith. 138 
134 The Times, July 20, 1995, p.15. 
135 The Times, July 14, 1995. 
136 Ibid. 
137 For a contemporary exploration of the 'intelligence sources' informing controversial articles (in 
this case on the Chechen war), also with reference to Michael Evans, see CLOGG, Richard. 
'Disinformation in Chechnya: an anatomy of a deception'. Central Asian Survey, 16(3), 1997, 
pp.425-430. 
138 According to General Smith, there were not more than 1,200 armed men in Srebrenica by early 
1995. Milosevic Trial. ICTY. October 9, 2003, p.27384. 
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Another journalist condemned 'the motives of the Bosnian government 
[which] was secretly prepared to see the safe areas fal1. .. using the 
enclaves as military staging points and re-supply dumps. 139 Yet another, 
reporting from Belgrade, described a film made in Serbia of an attack in 
December 1992 when Bosniacs attacked two Serb villages killing 63 
people, commenting that 'some victims were hacked with knives'.l40 
While this may have been an attempt to put the July 1995 events into 
some perspective it also, in the circumstances, indicated a lack of 
judgment. 
There has since been much speculation as to the information available 
internationally concerning a planned Serb assault on Srebrenica. Most 
senior international players interviewed later insisted that there had 
been no previous indication that the enclave might be overrun by VRS 
forces, or of the likelihood of massacres. 141 Medicins sans Frontieres, in 
an article in La Croi.xJ. categorically refute that claim, however, stating 
that on June 17, 1995, nearly a month before Srebrenica fell, the French 
and American intelligence services had intercepted a communication 
between General Perisic, Chief of Staffs of the Serbian army (V J) and 
Bosnian Serb Commander General Mladic, indicating that the two men 
were preparing an attack against Srebrenica. 142 Also, a confidential 
report dated June 26 was reportedly sent to the UN and the British 
government by General Smith's office in Sarajevo. Delivered to the 
government by a UN official, the report stated that if the Bosnian army 
139 Nik Gowing, Sunday Telegraph, July 16,1995, p.2l. 
140 Tim Judah, Ibid. 
141 Testimony by Rupert Smith at the Milosevic Trial, op.cit. ICTY, October 9, 2003, p.27328. 
See also Rapport d'information, op.cit. Interviews with Hans Van Mierlo and Joris Vanhoove, 
April 12, 2001, and Herve de Charette, May 10,2001. 
142 Quoted by the Balkans Director of Medicins sans frontieres, Pierre Salignon, in Rapport 
d'information, Ibid. May 17, 2001. Salignon believed that the massacres subsequent to the fall of 
Vukovar (where Msfhad also been working in 1991) made the incidence of massacres 
predictable after a Serb takeover of Srebrenica. 
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continued to fight around Sarajevo the Serbs would try to take the 
enclaves, in order to free their soldiers to fight elsewhere. 143 
Adding to the speculation is the fact that several senior UN officers went 
on leave just before the Serb offensive, including several of Yasushi 
Akashi's staff in Zagreb. 144 General Smith had also been on leave since 
the beginning of July. In the French enquiry into the events leading to 
the fall of Srebrenica, the absence of General Smith throughout the 
Srebrenica crisis was cited by a number of those interviewed as a source 
of concern. 145 General Herve Gobillard, who was appointed to replace 
Smith, informed the enquiry that he had not known of Smith's absence 
for several days, and was not briefed on Srebrenica until three days 
before the enclave fell. 146 General Smith's refusal to be interviewed for 
the French enquiry in 2001 further compounded the speculation. 147 
Another issue discussed at some length in the French enquiry, was the 
technical argument advanced for the lack of UN or NATO action in 
Srebrenica, that there were not the ground controllers present to guide 
the NATO planes. 148 It later emerged that there were in fact two teams in 
143 One British military source was reported as commenting, 'so much for the line that [the fall of 
Srebrenica this week] was a terrible shock'. Ibid. UN officials in Sarajevo later shrugged off the 
document. UN spokesperson Lt. Coward commented, 'We were aware of the dangers. There was 
not much the UN could have done'. The Times, July 15, 1995. 
144 This included a British brigadier. See HARTMANN, op.cit. p.338. 
145 See Rapport d'information, op.cit. Interviews with Generals Jean Cot, February 8, 2001, and 
Herve Gobilliard, March 1,2001, 
146 'I was plunged into the Srebrenica crisis without any preparation on the zone'. General Herve 
Gobilliard, Ibid. 
147 One witness testifying in the Krstic trial at the Hague, attributed the absence in Srebrenica of 
SGSR Yasushi Akashi, EC envoy Carl Bildt and General Rupert Smith for the method in which 
Srebrenica fell: 'Had the whole commanding mechanism ofUNPROFOR been actively involved 
in the situation, I believe that the whole procedure, the whole operation, would have been carried 
out ... in a more orderly fashion and with much less serious consequences'. Radovan Radinovic, 
Krstic Trial,lCTY, December 5,2000, p.7961. 
148 See Rapport d'in/ormation, op.cit. Interview with Herve Gobilliard, March 1,2001. This was 
disputed by other interviewees who argued that the Dutch ground controllers remained in 
position, 
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the enclave at the time, one from the Netherlands and another from 
Britain.149 Years later, one of the British team attempted to publish his 
memoirs. Writing under the pseudonym 'Nick Cameron', a former SAS 
sergeant and Military Cross holder, leading a 3-man British special 
forces patrol which was secretly in Srebrenica under UN command when 
the enclave was overrun by VRS forces, claimed in an article in The 
Sunday Times that, according to Cameron's SAS commander, there had 
never been any plan to defend Srebrenica. The article was scheduled as 
the first of a series. Shortly after the first article appeared, however, the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) threatened 'Cameron' with legal proceedings if 
he published further similar material. A year later, facing trial for 
unauthorized disclosures about his service in Bosnia, 'Cameron' agreed, 
in an out-of-court settlement, not to publish similar material without 
MoD permission. Cameron also paid £75,000 in MoD legal costs. ISO 
House of Commons. July 19, 1995 
The first full parliamentary debate on Srebrenica was held at the House 
of Commons on July 19. It was opened by the new Defence Secretary, 
Michael Portillo who, although evidently not fully acquainted with his 
brief,151 generally confirmed (albeit less suavely than his predecessor) 
the government position as laid out by the Foreign Secretary the 
previous week. The rumours filtering through of mass killings and 
thousands missing, VRS attacks on other 'safe areas', and the imminent 
fall of another eastern enclave, Zepa, had not produced a change in the 
but were not called on. 
149 Medicins sans/rontjeres' Balkans Director Pierre Salignon, commented that 'Curiously, the 
existence of [the British team] was never officially acknowledged by the British government'. 
ISO Sunday Times, July 7,2002, editorial. Reproduced by the Bosnian Institute, News & Analysis 
section, and Scotsman, July 4,2003. 
lSI He appeared, for instance, to be under the impression that 7,000 Dutch, British and Ukranian 
troops were deployed in the enclaves, instead of the few hundred actually there. ~ 
Hansard, Vo1.263, July 19, 1995, c.1743. 
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British government position. Drawing a symmetry of guilt, Mr Portillo 
declared that 
In the former Yugoslavia, we have seen European man at his 
absolute worst. All sides have been guilty of slaughter, rape and 
other atrocities ... all the parties have degraded themselves, 
and ... degraded humanity ... 
To bring this war to an end militarily would require the commitment 
of hundreds of thousands of men, equipment and armaments, at 
enormous risk to those forces ... our chances of success would be 
remote ... the only way that this war can end is by political 
settlement. 152 
Similar utterances had been made on numerous occasions by 
government ministers since 1991.153 The difference now was that the 
new Defence Secretary was imminently to be proved wrong, as the NATO 
action which ended the war was just six weeks away. Significantly, 
however, it was clear that the British government was not contemplating 
force in Bosnia except for the protection of its troops in Gorazde. 154 This 
'line drawn in the sand' at Gorazde was a new development which was to 
be expanded on at the London Conference two days later. Otherwise, the 
signals remained the same. The Defence Secretary confirmed that 'there 
has been no change in the UN's mandate. The extra forces are not there 
to make war .. .' 155 No reference was made to Zepa or the other UN 'safe 
areas'. 
152 Michael Portillo, B.Q.snia, July 19, 1995, op.cit. c.1740-1. 
153 This position was also reiterated in this debate by former foreign secretary Douglas Hurd from 
the back benches: 'I do not believe that it is possible, from the air, to bomb the Bosnian Serbs into 
coming to the conference table and reaching a peaceful settlement. .. No solution can be imposed 
from outside except...ifwe had sent a large international force ... ' Ibid. c.1753-4. 
154 'I want to make it absolutely clear to the House that anyone who harms them will be held 
personally responsible by the Government of the United Kingdom'. Michael Portillo, Ibid. c.1744. 
15S Ibid. c.1743. 
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Foreign Minister Nicholas Bonsor, closing the debate, also confirmed 
that 'we are not in Bosnia to fight a war',156 and that 'the rapid reaction 
force is clearly not there as a fighting force'. 157 Echoing the Defence 
Secretary, Mr Bonsor opined that escalation 'into a war in which we 
become directly involved' was an option which 
I do not believe either the House or the British people wish us to take ... 
the danger to our troops and to the humanitarian aid people would be 
out of any proportion to any impact that we could make in finding a 
proper solution to the conflict ... The Government's preference is clear 
and unequivocal - we remain convinced that UNPROFOR has a key role 
to play and we want it to stay,158 
All three ministers quoted the casualty toll in Bosnia over three years of 
war to justify the UNPROFOR presence: '130,000 dead in 1992, as 
opposed to 2,500 in 1994'.159 This grossly misrepresented the situation, 
however, since the Bosnian Serbs having gained control over 70% of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina before the end of 1992 mostly focused thereafter 
(with the exception of the Drina valley) on consolidating and defending 
the frontline. Mr Bonsor compounded the deception in declaring that 'in 
the British-controlled area, it is only the presence of our troops that 
prevents the renewal of the conflict between the Croat and Bosniac 
sides'.16o The Bosniac-Croat conflict had, of course, erupted just miles 
from the British UNPROFOR headquarters in Vitez in 1993, and was 
ended through US mediation. By 1995, it was in the mutual interest of 
both communities to join forces against the Serbs. Bonsor's argument 
was, therefore, somewhat specious. 
156 Ibid. c.1741. 
157 Nicholas Bonsor, Ibid. c.1783. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Nicholas Bonsor, Ibid. c.1781. See also Michael Portillo, Ibid. c.1742, and Malcolm Rifkind, 
B.2mia, July 12, 1995, op.cit. c.949. 
160 Nicholas Bonsor, Ibid. c.1781. Shadow Foreign Secretary Robin Cook seemed to be under a 
similar misapprehension. See Ibid. c.l747. 
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Srebrenica: The US Position 
The fall of Srebrenica prompted an increasing number of US Congress 
members, both Republican and Democratic, to announce their support 
for a Republican bill whereby the US would unilaterally lift the arms 
embargo against Bosnia. 161 The US Senate also voted 69/29 to require 
President Clinton to lift the embargo. Under complex US legislative rules, 
however, the House of Representatives had first to pass its own version, 
the two houses had to agree on the text of the final Bill, and it again 
needed a two thirds majority to survive a White House veto. It would also 
take effect only after UNPROFOR withdrawal. However, although there 
were no immediate consequences for UNPROFOR, it could encourage 
Islamic states to breach embargo openly. 162 
Clinton was in a Catch 22 situation. Lifting the embargo would lead to 
UN withdrawal which Clinton had already pledged to assist with up to 
25,000 troops. France was already threatening to withdraw its 6,000 
troops if its allied did not back a firmer stance against the Serbs. The 
difficulties in the withdrawal option, however, suggested that both the 
UN and NATO troops could be drawn into a bloody battle and suffer 
humiliation. It was at this point that Clinton decided on larger-scale 
NATO air strikes as the preferable option although, according to Richard 
Holbrooke, it was not until the Clinton administration was briefed by 
NATO planners in early June that US policy makers accepted the high 
probability of US troop involvement in the fighting. 163 Holbrooke 
161 This would enable the Bosnian government to acquire artillery, armoured vehicles, anti-tank 
guided missiles and transport and communications equipment, plus the ammunition to help 
exploit the Bosnian army's advantage in manpower. The combined Bosniac and Croat forces 
numbered 160,000 at this point, as against 75,000 VRS. Independent on Sunday, July 30, 1995. 
162 A number of Islamic states, including Malaysia and Egypt, had already pronounced the arms 
embargo a dead letter, however, pledging military assistance to Bosnia, while a Saudi paper 
called on the Islamic world to wage a jihad against the Bosnian Serbs. The Times, July 24, 1995, 
p.8. 
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assessed that the policy was facing defeat, which would inevitably mean 
US military involvement either way. It was therefore preferable that the 
involvement be built on success rather than failure. 
The United States was in an entirely different position from the previous 
year. Bihac had illustrated that Britain not only would not move on the 
lift and strike issue, but had acted to deter a US initiative to the point of 
jeopardising the safety of NATO planes. Also, the British commander on 
the ground had leaked information to the Serbs who were equipped with 
a new air defence system. This combination of factors, which had 
caused the US to withdraw in November 1994, also gave pause for 
thought in July 1995. The renewed US incentive to use force to end the 
war coincided with that of the French president. 164 
The changes on the ground in the Spring and Summer of 1995, as the 
Croatian and Bosnian government forces strengthened, were critical to 
the US decision. Indeed, it was reported that the US had given a green 
light (or an amber light tinted green) for the Croatian army operation. 165 
Since mid-1993, when the failure of the Vance-Owen plan had given way 
to the 'safe areas' policy, and hostilities had flared between Croats and 
Bosniacs in Central Bosnia, the US approach had been to strengthen 
Croatia as a strategic counterweight to Serbia, forging a Bosnian-Croat 
alliance to counter the Bosnian Serb army. 
London Conference. July 21! 1995 
Foreign and defence ministers from fifteen countries representing troop 
contributing nations, as well as UN Security Council Members, the UN 
163 See BURG/SHOUP, op.cit. p.324. 
164 For the American debate, see also 'The Military Balance in Bosnia and Its Effect on the Prospects 
for Peace'. Special Report 14. The United States Institute/or Peace (USIP), August 1995. 
165 Guardian, July 31, 1995, p.7. 
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Secretariat, the EU and NATO, convened on July 21 for a conference in 
London, called by the British Prime Minister, and chaired by the Foreign 
Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind. 166 
The London Conference has often since been described as a turning 
point in international policy, marking the point when the international 
community finally decided to use NATO air power to end the war. So far 
as the British government was concerned, however, the conference had a 
much narrower remit, namely, to preempt a VRS attack on Gorazde 
where British troops were deployed, and to detract from their Western 
allies' more ambitious plans. 
The Prime Minister, John Major, set out four specific objectives: (i) to 
enable UNPROFOR to remain in Bosnia, so long as it was not subjected 
to unacceptable risk, (ii) to agree a way of deterring further aggression, 
especially in Gorazde, (iii) to offer more support to international 
negotiators, and (iv) to address problems experienced by aid workers. 167 
The statements issued after the Conference represented a wide range of 
views, from the Canadians who reportedly understood that all 'safe 
areas' were to receive UN protection, and the French who wanted to use 
the rapid reaction force to protect and/ or retake the eastern enclaves, to 
the Russians who opposed any military intervention whatsoever. 168 The 
final statement read by Malcolm Rifkind reflected the British position, in 
stipUlating that 'any attack on Gorazde will be met with a substantial 
166 It was later described by a number of participants as an ad hoc gathering. with little 
documentation prepared in advance and no consensus reached at the end. Srebrenica Report, 
op.cit. p.79/406. 
167 Major was quoted, however, as describing the Conference as a desperate effort to keep the UN 
show on the road. Guardian, July 22, 1995, p.l, and Daily Telegraph, July 22, 1995, p.l O. 
168 One observer described it as 'a cacophony of conflicting emphases and statements', with only 
minimal and equivocal consensus amongst the major powers, encouraging Serb leaders, who 
weigh every nuance in an attempt to gauge what they could get away with next. Ian Traynor, 
Guardian, July 22, 1995, p.14. 
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and decisive response, including the use of air power'.l69 It was the first 
time during the Bosnian war that a British minister had issued such a 
specific military threat. Approximately 300 Royal Welch Fusiliers were 
still trapped in Gorazde, and could only exit with the permission of the 
VRS forces surrounding the enclave. Significantly, Rifkind did not 
mention the other 'safe areas'. 170 
British leaders had endeavoured to strike a balance in any military 
threat to the Serbs which would satisfy the demand for more effective 
action from America, France and the British public, while at the same 
time not alienating the Serb leadership to the point of endangering the 
lives of British troops in the enclave. Hence, the focus on Gorazde alone. 
As Britain had called and hosted the conference, the British statement 
was the most definitive to emerge. 171 However, as the Special Rapporteur 
for Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki pointed out, 'not a single word' 
was mentioned about Zepa at the London Conference. One week later, 
Mazowiecki resigned, writing to the Secretary-General that 
Events in recent weeks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and above all the fact 
that the United Nations has allowed Srebrenica and Zepa to fall, along 
with the horrendous tragedy which has beset the population of those 
'safe havens' guaranteed by international agreements, oblige me to 
state that I do not see any possibility of continuing the mandate of 
Special Rapporteur. 172 
169 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.80/406. Carl Bildt had already warned Milosevic that the 
'international community would not tolerate an attack on Gorazde' at a meeting in Dobanovci as 
early as July 14. Ibid. p.73/372. 
170 A role for the Rapid Reaction Force was envisaged in the protection of aid deliveries to 
Sarajevo, but not to break the siege of the city. 
171 There was also reportedly pressure from Belgrade to prevent Gorazde, although not the other 
'safe areas' from falling. GLENNY, Misha. The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism. war and the 
great powers. Granta, 1999, p.650. If this was the case, it demonstrated another instance of 
contiguity between the British position and that of Serbian President Milosevic. 
172 Srebrenica Report. op.cit. p.80/408. 
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Significantly, on the day before the Conference, General Mladic had 
informed General Smith that Zepa had also been captured by Serb 
forces, false information, confirmed however by the British UN 
spokesperson in Zagreb, Chris Gunness. 173 General Smith's proposal, 
that Zepa be demilitarised and the Serbs threatened with air strikes if 
they persisted in their offensive, was subsequently rejected by General 
Janvier on the grounds that no commitment had been made to Zepa at 
the Conference. 174 
The Conference had created a pause, deflecting from the US/French 
rapprochement on the international Balkans policy, and delaying 
effective US action as President Clinton, following the Foreign Secretary's 
visit to Washington, appealed to Democrats in Congress to postpone 
their vote on a resolution to lift the arms embargo till after the London 
Conference .175 
The Bosnian government declared the London Conference an 
unmitigated failure. It was also considered a defeat for the US 
administration which had urged full-scale air strikes in response to 
attacks on all the 'safe areas', and fuelled the momentum to lift the arms 
embargo. There were open admissions of international division, which 
were exemplified in the failure to produce an agreed final communique. 
The only clear message from western states was that any attack on 
Gorazde would meet 'a substantial and decisive response'. 176 But even 
this threat was generally viewed as lacking in substance. 177 
173 The Times, July 21,1995. 
174 Ibid. p.811417. 
17S The Times, July 20, 1995, p.l5. 
176 British officials later said the Serbs would be given a "clear ultimatum" privately. Guardian, 
July 22, 1995. p.l. 
177 The Times. Editorial, July 22, 1995. 
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The focus on Gorazde, and the exclusion of other UN 'safe areas' in the 
London Conference fmal statement, had a number of consequences, and 
exacerbated international divisions. 178 The VRS forces responded to the 
omission of other 'safe areas' in the communique by shelling Sarajevo, 
Zepa and Bihac. Zepa was critical as it was on the verge of falling, with 
no guarantee that its inhabitants would not undergo the same fate as 
those in Srebrenica. But the situation in Bihac, which was at this time 
being invaded in a pincer movement by Serb forces from both Bosnia 
and Croatia was, from the strategic viewpoint, was more serious still. 179 
A Serb takeover of Bihac ran the risk of involvement from Croatia whose 
foreign minister had already written to the Security Council on July 20 
warning that the Serb capture, and the expulsion of the 180,000 
inhabitants non-Serbs from Bihac would threaten Croatian security, and 
force Croatia to take measures to protect the enclave. 180 On July 23, the 
Bosnian and Croatian presidents signed an agreement of cooperation in 
Split to combat 'Serb aggression'. 
President Chirac maintained pressure for action to protect both Zepa 
and Gorazde. Yet UNPROFOR did not have orders to reinforce Zepa. 181 
Two days after the London Conference, the enclave had still not fallen, 182 
and the Bosnian leadership declared a reluctance to evacuate it. 183 An 
internal UNPROFOR meeting was held to determine how to proceed. An 
earlier proposal, to demilitarise Zepa and threaten the Serbs with air 
strikes if they attacked, was supported by General Smith, but preempted 
178 Major had intended to leave the conference directly after his speech, but was impelled to stay 
on into the afternoon, brokering bilateral deals with delegates. See SELDON, op.cit. p.S92. 
179 The Times, editorial, July 22, 1995. 
180 The Herald, July 22, 1995, p.7. 
181 General Smith reportedly informed Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic of this. CORWIN, op.cit. 
p.224. 
182 Srebrenica Report, op.cit p.811415. 
183 For the continuing defence of Zepa by the Bosnian military at the time of the London 
Conference, see ROHDE, op.cit. p.325. 
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by General Janvier in Zagreb who pointed out that the London 
Conference had made no mention of force to deter attacks on Zepa. 184 
On July 25, following an agreement reached with local Zepa forces, there 
was a mass Serb-orchestrated evacuation. The Bosnian government 
forces withdrew into Serbia, surrendering themselves to VJ forces. 18S 
Apologists for British government policy on Zepa later insisted that its 
collapse was inevitable. 186 The UN Srebrenica Report disagreed, 
however, asserting that Zepa fell because 'the international community 
lacked the capacity to do anything other than to accept its fall as a fait 
accompli'. 187 
Major had achieved another victory over his Western allies, however. For 
Britain, the protection of Gorazde where British troops were stationed 
was essential. The conference ultimatum took care of this concern, while 
appearing to be more forceful than in fact it was. 
The British victory on this occasion was short-lived, however. On August 
4, the Croatian army launched a full-scale offensive against Serb-held 
territory in Krajina, and took over its administrative centre in Knin. 
200,000 Serbs fled from Croatia, many to Banja Luka,leading to the 
further expulsion of non-Serbs there. 188 The HV action resulted in 
relieving pressure on Bosnian government forces in Bihac, and 
facilitated their subsequent defeat of the forces loyal to Fikret Abdic 
whose defences collapsed. along with his recently established 'Republic 
of Western Bosnia'. 
184 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.811417. 
18S As of November 1999, there were still 118 persons unaccounted for from Zepa.lbid. p.84/431. 
186 See, for instance, GOW, 1997. op.cit. p.273. 
187 Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p.94/487. 
188 Srebrenica Report, Ibid. p.84/433-4. 
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The Croatian army also managed to dislodge the VRS forces from the 
territory between the Bihac enclave and Western Herzegovina. For the 
first time during the war, the Bosnian Serbs began to take significant 
losses. 
Operation Storm had a major impact on the Bosnian war, and was 
quietly welcomed by the Clinton administration, although not by the 
British government and EU envoy, Carl Bildt. 
Operation Deliberate Force 
On August 28,37 people were killed and over 90 wounded by five 
rounds fired from Serb-held territory near Lukavica. After consultation 
with the commander of NATO Southern Command, General Smith 
turned the 'key', and operation Deliberate Force began on August 30, 
targeting the Serb air defence system, ammunition bunkers and heavy 
weapons positions. Despite threats, the expected 'massive retaliation' by 
Serb forces did not materialise. 189 General Mladic acknowledged the 
'considerable damage' to Bosnian Serb facilities, and the vulnerability of 
'Republika Srpska' as a result of the NATO action, and sought peace 
talks. Within three days, General Smith was able to open the land route 
into Sarajevo, linking the centre with Butmir to local civilian traffic, 
without clearance or inspection. Bosnian Serb Deputy Momcilo 
Krajisnik's warning of 'heavy consequences' if the roads were opened 
without Serb consent Smith countered with the threat that any attempt 
by Serbs to interfere with road traffic would be met by 'disproportionate 
force'. For first time since May 1992, civilian vehicles were moving 
unimpeded between Sarajevo and the outside world. The threat of force 
had worked, and the siege was at an end. 190 
189 Ibid. p.86/444. 
190 Ibid. p.87/450. 
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The UN Secretariat now took a different view of NATO air power, 
reflecting the change in international policy, and emphasized that the 
UNPROFOR decisions were consistent with UNSeR 836, and a 
precondition for UNPROFOR 'to perform its humanitarian mandate and 
to uphold responsibility to deter attacks against safe areas'. 191 There was 
a different nuance, however. When a spokesperson for General Smith 
stated that 'the aim is to cripple the BSA war machine and render its 
capabilities so devalued that General Mladic is forced to negotiate', the 
Secretariat objected, instructing the UN in Sarajevo to curb its 'verbal 
bloodlust'. 192 The same spokesperson continued, however: 
We're into peace enforcement here. peace enforcement is not 
negotiating ... We've seen that; it has failed over the years here. We are 
saying "If you do not do this, no conditions, you continue to get 
bombed". 193 
General Smith later stated that 
As a result of our enforcement action UNPROFOR abandoned its 
peacekeeping mission - at least in the Sarajevo area. We remain, for 
the time being, in the position of combatants; coercing and enforcing 
our demands on the BSA.194 
Smith also proposed that the UNPROFOR rules of engagement be 
altered. On September 6 NATO began to target Bosanski Brod in the 
north, prompting further criticism from the UN Secretariat. 195 On 
September 10, NATO suppressed the Serb air defence system in the 
Banja Luka area provoking, for the first time, a strong Russian protest. 
On September 13, a cease fire agreement was signed by the Bosnian Serb 
191 Ibid. p.88/452. Italics in original. 
192 Ibid. p.88/453-4. 
193 Ibid. p.88/454. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid. p.88/452-5. 
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leadership and, since compliance appeared satisfactory, Operation 
Deliberate Force formally ended on September 21, making way for a 
peace settlement at Dayton, Ohio, two months later. 196 
Conclusion 
Several factors combined in 1995 to bring about a major shift in the 
international approach to the Bosnian war, in both military and political 
terms. Lt. General Sir Rupert Smith, the new British UN commander, 
broke the UNPROFOR tradition of Serb appeasement introduced in 1992 
by General Lewis Mackenzie and continued by Smith's predecessor, 
General Sir Michael Rose, and the Croatian and Bosnian forces were 
empowered through the partial US waiving of the UN arms embargo. 
Meanwhile, the undermanned VRS forces were experiencing increasing 
difficulty in maintaining the front lines. The Croatian offensive in 
Western Slavonia, where Krajina Serb forces were routed in under two 
days, was a foretaste of what lay ahead. Also, the new French 
presidency, with Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac replacing Francois 
Mitterand, heralded a new era in France's Balkans policy, reflecting to 
some extent the fresh approach at UNPROFOR headquarters in 
Sarajevo. These changes resonated little in Whitehall, however. While 
British government ministers expressed verbal support for General 
Smith's call for air strikes on Serb positions, they also stressed that the 
new 'theatre force' being despatched to Bosnia was for UNPROFOR 
protection only, and not intended for combat action. The British 
position was now growing untenable, however, as the maintenance of 
UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina on its existing mandate was 
increasingly challenged on all sides. 
From the fall of Srebrenica onwards, it was mainly a damage limitation 
exercise. Britain had temporarily forfeited its 'special relations' status 
196 For the Dayton Accords, see map 5, p.352. 
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with the United States, it had lost France's support at the UN Security 
Council, and it had lost direct control of the situation on the ground, as 
Lt. General Rupert Smith determined to confront the Bosnian Serbs. 
Finally, the policy of looking to Serbian President Milosevic as the key to 
the successful management of the Bosnian crisis had, in Srebrenica, 
backfired. Britain's attempt to maintain the status quo, including the 
continuation of UN PROF OR on the same limited mandate, and the 
illusion of a progressive peace process, was overtaken by developments 
on the ground and in other Western capitals. France, rebuffed over 
Srebrenica and Gorazde, and with a French president anxious to restore 
the reputation of the French army sorely tested in a three-year abortive 
peacekeeping role, resolved to withdraw its UN troops at the earliest 
opportunity. 
British government ministers gradually adjusted to the new situation, 
while insisting that UNPROFOR remain and uphold the relativist policy 
of 'guilt equivalence', its non-combat role especially important while 
British troops remained in Gorazde. The requirement to focus on the 
security of Gorazde dominated the London Conference and implied the 
tacit sanctioning of VRS attacks on other enclaves. This led to a VRS 
onslaught on Bihac which, ironically, hastened the Croatian military 
action, both in Krajina and Bihac, in alliance with the ABiH, reSUlting in 
the defeat of the VRS forces besieging the enclave. 
United States policy was also becoming more focused, as President 
Clinton found it increasingly difficult to sustain a credible defence 
against an eventual lifting of the arms embargo which would lead to 
French, and possibly British, withdrawal involving US troops in an 
opposed ground operation. At Clinton's request, the Senate and 
Congress had withheld a resolution on the arms embargo till after the 
London Conference. The embargo vote just days later resolved Clinton 
to act to end the war, either through negotiation or air strikes, in 
conjunction with Bosnian and Croat forces on the ground. In this, he 
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had the support of General Smith, the UN Commander in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, as well as France, Croatia and, of course, the Bosnian 
government. 
Many analysts critical of Clinton's policy have argued that the US was 
always in a position to act to end the war. This was technically true, but 
Clinton was a leader who strove to maintain a consensus, particularly 
within NATO, and was loath to order air strikes with allied troops on the 
ground. Lifting the arms embargo without air support would have risked 
the East/West confrontation so many feared. It would also have implied 
a direct US responsibility in the final outcome, a burden which Clinton 
had thus far avoided. The shift in the military balance on the ground, 
however, which the US had worked to bring about since late 1993, plus 
the shift in French policy, created the conditions for air strikes to assist 
in a political settlement. 
Britain, on the other hand, had lost ground on both its twin pillars of 
policy. The UNPROFOR operation, despite the Defence Secretary's 
protestations to the contrary, had lost its raison d'etre after Srebrenica 
and Zepa. And the peace process could not be redeemed by the 
endeavours of the loyal but ineffectual EU envoy, Carl Bildt. General 
Smith, for months opposing British policy, now had the support of the 
US and France, and the authority on behalf of the UN to turn the dual 
key. When, on August 28, a Serb mortar hit the Sarajevo Markale 
market killing over 30 civilians, the British UN commander led an 
international ground and air assault which, paradoxically, brought to an 
end the British-led international policy which had prevailed for four 
years. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has focused on the specific role of Britain in Yugoslavia and 
its successor states between 1991 and 1995, and has demonstrated that 
Britain led the international 'consensus' at crucial points in the war, 
frustrating initiatives aimed at effective military intervention or 
otherwise redressing the military imbalance on the ground, and that this 
resulted in prolonging the war, and promoting the interests of the 
Belgrade and Pale regimes. 
Britain was particularly well placed to assume a dominant European 
role in addressing a conflict in its south-eastern flank. As an influential 
member of the European Community and the Western European Union, 
Britain also enjoyed a privileged status within NATO as a leading 
European military and nuclear power, with special links to the United 
States and, as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security 
Council, had disproportionate influence within the UN in regard to 
issues such as the arms embargo, sanctions and other resolutions 
related to the Balkans war, as well as the appointment of senior UN 
personnel on the ground. 
The breakup of Yugoslavia came about almost simultaneously with that 
of the Soviet Union, and brought another dimension to Britain's vision of 
its future in the aftermath of the Cold War. Initially, Britain strove, 
along with other European states and the United States, to hold 
Yugoslavia together. The balkanisation of the SFRJ was not in anyone's 
interests, especially when much of the world was contending with the 
fallout from the Gulf War, and the wider Middle East issues, as well as 
grappling to address the even greater implications of the Soviet 
disintegration. Once the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation seemed 
inevitable, and was recognised by most international institutions as 
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having disintegrated, Europe's leaders were, above all, concerned to 
prevent a balkanisation of Europe itself, where European powers lined 
up on different sides, as in the lead-up to World War I. 
The European Community took over the management of the Yugoslav 
war on behalf of the international community during 1991, when most 
of the crucial decisions which were to govern international policy in 
Yugoslavia and its successor states till the summer of 1995 were made. 
These included the imposition of a blanket UN arms embargo over 
Yugoslavia, the decision (publicly declared) to reject international 
military intervention to halt the hostilities, and the institution of a 
permanent peace conference, with a mandate to achieve a negotiated 
settlement acceptable to all sides, without recourse to military action, in 
all of which Britain had a leading role. British Foreign Secretary Douglas 
Hurd rejected out of hand the French proposal, first made in July 1991, 
to despatch a WEU force to Croatia, as well as the later Franco-German 
approach to the UN to intervene militarily, which was also supported by 
Italy and a number of other countries. 
The French and British positions were slowly to converge, however, 
initially at the prompting of World War II veteran and former 
Conservative MP Sir Fitzroy Maclean who assumed a mediation role 
between Belgrade and Paris. In November 1991, Britain and France 
steered a Belgrade proposal through the UN Security Council to deploy a 
UN peacekeeping force to Croatia within the Serb enclaves, which later 
became known as the 'Vance Plan', after a former US Secretary of State, 
Cyrus Vance who, under the mantle of the UN, fronted the plan. It was a 
measure which suited the objectives of the Belgrade regime, but not 
those of the Croatian government which recognised the plan as one 
which indefinitely froze Serb territorial gains acquired by force. 
The subsequent (allegedly premature) recognition of Croatia and 
Slovenia was based on the broad recommendations of the Badinter 
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Commission, a Franco-German initiative in which Britain was 
represented, but did not head. As has been demonstrated, however, 
international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia as sovereign states was 
almost inevitable after Milosevic's rejection of the peace plan, and did 
not confer on the new state many of the benefits normally anticipated, in 
particular territorial integrity, and the right to self defence. Croatia was 
recognised on the understanding that approximately one third of its 
territory would be occupied on a long-term basis by UN troops whose 
mandate it was to protect the Serb-held enclaves, yet who were not 
equipped to assist in the return of non-Serb refugees to their homes. 
Similarly, the international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 
1992 was not accompanied by any international commitment to defend 
its borders and prevent the JNA from transferring its arsenal and 
manpower from Croatia into Bosnia which, together with the RAM 
project, resulted in an acute military imbalance in that state. 
The deployment of UN troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina, requested by 
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic (and advised by an EC monitoring 
team) in late 1991 as a preventive measure before the onset of war, was 
rejected by the United Nations in January 1992 on the recommendation 
of a British diplomat, Marrack Goulding, then UN Under Secretary-
General for political affairs, following his visit to Sarajevo and Belgrade. 
Goulding made a second visit to Bosnia in May the same year when the 
war was already in progress, again advising the UN Secretary-General 
against a UN operation there. It was not until the following autumn, by 
which time the VRS forces, with the assistance of the JNA and Serbian 
paramilitaries, had already taken control of around 70% of Bosnian 
territory, that the British government initiated a proposal to deploy a 
small number of lightly-armed UN troops into the war zone in a non-
combat role, to escort humanitarian aid. The decision was taken during 
the British EC Presidency at the time of the London Conference. As the 
UN Srebrenica Report later emphasized, however, this was not a 
problem with a humanitarian solution. The Report concluded that, 
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while lives may have been saved by the UNPROFOR mission, their work 
could not fully redeem a policy that was, at best, a half measure, and 
that a systematic and ruthless campaign such as the one conducted by 
the Serbs would view the UN humanitarian operation, not as an 
obstacle, but as an instrument of its aims. In fact, the UNPROFOR 
mission in Bosnia, which ensured the continuation of the UN arms 
embargo and provided potential hostages, was essential to the success of 
the Serb strategy for, while able to conduct and, with relative ease, win a 
battle on one front at a time the Serb forces, notwithstanding their 
superior armoury, and financial and other support from Belgrade, found 
it increasingly difficult by 1995 to defend all the frontlines, as the 
Croatian and Bosnian armies became more professional, and acquired a 
degree of heavy weaponry. 
A sufficiently robust UN force deployed within the UN-declared 'safe 
areas' would have conveyed the message to the Serb leadership that the 
UN was serious in intent to fulfill the terms of the resolution. Yet, when 
three options for troop deployment were placed before the Security 
Council by the French representative, Britain insisted on the 'minimalist' 
option, rejecting offers from a number of Islamic countries willing to 
contribute on the basis that they were unacceptable to the Bosnian Serb 
leadership. Neither Britain nor France were themselves prepared to offer 
further troops. France, unlike Britain, however, had already committed 
several thousand troops in two 'safe areas' (Sarajevo and Bihac). Britain 
and France also wielded considerable control over UNPROFOR on the 
ground, both with regard to decision-making and the crucial routing of 
aid supplies, as noted by UN troop contributors from smaller countries. 
Two of the five UN commanders deployed to Bosnia during the war were 
from Britain, as well as several high-ranking British army officers who 
exercised considerable control on the ground. One instance of this was 
when the British Chief of Staff, Brigadier Vere Hayes, second in 
command to the Belgian UN Commander, Francis Briquemont, acted to 
foil a NATO initiative for air strikes over Mt. Igman in 1993. 
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Lt. General Sir Michael Rose, who succeeded General Briquemont as UN 
Commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina from January 1994, was one of the 
few UN commanders in Bosnia to last the full term of his contract. 
General Rose did not confine his duties in Bosnia to soldiering, however, 
but also took an active part in the negotiating process. In this, he had 
the full support of the British government, but soon came into 
confrontation with NATO leaders, to the point that NATO eventually 
threatened to withhold details of its flight plans from General Rose, 
fearing they might be disclosed to the Serbs and risk the safety of NATO 
aircrews. During his term of service in Bosnia, General Rose acted to 
limit NATO's response to Serb attacks on three of the UN 'safe areas', on 
at least one occasion in direct liaison with the Ministry of Defence, his 
actions by default encouraging the Serbs in the belief that they could 
continue to defy, with relative impunity, the organisation which General 
Rose was purportedly representing, i.e. the United Nations. Rose's 
successor, Lt. General Rupert Smith, who proposed a more 
confrontational policy in response to Serb offensives, did not receive the 
same degree of support from the British government and, in late May 
1995, was stripped of his authority to request NATO air strikes until 
after the fall of Srebrenica, by which time Whitehall was no longer able 
to defend its non-combat position and the myth of Serb military 
invincibility, which had been used throughout the war to frustrate 
effective military action, was finally crushed. 
The international peace process was another area where Britain 
exercised considerable control, through two former British foreign 
secretaries, Lord Carrington and Lord Owen, who consecutively held the 
chair of the Hague, Brussels and Geneva peace conferences from 
September 1991 through to June 1995 (David Owen as EC envoy, in 
conjunction with Cyrus Vance and, later, Thorwald Stoltenberg, 
representing the UN). The Cutileiro/Carrington Plan (or Lisbon 
Agreement), a proposal for the cantonisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
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based mainly on ethnic considerations, and presented to Bosnia's 
leaders in February 1992, was often later cited (not least by apologists of 
the Milosevic and Pale regimes) as the last chance for peace. Such a plan 
if implemented would, however, have entailed the displacement of huge 
numbers of civilians, in order to bring about the ethnic cohesion 
envisaged by Serb (and some Croat) leaders as an acceptable basis for a 
settlement. Nor was there a clear conception on the part of international 
proponents of the plan of how it would have worked in practice. Also not 
taken into account was the fact that the Bosnian Serb leaders, in 
conjunction with the Milosevic regime in Belgrade, had already created 
the political and military conditions for a fullscale war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and, particularly in light of the international acceptance of 
the assault on Vukovar and its aftermath, probably concluded that at 
that juncture there was more to be gained from war than peace. Despite 
the stated objective of the various peace plans proposed, to devise a 
formula which would preserve a multi-ethnic coexistence, each 
successive plan after the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in fact provided less 
sovereignty for the recognised Bosnian government, the only side which 
supported multi-ethnicity. The Vance-Owen plan, while acknowledging 
the principles of the London Conference, contained no provisions for 
implementation of its controversial aspects, particularly the withdrawal 
of Serb troops from 27% of captured territory and the return of refugees. 
The lack of commitment on the part of the British government to 
implementing the plan was evident at a Foreign Affairs Committee 
meeting shortly after the plan was publicly aired, when Foreign 
Secretary Douglas Hurd, under close questioning, was forced to admit 
that implementation was a matter for the parties concerned, 'based on 
people's perception of self-interest', but would not be imposed. 
Subsequent peace plans accepted the de facto partition of Bosnia-
Herzegovina into national territories. The Owen/Stoltenberg Plan, which 
was essentially a Serbian/Croatian creation, was put forward for 
international consideration by the ICFY co-chairs, Owen and Stoltenberg 
but, predictably, rejected by the Bosnian government. The Contact 
343 
Group plan, formulated after the US brokered Bosniac-Croat Federation, 
appropriated half of Bosnia's territory to a third of its population. This 
plan was used as the basis for the Dayton Agreement in late 1995, when 
the newly-ratified Serb Republic was still effectively (albeit not officially) 
led by indicted war criminal, Radovan Karadzic. 
Until late August 1995, most of the main decision-making was 
conducted through the UN Security Council, which also controlled the 
use of force in Bosnia-Herzegovina from mid 1993 through the so-called 
'dual key' arrangement between the UN and NATO, effectively 
neutralising the latter. Of the five Permanent Members of the Council, 
China throughout the early 1990s maintained its 'neutral' stance 
adopted after the 1949 Revolution, and Russia, while assuming an 
increasingly prominent role in international policy during the Bosnian 
war in endeavouring to retain its world power status, did not during that 
period act to veto decisions reached within the Council, its essential 
passivity evident not least at the time of the combined UN/NATO action 
in Bosnia in September 1995. 
The United States, as the only remaining superpower in the aftermath of 
the Cold War (as well as the main financial contributor to the UN), was 
perceived by many as the crucial player in determining international 
policy in the region. There were a number of factors during this time, 
however, which acted as constrictors on US policy, both in the Bush and 
Clinton administrations. War broke out in Croatia just months after the 
Gulfwar, and in the declining days of the Soviet empire, at a time when 
the international emphasis was on preempting any development which 
might further destabilise the Soviet Union, or act as a precedent in 
triggering its breakup. Also, George Bush was approaching a general 
election campaign which he was loath to fight on an international, and 
possibly unwinnable, ticket, and was content to defer to the European 
Community which, in the leadup to the Maastricht Treaty, was keen to 
prove its prowess in resolving a European war. Bill Clinton, who in 
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opposition had campaigned on a pledge to take tougher action in the 
Bosnian war, adopted a more pro-active position on assuming the US 
presidency, developing what became known as a 'lift-and-strike' policy, 
namely, the removal of the arms embargo against the Bosnian 
government, accompanied by air strikes on Serb positions. This initiative 
was significantly compromised, however, following the visit of US 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher to European capitals in early May 
1993, starting with Britain where his proposals were rebuffed with 
disdain by a full complement of senior ministers. The United States 
subsequently supported a draft UN Security Council resolution to lift the 
arms embargo from the Bosnian government, which was defeated with 
six votes in favour and nine abstentions, including that of Britain. The 
Unites States also attempted to use NATO air power against the Serb 
positions, most notably during the Igman crisis in August 1993, and 
again in the 'safe areas' of Sarajevo, Gorazde and Bihac the following 
year. It was during the Bihac crisis, however, that the US was again 
forced to withdraw its support for air strikes. Faced with a new Serb air 
defence system and the implacable resistance of Britain in particular, to 
strategic (as opposed to tactical) NATO air strikes, the US was virtUally 
faced with the choice of defending the UN 'safe areas' in Bosnia or 
preserving the Atlantic Alliance. It opted for the latter but worked 
simultaneously towards balancing the forces on the ground in Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, through a partial relaxation of the arms 
embargo on the Adriatic, and implicit endorsement of a training scheme 
for the Croatian and Bosnian armies, under the agency of retired 
American military officers. This, and the concomitant rapidly 
diminishing morale amongst VRS forces, were not inconsiderable factors 
in persuading Serb leaders to acquiesce in a negotiated political 
settlement at Dayton. Critics of US policy during the Bosnian war often 
did not take full account of this, or of the major US diplomatic 
contribution to ending the war in Central Bosnia. 
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France, the other European 'P5' member on the UN Security Council, is 
often perceived, especially within the Bosnian Federation, as having led 
international policy on the war, together with Britain. To a large extent, 
as has been demonstrated, this was the case. France, like Britain, was 
a major contributor to UNPROFOR, its contribution (and casualty toll) 
until 1995 exceeding that of Britain, which did not have troops deployed 
in any of the 'safe areas' until 1994. France also argued strenuously to 
maintain the UN arms embargo over all the Yugoslav successor states. 
The pro-Serb culture within British army circles, as well as amongst 
academic experts, was also evident in France which had traditionally an 
even stronger reputation for Serbophilia than the UK. On the other 
hand, the French government (like that of the United States) had to 
contend with a relatively vocal opposition throughout the war, which 
was not confined to party politics but extended to the intelligentsia and 
NGOs working in the area. Most significantly, however, France's 
objectives at the time were somewhat different from those of Britain, one 
of its main concerns being to promote the concept of European defence, 
to build a strong European army within the WEU and achieve a greater 
measure of independence from the United States, whilst maintaining its 
ambivalent role within NATO. France, therefore, sought involvement at 
the highest level in the leadership of European unity in the Balkan war, 
including full participation in 'peacekeeping' operations on the ground. It 
was also concerned to associate itself with the dominant Yugoslav 
partner, Serbia, as a useful ally in any postwar European configuration, 
and to counteract German hegemony in the Balkans. For, whilst in 
accord with Germany on the necessity to centralise power structures 
within the EC/EU, France had military ambitions beyond those of 
Germany, which was confined by constitutional restrictions imposed 
after World War II. Consequently, during the Bosnian war in particular, 
France was to play something of a 'balancing' role, mostly supporting 
the UK within the UN Security Council but seeking, where opportune, to 
assume a dominant position within the European decision-making 
framework. For these and other reasons, France's Balkans policy during 
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the early 1990s was less consistent than that of Britain. Differences 
were evident on the issue of imposing the UN air exclusion zone over 
Bosnia-Herzegovina which France pressed for in late 1992. France also 
initiated the NATO ultimatum threatening air strikes on Serb positions, 
in February 1994. In proposing three options for UN troop deployment to 
the 'safe areas', the French representative supported the additional 
deployment of up to 12,500 troops, as opposed to the minimalist, 
symbolic level of deployment proposed by Britain. The relative flexibility 
of French policy, vis-a.-vis that of Britain, was most evident, however, 
when Jacques Chirac took over the French presidency from Francois 
Mitterand in May 1995, reversing within days the appeasement policy of 
his predecessor. The ease and speed with which France's Balkans policy 
shifted to a more confrontational stance suggested, inter alia, a lack of 
the institutional entrenchment which had marked Britain's Balkans 
policy throughout the war. 
In tracing the British role, particular attention has been paid in this 
study to government ministers' presentation of the issue in the House of 
Commons and through evidence at parliamentary Select Committees. 
Several factors became apparent. Firstly, despite Britain's leading role in 
international policy in the Balkans, as one of the main troop and aid 
contributors, the opportunities for informed parliamentary debate on the 
issue were few, as pointed out by a number of backbenchers from across 
the political spectrum with differing views of the war. British ministers 
also misled the House of Commons on a number of occasions in relation 
to crucial aspects of the international debate and developments on the 
ground claiming falsely, for instance, that all expert advice from the 
military and diplomatic corps was against intervention in Bosnia, a 
claim refuted by senior NATO officials, and exposed by backbench MPs. 
Ministers also perpetrated the myth that it would take several hundred 
thousand troops to defeat the Serbs. The US 'lift-and-strike' policy, on 
the other hand, was never seriously considered, and attempts to raise 
the subject in the House of Commons were routinely quashed by 
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ministers. The Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, the prime mover 
behind all the turmoil in the region, was portrayed as essential to the 
peace process, while the continuing role of Serbia in supporting, both 
militarily and financially, the VRS forces perpetrating the majority of the 
war crimes in Bosnia, was mostly overlooked, and even denied. British 
ministers also claimed repeatedly that the Bosnian war was a civil 
conflict. This had a manifold purpose and effect. It suggested a 
symmetry of guilt, ignored the origins of the war and the manner in 
which it was conducted on the ground and, at the same time, insinuated 
that the international community had less reason (and right) to 
intervene in the war, other than in a humanitarian and mediating 
capacity. There was also the question of terminology. Confusion arose 
over the loose, and possibly expedient, terms used to describe the 
UNPROFOR mission. The term 'peacekeeping', in reference to the role of 
the UN troops, was especially misleading since, despite assertions by 
British ministers and some army officers to the contrary, there was no 
peace to keep. It also conflicted with the original declared UNPROFOR 
role, namely, to escort UN aid. As it soon became evident that aid was 
often not reaching the isolated areas most at risk, was consistently 
below the UN estimated required monthly target, and was frequently 
used to feed the armies, particularly the VRS which manned most of the 
checkpoints, it became clear that either UNPROFOR should withdraw in 
the acknowledgement that the mandate was unachievable, or its 
mandate should be changed. In fact, neither occurred, the troops 
instead acquiring the nebulous, and inaccurate, designation of 
'peacekeepers', which also suggested that the UN troops were performing 
a more vital role than was often the case. 
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None of the world powers or institutions emerged well from their 
respective roles in attempting to resolve the conflict in Yugoslavia and its 
successor states between 1991 and 1995. Through the use of empirical 
data, and with emphasis on the importance of the chronological order of 
events, this study concludes, however, that Britain distinguished itself 
from its major Western allies in its consistent endorsement of policies 
which froze, and even exacerbated, the imbalance of weaponry on the 
ground, leaving the Serbs with overwhelming military dominance, and 
effectively depriving Bosnia-Herzegovina of its right to self defence under 
the UN Charter. It helped to institute, and largely dominated, an 
international peace process geared to continuing negotiations with the 
architects of genocidal policies, while implicitly equating victims and 
perpetrators in a genocidal war. British ministers misled parliament on 
the nature of the war, the military invincibility of the Serbs, and on 
advice received from NATO officials and others which did not accord with 
the British position. Most crucially, Britain consistently obstructed 
initiatives by other states and institutions to intervene militarily at 
various points of the war from the summer of 1991 which, as official 
studies of international responsibility in the conflict have all concluded, 
was a major factor in prolonging the war and making possible the mass 
slaughter at Srebrenica, the event which, ironically, opened the way for 
the coordinated military action which finally brought the war to an end. 
In sight of the overwhelming evidence, it can be safely concluded that 
British foreign policy under the Major government was intellectually 
unsustainable, for it contained an overwhelming paradox between the 
policy aims, the means and the results, and morally corrupt in all too 
often distorting the issue of culpability. Pinning the British colours to 
the ability of the Belgrade regime to achieve or maintain Yugoslav unity 
not only caused the policy to fail but, in the process, wrought a great 
deal of turmoil and unnecessary destruction of life and property, and 
added to the instability in South Eastern Europe which, for a time, 
threatened to expand beyond the borders of the former SFRJ. 
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GLOSSARY 
Armija Bosne i Hercegovine [Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina] 
Bosnian Serb Army 
Common [EU] Foreign and Security Policy 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
European Community 
European Community Monitoring Mission 
European Union 
Foreign Affairs Committee 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica [Croatian Democratic 
Union Community] 
Hrvatska Vojska [Croatian Army] 
Hrvatsko Vijece Odbrane [Croatian Defence Council] 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
Joint Action Programme 
Jugoslovenska Narodna Annija [Yugoslav People's Army] 
Muslim Bosniac Party 
Ministry of Defence 
Military Professional Resources Inc. 
North Atlantic Council 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
No-Fly Zone 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
Republika Srpska 
Republika Srpska Krajina 
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RRF 
RTS 
SACEUR 
SAO 
SAS 
SDA 
SDS 
SFRJ 
SHAPE 
SPS 
SRSG 
TO 
UN 
UNPROFOR 
UNHCR 
UNSC 
VJ 
VOPP 
VRS 
WEU 
Rapid Reaction Force 
Radio Televizija Srbije (Serbian Radio and Television] 
Su preme Allied Commander Europe 
Srpske Autonomne Oblasti [Serbian Autonomous Regions] 
Special Air Service 
Stranka Demokratske Akcije [Party of Democratic Action] 
Srpska Demokratska Stranka [Serbian Democratic Party] 
Socijalistickafederalna republika Jugoslauije [Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
Socijalisticka Partija Srbije [Serbian Socialist Party] 
Special Representative to the UN Secretary General 
Teritorijalna Odbrana [Territorial Defence Force] 
United Nations 
United Nations Protection Force 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
United Nations Security Council 
Vojska Jugoslavije [Army of Yugoslavia) 
Vance-Owen Peace Plan 
Vojska Republike Srpske [Bosnian Serb Army) 
Western European Union 
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